

# The Russia–Ukraine War and Its Consequences on the Geopolitics of the World

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The Role and Place of Geopolitics in the Scientific System..... 1  
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Geopolitics belongs to the group of social-geographical sciences and is a part of political geography. They distinguish between traditional, new (geo economics), and the latest (geo philosophy) geopolitics. Traditional geopolitics emphasizes the military-political power of the state and the dominant role of geographical factors in the conquest of foreign territories. The new (geo-economics) focuses on the economic power of the states in contrast to the traditional one. The latest geopolitics, in which spiritual power dominates military and economic power, helps states to overcome traditional and economic determinism at the expense of expanding the basic factors in determining behavior in international relations.

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For the realization of foreign policy, defense and national security priorities, each country needs to work out an appropriate National Security and Military Strategy. A National Security Strategy or Policy (NSS or NSP) is a key framework for a country to meet the basic needs and security concerns of citizens, and address external and internal threats to the country. Military strategy involves using military resources such as people, equipment, and information against the opponent's resources to gain supremacy or reduce the opponent's will to fight, developed through the precepts of military science.

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The chapter assesses consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, both global and regional. It examines how the war shaped and reinforced the shifts in the balance of power; it also focuses on transformations of regional security architecture. A global competition of China and the US is examined as a context of the war; implications of the security strategy of such actors as NATO, the EU, and Germany are also examined. It concludes with considerations about whether wars are back in a realist-driven international politics.

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Russian foreign policy is one of the most complex issues to examine, in terms of its internal and external determinants. In this research brief, the author focuses on analyzing the foreign policy of Russia according to the following aspects: Geography, economy, groups of social interest, Russian political structure and mechanism of decision-making, international commonwealth and Russia, and comparative analysis of Russian and Soviet foreign political behavior. The author will analyze the significance of these factors and how much they've contributed to shaping the foreign policy of Russia as it is today. Since this research will be based on foreign policy analysis, the author will use academic articles, books, journals, and documents from government websites. It should be noted that the author will use qualitative and quantitative analysis. The researcher will use thematic analysis to explain the behavior of the Russian Federation, as well as events and the developments that contributed to the development of Russian foreign policy.

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Thirty-three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one thing is obvious: The resolution of several international crises still depends on relations between the West and Russia. Like it or not, this geopolitical situation is a fact which, however, Americans and Europeans have not been duly taken into consideration since 1989. This crisis, which has not stopped, experienced a more expansive phase on February 24, 2022: it is the Russian special military operation for some leaders in Ukraine, Russian interventionism for others, and the war in Ukraine for still others. It is particularly notable in the soaring prices of raw materials essential for the functioning of industries. The Ukrainian crisis has revealed the fragilities of the dependence of certain States and Unions on raw materials, but also certain military fragilities. A critical situation therefore prevails, and many hypotheses remain perceptible given the existence of several scenarios and possible balances. This insight analyzes the current geopolitical situation between blocs and considers a possible vision of the blocs by 2050.

## Chapter 6

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This study intends to analyze the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Belt and Road Initiative. As the Belt and Road Initiative is the President Xi Jinping's flagship foreign policy agenda, the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Belt and Road Initiative are worth discussing. Although the Russia-Ukraine war is a geopolitical event, the consequences of the war on geoeconomics could be seen. Through its six economic corridors the Belt and Road Initiative sets up trade, financial, people-to-people, and digital connectivities across the world. The Russia-Ukraine war disrupted connectivities across the regions that the Belt and Road Initiative aspires to set up. Especially, China's land connection to Europe through the Northern Route stalled because of war conditions. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine war damaged China's political, economic, and infrastructural linkages to European countries. The course of the war between Russia and Ukraine could have drastic results on the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative.



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The idea of a time being divided into two-time era in the form of B.C. and A.D. has been prevalent based on the life of Jesus Christ. An iconic messiah which had divided the global history into two different precincts. One before the birth of Christ and the other after his demise. Now the global Covid-19 pandemic could also be looked at exactly the same way. One where we could look at the similar way the world that existed before Covid-19 pandemic and the other that is now while we are still in the process and looking for a time period which may be considered as something post-Covid-19. This is why we are going back to the notion of dividing the era into two different times, to understand how the dynamics of geo-politics has changed especially post-Covid. Amidst all of this the Russia-Ukraine war spread out which created a huge impact on world politics. In this scenario of world politics, India has been a key player in the realm of geo-politics. The sudden rise of India has also provided the opportunity to play a role as a mediator in dynamics of Russia-Ukraine conflict.

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This study aims to examine the national roles Turkey adopted during Russia-Ukraine War. The national role concept was developed in the second half of the 20th century. Holsti carried the concept from sociology to international relations. According to this concept, every state plays a particular role that its leaders specify as appropriate for their countries. Turkiye also played a national role in the international arena during the war between Russia and Ukraine. These roles have been highlighted by their differing political aims. On the one hand, Turkey has desired to repair its political image as “aggressive.” Turkey adopted a mediator-integrator role between Putin and Zelensky. On the other side, Turkey didn’t reject its political maneuvers of recent times which formed in trajectory of being “independent” of western or Eurasian oriented policies. Turkey criticized Russia’s invasions acts. It also criticized NATO because it ruled out Russia’s existential concerns over NATO’s plans.

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Since the beginning of the conflict, Turkey, as a regional powerhouse, has remained intact in its position as the “honest broker.” In a nutshell, Turkey has been trying to consolidate a balance between the resurgence of Russian aggressiveness and the Western aspirations to protect Ukraine at all costs. For so many in the West, Turkish actions were defined as even damaging at some point to the causes of NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, Turkey’s role conception in this war is nothing new and rooted very well back to the earlier Republican experience with the Black Sea. In other words, Turkish foreign policy towards the Black Sea and Ukraine/Russia has always leaned toward a strategic behavior of balancing these significant powers. The latest act has been no different from a Turkish way of “sticking with the plan.” Therefore, deciphering the dynamics of this role is undoubtedly a must to undercover the geopolitical interest of Turkey from the region amid a fully-fledged war. This chapter proposes three related sections to understand and analyze the story’s Turkish side.

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*Akash Bag, Amity University, India*

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*Rinkey Sharma, Indian Institute of Legal Studies, India*

Numerous organizations have battled for global peace and stability since the end of World War II. The difficult situation in Ukraine turned into an armed conflict in February 2022 when Russia launched a military offensive, despite efforts by organizations and world leaders to prevent it. This essay will look at the conflict prevention efforts made by the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) concerning the war in Ukraine. The notion behind conflict prevention measures is supported by a study done by the Carnegie organization. The analysis findings show that both companies employ strategies from Carnegie's conflict-prevention theory. None of the organizations use all seven metrics from the theory, resulting in two different centers of gravity for the measurements. Conclusions can be taken from the various organizational types and their capacity to employ various tactics.

## Chapter 11

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*Glen Segell, The University of Cambridge, UK & The University of the Free State, South Africa*

This chapter examines the geopolitics of the Regime of the Straits, (the Montreux Convention 1936), governing the Turkish Straights connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It is on the agenda following the military attack launched by Russia on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russia initiated a naval blockade of Ukrainian ports. The Convention prevents countries outside the Black Sea area from sending ships to break the blockade. In July 2022, an agreement brokered by the United Nations and Turkey was reached for limited exports of some products as many countries worldwide rely on Ukrainian grain, and without it, there would be hundreds of millions of starving people. However, the same agreement also prevents any ships entering the Black Sea to import goods to Ukraine as Russia is concerned that foreign weapons could be shipped there. The Agreement must be renewed every 120 days and so remains at the fore of international attention and may well put to the test other similar international conventions.

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*Irakli Kervalishvili, Georgian Technical University, Georgia*

Russia-Ukraine war and sanctions, which have been adopted against Russia, have seriously affected on the socio-economic development of Russia and world economy in general. In 2022, GDP of Russia reduced by about 2.1%, but after the entrance into force the sanctions in the field of energy, the damage for Russian economy in the beginning of 2023 have been increased significantly. First of all, those sanctions affected on the increasing the budget deficit of Russia, which prevailed 30 billion USD within the first three months of 2023.

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*Simant Shankar Bharti, University of Warsaw, Poland*

*Deepen Bista, University of Warsaw, Poland*

Russian aggression has been once again triggered towards Ukraine after 2014 but this time it has come with a more catastrophic collapse of a democratic country. Russia attacked Ukraine on 24 February 2022 resulting in a mass migration of Ukrainian citizens towards Polish borders and other European nations. As to data, most war refugees fled to Poland, and the Polish government and its citizen welcomed most of them. This chapter explores the Polish role in the management of Ukrainian refugees and in providing them with facilities for immediate integration into society. Although Poland is frequently regarded as a country that wants to be a ‘solidarity superpower’, the article also analyses the status of Polish facilitation of Ukrainian war refugees. Recently, the Polish government regarded its vision on migration and refugee accommodation as ‘flexible solidarity’. Likewise, qualitative content and discourse analysis are applied to generate Poland as a ‘solidarity superpower’. The initial finding indicated that Poland has gained more advantages in being a regional player in Europe.

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In the 21st century, information is easily disseminated using various technologies. At this stage, all such means are “preoccupied” with spreading the information about the Ukraine-Russia war. In the wake of this war, there is even more interest in what EU foreign policy and security looks like. The chapter serves to discuss this issue in detail. It also describes whether the current war has changed the EU’s attitude towards foreign policy and security. The sources that provide the latest information on the issue from time to time, as well as the opinions of non-member countries and other organizations about the attitude of the European Union, are discussed in the chapter.

### **Chapter 15**

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*Akash Bag, Amity University, India*

*Samieekcha Subba Limboo, North Bengal University, India*

*Ashika Pradhan, Symbiosis Law School, Symbiosis International University (Deemed), Pune, India*

The European Union (hereinafter EU) has grown more reliant on Russian gas in recent decades. Multiple geopolitical disputes in Ukraine simultaneously affected gas relations and placed the country’s independence under stress. This chapter aimed to examine the connection between reliance and geopolitical conflicts. This fascinating relationship was given a fresh perspective by examining it in the context of the interdependency and asymmetry theories. A unique case study, an abductive research method, was used to approach this challenge. As a result, the geopolitical problems in Ukraine are utilized to explain how reliance and conflict relate to one another. The primary factors examined were trade, reliance, and

sanctions. According to the analysis, there is a significant connection between an actor's economic and political goals and how they affect reliance. It can be concluded that there is a connection between the geopolitical unrest in Ukraine and the EU's reliance on Russian gas.

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## Preface

As editor of this edited reference book, it is my privilege to introduce a comprehensive analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war and its profound implications on the global geopolitical landscape. Geopolitics, a dynamic and ever-evolving concept, serves as a fluid prism through which we understand the shifts in power dynamics, socio-political changes, and economic influences within and among nations.

Wars, victorious or otherwise, have historically played a pivotal role in shaping geopolitical narratives. The aftermath of triumph binds a nation together, igniting a resurgence of national culture and often fueling aspirations for territorial and spiritual expansion into neighboring states. Paradoxically, defeat can also catalyze the creation and dissemination of geopolitical theories, as exemplified by Germany's experiences after the First and Second World Wars.

Therefore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 holds particular geopolitical significance. The conflict has united the world as never before, drawing attention to the dire consequences of this humanitarian crisis. As noted by Joe Biden, "NATO and the EU are more united than ever amid Russia's ongoing invasion" (Deutsche Welle, 2022). The war has resulted in a staggering number of internally displaced persons and refugees, surpassing 11 million people affected (ICRC, 2022). The ripple effects of this crisis have reverberated across Europe and beyond, posing significant challenges to nations grappling with the ensuing refugee influx.

The war in Ukraine also raises fundamental questions about Russia's regional hegemony, as Ukraine serves as the largest energy transit state in Europe. The geopolitical, economic, political, legal, military, and nuclear consequences of this conflict have far-reaching implications that warrant thorough examination. Consequently, this book aims to assess the current geopolitical conditions in the region and anticipate the future complications arising from the Russia-Ukraine war.

This comprehensive reference work offers a novel approach, delving deep into geopolitical theories that underpin the East-West confrontation and the clash between democracy and authoritarianism, as exemplified by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Moreover, it provides an in-depth analysis of the geopolitical, economic, military, security, and informational consequences of the war. We explore how these outcomes will reverberate throughout the regional and global security landscapes, with a particular focus on the Black Sea/Caspian Region.

The book also investigates the positions and policies of key geopolitical actors, such as the United States, the European Union, NATO, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and Japan. By examining their attitudes towards the war and their foreign policy priorities, we gain valuable insights into their respective geopolitical interests in the region and their broader implications for international security.

## **Preface**

This book is a vital resource for professionals and researchers across a range of disciplines, including political analysis, economics, defense, international politics, geopolitics, security, and military affairs. It will contribute to an enhanced understanding of global politics among governmental agencies, educational and scientific institutions, media outlets, civil societies, and business communities worldwide.

### **Key Concepts Explored in This Book**

#### Main Concepts of Geopolitics

Confrontation between Sea and Ground Geopolitical Powers, democracy and authoritarianism through the Russia-Ukraine War example

Geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic importance of the Black Sea Region

Geopolitical interests of the United States, European Union, Russia, NATO, China, Turkey, Iran, and Japan in the Black Sea Region and their attitudes towards the Russia-Ukraine War

Possible consequences of the war on World Politics

Possible impact of the war on the world economy

Possible impact of the war on International Security

We hope that this edited reference book will serve as an authoritative and thought-provoking resource for scholars, policymakers, and individuals seeking a comprehensive understanding of the far-reaching consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war on the geopolitics of the world.

### **Organization of this Book**

Chapter 1 explores the different branches of geopolitics, including traditional, new (geo-economics), and the latest (geo-philosophy) perspectives. It delves into how traditional geopolitics emphasizes military-political power and geographical factors in territorial conquest, while new geopolitics emphasizes economic power. The latest geopolitics introduces the dominance of spiritual power over military and economic power, challenging traditional and economic determinism in international relations.

Chapter 2 focuses on the development and implementation of National Security Strategies (NSS) and Military Strategies by countries to address their foreign policy, defense, and national security priorities. It highlights the significance of NSS and how military strategy employs military resources to gain supremacy or reduce the opponent's will to fight, drawing on principles of military science.

Chapter 3 assesses the global and regional consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It examines how the war has shaped the balance of power and transformed the regional security architecture. The chapter also considers the global competition between China and the United States as a contextual backdrop to the war, as well as the security strategies of NATO, the EU, and Germany. It concludes by discussing the resurgence of realist-driven international politics and the potential return of wars in this new geopolitical landscape.

Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of Russian foreign policy by considering various determinants, including geography, economy, social interest groups, political structure, decision-making mechanisms, international relations, and a comparative analysis with Soviet foreign policy. The chapter examines how these factors have shaped Russia's foreign policy today, utilizing qualitative and quantitative analyses based on academic articles, books, journals, and government documents.

## **Preface**

Chapter 5 examines the persistent importance of relations between the West and Russia in resolving international crises since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It discusses how this geopolitical situation, often overlooked since 1989, has been further intensified by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The chapter also explores the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the global economy, the vulnerabilities of states dependent on critical raw materials, and potential future scenarios and power balances between blocs by 2050.

Chapter 6 analyzes the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It explores the geoeconomic consequences of the war, particularly in disrupting trade, financial, people-to-people, and digital connectivities established by the BRI across regions. The chapter highlights how the war has stalled China's land connection to Europe through the Northern Route and damaged its political, economic, and infrastructural linkages to European countries, potentially altering the trajectory of the BRI.

Chapter 7 examines the dynamics of geo-politics post-COVID-19, particularly in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. It also explores India's rise as a key player in global geopolitics and its potential role as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The chapter highlights India's geopolitical interests and analyzes its positioning within the conflict, considering the shifting dynamics of world politics.

Chapter 8 investigates the national roles adopted by Turkey during the Russia-Ukraine war. It explores Turkey's attempts to repair its political image as "aggressive" while also pursuing independent policies outside Western or Eurasian orientations. The chapter delves into Turkey's mediator-integrator role between Putin and Zelensky, its criticism of Russia's invasion, and its simultaneous criticisms of NATO. By examining these roles, the chapter sheds light on Turkey's geopolitical interests and behaviors in the region.

Chapter 9 examines Turkey's historical strategy of balancing significant powers in the Black Sea and its application in the Russia-Ukraine war. It explores Turkey's role as an "honest broker" between Russian aggression and Western aspirations to protect Ukraine. The chapter highlights the continuity of Turkey's strategic behavior and analyzes its geopolitical interests amid the fully-fledged war.

Chapter 10 focuses on the conflict prevention efforts of the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in relation to the Ukraine war. It explores how these organizations employ strategies from Carnegie's conflict-prevention theory, analyzes their different approaches, and draws conclusions about their capacities and tactics for conflict prevention.

Chapter 11 examines the geopolitics of the Regime of the Straits, particularly the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the Turkish Straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It explores the implications of Russia's military attack on Ukraine for the Convention and analyzes the limitations it imposes on ships entering the Black Sea. The chapter sheds light on the ongoing international attention and challenges related to this convention.

Chapter 12 delves into the economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war and the sanctions imposed on Russia. It discusses the serious socio-economic impact of these sanctions on Russia and the global economy. The chapter highlights the reduction in Russia's GDP, the increase in budget deficit, and the wider implications for economic stability.

Chapter 13 focuses on Poland's role in managing Ukrainian war refugees in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war. It examines Poland's facilitation of refugee integration and analyzes the country's status as a "solidarity superpower." The chapter explores the challenges and advantages faced by Poland in this role, presenting a nuanced understanding of its regional contributions.

## **Preface**

Chapter 14 investigates the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on EU foreign policy and security. It examines how the war has influenced the EU's attitudes and actions in these areas, considering the opinions of non-member countries and other organizations. The chapter provides insights into the evolving stance of the EU and its engagement in foreign policy and security matters.

Chapter 15 explores the relationship between reliance on Russian gas and geopolitical conflicts in the context of EU-Russian gas trade. It investigates how economic and political goals of actors impact reliance and examines the connection between geopolitical unrest in Ukraine and the EU's reliance on Russian gas. The chapter analyzes trade, reliance, and sanctions as primary factors in this complex relationship.

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# Chapter 1

## The Role and Place of Geopolitics in the Scientific System

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Geopolitics belongs to the group of social-geographical sciences and is a part of political geography. They distinguish between traditional, new (geo economics), and the latest (geo philosophy) geopolitics. Traditional geopolitics emphasizes the military-political power of the state and the dominant role of geographical factors in the conquest of foreign territories. The new (geo-economics) focuses on the economic power of the states in contrast to the traditional one. The latest geopolitics, in which spiritual power dominates military and economic power, helps states to overcome traditional and economic determinism at the expense of expanding the basic factors in determining behavior in international relations.*

### **INTRODUCTION. GEOPOLITICS AS A SCIENCE. THE CONCEPT AND SUBJECT OF GEOPOLITICS**

Even scientists of the Ancient World noticed a natural connection between political activity (by which they primarily understood the acts of rulers) and the space of the Earth, where this activity unfolded. Indeed, is it possible to plan and even more so to carry out political measures without knowing the extent, area, topography, vegetation, climate, rivers - as water barriers and means of communication, the sea - as a special geographical factor in politics, etc.? Is it possible to achieve victory in a war, or even in one battle, without knowing and not using at least the main characteristics of the spatial factor and the specific terrain on which the opposing armies will fight, without having information about the economic power of the country and the military strength of the army? Moreover, one cannot count on retaining the occupied territory, Moreover, one cannot count on retaining the occupied territory, if there is no information about population – what is the number of people, density, other demographic characteristics, national character, etc.

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Thus, geopolitics is a determination of the success of political activity (peaceful and military) by geographical, historical, socio-psychological, ethnographic, and economic factors, as the relationship between the political and the Spatial-social, has existed for a long time. The term consists of two parts: “geo” means geographical in general, that is, the influence of geographical factors in the broadest sense of the word on the policy of the state. The main among these factors are:

- “ territory;
- “ geographical location, ie the location of the state on the continent;
- “ extent of borders, their position on natural or artificial borders;
- “ the presence of rivers as water barriers and means of communication;
- “ the position of the country about the sea, the length of the coastline, and the conditions for navigation;
- “ climate (cold, temperate, hot, arid, etc.);
- “ soils (to what extent they favor the development of agriculture, infrastructure, and industry);
- “ bowels, their wealth, the ability to ensure economic growth and social needs of the population;
- “ population, its size, density, social composition, and other characteristics (Heffernan, 1998).

At the end of the XX - the beginning of XXI century. the root “geo” acquired a second meaning. Now it is increasingly interpreted as a “planetary”, “global” dimension of politics, characterizing the relationship of superpowers or military blocs (USA and the USSR, NATO and the Warsaw Pact), as a “clash of civilizations” (A. Toynbee, S. Huntington) or as a change the general configuration of the world system, for example, from bipolar to mono- or polycentric.

The second part of the term - “politics” - in this context means the exercise of domination, the conquest of power, space, and its development. Recently, it has also been undergoing significant changes in the sense that modern actors of geopolitics are not so much eager to conquer and develop new territories, but rather strive to control the maximum possible spaces, and - and this is also a feature of modern geopolitics - to control not territories as a whole, but for the most part, the communication lines of these territories and flows (financial, commodity, labor, etc.), thereby maintaining the most favorable conditions for their development and prosperity (Chitadze, 2011).

In the classical period of development of the discipline (late 19th - early 20th century), when it acquired the characteristic features of science, emphasis was placed on the knowledge of the state as a living organism embodied in space (F. Ratzel, R. Kjellen). Modern geopolitics continues the study of states as actors in the geopolitical process, but taking into account the declining role of state bodies in modern international relations and the increasing importance of the UN, military-political blocs, regional international organizations, and economic and cultural international structures. Modern geopolitics includes both geopolitical statics (world hierarchy, statuses, and roles of subjects of world politics) and geopolitical dynamics (geopolitical processes, the changes of the geopolitical actors at the “chessboard” of the world) (Chitadze, 2011).

In the period of becoming geopolitics was an independent branch of knowledge, there was no common opinion about the fact, is geopolitics a science or only a method, possibility to understand the interrelations among the states in the process of spatial growth. For example, the author of the term “geopolitics” R. Kjellen defined it as “the science of the state as a geographical organism related to space (Kjellen, 1916).”

The opposing position was held by the prominent representative of the German classical school A. Grabowski, called geopolitics the “means of cognition,” the “method,” and by no means science, which has its subject, law, and place in the system of sciences (Chitadze, 2011). A recognized representative

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of the German school, K. himself. Even Haushofer was hesitant about defining the status of geopolitics, calling it sometimes “one of the sciences about the state,” and sometimes as “not the science but the approach to understanding the reality” (Chitadze, 2011).

Despite everything, the XIX and XX centuries. At the border, geopoliticians in their research have defined the object of geopolitics (the state as a living organism in its interaction with the natural environment) and the subject (the spatial laws of state growth). In the Manifesto of the Munich School, K. Haushofer defined geopolitics as “the doctrine of the connection of political processes with the earth” and as “the art capable of guiding practical politics” (Haushoffer, 1925). He called on geopoliticians to teach “geopolitical thinking” to the population and “geopolitical action” to politicians (Haushoffer, 1925).

American scientists, well known for their pragmatic views on any science, started to explain geopolitics as “doctrine and the practice – based on it” and as a “school of strategy”, the main purpose of which is to use the military machine for the occupation of the space, which has the strategic importance for the nation (Strausz-Hupe, 1942).

The French geopolitician J. In 1947, Gottman called geopolitics “a geographical interpretation of history adapted to the demands of Pan-Germanism” (Gottman, 1952).

Thus, in the classical period during the development and the terminology and definition of geopolitics, can be distinguished the following aspects:

- A science that has its subject of study, regularity, cognition - which has a certain place in the system of sciences, or a method of cognition of politics based on geographical factors;
- An objective scientific discipline or subjective ideological pseudoscience that justifies the conquest of “living space” (Chitadze, 2011).

In the postwar period, geopolitics mainly managed to overcome the problems related to its definition as an aggressive ideology and policy. Thus, geopolitics has become if not an independent science, any way to be together with other disciplines in the framework of political science.

### **Categories of Geopolitical Discipline**

Since the beginning of its independent existence, geopolitics has developed its categories and concepts. The most important of them is the concept of the state as a living organism: “... the state is an organism,” wrote F. Ratzel, “in which a certain part of the earth’s surface plays such a significant role that all the properties of the state are determined by the properties of the people and its territory” (Ratzel, 1897). In turn, the concept of the state follows Ratzel from the idea of the unity of the Earth as a planet, earthly nature, and humanity. The state, according to the scientist, is, as it were, a continuation of human society, it has two main functions - growth and development. The latter, being an expansion against other, weaker state organisms, is called vital energy (one of the basic concepts of Ratzel) of a growing state organism. To describe this expansion, Ratzel introduces the concept of “living space” (Lebensraum).

From the concept of the Ratzel state, K. Haushofer derives the category of *the border*, interpreting this concept very broadly. This is the dividing line between states, and the natural border separating climatic zones, and the coastline, and the delimitation of ethnic groups, confessions, civilizations: “Any useful and stable border is not only a political border, but also the border of many life phenomena, and she on its own becomes another vital (Haushofer, 1928).

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The main category of modern geopolitics has become geostrategy, its content also derives from Haushofer's ideas on geopolitical thinking and geopolitical action. At the same time, its abstract-theoretical aspect has retained the name - geopolitics, while the practical activity in our time is called - geostrategy. At the same time, the functions of geopolitics and geopolitical theory became: understanding the picture of world political variability, the interdependence of world political actors, the new generation or transformation of well-known geopolitical ideas, and the formation of geopolitical concepts and theories. Geostrategy is the implementation of geopolitical theories - which take the form of doctrines, programs, and concepts - in life (foreign policy, national security, etc.). In some cases, geostrategy is understood as a means of defining political, economic, and cultural dependencies (e.g., the US Pacific Geostrategy) or as a means of resolving foreign policy tasks (e.g., the US Geostrategy of Vietnam 1964-75). Understanding geopolitical (geostrategic) regions are equally important for modern geopolitics (Garafano, 2004).

*Furthermore, important for modern geopolitics represents the meaning of geopolitical (geostrategic) regions, and there are connected with the pan ideas of Haushofer, according to which the world is divided into the zone of influences. The examples of pan ideas implementation German scientists considered the creation of Pan American and Pan Pacific Unions, the Second and Third Internationals, also the "Pan European Plan".*

Specialists of Geopolitics (Z. Brzezinski, S. Cohen), dividing the world into *zones of influence* (a frequently used concept of geopolitics), prefer to use the above concepts to distinguish between the zones of influence of various "players" on the global "chessboard" (Brzezinski, 1997).

### **The Structure of Geopolitics and its Place in the System of Sciences**

Based on the division of geopolitics into theoretical and practical (geostrategic) components, the structure of modern geopolitics can be represented by the following formula: Theoretical Geopolitics – Geo-Political Science; and Practical, applied geopolitics - Geostrategy.

Based on the differentiation of geopolitical knowledge, geopolitics can be divided into several components. We are talking about the place of geopolitics in the system of sciences, interaction, and mutual influence, as well as borrowing research methods and terminology from related, closest scientific branches in terms of the subject of research and tasks.

According to the scale of the studied processes and phenomena, according to the geopolitical status of the actors, geopolitics is divided into *global, regional-continental, and regional-local* (Chitadze, 2011). In the first case, the world level of relations between superpowers, or world actors of geopolitics, is considered; regional-continental geopolitics, as it explores situations and processes in regions of a continental scale, highlighting its leaders and Continental actors in each part of the world. Finally, regional-local geopolitics deals with the problems of the regions of each country separately.

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*Table 1. Components of geopolitics*

<p><u>Geographic and Demographic Components:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Physical Geography</li> <li>- Political Geography</li> <li>- Economic Geography</li> <li>- Ethnic Geography</li> <li>- Demography</li> </ul>
<p><u>Historic and Political Components:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World History</li> <li>- History of Political Thought</li> <li>- Political Theory</li> <li>- History of International Relations</li> <li>- International Political Systems</li> <li>- Political systems of the World States</li> <li>- Religion and Politics</li> <li>- Ethnic policy</li> <li>- Regional Policy</li> </ul>
<p><u>Economic and Information Components:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World Economy</li> <li>- Economic Statistics</li> <li>- Marketing</li> <li>- Informatics</li> <li>- Communication Theory</li> <li>- Military Economics</li> </ul>
<p><u>Strategic-Military Component:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military Strategy</li> <li>- Maritime Strategy</li> <li>- Air War Strategy</li> <li>- Military Art History</li> <li>- Maritime Art History</li> <li>- To study the military potential of the State</li> </ul>

Source: Chitadze, 2011.

**State of Modern Geopolitics**

Modern geopolitics dates back to the end of World War II and the post-war reconstruction of the world. These historical events not only served to radically restructure the world and the geopolitical paradigm but also coincided with the invention of a weapon of enormous destructive power - the atomic bomb, which, together with the rocket launcher created somewhat later, began to play not only a military-strategic but also a geostrategic role.

Modern political scientists do not deny the connection between politics and a wide variety of spatial factors. First of all, we are talking about the natural-physical, geographical space, which, as Ratzel noted, consists of three spheres: the geosphere (land), the hydrosphere (water), and the atmosphere (air) (Ratzel, 1902). These spheres on the inhabited surface of the Earth (ecumene) intersect and interact most diversely and bizarrely. Indeed, the land is connected with water in various ways, forming the banks of rivers, lakes, swamps, seas, and oceans, as well as islands, peninsulas, capes, bays, bays, straits, and continents. The air environment, depending on latitude, solar activity, and terrain, creates a climate favorable or unfavorable for human activity: trade winds and monsoon winds with heavy rains or sultry sirocco from the Sahara, the additional volume of oxygen in the forest regions and its lack in Arctic and Antarctic regions, moderate temperature or dangerous for the people's life temperature at the equator.

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In addition, each of the three spheres in which human activity takes place must be considered in its entirety and complexity. This means that land as a geopolitical factor includes:

- .. sizes, areas of territories of the states;
- .. their relationship and interaction with the sea;
- .. climate (temperatures, rainfall, seasonality, other characteristics);
- .. the state of soils in terms of their fertility, the growth of certain crops;
- .. natural resources;
- .. freshwater reserves;
- .. the presence of rivers as sources of hydroelectric power, and water arteries as forces that maintain a natural balance.

Water environment as the second component of the geographic factor of policy:

- .. forms, in interaction with land, certain shapes and outlines of continents, islands, and coasts, giving them geopolitical benefits or inconveniences;
- .. includes the underwater environment with its underwater world, minerals, and opportunities for their development;
- .. creates convenience for fishing and fish farming, harvesting and breeding of sea animals, mollusks, pearls, etc.;
- .. enables shipping, trade, passenger transportation, tourism, etc.;
- .. accelerates the development of the so-called “sea” nations (Chitadze, 2011).

The air environment was mastered by mankind in the third place, after the development of land and sea. It enables:

- .. avoid obstacles in the form of the uneven ground;
- .. quickly overcome the open spaces of the sea;
- .. sharply increase the speed of movement;
- .. reach difficult and unreachable places on the earth’s surface;
- .. almost always lay a course in a straight line;
- .. increase the efficiency of studying the earth’s surface from previously unattainable heights;
- .. sharply increase the effectiveness of combat operations through massive bombardments and high-quality aerial reconnaissance;
- .. arrange fast passenger transportation, as well as transportation for political purposes (official visits of statesmen, exchange of delegations of parliamentarians, government, and public organizations, etc.) (Chitadze, 2011).

In the course of conquering the air environment, man rose “higher and higher”, and penetrated the upper layers of the atmosphere, bringing the development of the next, space environment closer.

Thus, the connection between politics and the physical world, with geography over the past two centuries (during which this connection has been closely studied by geographers, political scientists, and geopoliticians) has not only not weakened, but, moreover, has noticeably increased. If the politicians of the Ancient World spoke about the struggle between the Land and the Sea, and the geopolitics of the

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classical period also included the air environment in this ensemble, now outer space should be added there. The development of the space environment allowed the “space” powers:

- “ to strengthen and qualitatively improve the control of terrestrial space, making it truly global;
- “ increase the possibilities and efficiency of studying and further developing the surface, depths, and bowels of the Earth;
- “ create new, more powerful, and efficient laser weapons and space rockets used as carriers of nuclear weapons;
- “ to create new, space branches of science and technology;
- “ create a springboard for the exploration of the Moon and the planets of the solar system.

But that’s not all. Each sphere of this physical-cosmic factor of geopolitics has significantly expanded and deepened. The expansion of these areas was due to:

- “ development of the entire territory of the ecumene and transfer of its borders almost to the north and south poles;
- “ settlement of almost all more or less habitable islands, connection to the civilized life of their population;
- “ development of almost the entire water area of the World Ocean with the help of modern ships and other equipment;
- “ exploration of the air ocean by passenger liners, research, and military aircraft. A significant deepening of the study and use of the land, ocean, air, and space spheres occurred as a result of:
- “ further human penetration into the earth’s crust to extract the necessary underground resources and further explore the underground world;
- “ human immersion to ever greater depths of the ocean for peaceful and military purposes;
- “ assault on the upper layers of the atmosphere, which led to the blurring of the boundaries between the air and space environment and the invention of such devices as the “Shuttle” and “Buran” for flights in both environments;
- “ the gradual movement of humanity from the exploration of near-Earth outer space through the exploration of the planets of the solar system to the exit into the vastness of space (Chitadze, 2011).

We talked about the influence of the geo cosmic, physical, and felt factors on politics. But the latter to no lesser extent depends on non-physical, non-geographical, and not directly perceptible by the senses acting forces. We are talking about the connection of politics with social facts, i.e., such phenomena and processes that are generated within society, which are born through the interaction of people, social groups, or societies. Indeed, the relationship between states is largely determined (and the classics of geopolitics wrote about this) by such demographic indicators as:

- “ number and density of population;
- “ belonging to a given territory (autochthonous, newcomers in a tribe, modern migrants).

To this, from the point of view of modern demography, one should add such problems as:

- “ increase (decrease) in life expectancy;
- “ change in the ratio of the male and female population, the elderly and the young;

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- .. The need to improve the educational level, especially for young people;
- .. ratio of urban and rural population;
- .. level of consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs;
- .. increase in the number of man-made accidents with human casualties (Chitadze, 2011).

Another “not clearly visible”, but quite material and essential, is the mental factor of geopolitics, which consists in the direct connection of the adoption of geopolitical decisions with such mental determinants as:

- .. the psychological state of the leaders of countries, employees of their apparatus, as well as geopoliticians who created geopolitical concepts;
- .. psychological microclimate established in the upper echelons of power;
- .. the psychological state of the controlled majority; the psychological situation in a given country, in the world as a whole, etc. (Chitadze, 2011).

In the same way, we can trace the connection between politics and the ethnography and ethnology of a nation, i.e., with its settlement in a certain territory, the formation of certain traits of a national character, its passage through a certain stage of ethnogenesis, and other ethnic processes that have an impact both on the policy pursued and on the future fate of the nation.

The ideological factor has a certain influence on geopolitics. Politics in general is strongly dependent on, and sometimes skillfully distorted, transformed by ideology. The position of an observer can paint the same political situation in any color of the ideological rainbow. The ideological sphere is a set of “magnetic anomalies”, the number of which corresponds to the number of world ideologies or the number of leading parties in a given country.

Geopolitical concepts are often influenced by national interests in one area or another. The same geopolitical problem based on this or that national ground takes on the characteristic national character of countries. Take the example of Alsace and Lorraine. According to the German School of Geopolitics, these territories are part of Germany and central Europe, while the French School of Geopolitics considers these geographical units to belong to the French geopolitical space. And as for language and culture, their transformation depends on the free choice of the people who live in a given space. After World War I, German geopolitics has long been accused of serving fascism in terms of a one-sided (only in the interests of the German nation) approach to the geopolitical picture of the world. However, modern Russian geopoliticians justify Russia’s imperialist ambitions, and therefore, as long as geopolitics serves the interests of specific leading geopolitical players, it always stands in a position that reflects the interests of specific great states (Chitadze, 2022).

There is no doubt about the influence of economic processes on geopolitics. In this regard, it is important to focus on the area of land suitable for industrial enterprises and agriculture, in the defined geographical conditions of economic infrastructure - proximity to the sea, the neighboring country, and others.

We have discussed the key factors that influence policy. They are all determined by geographical location and all of this together constitutes geopolitics. But modern geopolitics receives development impulses not only from the above sources but also from the so-called virtual geopolitics. Virtual spheres without which their existence is impossible today.



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First of all, this field is the ether, which by the psychics in the XIX century was considered as material. The modern air will show the struggle of cultures, and the conflicts of interests of the subjects at the level of local, regional, and world politics. The state of war during the global processes is complicated by the fact that its subjects are not only national states but also transnational companies, international non-governmental organizations, mass media, and others.

The second direction of virtual geopolitics is the International Computer Network. The network organization of the Internet allows us to look at the world through different eyes than it is presented on the political map.

In the views of the philosophers of the ancient world, geopolitics as a science was a combination of political and geographical factors, a union of state and space, in which actions took place on land and at sea, while in the views of classical geopolitics, the main processes took place in the geosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere. Modern geopolitical paradigms operate both in real (land, water, air, underwater, space) and virtual (radio and television, print, science, and art, the Internet, etc.) spheres in which the spatial factor, the political one in aggregate - creates geopolitics.

Moreover, if geopolitics represents the global level of interstate conflicts, then interstate wars, such as the alliance of Greek policies against Persia and Rome against Carthage, are presented as geopolitical events in the Old World. At the same time, geopolitical events on a regional scale represent the Athenian-led Peloponnesian War against Sparta, a struggle for dominance between Chinese kingdoms. The emergence of classical geopolitics coincided with the formation of an ethnocentric picture of the world, when European states fought for dominance on the continent, for the expansion of their colonial possessions, and world domination. At the same time, the geopolitics of the classical period went beyond the oikumene (the Greek word that means inhabited area), united divided continents, promoted wars of conquest, and conquered vast expanses of land and the oceans. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the leading countries of the world were not yet closely intertwined, could not see the real global characteristics of the planet (for example, global warming), and sought to conquer new spaces. Geopolitics gradually became intercontinental, but the world was not yet the universal society that we see today in the light of modern reality. So, geopolitics has already reached the farthest corners of the planet.

At the present stage of development, geopolitics is changing its Eurocentric view towards the universal. Today, the struggle is not for the conquest and preservation of a certain territory, but for establishing control over it. Attempts to establish control over the geosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere with the help of naval, air, and space technology have acquired a truly international, planetary character. The acquisition of universal, international, and planetary qualities by modern geopolitics has determined its global character. The subjects of global politics today are not only national states but also universal international organizations (the UN and its specialized agencies), transnational corporations, regional organizations, individuals, etc.

Accordingly, the structure of geopolitics is differentiated at the global, regional, and local levels.

### **Institutionalization of Geopolitics**

Modern geopolitics does not yet have all the signs of science. We can state the commonality of the approach of geopoliticians from different countries to the definition of geopolitics, the many concepts and theories they have developed, the existence of common methods, methods of analysis, and common terminology. At the same time, disputes continue between geopoliticians and representatives of related scientific disciplines (for example, international relations, world systems theory, political theory, politi-

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cal philosophy, and history of political thought) about the delimitation of subject areas and determining the place of geopolitics in the system of sciences, and the most radical ones "subcontractors" do not recognize for geopolitics not only the right to be an independent science but also the right to be called a scientific discipline.

The institutionalization of geopolitics is manifested in the creation of new geopolitical journals, and other periodicals, a sharp increase in the number and circulation of geopolitical literature, and the number of defenses of dissertations on geopolitics., and finally - and this is typical for many countries - the appearance in the state standards of the mandatory course "Geopolitics" for students of political science specialties. Summarizing what has been said, it can be stated that the geo-the-political method has proven its worth, geopolitics as an academic discipline exists, but geopolitics as a science does not yet have all the signs of such.

### **Definition of "Geopolitics"**

The works of numerous representatives of geopolitical schools, despite all their differences and often contradictions, add up to one general picture, which allows us to speak of the subject itself as something complete and definite. Some authors and dictionaries differ among themselves in defining the main subject of study of this science and the main methodological principles. This divergence stems from historical circumstances, as well as from the close relationship of geopolitics with world politics, issues of power, and dominant ideologies. The synthetic nature of this discipline implies the inclusion of many additional subjects of geography, history, demography, strategy, ethnography, religious studies, ecology, military affairs, the history of ideology, sociology, political science, etc. in it. Since all these military, natural, and humanitarian sciences in themselves have many schools and directions, it is not necessary to speak of some kind of rigor and unambiguity in geopolitics. But what is the definition of this discipline, so vague and at the same time expressive and impressive? Geopolitics is a worldview, and as such, it is better compared not to the sciences, but to the systems of sciences. It is on the same level as Marxism, liberalism, etc., i.e. systems of interpretations of society and history, highlighting as a basic principle one of the most important criteria and reducing to it all the other countless aspects of man and nature. Marxism and liberalism alike base the economic side of human existence, on the principle of "economy as destiny". It does not matter that these two ideologies draw opposite conclusions. Marx comes to the inevitability of an anti-capitalist revolution, and the followers of Adam Smith consider capitalism to be the most perfect model of society. Both in the first and the second cases, a detailed method of interpreting the historical process is proposed, special sociology, anthropology, and political science. And, despite the constant criticism of these forms of "economic reductionism" from alternative (and marginal) scientific circles, they remain the dominant social models, based on which people not only comprehend the past but also create the future, i.e. plan, design, conceive and carry out large-scale deeds that directly affect all of humanity. The same is true of geopolitics. But unlike "economic ideologies", it is based on the thesis: "geographic relief as destiny." Geography and space act in geopolitics in the same function as money and production relations in Marxism and liberalism reduce all the fundamental aspects of human existence to them, they serve as the basic method of interpreting the past, they act as the main factors of human existence, organizing all the rest around them. side of existence. As in the case of economic ideologies, geopolitics is based on approximation, on reductionism, reducing the diverse manifestations of life to a few parameters, but despite the deliberate error that is always inherent in such theories, it impressively proves its harmony in the issue of explaining the past and the ultimate efficiency in organizing present

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and designing the future. If we continue the parallel with Marxism and classical bourgeois political economy, we can say that, like economic ideologies that affirm a special category of “economic man” (homo economicus), geopolitics speaks of a “spatial man”, predetermined by space, formed and conditioned by its specific quality. relief, landscape. But this conditionality is especially clearly manifested in the large-scale social manifestations of a person in states, ethnic groups, cultures, civilizations, etc. The dependence of each individual on the economy is evident in both small and large proportions. Therefore, economic determinism is understandable to both ordinary people and authorities operating with large social categories. For this reason, perhaps, economic ideologies became so popular and performed a mobilizing function up to revolutions based on the personal involvement in the ideology of many individuals. The dependence of a person on space is seen as the main thesis of geopolitics only with some distancing from an individual. And therefore geopolitics did not become, despite the prerequisites, an actual ideology or, more precisely, a “mass ideology” (Chitadze, 2011). Its conclusions and methods, subjects of study, and main theses are intelligible only to those social institutions that deal with large-scale problems of strategic planning, understanding of global social and historical patterns, etc. Space manifests itself in large quantities, and therefore geopolitics is intended for social groups dealing with generalized realities of countries, peoples, etc.

Geopolitics is the worldview of power, the science of power, and for power. Only as a person approaches the social elite, geopolitics begins to reveal its meaning, its meaning, and its benefits for him, whereas before that it was perceived as an abstraction. Geopolitics is a discipline of political elites (both current and alternative), and its entire history convincingly proves that it was dealt with exclusively by people actively participating in the process of governing countries and nations, or preparing for this role (if it was about alternative, oppositional ideological camps removed from power due to historical conditions). Without pretending to be scientific rigor, geopolitics at its level determines what has value for it and what does not. Humanitarian and natural science disciplines are involved only when they do not contradict the basic principles of the geopolitical method. Geopolitics, in a way, itself selects those sciences and those directions in science that seem useful to it, leaving everything else unattended. In the modern world, it is a “ruler’s quick guide”, a textbook of power, which provides a summary of what should be considered when making global (fateful) decisions such as making alliances, starting wars, implementing reforms, restructuring society, introducing large-scale economic and political sanctions, etc. Geopolitics is the science of rule (Kjellen, 1916).

### **The Main Law of Geopolitics: Tellurocracy and Thalassocracy**

The main law of geopolitics is the assertion of fundamental dualism, reflected in the geographical structure of the planet and the historical typology of civilizations. This dualism is expressed in opposition to “tellurocracy” (land power) and “thalassocracy” (sea power). The nature of such a confrontation is reduced to the opposition of a commercial civilization (Carthage, Athens) and a military-authoritarian civilization (Rome, Sparta). In other terms, the dualism between “democracy” and “ideocracy”. From the very beginning, this dualism has the quality of hostility, the alternativeness of its two constituent poles, although the degree may vary from case to case. The entire history of human societies is thus regarded as consisting of two elements, “water” (“liquid”, “fluid”) and “land” (“solid”, “permanent”). “Tellurocracy”, and “land power” is associated with the fixedness of space and the stability of its qualitative orientations and characteristics. At the civilizational level, this is embodied in sedentism, conservatism, in strict legal standards to which large associations of people of a kind, tribes, peoples, states,

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and empires are subject. The firmness of the Land is culturally embodied in the firmness of ethics and the stability of social traditions. Land (especially settled) peoples are alien to individualism, the spirit of entrepreneurship. They are characterized by collectivism and hierarchy. “Thalassocracy”, or “sea power” is a type of civilization based on opposite attitudes. This type is dynamic, mobile, and prone to technical development. His priorities are nomadism (especially seafaring), trade, and the spirit of individual entrepreneurship. The individual, as the most mobile part of the team, is elevated to the highest value, while ethical and legal norms are blurred, becoming relative and mobile. This type of civilization is rapidly developing, actively evolving, and easily changing its external cultural features, keeping only the internal identity of the general attitude unchanged. Most of human history unfolds in a situation of the limited scope for both orientations under the global dominance of “tellurocracy”. The element of Earth (Land) prevails over the entire ensemble of civilizations, and the element “Water” (sea, ocean) appears only fragmentarily and sporadically. Dualism up to a certain point remains geographically localized on sea shores, estuaries, river basins, etc. Opposition develops in different zones of the planet with different intensities and different forms. The political history of the peoples of the earth demonstrates the gradual growth of political forms, which are becoming ever larger. This is how states and empires are born. This process at the geopolitical level means the strengthening of the space factor in human history. The nature of large political formations of states and empires expresses the duality of the elements more impressively, reaching the level of more and more universal civilizational types. At a certain moment (the ancient world), a rather stable picture emerges, reflected in the Mackinder map. The tellurocracy zone is consistently identified with the inland expanses of northeastern Eurasia (in general terms coinciding with the territories of tsarist Russia or the USSR). Thalassocracy is more and more clearly defined as the coastal zones of the Eurasian continent, the Mediterranean area, the Atlantic Ocean, and the seas washing Eurasia from the South and West. Thus, the map of the world acquires geopolitical specifics: core”), the “geographical axis of history”, which steadily preserves the tellurocratic civilizational specifics. 2) “Inner or continental crescent”, “coastal zone”, rimland represents a space of intensive cultural development. The features of “thalassocracy” are obvious here. Although they are balanced by many “tellurocratic” tendencies. 3) The “outer or island crescent” represents “uncharted lands” with which only sea communications are possible. For the first time, it makes itself felt in Carthage and the commercial Phoenician civilization, which influenced the “inner crescent” of Europe from the outside. This geopolitical picture of the relationship between thalassocracy and tellurocracy is revealed potentially by the beginning of the Christian era, after the era of the Punic Wars. But finally, it acquires meaning in the period of the formation of England as a great maritime power in the 17th and 19th centuries. The era of great geographical discoveries, which began at the end of the 15th century, led to the final formation of thalassocracy as an independent planetary formation, detached from Eurasia and its shores and completely concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon world (England, America) and colonies (Chitadze, 2011).

The “New Carthage” of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and industrialism took shape into something unified and whole, and since that time geopolitical dualism has acquired distinguishable ideological and political forms. The positional struggle of England with the continental powers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, and Russia was the geopolitical content of the 18th and 19th centuries (+ the second half of the 20th century), and since the middle of our century, the United States has become the main stronghold of thalassocracy. In the Cold War of 1946-1991, the age-old geopolitical dualism reached its maximum proportions, thalassocracy was identified with the USA, and tellurocracy with the USSR. Two global types of civilization, culture, and meta-ideology resulted in complete geopolitical outlines, summarizing the entire geopolitical history of the opposition of the elements. At the same time, it is striking that these

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forms of complete geopolitical dualism at the ideological level corresponded to two equally synthetic realities - the ideology of Marxism (socialism) and the ideology of liberal capitalism. In this case, we can talk about the implementation in practice of two types of “reductionism”: economic reductionism was reduced to opposing the ideas of Smith and the ideas of Marx, and geopolitical reductionism to the division of all sectors of the planet into zones controlled by thalassocracy (New Carthage, USA) and tellurocracy (New Rome – The USSR) (Chitadze, 2011).

The geopolitical vision of history is a model for the development of planetary dualism to its maximum proportions. Land and Sea extend their original opposition to the whole world. Human history is nothing but the expression of this struggle and the path to its absolutization. This is the most general expression of the main law of geopolitics, the law of elemental dualism (Land versus Sea). Geopolitical teleology Until the final victory of the United States in the Cold War, geopolitical dualism developed within the initially set framework, it was about acquiring the maximum spatial, strategic, and power volume by thalassocracies and tellurocracy. Given the build-up of nuclear potential by both sides, some geopolitical pessimists considered the outcome of this entire process catastrophic, since, having fully mastered the planet, the two powers had to either transfer the confrontation beyond the earth (the theory of star wars) or mutually destroy each other (nuclear apocalypse). If the nature of the main geopolitical process of history - the maximum spatial expansion of thalassocracy and tellurocracy for this discipline is obvious, then its outcome remains in question. There is no determinism in this respect. Therefore, geopolitical teleology, i.e. comprehension of the purpose of history in geopolitical terms, comes only to the moment of globalization of dualism and stops here. Nevertheless, on a purely theoretical level, several hypothetical versions of the development of events can be singled out after it will be possible to ascertain the victory of one of the two systems of thalassocracy. 1st option. The victory of the thalassocracy completely cancels the civilization of the tellurocracy. A homogeneous liberal-democratic order is being established on the planet. Thalassocracy absolutizes its archetype and becomes the only system for organizing human life. This option has two advantages: First, it is logically consistent, since it can be seen as a natural completion of the unidirectional (in general) flow of geopolitical history from the complete domination of the Land (the traditional world) to the complete domination of the Sea (the modern world); and secondly, that is exactly what is happening in reality. 2nd option. The victory of thalassocracy ends the cycle of confrontation between two civilizations, but does not spread its model to the whole world, but simply completes geopolitical history, canceling its problems. Just as the theories of post-industrial society prove that the main contradictions of classical political economy (and Marxism) have been removed in this society, so some mondialist theories argue that in the coming world, the confrontation between Land and Sea will be completely removed. This is also the “end of history”, but only the further development of events does not lend itself to such a rigorous analysis as in the first version (Chitadze, 2011).

Both of these analyzes view the defeat of the tellurocracy as an irreversible and accomplished fact. The other two options treat it differently. 3rd option. The defeat of tellurocracy is a temporary phenomenon. Eurasia will return to its continental mission in a new form. This will take into account the geopolitical factors that led to the catastrophe of the continentalist forces (the new continental bloc will have maritime borders in the South and in the West, i.e., the “Monroe Doctrine for Eurasia” will be implemented). In this case, the world will return to bipolarity again. But already of a different quality and another level. 4th option (which is a development of the previous one). Tellurocracy is winning in this new confrontation. It seeks to transfer its civilizational model to the entire planet and “close history” on its own accord. The whole world will typologically turn into the land, and “ideocracy” will reign everywhere. Anticipating

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such an outcome were the ideas of the “World Revolution” and the planetary domination of the Third Reich. Since in our time, the role of the subjective and rational factor in the development of historical processes is greater than ever, these four options should be considered not just as an abstract statement of the likely development of the geopolitical process, but also as active geopolitical positions that can become a guide to actions on a global scale. But in this case, geopolitics cannot offer any deterministic version. Everything here comes down only to a set of possibilities, the implementation of which will depend on many factors that no longer fit within the framework of a purely geopolitical analysis. Rimland and “boundary zones” The entire methodology of geopolitical research is based on the application of the principles of the global geopolitical dualism of Land and Sea to more local categories. When analyzing any situation, it is the planetary model that remains the main and fundamental one. Those relationships that are characteristic of the overall picture are repeated at a more particular level. After highlighting the two main principles of thalassocracy and tellurocracy, the next most important principle is rimland, the “coastal zone”. This is the key category underlying geopolitical research. Rimland is a composite space that has the potential to be part of either a thalassocracy or a tellurocracy. This is the most complex and rich in culture region. The influence of the sea element, Water, provokes active and dynamic development in the “coastal zone”. The continental mass presses, forcing energy to be structuralized. On the one hand, the rimland turns into the Island and the Ship. On the other hand, to the Empire and the House. Rimland is not limited, however, only to an intermediate and transitional medium in which the counteraction of two impulses takes place. This is a very complex reality that has its logic and greatly influences both thalassocracy and tellurocracy. It is not the object of history, but its active subject. The struggle for the rimland of thalassocracy and tellurocracy is not a rivalry for possession of a mere strategic position. Rimland has its destiny and its own historical will, which, however, cannot be resolved outside of the underlying geopolitical dualism. Rimland is largely free in choice, but not free in the structure of choice, since, apart from the thalassocratic or tellurocratic path, there is no third way for him. In connection with this quality, the “inner crescent” is often generally identified with the area of distribution of human civilization. In the depths of the continent, conservatism reigns; outside it, the challenge of mobile chaos. The “coastal zones” are, by their very position, confronted with the need to answer the problem proposed by geography. Rimland is a border zone, a belt, or a strip. However, this is borderline. This combination leads to a geopolitical definition of the border. Unlike borders between states, geopolitics understands this term differently, starting from the original model, in which the first border or archetype of all borders is a specific historical, geographical, and cultural concept of rimland. The spatial volume of coastal zones is a consequence of looking at the mainland from the outside, “from the perspective of marine aliens.” It is of the “forces of the sea” that the coast is a strip extending inland. For the mainland itself, the coast opposite, this is the limit, the line. The border as a line (namely, as it is understood in international law) is a vestige of “land jurisprudence”, inherited by modern law from ancient traditions. This view is purely terrestrial. But the view of the sea, external to the mainland, sees coastal territories as potential colonies, as strips of land that can be torn off from the rest of the continental mass, turned into a base, into a strategic space. At the same time, the coastal zone never becomes completely “own”; if necessary, you can board a ship and sail away to your homeland, to the “island” (Chitadze, 2011).

The coast becomes a strip precisely because it is unsafe for aliens from the sea to go deeper into the continent only at a certain distance. Since geopolitics combines both views of the maritime and land space, rimland is understood in it as a special reality, as a border strip, and its qualitative volume depends on which land or sea impulse dominates in this sector. The gigantic and completely navigable oceanic coasts of India and China are lines, bands of minimal volume. The respective cultures are terrestrial in

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orientation, and the volume of the coastal strips tends to be zero, to become simply the end of the mainland. In Europe, and especially in the Mediterranean, coastal zones are broad strips extending far inland. Their volume is maximum. But in both cases, we are talking about a geopolitical border. Therefore, this category is variable, varying, depending on the circumstances, from a line to a strip. Geopolitics also projects this approach to the analysis of more particular problems related to borders. She views the borders between states as “zones of variable volume”. This volume of its contraction or expansion depends on the general continental dynamics. Depending on it, these zones change their shape and trajectory within the given limits. The concept of “geopolitical border” can include entire states. For example, the English idea of a “cordon sanitaire” between Russia and Germany assumed the creation of a “no man’s” (semi-colonial and oriented towards England) zone, consisting of the Baltic and Eastern European states. The continentalist policy of Russia and Germany, on the contrary, tended to turn this zone into a line (Brest-Litovsk, Rappalo, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact). The Atlantist thalassocrats sought to expand it to the maximum by creating artificial “laying states” (Etats-tampons). At the same time, a complete and perfect thalassocracy (England, USA) applies a double standard in this case: the thalassocrats strive to reduce the borders of their Islands to a line and to expand the coastal zones of Eurasia to the maximum. For continentalist geopolitics, it is logical to use the same principle in the opposite direction: the borders of Eurasia are lines, and the borders of America are stripes. The analogy with the historical rimland as the “cradle of civilization” shows the importance of “zones-borders” in more particular cases. Free from the need to bear the brunt of the geographical charge of history, the “border zones” very often direct their energy into cultural and intellectual spheres. And the skillful use of this “easy” geopolitical potential is the art of the geopolitical strategy of the opposing sides. At the same time, it was the “sea forces” that mastered this to perfection, since they were always based on the principle of maximum and speedy derivation of benefits from the colonized territories. This distinguished them from the land conquerors, who, after seizing the territory, immediately began to consider it their own, and, consequently, were in no hurry to squeeze everything they could out of it. Geopolitics as Destiny The laws of geopolitics are extremely convenient for the analysis of political history, the history of diplomacy, and strategic planning. This science has many intersections with sociology, political science, ethnology, military strategy, diplomacy, the history of religions, etc. Indirectly, but sometimes very clearly, it is also connected with the economy, to the point that some geopoliticians proposed to find a new science of geoeconomics. In any case, in some aspects of the geopolitical method, an appeal to economic realities is necessary. At the moment, with all types of sciences tending towards synthesis, towards merging, towards the creation of new inter-scientific macro disciplines and multidimensional models, geopolitics reveals its significance both for purely theoretical research and for practical steps in managing complex civilizational processes on a planetary scale or a scale of individual states or blocs of states. This is the science of the future, the foundations of which very shortly will be taught not only in specialized institutions of higher education, institutions, and academies but also in ordinary schools. With the help of geopolitical analysis, one can easily comprehend entire epochs of the historical development of countries and peoples. With the expansion of information zones characteristic of our time, the emergence of such simple and illustrative reductionist methodologies is inevitable, since otherwise a person risks completely losing all reference points in the diverse and multidimensional chaos of heterogeneous knowledge flows. Geopolitics is an invaluable aid in matters of education. Its structure is such that it could become an axial discipline at a new stage in the development of the school. At the same time, the role of geopolitics in the broad social sphere is becoming more and more obvious.

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The level of development of information, the active involvement of an ordinary person in events unfolding on the entire continent, and the “medicalization” of the mass media, all highlight spatial thinking in geopolitical terms, which helps to “sort” peoples, states, regimes and religions into a single simplified scale so that the meaning of even the most elementary television or radio news is at least approximately understandable. If we apply the simplest geopolitical grid of heartland, rimland, and World Island to any message regarding international events, a certain clear interpretive model is immediately built that does not require additional highly specialized knowledge. “NATO expansion to the East” in this approach means “increasing the volume of rimland in favor of thalassocracy”; “an agreement between Germany and France regarding the creation of special purely European armed forces” “a step towards the creation of a continental tellurocratic structure”; “the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, the desire of the continental state to destroy the artificial thalassocratic formation that prevents direct control over the coastal zone,” etc. And finally, it is about the influence of geopolitical methodology on domestic and foreign policy. If the geopolitical meaning of certain steps of political parties and movements, as well as power structures, is obvious, it is easy to correlate them with the system of global interests, and, consequently, to decipher their far-reaching goals. For example, the integration of Russia with European countries (especially with Germany) is a move by tellurocratic forces (Eurasians), from which one can automatically predict the strengthening of “ideocratic” (“socialist”) tendencies within the country (Chitadze, 2011). On the contrary, the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington means subjugation to the thalassocratic line and inevitably entails the positional strengthening of the “market players,” and so on. In the same way, in light of the laws of internal geopolitics, one can easily interpret the internal political processes of the separatism of peoples within Russia and bilateral or multilateral agreements between various administrative entities and regions among themselves. Each event in the light of geopolitics acquires a clear meaning. This geopolitical meaning cannot be regarded as the *ultimo ratio* of the event, but in any case, it always turns out to be highly expressive and useful for analysis and forecasting. The absence today of any textbook on this topic has prompted us to write and compile this book, which is an introduction to geopolitics as a science.

## **CONCLUSION**

In general, it should be pointed out, that Geopolitics (geographic politics; Greek. γη — land + politics — state or public affairs (pron. πολις — city-state in ancient Greece) is a science that studies the role of the geographical factor in the state’s foreign policy and its influence on the formation of the country’s national interests, state or interstate Laws of the division of territories and redistribution of spheres of influence by organizations.

Geopolitics belongs to the group of social-geographical sciences and is a part of political geography. They distinguish between traditional, new (geo-economics), and the latest (geo philosophy) geopolitics. Traditional geopolitics emphasizes the military-political power of the state and the dominant role of geographical factors in the conquest of foreign territories. The new (geo-economics) focuses on the economic power of the states in contrast to the traditional one. The latest geopolitics, in which spiritual power dominates military and economic power, helps states to overcome traditional and economic determinism at the expense of expanding the basic factors in determining behavior in international relations.

The main goal of geopolitics as a foreign political practice is to improve the geographical situation of the state, i.e. The main goal of geopolitics is to develop the geostrategy of any country. A synthetic



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study of the geopolitical approach implies a combined study and assessment of the geographical, socio-political, military, demographic, economic, and other factors determining the country's strength of any country or region.

When evaluating the geopolitical location of the country, the greatest attention is paid to the geographical factor, as well as economic and strategic positions, the past of the country, any relations of this country with its neighbor, and the political or economic situation in neighboring countries and the region.

Earth according to Mackinder's Heartland Theory

The history of the 20th century had a great influence on the peculiarities of the development of the geopolitical situation of many large countries. A clear example of this is even the change of state geopolitical "regalia" of Russia over a century. Significant changes also occurred in the features of the development of geopolitical factors in many Western European countries. The changing geopolitical situation of France is interesting on this side. The last century reflected the most important changes that took place in the country's domestic and foreign policy, and which had a great influence on the formation of the modern positions of the geopolitical situation of France (Mackinder, 1904).

The main criteria of geopolitical power of any country are:

- surface area
- Nature of borders, landlocked
- Number of population
- natural resources
- financial strength
- Level of development of economy and technology
- Ethnic homogeneity
- Level of social integration
- political stability
- national spirit

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## **KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**Atlanticism:** Also known as **Transatlanticism**, is the belief in or support for a close relationship between the peoples and governments in Northern America (the United States and Canada) and those in Europe (the countries of the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and the European microstates outside the European Union) on political, economic, and defense issues. It seeks to maintain the security and prosperity of the participating countries and protect liberal democracy and the progressive values of an open society that unites them. The term derives from the Atlantic Ocean, which is bordered by North America and Europe.

**Eurasianism:** A political movement in Russia that states that Russia does not belong in the “European” or “Asian” categories but instead to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia dominated by the “Russian world” (Russian: Русский мир), forming an ostensibly standalone Russian civilization. Historically, the Russian Empire was Euro-centric and generally considered a European/Western power.

**Foreign Policy:** A state's foreign policy or external policy (as opposed to internal or domestic policy) is its objectives and activities regarding its interactions with other states, unions, and other political entities, whether bilaterally or through multilateral platforms

**Geoeconomics:** The study of the spatial, temporal, and political aspects of economies and resources. Although there is no widely accepted singular definition, the distinction of geoeconomics separately from geopolitics is often attributed to Edward Luttwak, an American strategist and military consultant, and Pascal Lorot, a French economist and political scientist.

**Geography:** A field of science devoted to the study of the lands, features, inhabitants, and phenomena of Earth.

**Geopolitics:** The study of the effects of Earth's geography (human and physical) on politics and international relations. While geopolitics usually refers to countries and relations between them, it may also focus on two other kinds of states: *de facto* independent states with limited international recognition and relations between sub-national geopolitical entities, such as the federated states that make up a federation, confederation, or a quasi-federal system. At the level of international relations, geopolitics is a method of studying foreign policy to understand, explain, and predict international political behavior through geographical variables. These include area studies, climate, topography, demography, natural resources, and applied science of the region being evaluated.

**Geostrategy:** A subfield of geopolitics, is a type of foreign policy guided principally by geographical factors as they inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. As with all strategies, geostrat-

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egy is concerned with matching means to ends Strategy is as intertwined with geography as geography is with nationhood, or as Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan state it,” (geography is) the mother of strategy.”

**National Interests:** A sovereign state’s goals and ambitions (economic, military, cultural, or otherwise), taken to be the aim of government.

**National Security:** or **National Defense:** The security and defense of a sovereign state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government. Originally conceived as protection against military attack, national security is widely understood to include also non-military dimensions, including security from terrorism, minimization of crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, and cyber-security.

**Political Geography:** Concerned with the study of both the spatially uneven outcomes of political processes and how political processes are themselves affected by spatial structures. Conventionally, for analysis, political geography adopts a three-scale structure with the study of the state at the center, the study of international relations (or geopolitics) above it, and the study of localities below it. The primary concerns of the subdiscipline can be summarized as the inter-relationships between people, state, and territory.

## Chapter 2

# Geopolitics, National, and Military Strategy

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### **ABSTRACT**

*For the realization of foreign policy, defense and national security priorities, each country needs to work out an appropriate National Security and Military Strategy. A National Security Strategy or Policy (NSS or NSP) is a key framework for a country to meet the basic needs and security concerns of citizens, and address external and internal threats to the country. Military strategy involves using military resources such as people, equipment, and information against the opponent's resources to gain supremacy or reduce the opponent's will to fight, developed through the precepts of military science.*

### **INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIES IN MODERN GEOPOLITICS**

Modern geopolitics, taking into account the colossal changes in the world, begins to take shape after the Second World War. But, despite these changes, both the classical and modern geopolitical paradigm necessarily included and includes *military strategy*. Military strategy is usually understood as the method and purpose of preparing and using armed forces in war. If military strategists — generals and admirals — are responsible for the methods, methods of training, and results of the combat use of troops and fleet forces, then the preparation for war of a nation, industry (including military), agriculture, infrastructure (means of communication, means of communication, etc.), the goals of the war are determined by the highest political leadership. Thus, military strategy is an integral part of politics in the same way that geostrategy is an element of geopolitics.

The geostrategy of modern developed countries is structured on three levels. The highest level of geostrategy is called *the national strategy* and includes all lower levels of strategy in certain areas and directions of the nation's development. It determines the goals of the development of the nation, ensures the effective use of spiritual and material resources, directs the nation to achieve national goals.

The second level of geostrategy is called *national security strategy*, which is sometimes replaced by the terms “grand strategy”, “defense strategy”, and “strategic doctrine”. The national security strategy

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includes strategies for those areas and areas that are extremely important for national security, that is, to ensure acceptable conditions for the formation and development of the nation. The national security strategy is usually formed in an official document, in Russia it is the National Security Concept (Rondeli, 2003).

The third level of geostrategy is *military strategy*, which coordinates only the military problems of national security: the development of the military industry and the provision of the Armed Forces with military equipment, weapons, communications equipment, ammunition, etc., the combat training of the military personnel themselves, the combat readiness and combat capability of the troops and fleet forces. Military strategy is usually formulated in *military doctrine* (Rondeli, 2003).

Military strategies have been around for a long time. At least, already in the policies of Ancient Greece there were elected state positions of archon and strategist, the first of which was interpreted as the position of the supreme ruler, and the second - as the position of the highest commander. Thus, it can be stated that the division of political activity into geostrategic and military-strategic occurred no later than the 5th century BC. BC e. (Chitadze, 2011).

However, it was also possible to combine these types of policies in the activities of one person. For example, Niccolo Machiavelli served as second secretary (internal affairs) and secretary of the Commission of Ten (military affairs) of the Florentine Republic. Therefore, he had to implement, in modern terms, both a national security strategy and a military strategy (and not only plan, but also lead the army). In other Italian republics and signories of the Renaissance, geostrategic tasks were decided by top politicians; for the implementation of purely military purposes, professional military men were invited – gonfaloniers (Mkurnalidze, Khamkhadze, 2002).

Up to the XX century. the prerogative to formulate the highest national and military goals belonged either to hereditary rulers (kings, emperors, caliphs, etc.), or to the highest political figures authorized to do this: presidents, chancellors, prime ministers, viziers, etc. Since the beginning of the 20th century the functions of drawing up strategic and military doctrines, and, consequently, of formulating the highest goals of the nation are gradually transferred to the apparatus that served the highest officials, i.e., to political scientists. The highest politicians of the state, as before, could formulate the strategic goals of the nation, but, receiving reports, certificates and doctrines in finished form, they preferred only to make the necessary changes to them. The formation of democracy contributed to the emergence of political analysts, who created political theories, concepts, strategies and offering them in a form of books, articles on the ideas markets.

## **Military Strategy**

Military strategy is a set of ideas implemented by military organizations to achieve desired strategic goals. The term “strategy”, derived from the Greek word “strategos”, first used in the 18th century, was considered in a narrow sense as “the art of the general” or “the art of disposition” of troops. and deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy.

The father of modern Western strategic studies, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), defined military strategy as “the use of battles to end the war.” B. H. Liddell Hart’s definition places less emphasis on combat, defining strategy as “the art of distributing and employing military means to achieve the goals of policy.” Consequently, both favored political goals over military goals (Chitadze, 2011).

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Sun Tzu (544–496 BC) is often considered the father of Eastern military strategy, and he has had a major influence on the historical and modern military tactics of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. The popularity of Sun Tzu's "Art of War" grew and found practical application in Western society. It continues to influence many competitive areas in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, including culture, politics, and business, as well as modern warfare. Eastern military strategy differs from Western in that it focuses more on asymmetric warfare and deception. Chanakya's Arthashastra is also an important strategic and political compendium in the history of India and Asia (Rondeli, 2003).

Strategy differs from operations and tactics in that strategy refers to the use of a nation's entire military capability through high-level and long-term planning, development, and procurement to ensure security or victory. Operations and tactics is the art of organizing troops on or near the battlefield to protect targets as part of a larger military strategy.

Basics Military strategy is the planning and execution of competitions between groups of armed opponents. It is a sub-discipline of warfare and foreign policy, as well as the main tool for protecting national interests. Its perspective is broader than military tactics, which involves the positioning and maneuvering of units on a particular sea or battlefield, but less broad than grand strategy, otherwise known as national strategy, which is the overarching strategy of major organizations such as a nation state, confederations, or international union and involves the use of diplomatic, informational, military and economic resources. Military strategy involves using military resources such as men, equipment, and information against enemy resources to gain superiority or reduce the enemy's will to fight, developed through the prescriptions of military science.

The definition of NATO strategy "represents the way in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national goals or the goals of a group of countries. Strategy can be divided into "grand strategy", geopolitical in scope, and "military strategy", geopolitical policy goals into militarily achievable goals and campaigns. Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Co-Chairman of the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout most of World War II, described the art of military strategy as: "deriving from a [political] goal a set of military goals to be achieved: evaluate these goals in terms of the military needs they create and the preconditions that are likely to be required to achieve each of them: to measure the available and potential resources in accordance with the requirements, and, based on this process, outline a coherent scheme of priorities and a rational course of action. Field Marshal Montgo Meri summed it up this way: "Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means, such as armed forces and supplies, to achieve the goals of policy. Tactics means the disposition and management of military forces and methods in actual combat. In short: strategy is the art of warfare; tactics is the art of warfare" (Chitadze, 2016).

## **Background**

Military strategy in the 19th century was still seen as one of the trivial "arts" or "sciences" that governs the conduct of war; others - tactics, the execution of plans and the maneuvering of troops in battle, as well as logistics, the maintenance of the army. The view has dominated since Roman times, and the line between strategy and tactics was blurred during this time, and sometimes the categorization of a decision is a matter of almost personal opinion. Carnot during the French Revolutionary Wars thought it was simply due to the concentration of troops (Rondeli, 2003).

Strategy and tactics are closely related and exist on the same continuum; modern thinking places the operational level between them. Everything deals with distance, time and power, but strategy is large

## **Geopolitics, National, and Military Strategy**

scale, can last for years and is social, while tactics is small scale and involves the arrangement of fewer elements that can last from a few hours to weeks. Initially, it was assumed that the strategy controls the prelude to battle, and tactics determine its course. However, in the world wars of the 20th century, the distinction between maneuver and battle, strategy and tactics, expanded at the expense of the possibilities of technology and transit. Tactics that were once the prerogative of a cavalry company would be applied to a tank army.

It is often said that the art of strategy determines the objectives to be achieved in a military campaign, while tactics determine the methods to achieve these objectives. Strategic goals might be: “We want to conquer territory X” or “We want to stop the expansion of country Y into the world trade in product Z”; while tactical decisions range from a general statement - for example, “We are going to do this by a naval invasion of the north of country X”, “We are going to blockade the ports of country Y” to the more specific “C Platoon will attack and D Platoon will provide fire cover” (Rondeli, 2003).

In its purest form, the strategy dealt exclusively with military issues. In earlier societies, the king or political leader was often the same person as the military leader. If not, then the distance of communication between the political and the military leader was small. But as the need for a professional army grew, the boundaries between politicians and the military began to be recognized. In many cases, it was decided that separation was necessary.

As the French statesman Georges Clemenceau said, “War is too important a matter to be entrusted to soldiers” (Rondeli, 2003). This gave rise to the concept of grand strategy, which involves managing the resources of an entire nation in waging war. Under grand strategy, the military component is largely reduced to operational strategy—the planning and control of large military units such as corps and divisions. As the size and number of armies grew and communication and control technologies improved, the difference between “military strategy” and “grand strategy” narrowed. The foundation of grand strategy is diplomacy, by which a nation can forge alliances or force another nation into compliance, thereby achieving victory without resorting to combat. Another element of grand strategy is the management of the post-war world.

As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy can be a means to an end, but not an end in itself. There are many examples in history when victory on the battlefield did not lead to goals such as long-term peace, security or tranquility (Chitadze, 2011).

## **Principles**

Many military strategists have tried to wrap a successful strategy in a set of principles. Sun Tzu identified 13 principles in his *The Art of War*, and Napoleon listed 115 principles (Rondeli, 2003). American Civil War general Nathan Bedford Forrest had only one thing: “[get] there first with the most people.” Concepts identified as important in the US Army Military Operations Field Manual (FM 3–0):

1. Type of goal (direct every military operation to a well-defined, decisive, and achievable goal)
2. Offensive type (capture, retention, and use of the initiative)
3. Mass type (concentration of combat power in a decisive place and time)
4. Economy of the power type (distribution of the minimum necessary combat power to secondary efforts)
5. Type of maneuver (put the enemy at a disadvantage through the flexible use of combat power)

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6. Unity of type of command (For each goal, ensure unity of effort under the leadership of one responsible commander)
7. Security type (Never let your opponent gain an unexpected advantage)
8. Type of surprise (to strike at the enemy at a time, in a place, or in a way for which he is not ready)
9. Type of simplicity (prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure full understanding) (Rondeli, 2003).

According to Greene and Armstrong, some planners argue that adherence to fundamental principles guarantees victory, while others argue that war is unpredictable and the strategist must be flexible. Others argue that predictability could have been enhanced if the protagonists looked at the situation from the other side of the conflict. Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke described strategy as a system of “special moves” by which a general must act under pressure. These fundamental principles of strategy have survived relatively unscathed as the technology of warfare has advanced (Chitadze, 2011).

Strategy (and tactics) must constantly evolve in line with technological advances. A successful strategy from one era tends to remain popular long after new developments in military weapons and technology have rendered it obsolete. In World War I, and to a large extent in the American Civil War, Napoleonic tactics of “offensive at all costs” were countered by the defensive power of trenches, machine guns, and barbed wire. In response to its experience in World War I, France attempted to use its Maginot Line to apply the principles of mass and economy of force, as troops could be concentrated in the north to advance there, while the line acted as a means of increasing force in the south, and Maneuver and Security, preventing the Germans from marching straight from Alsace to Paris (Chitadze, 2011).

## **National Security Strategies**

### **National Interests**

In domestic and foreign policy, the concept of “national interests” is so popular that it is used to justify and justify any political action. This concept has acquired a special, even some kind of mystical connotation. National interests are recognized as the cornerstone of “high politics”. “High politics” is a necessary condition for the existence and development of a sovereign state. The so-called implementation of “national goals” and “national perspective” is carried out as a result of determining national interests, with their consistent protection (obviously, the necessary adjustments are also meant here).

National interests are the key concept of foreign policy. modern, so-called In an anarchic international system, where there is no supremacy of international law and no supreme authority capable of serving as the guarantor of international order and peace, sovereign states pursue such foreign policy as, in the opinion of their governments, follows from their national interests. which, taking into account the values prevailing in the modern international system, means the political and, consequently, the growing economic power of states (Morgenthau, 1956).

The concept of national interests is associated with the school of political realism. In fact, he is his firstborn. This concept is a key element of the political realism belief system. At the same time, it was the least studied and could not go beyond the level of general formulations. According to P. Reynolds, the concept of “national interests” is generally unsuitable, since it does not have an exact meaning. In addition, it is impossible to establish the national interests of a particular country, and politicians use



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this concept to deceive society and themselves. Despite the foregoing, this concept turned out to be very viable and is still widely used in the theory and practice of international relations.

Statesmen, political parties or interested groups of the population participating in the development of the foreign policy of the state or leading this policy substantiate and substantiate their views, decisions and policies with national interests.

**National interests and national security**, since they do not have a precise meaning, are perceived differently by both individuals and different groups of society. That is why it is very difficult to reach a national consensus when it comes to what a country's national interests are and what kind of foreign policy it should pursue (Reynolds, 1990).

**Essence of national interests.** In general, national interests imply certain goals, for the achievement of which the state must pursue an appropriate policy. National interests also presuppose a direction of policy that stands out from the rest, no matter how alternative they may seem. This kind of policy involves the achievement of goals that express the interests of individuals and groups, as well as the interests of the entire nation, state. Such a policy means that everything is subordinated to national, state interests. One of the "fathers" of political realism. Morgenthau notes that national interests need to be protected ("national interests must be protected from being usurped by non-national interests").

Any foreign policy determined by national interests necessarily implies, at a minimum, the survival of a nation, a country, the preservation of its territorial integrity, political institutions, and culture. Therefore, each state is called upon to protect its geographical, political, economic and cultural identity in the event of a threat of encroachment from another state.

G. Morgenthau emphasizes that statesmen think and act based on state interests, working in the international arena. So it was in the past, so it is now, so it will be in the future. Former US Secretary of State H. Kissinger stated in Washington in 1974 that the AU's foreign policy is pragmatic, dictated by the country's interests (Rondeli, 2003). Such views and statements are quite common, especially among representatives of the school of political realism and practicing politicians.

According to the principles of political realism (these principles are still most used in international politics!), international politics, like any politics, is a continuous struggle for power. Because sovereign states are an acceptable and effective instrument of international politics, and force is a desirable goal. The international system is characterized by active or potential conflict between states and the possibility of always using force and war. Each state tries to protect its territory and interests from real or perceived threats. Political integration between countries is weak and lasts as long as it serves the national interests of these countries. Only the use of force or its demonstration (threat) is a factor in the survival of the country.

When politicians, leaders of states manage to coordinate their interests, or when a balance of power is established, the international system becomes stable.

The national interests of the state, first of all, presuppose the interests of "high politics", national security. Any government, democratic or not, will pursue a policy of protecting the national interest. - because it is the only logical choice in the cutthroat anarchist international arena.

What does national interest mean? K. According to Deutsch, the interests of an individual or group are determined by two factors: the priority of attention and the expectation of a "reward". If something arouses our interest, it will attract our attention and give us some experience, satisfaction, or hope for such a "reward". To receive a "prize" means to gain something of value to us or to keep something that we value and cannot lose. In politics, the first prize is security (Deutsch, 1968). Along with this - freedom, the territorial integrity of the country, national dignity, economic well-being, etc.

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As you can see, certain values underlie national interests. These values are the values of the nation, are the product of its culture and express its unity. Values are expressed in an ideology that can be either democratic or totalitarian, because no society has ever become completely democratic or totalitarian.

Value systems sometimes include conflicting values. We must also remember that different cultures give different meanings to the same values. People have always aspired to the highest value, but in order to fulfill this role, “national interests” were not given a sufficiently clear meaning, and the role of the highest value, “power”, “strength” also cannot be fulfilled. It is true that power is a necessary condition for survival, but it is not yet universal enough. When two or more values are in conflict, their relative importance can be determined and “disassembled”, but this is often not easy; Because a specific situation and emotions play a big role in this process, which makes it difficult to objectively assess the cost. Values show their full political significance in action when they are actively used by politicians. A political decision requires a politician to match his values with the environment in which he finds himself. Therefore, he needs reliable, extensive information and political intuition. Without this, it is difficult to “transfer” values to national interests.

The national interests of the state presuppose such values and goals, for the sake of achieving or maintaining which it can make the greatest sacrifices. These values and goals are usually included in the main principles and priorities of countries’ foreign policy. Because of this, they are considered sacred interests and possessions. Politicians call such interests “vital”, and scientists - basic, main values.

What interests and values are vital? Traditionally, such interests of the state are associated with its viability and existence. These are sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, cultural identity, political institutions, socio-economic structure.

Vital interests are often equated with national security. Sometimes even purely prestigious moments are revealed as vital interests. For example, in the early 1970s, the Israeli government declared Jerusalem the capital of the country. It was not absolutely necessary from a security point of view. Neither economically nor ideologically, but Jerusalem, as a symbol, was given the “status” of vital interests.

There are different types of national interests. For example, they distinguish between vital and secondary, general and private interests. They also distinguish between identical, complementary and conflicting national interests. J. Frankel offers two levels of formulation of national interests: desired and operational (possible). The first includes those goals and objectives that it is desirable to achieve in the presence of appropriate guidelines and means. As a rule, such national interests are of a long-term nature. Parabism, pan-Turkism, world revolution, world domination of communism are good examples of such interests. Interests of the second level are usually short-term, adequate to existing conditions and opportunities. As an example of the UK’s interest, it is enough to create and maintain a “chain” of strategic bases (Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Suez, Aden) on the sea route to India (Frankel, 1990).

At the present stage of international relations, it should be noted that the importance of the “economic component” of national interests has increased dramatically. The internationalization of economic life, integration processes, the causes of the emergence of transnational corporations, as well as the means of solving them, are becoming more and more economic (reduction-increase in imports, export subsidies, financing of competitive technological projects, etc.). This gives a strong economic connotation to the national interest. Each state is economically so closely connected with the rest of the world that the viability, employment, and well-being of its population depend on international economic processes. Economic factors have become the “rulers” of national interests. The economic component of national interests has always been of great importance, and the national interests of modern states are so “economized” that in some cases the political side

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He is almost overshadowed by economic interests. That is why some experts consider economic well-being to be the determining factor in the national interests of the modern state. The mechanism for formulating national interests, according to some authors, is similar to the formulation of individual consumer goals and needs known in economic theory.

The foreign policy goals of the state should follow from its national interests. Therefore, the national interest presupposes an ideal reconciliation of certain goals. These are the goals that a sovereign state (through relations with other states) is trying to establish in its life for a certain period of time. The goal or goals are, in fact, the future situation or conditions that the leadership of the state considers necessary to achieve. Some goals may be relevant for a long time, while others may change rather quickly. In foreign policy, there are very frequent cases when national interests, and hence foreign policy priorities and goals, are formulated not as a result of a long process, but as a response to unexpected events, in conditions of “ceinot”, by means of a quick response. It has been repeatedly noted that the most important decisions were often made in such a crisis situation and under time constraints. It is because of this practice, according to some specialists in foreign relations, that governments usually do not pursue “planned” policies and only react to the actions of others; However, such a policy must necessarily be based on national interests, the political orientation of the state and its place and role in the international system and society also come from the tribes.

Who forms, determines the national interests of the state? G. Morgenthau notes that various interested groups of society are trying to define national interests in their own way (Morgenthau, 1956).

It is known that there are two traditions or ways of defining national interests. The first is called elitist or Platonic because it comes from the circle of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. According to the elite tradition, what is good for the pastures should be determined by the elite of society, that is, the learned and wise group. The second tradition originates in the philosophical circle of Aristotle and is called the democratic tradition (Chitadze, 2016). According to the Aristotelian tradition, what is best for society should be determined through a democratic process. that is, in society there should be a constant public discussion of everything that excites and interests society, and on the basis of such discussion it should be determined what is best. The two ways of determining public, collective or national interests mentioned are presented in their pure form in reality, and most often national interests are formed by a small group of people, but their decision cannot contradict the prevailing public opinion.

Entrepreneurs, national minorities, parliament, government, all kinds of ideologists compete with each other to declare their private interests as national interests. Morgenthau calls it “an attempt to usurp the national interest.” According to him, the most important thing is to determine the “rational core” of national interests through an objective analysis. When this core is cut down, then, despite the attempts at usurpation mentioned above, national interests form the basis of a real and far-sighted foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1956). A foreign policy dictated by moral abstractions without regard to national interests is fruitless.

The definition of national interests and their implementation, coupled with a fairly high political and economic culture of the country’s political elite, also requires sophisticated diplomacy. In this regard, attention is drawn to the features of the processes of development and implementation of national interests by the governments of newly created sovereign states. Such states are born as a result of economic cataclysms, the implementation of the principle of national self-determination and separatism, and they are controlled by largely inexperienced political forces that have grown out of the yeast of populism and nationalism. Bloody or “velvet” revolutions, the collapse of large states or the unification of different countries upset the balance of power in international and regional systems, create a power vacuum, create

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temptation and opportunities for potential aggressors to improve their positions at the expense of others. As for revolutionary governments, they are often characterized by ideological pathology caused by excessive ideologization and extreme nationalism, ignoring real political, socio-economic problems, somewhat specific, unrealistic, distorted perception and vision of the outside world or other international events. Added to this is the conflict between the forces of national sovereignty and national self-determination in ethnically heterogeneous countries (for example, the former Yugoslavia and the USSR). Each nation and ethnic group has its own historical vision. Glorifying one's past and declaring oneself a victim of twisted historical events is also common. Under such conditions, an objective, rational understanding of events and the definition of a national perspective, national interests and the implementation of an appropriate policy is a very difficult task. The leadership of newly formed sovereign states with revolutionary, ideological and nationalist regimes usually pays great attention to the military aspects of national interests, and these interests also include economic and cultural goals. Excessive attention to military interests means an increase in military spending, which does not necessarily contribute to the well-being of the population. As a result, the national interests of the country are faced with an internal contradiction, which is figuratively called the "butter and gun" dilemma.

The national interests of a large and powerful country extend to all parts of the world and all spheres of life. For example, in the 19th century, the national interests of Great Britain consisted in maintaining the balance of power on the European continent, dominance in the oceans, and ensuring communications and trade between the mother country and the colonies. In the post-war period, the national interests of the United States, according to J. Chase, included four main aspects: the exclusion of any possibility of an attack by any potential aggressor on US territory; uphold the self-determination and democracy of nations throughout the world; patronage of international trade, its support; Set desired AS balance of power on a global scale (Chase, 1956).

In the national interests of middle-sized countries, as a rule, the most important place is occupied by security issues, the struggle for leadership in the region, joining the "win-win" coalition, establishing and strengthening favorable foreign economic relations.

For small countries, the issue of security (finding a strong ally, patron, joining a favorable coalition or otherwise) is of decisive importance. Since the economy of a small country is more open due to the small capacity of its domestic market and less diversification of the economy, great importance is also attached to favorable sustainable economic ties. The issue of preserving national identity and cultural values is a very "sensitive" component of the national interests of a small country. The national interests of small, relatively weak countries militarily may not look impressive in the eyes of others, but due to their very limited military and economic potential, it is extremely difficult to ensure them. The definition and implementation of the national interests of small countries should contain the least emotional, populist elements; It requires the development and implementation of a highly realistic, sufficiently flexible (at the same time principled) policy.

The concept of national interests still arouses animal interest. When Condoleezza Rice declared during George W. Bush's 2000 presidential campaign that "we must stand not on the illusory interests of the international community, but on the solid foundation of the national interest" (Chitadze, 2023).

The well-known American expert Joseph Nye points out that the unifying ties of the international community are indeed weak, but they are important. If we do not respect the opinions of others and include the general concept of justice in our national interests, this will ultimately harm us (Nye, 2007).

If a democratically elected government does not pay due attention to the national interests of its country, it will not be re-elected. But global interests must also be taken into account in national interests.

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Terrorism, for example, is a threat to all countries. International trade is also in the national interests of all countries. The global problem of pest control is very dangerous for all countries, not to mention the epidemic.

Traditionally, there are two approaches to foreign policy based on values and interests. Of course, the priority of vital interests is necessary, but today it is already very important to protect human rights, promote democracy and development in certain areas of the economy. Humanitarian interests are very important for all people and for the foreign policy of each country, but, naturally, certain national interests are defined as still vital and priority, since their provision is associated with the presence or absence of states.

According to J. Nye, national interests in a democratic country are what citizens decide through serious debates and discussions. Determination of national interests is not a poll of the population (Nye, 2007). It is an expression of opinion resulting from discussion and debate. That is why the government should spare no effort to publicly discuss and explain the problems and essence of national interests, present its approach and understand the opinion of the population. There is no better way to define national interests. National interests have always meant the interests of one country. At the same time, no one can deny that peace and stability in the international system has often been taken into account in the national interest. In any case, this has always been possible for most states. Global processes that have been going on for several decades and have an extremely large impact on international politics have not left such a traditional and conservative concept as “national interests” untouched. Moreover, some politicians have gone so far as to declare national interests an obsolete and harmful concept for humanity at the present stage. In the words of Václav Havel, former President of the Czech Republic, “...countries should gradually move away from this category of foreign policy, which, in their opinion, was usually critical: the category of “national interests”, which does not bring us closer, but further alienates us each from friend” (Chitadze, 2023).

Despite the fact that international relations theorists treat the concept of “national interests” with great disdain, which, in their opinion, is outdated and devoid of practical significance, it is still used in the field of foreign policy and sometimes even becomes an occasion for heated discussions. debate.

## **National Security**

For a sovereign state, security issues are of vital importance. Ensuring security means many things, but, above all, it is the protection and preservation of sovereignty, the integrity of the country, political institutions, and cultural identity. The concept of “national security” has many opponents. Their arguments are: 1. This concept is a powerful but very vague symbol. 2, the problem is not national security, but international security. A person should live in a safe world, not in a safe country; 3. National security is the security of the state, not the individual. Governments often use this concept to suppress dissent and opposition within a country. Due to the state’s active concern for their own security, people’s personal security is often limited; 4. This concept is often used for the narrow interests of a certain group or person (examples: authoritarian leader, military-industrial complex, law enforcement agencies) (Wolfers, 1988).

Since every sovereign state today takes care of its own security, there is no universal security. Because of this, the world is “plunging” into a situation that is known as the “morning of security.” It follows logically from the anarchy of the international system of sovereign states, which means that each state is forced to ensure its own security in a situation of general mistrust and the absence of a higher international authority. Therefore, each country, whether it wants it or not, is forced to strengthen its military

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and military-economic capabilities, because it is not sure that no one will help it. Thus, an increase in the military potential of one country forces its rival or rivals to take care of strengthening their military potential. It is clear that even the strongest country is not in a safe position, because its rival in response is trying to improve its position, and there is no end in sight to this rivalry. The dilemma is that no matter how strong you become, your safety is still not guaranteed. This position and, absolute or not, the indomitable desire for relative security not only determine the special interest in hidden weapons and military-strategic problems, but also cause wars and military-political ties. In general, ensuring one's own security is considered the primary need and task of a sovereign state.

In a world where force is recognized as the most important political factor, the special attitude towards security is understandable. At the same time, it must be recognized that security issues appear in a dynamic political reality as new complex problems and dilemmas and create many mysteries for the theory and practice of international relations.

Since danger exists not only physically, but often very subjectively and is perceived differently by everyone, safety also has an important psychological aspect. The psychological aspects of security make it difficult to objectively assess and perceive it, and in many cases lead to irrational decision-making in national security priorities and policy.

Any national security strategy begins with an imaginary map of the world or region. Naturally, the perceptual maps of the world of the 18th or 19th centuries differed from similar maps of the world and its individual regions of the 20th century. Moreover, there is a big difference between the imaginary maps of the first half of the twentieth century and its middle, and especially the end. According to the perception of modern man, the world should appear on the map as more united and interdependent, and perhaps it is, but for people working in the field of national security, such imaginary maps should also clearly show the hierarchy of power between states, specific security relations and conflicts., global and regional threats, strategic resources and their transportation, signs of a struggle for control over roads, and much more. National security issues continue to be a priority in the international system of sovereign states. Does this mean that everything remains the same in relations between states and nothing has changed? Partly so, but as the world changes, our view of the national security of states, as well as global or individual security, has changed significantly. First, the geography of national security has changed. This means that not only has power dispersed in the world, but the significance of the teachings in the modern world has also decreased. The role and importance of moral principles in international politics and, consequently, in the theory and practice of national security have undergone significant evolution. While force continues to be the deciding factor, ethnic and humanitarian aspects already play a major role in international politics (Jervis, 1978).

### **USA: The Evolution of the Concept of National Security**

Each country has its own conditions and security issues. The security problems of a strong country are very different from those of a weak country, although they have much in common. A state as powerful as the US faces the same complex and consistent security challenges as any other country; Thus, it will be interesting to look at the security problems of the United States, the current world hegemon, in general.

Until the post-war period, the term "national security" was practically not used in official documents of the US government, in the speeches of presidents. It entered the political lexicon of the United States only from the 40s after the Second World War.

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According to May, the evolution of American views on national security can be divided into four historical periods: 1. XVII century. 90s - XIX century. 70s; 2. XIX century. 70s - XX century. late 30s; 3. Counting the 60s from the beginning of the Second World War; 4. From the 60s to the present day (May, 1992).

In the first period, which lasted until the end of the 30s of the current century, it was considered closely connected with the national security of the United States (this was already the implementation of the “Monroe Doctrine”), but priority was given to social peace and the prevention of class conflicts within the United States.

From the moment the United States was created until the start of World War II, the country’s foreign policy was not of a global nature, public opinion, most politicians advocated isolationism, keeping the United States away from conflicts and wars in other regions. The United States developed dynamically and was mainly occupied with its internal affairs. It was not until the end of World War I that the US entered into hostilities against Germany, but the country’s public opinion was still in favor of isolationism. As J. Spanier points out, the historical tradition of the United States was isolationism (Spanier, 1991).

In the third period, which lasted until the end of the 1960s, the “framework” of US national security was significantly expanded and already included the security of the countries of the “free world”. At the same time, it was considered an important element of national security and included ensuring the dynamism of the country’s economy and the welfare of the population was considered an important element of national security. It is worth noting that from now on the United States defends the independence and freedom of the democratic world from communism. In 1948, President Harry Truman declared that the loss of independence by any country directly threatened the security of the United States and all free countries. At present, the US, the world’s military and economic hegemon, is the leader of the West. In 1951, at the beginning of the Korean War, H. Truman declared that the national security of the United States was closely connected with the fate of other free countries. It was after World War II that the National Security Council (1947) began to prepare secret directives that determined US national security priorities for the near future. It is clear that in the conditions of the “cold war” with the USSR, these documents emphasize the policy towards the USSR, its containment, as well as the struggle against its dominance in Eurasia (Gaddis, 1982).

In the 1960s, a new period began in the ideology of US national security. The development of nuclear and missile weapons, the struggle between the US and the USSR on a global scale, the threat created for the territory of the US itself, to a certain extent changed the content of the country’s national security. Henceforth, US security goals also prioritized economic prosperity around the world. The containment of communism in the USSR remained a top priority.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist camp and the USSR, the defeat of the communist ideology posed in a new way the task of comprehending and defining US national security. When the US’s only rival, the USSR, collapsed and a much weaker Russia took its place, the American public demanded a revision of the country’s national security priorities, turning to domestic socio-economic problems.

As we have seen, US national security has always been viewed as a combination of internal and external components. Sometimes they complemented each other, and sometimes contradicted each other. The second feature is that the United States has always considered its own national security in connection with the security of another state. Some experts even call it “internationalism”. According to the American A. Tonelson, after the end of the Cold War, “global international” foreign policy will no

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longer suit the United States, and henceforth they must give priority to national security to real national interests (Tonelson, 1991).

The irreconcilable critics of the US foreign policy baptized this policy as imperialist, and the country's national security doctrines as subordinate to imperialist goals, and it is still the case today.

In the 1990s, the interest in national security problems in the USA increased dramatically. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp, the change in the balance of power and the geopolitical situation in the world required a significant revision of the country's national security concept, its definition in a new way. Voices were heard that the approach to national security issues should be based on methods developed and tested by big business. National security costs a lot of money, so defining its priorities and realizing them should be economically effective (Allison, 1995). 4 out of every 5 dollars spent on US security went to the military, and almost half of the security budget went to nuclear weapons and US military spending in Europe, again showing that the central concern of the country's security was dealing with a possible Soviet invasion of Europe. The costs of the non-military component for security (1/5) are much less than the military component (4/5), both in terms of money and personnel, but its effectiveness is not easy to assess.

At the same time, it is known that skillful diplomacy can produce such results as to drastically reduce the costs of the military sphere. In addition, mitigating internal problems of the country, increasing the social and political unity of the nation, prosperity also strengthens the national security of the country, but the monetary assessment of these results is very difficult. In a word, the critical evaluation of the national security policy touched not only on concepts and priorities, but also on their economic aspects.

In the early 90s, the American T. Sorenson noted that the era of deterrence is over and it is necessary to develop a new concept of national security. According to him, the concept of modern US national security should have two main goals: economic independence and support for democratic development in the world. At the same time, special attention should be paid to internal problems - technological progress, sharp improvement of personnel training in technical fields, etc (Sorenson, 1990). If Sorenson preferred to support democratic processes in the world using peaceful and "tactful" forms, his compatriot T. Diebel recognized that spreading American values in the world and supporting democratic processes means interfering in the internal affairs of other countries (Diebel, 1992). Another American J. Muravik directly stated that the "export" of democracy is of great importance for US national security. He gives three reasons: 1. Democracy is the best form of government so far; 2. The more democratic the world, the friendlier the US environment; 3, the more democratic the world, the more peaceful it is. Muravchik notes that US aid to other countries is not just charity, but a mixture of geostrategy, domestic politics, economics and philanthropy. In his opinion, it is difficult to foresee the country's long-term security priorities, but ensuring security should have a long-term, prospective character. The export of democracy has exactly this goal. The US can export democracy, he notes, adding: "What's good for democracy is good for America" (Muravchik, 1991).

In the first half of the 90s, the majority of American experts still believed that at the current stage the country should pay more attention to its domestic problems. In their opinion, "foreign" and "domestic" policies can no longer be disconnected, especially since, in their opinion, the US is gradually losing its economic hegemony. Its budget and balance of payments deficits, slow technological progress and other economic problems reduce the country's global competitiveness and seriously threaten its national interests. Demands to shift attention to internal problems, to give up global "duties", to revise the country's national security priorities, naturally cause critical evaluations from those experts who see strong military potential as the basis and guarantor of US security.



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The onset of the Cold War and the East-West conflict brought to the fore a whole set of threats previously overshadowed by the Cold War, and the entire field of international security was viewed primarily as a problem of containing communism or capitalism and avoiding nuclear war between the superpowers. When the mentioned problems became less active, the field of international security appeared more multi-faceted and “multi-dangerous”.

During the 90s, the US national security concept continued to be adapted to the changed strategic-geopolitical environment. The national security imperatives of the US have fundamentally changed compared to previous decades - the greatest threat, in the form of the Communist Soviet Union, has passed into the past, and the entire “Kona” of other threats (regional destabilization resulting from ethnic conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, degradation of the natural environment with the rapid growth of the world’s population) (the growth of international organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism) have become global threats that have been declared paramount to US national security. Taking into account the changed international environment, new threats and challenges, US national security priorities have been defined as follows: 1. Strengthening the country’s security through military forces that are combat-ready and properly represented outside the country’s borders; 2. Accelerating America’s economic revitalization; 3. Support for democracy outside the country (Rondeli, 2003).

In terms of the evolution of US national security priorities, the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, which not only shocked the US population and had a great impact on the whole world, but also forced Americans to more realistically evaluate the social and political processes taking place in the world, should be considered as an event of special importance. and revise some of their security priorities. First of all, the terrible threat from international terrorism has become a potential reality - in broad daylight, the world’s most powerful super-state has been exposed to the bloody action of a handful of self-confessed terrorists. Indeed, the US public not only had serious doubts about its own state’s ability to defend itself, but also about the country’s government’s ability to think strategically. The US government, under increasing criticism, had to not only take urgent security measures and carry out serious reforms in this area, but also seriously revise the country’s national security priorities and prioritize the fight against terrorism.

By the fall of 2002, a new concept of US national security had been enacted, emphasizing that the threat to America was not the fleets and armies of adversaries, but the catastrophic technologies in the hands of a group of embittered men.

The new documents focus on seven main threats and problems, among which global terrorism takes the first place. It is noteworthy that regional conflicts are considered as two threats. The third place is the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, the document traditionally emphasizes the necessity of promoting global economic development, free markets and free trade, and supporting the process of democratization in the world. The US national security strategy also mentions that the US reserves the right to attack terrorists outside the country’s borders. US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq were a practical implementation of the mentioned thesis.

In March 2006, a new concept of US national security was published, which again emphasizes the crucial role of traditional values for these countries (human dignity, democracy, free trade) in determining the country’s national security priorities, and separates the fight against global terrorism from threats. In the field of US security, strengthening relations with allies, dealing with the challenges of globalization, caring for the spread of democracy in the world, promoting the resolution of regional conflicts, and, of course, further strengthening and refining US national security institutions are recognized as priorities (Chitadze, 2023).

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As we can see, after the end of the Cold War, the US national security strategy acquired a new content and dynamism. The example of the evolution of US national security priorities clearly shows how the views on national security priorities are adapted to the changing international environment and new challenges and threats.

### **National Security Policy: Some Aspects**

As we have seen, national security does not mean only the provision of military capabilities and their use. Military intelligence still remains a leading component of national security, it is at least one of the components along with others. Today, a broader, more complex understanding of national security is being formed, which, along with military components, includes economic, diplomatic, social and environmental components.

Security is directly related to values, but it is not a value itself. For the state, it is the condition through which values are maintained. Therefore, national security policy is “that part of the government’s policy, the purpose of which is to protect and preserve national values, to create such political conditions at the state and international levels, which will be directed against existing and potential rivals (Trager, 1973).”

Objective “measurement” or assessment of security is extremely difficult, as such assessment involves not only the assessment of given strengths and weaknesses, but also the perception of possible threats. Security is a relative state and we have to evaluate it in relation to existing and potential threats. At the same time, security is not a static state in a vacuum, and it is determined by the ever-changing domestic and international context (Kaufman, 1985).

The goal of national security policy is to protect and preserve the values of the nation and the state. The most important value in this case is survival. Without it, the country has nothing to do with other values. First of all, survival means preservation of population, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Only physical survival is not enough - society needs freedom, justice, democratic values, which require protection and preservation. These values are determined on the basis of competition and compromise between different groups of the population in a democratic state, and by the ruling group in a totalitarian state. That is why in the latter, the survival of a certain regime is considered a more important goal compared to the survival of the entire society.

In order for the protection and survival of the mentioned values to become the basis of the national security policy, it is necessary to define them more concretely and adapt them to a specific political situation, i.e. Politicians should determine the specific goals and interests that derive from the relationship of national values with the domestic and international situation of the country. Therefore, national interests and national security priorities are discussed and determined based on the analysis of the interaction between values and the current domestic and international situation. National security policy should be developed based on the essence of values.

Determining what the field of national security includes is a political issue, and it involves both domestic and foreign policy, and their reconciliation. First of all, due to the inexorable increase in the level of integration in the international economic system, foreign policy today is more than ever linked to domestic policy and, in fact, derives from it. Therefore, the national security policy is simultaneously determined by domestic and foreign factors, i.e. It simultaneously includes elements of domestic and foreign policy.

National security policy has three dimensions: diplomatic, economic and military. The field of diplomatic policy is political relations with other countries, economic policy is the distribution of resources

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within society and economic relations with other countries, and military policy is everything that concerns the armed forces and the use of military force. It should be especially noted that the mentioned three dimensions, three components of the national security policy are closely related and mutually determining.

National security policy has traditionally been viewed primarily as a military policy (Buzan, 1991). Today, the military component is still very important, but the other two (diplomatic and economic) are gaining more and more importance.

The main task of diplomatic policy lies in maintaining the effectiveness of relations and their constant contribution to national interests. Even the most powerful country like the USA will not have enough resources to ensure its own national security on its own.

The main elements of economic policy are: providing economic aid to other countries or receiving such aid, economic sanctions, transfer or acceptance of technology, protectionism of private production industries and provision of strategic resources, etc.

There are two main components of military policy: military strategy and the structure of the armed forces (organization, armament, increasing efficiency, etc.). The state, if it comes to its vital interests, should always be ready to use its own armed forces, but the use of military force or the threat of using it ultimately serves to create favorable conditions for proper political acquisition (Pirages, 1978).

National security is a dynamic process. Changes, both domestically and internationally, lead to a revision or adjustment of national security priorities and policies. The existence of the national security problem is due to the nature of the international system, which is based on the idea of state sovereignty. The anarchy of international systems determines the conflictual interaction of sovereign states. The danger of conflict requires military power and strength. Unfortunately, military strength is the factor that can somehow reduce risk and randomness in international relations. At the same time, the modern understanding of national security is increasingly filled with new content, new elements (welfare, ecology, etc.). According to many experts, the internationalization of economic life, the rapid progress of military technology and the new "ecological" consciousness of humanity fundamentally changed the essence of international relations, and as a result of these events, prosperity took the place of security in the foreign policy of states. Therefore, the power factor should lose its previous importance and the importance of the sovereign state as the main "actor" of international relations should be significantly reduced. The representatives of the school of realism prevailing in the theory of international relations believe that neither the internationalization of economic life, nor nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, nor global ecological problems can change the essence of the intellectual, technological policy of the sovereign state. Humanity's mental, technological and economic progress cannot eliminate the struggle for power, but it will undoubtedly have a positive effect on the state's better anticipation of national interests and their realization. R. Gilpin believes that international politics has not changed since the era of Thucydides. BC yr.) to date (Gilpin, 1981).

### **The Nuclear Weapons Factor**

After the end of the Second World War, many things happened that could not but have a great impact on international relations. First of all, it was the accumulation of nuclear weapons, which added a new, terrifying dimension not only to war, but also to international politics. The fear of universal nuclear war and, therefore, universal suicides became widespread, but nuclear weapons did not remove the problem of war from the agenda. Although nuclear weapons have made total war almost impossible, and the countries with such weapons have not used them since the Second World War, this circumstance has

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not invalidated the force factor as a leading component of international politics. Moreover, the owners of nuclear weapons have reached a qualitatively higher level of strength and power, and the zeal shown by many of the world's big and small to get into the "nuclear club" does not really indicate the decline of the force factor in politics.

The used weapons have significantly reversed the power vectors - "nuclear" power has become the most powerful factor, guaranteeing the country's security, preserving their status quo or not. Therefore, many believe that the widespread distribution of nuclear weapons will eventually lead to universal peace, but we must not forget that "even in a nuclear world, the hierarchy of forces and capabilities will continue to exist (Roberts, 1993).

### **Factor of Internationalization of Economic Life**

Over the last three decades, the sharply increased interdependence of states and the internationalization of economic life, according to the views of some authors, have changed international politics and pushed territorial conflicts, the need to use force, to the background; They have also changed the content of national security and many traditional forms of foreign policy of sovereign states. Others, on the contrary, think that neo-mercantilist theory and practice are gaining ground and are just as promising as liberal ones. National security is still, first of all, military security, but the reality of new relations, in which economic interdependence and the importance of the state's well-being have increased dramatically, strengthen the economic aspects of national security even more (Buzan, 1984).

### **Environmental Factor**

The role of this factor in defining and formulating national security is a relatively new, but very remarkable phenomenon. The aggravation of global and regional environmental problems and the realization of the need to solve these problems through international cooperation are very visible events in the international life of humanity. Environmental problems have indeed added a new dimension to such traditional concepts as "national interests", "national security", "war", "survival", "welfare" etc. The development of nuclear energy, radioactive and other waste and pollution problems have become important deterrents in terms of "tame" force policy. Among the components of the national security of the states, the ecological component occupies a very important place. The problem of ecological security is especially acute for small countries, because their territory is usually small, and a serious ecological threat can become equivalent to a national disaster (Mische, 1989).

### **Other Aspects Related to Security**

For a long time, security was considered only in terms of military security, and because of this, no one thought about the true meaning of security. The current tendency to turn everything into a security problem can be seen as a reaction to the previous tradition. At the same time, the declaration of many problems as security problems is the result of new assessments of existing problems. Therefore, this trend is logical and stems from the desire to better understand public security issues.

Today, we are talking about security in different areas of our life: military, political, economic, public and nature protection. By having different types of these interactions. Security means getting rid of a dangerous threat to one's existence, survival, but the analysis of security in each separate field implies the

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presence of different units. In each field, danger and survival have a different nature, because the threat to existence is different in all fields. Viewing from the position of each field is to see the international system in such a way that one particular aspect of the relations and interactions between the system's constituent elements appears.

Security is intertwined with politics, and security issues have become an integral part of political debate and political activity as a whole. At the same time, some things from the field of national security are skillfully “disguised” even in a democratic state. In developed democratic states, such components of national security as the armed forces and special services are separated from normal political sheep and their use involves special procedures. In many weak states and totalitarian countries, such a separation does not exist, and most of the politics falls into the sphere of security.

Idealizing national security is dangerous for society. We have in mind a situation where the ruling regime or an authoritarian leader suppresses the opposition for the sake of ensuring national security. Sometimes discussing some problems in terms of security and finding a place for them in the field of national security helps to “mobilize” proper attention to the mentioned problems, for example, to nature conservation problems or problems that are not yet considered by society as a security problem (Rondeli, 2003).

### **The Concept of Balance of Power**

Like the concept of “national interests,” the concept of “balance of power” is also key to the theory of realism in international relations.

The 19th century English politician John Bright pointed out that the whole idea of the balance of power is false even though it dates back to ancient times. A century before Bright, the English philosopher David Hume called the concept of balance of power a scientific regularity, a fact of political life. Martla also stated in the terms of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht that the separation of the thrones of France and Spain was justified by the need for balance in Europe (Butterfield, 1966). According to Karl Pollan, the civilization of the 19th century was based on the equality of power, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market and the liberal government (Polanyi, 1957).

According to H. Morgenthau, “the balance of power and the policy aimed at maintaining it in the society of sovereign states is not only inevitable but also an essential stabilizing factor. The balance of power in the international system is used by states for their own security purposes. Its antidote may be the principle of “collective security” that has been sought since 1919, but it has not materialized (Morgenthau, 1956).

The concept of balance of power has always been criticized for being too vague. Iny Claude aptly observed that “the problem with the balance of power is not that it doesn't matter, but that it matters too much. Ernst Haas found at least eight meanings for the principle of balance of power: 1. Any distribution of power; 2. balancing process; 3. Hegemony or striving for it; 4. Stability and peace in the Commonwealth of Nations; 5. Instability and war; 6. Power politics; 7. The universal law of history; 8. System and guiding principle for the politician (Claude, 1962).

Usually, when we talk about the principles of balance of power in international politics, we still mean military power, strength. D. Hume pointed out that the principle of military balance received great attention in antiquity, which provided us with many impressive examples in all fields of thought and knowledge. Wise and experienced rulers of ancient times knew and used the principle of balance of power (Chitadze, 2023). In the Middle Ages, and especially in the 18th and 19th centuries, the use of

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the principle of balance of power became a favorite activity of politicians. Even in modern international politics, the principle of balance remains one of the means of ensuring the national interests of states and, above all, national security.

The concept of balance of power refers to the implementation of such a foreign policy, which aims to establish and maintain the balance of power in the region on a global scale. States operate in an anarchic international system, and their goals range from survival to world domination. Each state tries to ensure its own security by using the principle of balance of power and by creating alliances and coalitions to neutralize objectively existing or subjectively perceived threats. Application of the principles of balance of power gives stability to the regional and global international system. Establishing and maintaining the balance of power on a global scale is carried out through the world's most powerful states, and it depends on the will and capabilities of these states. Even in the first half of the 20th century, the principle of balance of power prevailed in world politics as one of the well-known forms of international order. The bipolar international system established after the Second World War was also a system of balance of power or, as it is called, "balance of terror" (Rondeli, 2003).

K. Waltz even calls the concept of the balance of power a theory and notes that this theory accurately reflects the current processes in the international system if it consists of unitary actors who, at least, fight for survival and, at most, for world domination. In such a system, each country tries to achieve the desired goals in any way. Countries can achieve these goals through domestic policies and efforts outside their borders. Therefore, there should be three or more participants in the international system, because in a system consisting of two participants, the forces can be balanced, and each country can only increase its own capabilities to maintain the balance (Waltz, 1979).

A state of balance of power can be created without any intention when as a result of certain processes, the balance of power at the level of the region or in the entire international political system will occur. More often, to achieve the balance of power, states direct their foreign policy in the appropriate direction.

The function of the balance of power is not to maintain peace, but to maintain the international system itself. It is as a result of this that this principle is used to match the interests of the strongest country in the system, to the detriment of smaller, weaker countries, which is manifested in the latter's accession or their accession by some powerful country. The survival of an individual state also means the survival of the system of which it is a constituent element. If the primary goal of the states is to save and maintain their independence, and the best way to do this is to maintain the international or regional system itself, it will be natural to conclude that no country in the system should rise so much as to create a threat to others. That is why states form alliances to protect themselves and keep a watchful eye on potential rivals.

When a state tries to ensure its security, it enters into relations with other states, resorts to intervention (preventive war) to prevent the rise of a potential rival, and needs mobility to immediately contact yesterday's rivals and "break up" with yesterday's allies in the moment of crisis. The above-mentioned way of applying the principles of the balance of power in practice is considered very immoral even by the norms of international politics because it is often dictated by the extreme "egoism" of the state. In this respect, the states of the era of absolutism were in an easier position, which changed allies and rivals like gloves. For a democratic regime that shares certain moral values and principles, it is not easy to make a quick decision, contrary to yesterday. It is also not easy for a regime "burdened" with ideological commitments to reach a balance of power with yesterday's ideological rival; However, the "fraternization" of fascist Germany and the communist USSR in 1939 shows that everything is possible in international politics. Due to the principle of balance of power, yesterday's enemies form alliances and yesterday's

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allies become enemies. The principles of the balance of power, from the point of view of the theory of international relations, have several functions. According to H. Bull, these functions are as follows:

1. The balance of power, on an international scale, protects the international system from transforming into a universal empire as a result of conquest;
2. The balance of power in the region protects the independence of the states from being dominated or “swallowed” by the local (regional) strongest country;
3. The balance of international and local (regional) forces creates conditions in which other institutions establishing the international order are allowed to act (Bull, 1977).

J. Dougherty and R. Pfaltzgraff, consider that the functions of the balance of forces are:

1. Avoiding general hegemony;
2. Maintenance of constituent elements of international systems and the system itself
3. Support for stability and security in the international system;
4. Strengthening and prolonging peace by preventing war (Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 1990).

The concept of equality of power is a key concept of the theory of realism. It has many supporters, but many seriously criticize it, first of all, because the very concept of “balance of power” is rather vague and it implies many things. This concept is also criticized because the pursuit of a balance of power often leads to war and because statesmen sometimes abuse this principle both in their politics and for propaganda purposes. At the same time, the power balance mechanism, according to some, in modern politics loses its meaning.

In the era of nuclear weapons, the concept of balance of power took on a new color and, as already mentioned, even earned the nickname “balance of terror”. The balance of power is a concrete fact of history and not just an abstract concept, but we should also not forget that the objectively existing balance of power is often quite different from the subjectively perceived one, and this is especially true of the balance of power in the age of nuclear weapons. The “balance of terror” is even more subjective than the simple balance of forces, because it is usually very difficult for the leadership of the opposing “nuclear” states to estimate what kind of damage the adversary can suffer, what extreme steps he is ready to take, etc. In “nuclear” international politics, defense and deterrence have changed places. If earlier deterrence had a secondary function, in the era of nuclear weapons, in the “balance of terror” situation, the entire emphasis has shifted to deterrence. If containment fails, the entire system will die.

It has already been mentioned that the principle of balance of power “works” for the good of the strong state and to the detriment of the weak. Indeed, if we look at 1648-1914 In the history of Europe, we will see how the number of European states drastically decreased during this period; And one of the reasons for this was the implementation of the principle of balance of power by powerful states. The repeated redistribution of Oline is a tragic example of the practical application of this principle.

As H. Bull observes, from the position of a weak state victim of the balance of power, this is a ruthless principle, but it is necessary to use this principle to maintain international order; It is better to have a universal balance in the system, even if it is sacrificed by a weak state or states. As we can see, a weak state is a victim of the principle of balance of power in the international system (Bull, 1977).

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This principle is no less a disaster for international law. For its operation, in order to maintain the balance of power, it is necessary to violate the norms of international law. Thus, this principle and international law are in conflict.

### **Equilibrium in Bipolar and Multipolar Systems**

When analyzing the concept of balance of power, special attention is paid to the distribution of power in the international system, which can be bipolar or multipolar. While discussing different types of the international system, it has already been mentioned that history has so far only “suggested” this type. That’s why we think we should give some space to their discussion.

A **bipolar system** is when power is concentrated around two poles, the two most powerful states. The system is multipolar when the number of the most powerful states exceeds two (as it was during the 19th century, during the years of the First World War, and in the period between the two world wars). Much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of one type or the other in terms of establishing stability and balance in the system, i.e. “peacefulness”. The majority of authors recognize bipolar as a more stable system.

The term “bipolarity” was established only after the end of the Second World War, and it reflected the new nature of the distribution of power in the international system. The previous system of world politics, in which a few powerful states were constantly trying to use the balance of power mechanism to ensure their own security, passed into the past, and a new system was formed in its place, in which the maintenance of international order became the prerogative of the two most powerful states in the world. Thus, stability in the international system was based on the balance between the two giants, the USA and the USSR (Morgenthau, 1956).

In such a bipolar system, when the two most powerful states, in terms of military capabilities, overshadow all the others (for example, the confrontation between the USA and the USSR), the latter (especially the weakest) have practically no influence on the “scales” of the balance of power. on the mechanism. All weak states fall into the orbit of one or the other super-giant, and their foreign policy preferences and capabilities are determined by the features and needs of the bipolar system. H. Morgenthau rightly notes that many countries involved in such a system do not deserve the nickname “companion” by chance. Both states usually try to help their weaker allies militarily and economically, which was well demonstrated during the Cold War, when both the United States and the Soviet Union did their best to strengthen their allies; Many of them (especially US allies) used the said assistance for their own benefit (Morgenthau, 1956).

In the bipolar international system, in which only the two strongest states dominate, St. According to Waltz, the balance of power is unstable. According to him, it will become stable when the four strongest countries are represented in the system, and if the fifth “balancer” of the same rank appears, the system becomes quite stable. If lying about a country is too great, that country will even be tied to Satan, but it will be spared from military persecution. If in the multipolar system, where it is often quite difficult to find out who is whose opponent or ally, there are more options, in the bio-polar system everything is clear; Here, both sides know their opponent very well, uncertainty is minimized and evaluation is made easier. In such a situation, when the position of both rivals as leaders of opposing camps is solid and less dependent on the wishes and obligations of the allies, the leadership of both leaders can pursue a more independent, flexible policy (Waltz, 1979).



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In a bipolar system, the possibility of war exists practically only between the two opposing strongest states, because the weaker states are under the influence of the two leaders and obviously cannot fight each other.

According to R. Rosecrance, the period after the Second World War was not bipolar, but rather tripolar. H. Bull also believes that during the transition from the 60s to the 70s, the picture of the polarization of forces became quite blurred and the “weight” of other states in world politics increased so much that the two strongest countries could no longer completely dominate the rest even in the case of cooperation with them. Two superpowers dominated, but their dominance was no longer absolute (Rosecrance, 1970).

In the **multipolar system**, as we said, not two, but three and more powerful states dominate, and the weaker states already have more opportunities to maneuver, unite in various alliances and act independently.

K. Deutsch and D. Singer think that, since the balance of power mechanism objectively exists and operates, the multipolar system is more “peaceful”; At this time, due to the multipolar nature of the distribution of forces, more opportunities are created for states to maneuver and achieve stability. Increasing the number of participants in the system provides much more opportunities for confrontations and at the same time for creating connections. In a multipolar world, individual states are less afraid of military and economic weakening, because they can always compensate for it by entering into various alliances and thereby “borrowing” additional power. At the same time, multipolarity does not contribute to the hidden armament of states (Deutsch, Singer, 1964).

The multipolar system has many critics. According to them, such a system has more possibilities for international conflicts, because the national interests of many states represented in the system will conflict with each other. In such a system, it is difficult to predict ongoing changes, and it is common to underestimate or overestimate the intentions and capabilities of potential rivals, which becomes the cause of conflicts and wars. Multipolarity makes the activity of politicians difficult because they have to calculate many options, and objectively evaluate many facts, events, or processes, which is the most difficult (if not impossible) task. From a military point of view, two opposing rivals in a multipolar system can become “enemies-partners”, as happened during the “Cold War”, because, despite polar opposite interests, they were united by the desire to avoid a global nuclear war.

Bipolarity saved humanity from world war in the nuclear age, but it did not prevent countless smaller wars. This was also a result of the fact that deterrence at the “nuclear level” is different than deterrence at the “conventional” military point of view. In the multipolar system, in the regional system of a relatively weak state, the involvement of a relatively weak state in a regional, local conflict may involve more important states in such a conflict. The balance of power mechanism in the multipolar system is more flexible, but at the same time, the possibilities of conflicts and wars, and regional imbalances are increasing.

In a word, when comparing bipolar and multipolar systems, the majority of experts come to the conclusion that in the bipolar system, compared to the multipolar system, the danger of global war (in the nuclear era) is much less.

## **CONCLUSION**

National security or national defense is the security and protection of a sovereign state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is considered the responsibility of the government. Originally conceived as a defense against military attack, national security broadly includes non-military dimensions

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as well, including defense against terrorism, crime minimization, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, and cyber security. Similarly, national security risks include, in addition to the actions of other nation-states, the actions of violent non-state actors, drug cartels, and multinational corporations, and the effects of natural disasters.

Governments rely on a range of measures, including political, economic, military force, and diplomacy, to ensure the security of the nation-state. They can also act to create a secure environment at the regional and international levels by reducing transnational causes of insecurity such as climate change, economic inequality, political isolation, and nuclear proliferation.

Potential national security causes include the actions of other states (eg military or cyber attack), violent non-state actors (eg terrorist attack), organized crime groups such as drug cartels, and the effects of natural disasters (eg floods, earthquakes). Systemic insecurity factors that can be transnational include climate change, economic inequality and marginalization, political exclusion, and militarization.

Given the wide range of risks, nation-state security has several dimensions, including economic security, energy security, physical security, environmental security, food security, border security, and cybersecurity. These dimensions are closely related to the elements of national power.

Increasingly, governments are integrating their security policies into a National Security Strategy (NSS); as of 2017, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US are among the states that have done so. Some states also appoint a National Security Council and/or a National Security Advisor, which is the executive government agency. He supplies the head of state with issues related to national security and strategic interests. The National Security Council/Advisor develops long-term and short-term national security contingency plans. India has one such system, which was established on November 19, 1998.

While states' approaches vary, and some are beginning to prioritize non-military action to address systemic causes of insecurity, various forms of coercive power, especially military capabilities, predominate. The scope of these opportunities has expanded. Traditionally, military capabilities have been mostly land- or sea-based, and remain so in smaller countries. In other areas, areas of potential warfare now include air, space, cyberspace, and psychological operations. Military capabilities dedicated to these areas can be used for national security or equally for offensive purposes, such as the conquest and annexation of territory and resources.

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## **KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**Atlanticism:** Also known as **Transatlanticism**, is the belief in or support for a close relationship between the peoples and governments in Northern America (the United States and Canada) and those in Europe (the countries of the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and the European microstates outside the European Union) on political, economic, and defense issues. It seeks to maintain the security and prosperity of the participating countries and protect liberal democracy and the progressive values of an open society that unites them. The term derives from the Atlantic Ocean, which is bordered by North America and Europe.

**Eurasianism:** A political movement in Russia that states that Russia does not belong in the “European” or “Asian” categories but instead to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia dominated by the “Russian world” (Russian: Русский мир), forming an ostensibly standalone Russian civilization. Historically, the Russian Empire was Euro-centric and generally considered a European/Western power.

**Foreign Policy:** A state’s foreign policy or external policy (as opposed to internal or domestic policy) is its objectives and activities regarding its interactions with other states, unions, and other political entities, whether bilaterally or through multilateral platforms

**Geopolitics:** The study of the effects of Earth’s geography (human and physical) on politics and international relations. While geopolitics usually refers to countries and relations between them, it may also focus on two other kinds of states: *de facto* independent states with limited international recognition and relations between sub-national geopolitical entities, such as the federated states that make up a federation, confederation, or a quasi-federal system. At the level of international relations, geopolitics is a method of studying foreign policy to understand, explain, and predict international political behavior through geographical variables. These include area studies, climate, topography, demography, natural resources, and applied science of the region being evaluated.

**Geostrategy:** A subfield of geopolitics, is a type of foreign policy guided principally by geographical factors as they inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. As with all strategies, geostrategy is concerned with matching means to ends Strategy is as intertwined with geography as geography is with nationhood, or as Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan state it, “(geography is) the mother of strategy.”

**Military strategy:** A set of ideas implemented by military organizations to pursue desired strategic goals. Derived from the Greek word *strategos*, the term strategy, when first used during the 18th century, was seen in its narrow sense as the “art of the general”, or “the art of arrangement” of troops.

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and deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy.

**National Interests:** A sovereign state's goals and ambitions (economic, military, cultural, or otherwise), taken to be the aim of government.

**National Security:** Also known as **national defense**, it is the security and defense of a sovereign state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government. Originally conceived as protection against military attack, national security is widely understood to include also non-military dimensions, including security from terrorism, minimization of crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, and cyber-security.

## Chapter 3

# Implications for Global and Regional Security

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### **ABSTRACT**

*The chapter assesses consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, both global and regional. It examines how the war shaped and reinforced the shifts in the balance of power; it also focuses on transformations of regional security architecture. A global competition of China and the US is examined as a context of the war; implications of the security strategy of such actors as NATO, the EU, and Germany are also examined. It concludes with considerations about whether wars are back in a realist-driven international politics.*

### **IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY**

Russian invasion of Ukraine has launched a conventional interstate war in Europe, the scale of which has surpassed that of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990-ies and made it the largest war on the continent since World War II.

Due to that fact alone, one might expect considerable impact of the war on international security at several levels. It has a potential to shift the global balance of power; it tests and undermines international institutions; it changes usual patterns of expectations among states, including those linked to the direct use of military force. It also shows the profile of a modern war by introducing new technologies and forms of warfare, and broadens our understanding of contemporary security, for instance, in cyber, environmental or commodities realms.

In addition, the war resonates with the crisis of international order. The West is once again united in an attempt to protect and restore a rule-based world. Revisionist states, first of all Russia, but not only, are aiming at changing the rules and rebuild the structure of the international system in a way that would provide them with more advantages and better perspectives. Outcomes of the war are to be felt for years to come and will shape the contours of regional security arrangements in Europe.

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### **Global Level: Balance and Transition of Power**

The broader context of this war is about challenging existing international order. Thus, it is about checking the balance of power between challengers and status quo powers. The outcome of war will show whether what is often referred to as ‘norms based international order’ is protected and reinstalled or, if the challenge is successful, the next international order will be based on a different set of norms.

Major wars not only affect global balance of power but also reveal it. One of the problems with international security mechanisms constructed on the basis of the balance of power principle is that it is often difficult to measure that balance. Wars between states are exceptionally rare; while wars between great powers are absent since the times of World War II. Under such conditions balance of power becomes too speculative and vague to be a solid foundation of an international order.

Uncertainty about relative power potentials of the states can in itself be a factor of (in)stability. More risk-taking (for whatever reasons) governments may be tempted to test things on the ground. Challengers may overestimate their power while underestimating that of reigning hegemony. There are possibly other ways how lack of information about distribution of power in the international system can affect the likelihood of a major war. In case of Russia, speculations about the balance have become a pretext of aggression: Russian rhetoric was systemically referring to the shifts of the balance of power in West’s favor taking place after the end of the Cold War, which arguably caused all the problems in the realm of international security (Путин, 2012). But what was the real balance or imbalance?

A war makes existing distribution of power more explicit. Russia’s war in Ukraine, in particular, has so far demonstrated the limits of the West’s capabilities; measures of European soft and normative power; calculations of the ‘West against the Rest’ standoff; and, especially, Russia’s weakness. Thus, a real balance of power, both global and regional, has been revealed. It has become clear that the Western hegemony, even if still present, is not overwhelming. China, on the other hand, is not ready to align fully with Russia’s aggressive revisionism, even if Moscow’s and Beijing’s strategic goals linked to the change of international order are the same. Although incapable of preventing a large war, global interdependence, however, is strong enough to keep escalation under control and avoid another repetition of the World War I scenario.

The war is revealing that the world today carries elements of bipolarity, reflected in concepts and perception like those of Global North vs. Global South or democracies vs. autocracies. These elements are reinforced also by distribution of material capabilities, with the US and China being the only two states to bypass a 15% share of world GDP mark. Bipolarity, however, is only partial: there are well more than two poles in the modern world. References to a multipolar moment are also well-grounded: probably, most leaders of great powers would say they live in a world of political diversity, dispersion of power and competition of several centers of gravity (Scholz, 2022/2023). Moreover, power in today’s world is not so heavily concentrated in the hands of states, with non-state actors acquiring more influence, resources and agenda-setting capabilities. Under such conditions, the future stance of the EU, as well as positions taken by countries like India, Saudi Arabia or Brazil, may also significantly impact the coming architecture of international security.

Polarity is defined by distribution of material capabilities; but also by readiness and ability of states to project military power and transform those capabilities into changed behavior of others. Both readiness and ability to do so are also being tested by the war. Results, which are to be revealed, will be of great importance in constructing the future system of international security. The ongoing war is also a battle for international leadership, vision and coalitions.

### ***Implications for Global and Regional Security***

At the same time, major wars are not only revealing the existing balance of power, but also changing it. A shift in the global balance is important from both static and dynamic perspectives. The former is about understanding in what kind of international system we are living; while the latter is about checking and controlling power transition.

A war in Ukraine has become a powerful factor of polarization of international politics. In terms of economic and military capabilities of states, the world before the Russian invasion could have been described as either multipolar or bipolar. Technological changes and evolution of political institutions made power more dispersed, depriving states of control over significant part of world economy and/or surplus of material capabilities. Power diffusion of that kind has been reinforced by a network of international multilateral institutions, several powerful international regimes and what constructivists might have called ‘international society’, i.e. set of accepted norms, rules and procedures (Wendt, 1999). Rejection of war as a tool for resolving political disputes among states was among them.

The American hegemony in decline, coupled with the rise of China; steady growth of countries like India; maintained positions of traditional poles like the EU or Japan – all of that pointed to coexistence of several great powers in an increasingly diversified political setting; however, hard power dominance of the US and China made expectations of bipolarity widespread.

One of the peculiarities of international politics in recent two decades has been linked to the controversial status of American supremacy. On the one hand, the US has been the most powerful state in the world; but on the other, it no longer enjoyed hegemony. American supremacy has been grounded in a traditionally large share of world economy, huge lead in military expenditures and ability to project power globally, as well as a global network of allies. But those material capabilities did not convert automatically into influence over decisions of others, which is the essence of power (Dahl, 1957). Unlike in the 1990-ies, the US has not controlled outcomes of politically significant recent events, for instance Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the war in Afghanistan.

Relative decline of American power capabilities gradually added elements of multipolarity to the system. A multipolar balance of power system maintained international security through collective dominance of the West and a global network of security commitments involving Western multilateral alliances or particular countries; and reinforced by containment on a regional level. Several international regimes have been functioning to limit the risks of a direct military standoff, including those of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. That is how a global system of international security has been designed – and that’s how it failed to prevent a major war in Europe.

Has Russia’s war in Ukraine fundamentally changed the global balance of power? My assumption is that it didn’t, apart from considerably weakening Russia. However, the war has changed the framework of expectations within which states operate; and it also accelerated major structural developments, such as consolidation of coalitions. The US has increased its chances for regaining global leadership; however, it is yet to be seen whether those will be converted into additional political influence.

The dynamics of power transition is also important and is addressed by a power transition theory. It provides a valuable perspective of how regional crises can transform global orders – when they resonate with a long-term trend of decline of hegemony. From such theoretical perspective, security at a global level is maintained as long as status quo countries significantly outweigh challengers. The former usually ally in some form of collective hegemony and include states which gain most benefits from existing rules, structures and institutions. The actual gap between status quo powers and challengers is hard to measure; thus when it gets closer, international risks are on the rise. Challengers may resort to aggressive revisionism if they overestimate their capabilities or underestimate those of the status quo powers.



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Inaccurate assessments of the balance of power have already become a typical mistake of the Russian-Ukrainian war. That has been accompanied by the readiness of Russia to put it under test, which may signal the beginning of a deep crisis of international security, rooted in expected or real power transition.

From such a perspective, international security architecture at the global level started to deteriorate as the gap between status-quo powers and potential challengers was closing. The consistent rise of China, geopolitically channeled by implication of a new grand strategy in One Belt, One Road initiative since 2013; as well as consolidation of Russia in the 2000-ies, which enabled Vladimir Putin to mark a revisionist turn in his 2007 speech in Munich and invade Georgia a year later might have been points of principal change. The Russian-Ukrainian war is an element in the series of regional conflicts, marking the global crisis of international security, resulting from the shifts in the balance of power.

This war demonstrates the scope of the shift. One of the most principal mistakes a challenger can make is inaccurate assessment of the balance of power in general and underestimation of the power of coalitions, arranged by a hegemon. Seen from such perspective, the Russian-Ukrainian war reinforces Western alliances and consolidates them around democratic values, making the life of challengers much harder.

From a dynamic perspective, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has set things in motion in a US-EU-China geopolitical triangle. The US partly restored its leadership in the Western world and consolidated trans-Atlantic ties; relations between China and the EU have deteriorated; while geopolitical standoff between the US and China has become more risky and tense. For the US the war has raised fundamental issues of security commitments, limits of deterrence, and managing risks in a rivalry which can bring back significant part of former America's global influence.

Attempts to preserve post-Cold War international order stretched and depleted US power resources. For a long time its approach towards Ukraine was a part of a broader strategy towards Russia aimed at securing cooperation with Moscow at some level and in some critical areas like strategic arms control. Since negotiations about Ukraine's abandonment of nuclear weapons in the early 1990-ies, Washington was avoiding granting Kyiv formal security guarantees. A long list of obstacles prevented Ukraine from joining NATO. Managing risks in relations with Moscow seemed to be the basis of US policy towards Ukraine. Even when Russia illegally annexed Crimea, the American response was restrained. It was brought down to regime of sanctions and limited financial and military support for Kyiv. Results of implementing such strategy were hardly optimistic. Russia perceived American limited engagement as an invitation or at least as the West's tacit consent for Ukraine's belonging to a sphere of Russia's special security interests.

Washington, however, was calculating its long-term strategy within a broader perspective. Keeping and enhancing US global reach required careful management of huge but still limited resources, and risks. Dealing with client states posed a dilemma of defining the measures and optimal responses, in particular when it came to weapons supplies, security guarantees and financial support (Yarhi-Milo, K., Lanoszka, A., Cooper, 2016). The crisis of leadership made the US more cautious on the regional level, as well as more concentrated on its strategic partnership with the EU and strategic rivalry with China. Engaging into issues of regional security was increasingly more problematic. However, annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 2014 was more than just a regional security issue; it was a direct challenge to fundamental principles of the international order. The US had to accept more engagement into the conflict up to the point when it no was longer defined by its relations with Russia and became a part of the global competition.

EU's security environment has been significantly affected by the annexation of Crimea as well. Since 2014 the Union has been struggling to find a new *modus operandi* in relations with Russia, the one which

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would deny Russia's further attempts to destabilize Europe but at the same time leave some space for stable and predictable coexistence. Russia continued to be an important trade partner and especially in what concerned energy resources supplies. Regardless the sanctions, a bunch of European countries have been supporting the construction of a new gas pipeline, Nord Stream-2, till several weeks before the invasion. In short, Russia continued to play an important role in strategic planning of the EU and its largest member-countries, like Germany and France.

That has changed. The EU has significantly lowered its dependency on Russia in energy supplies; and reconsidered Russia's role as a threat to European security. The war brought the US and the EU closer, while the role of NATO has been reinforced.

China's interests are also at stake; and the Russian-Ukrainian war is a strategic challenge to Beijing. China's short-term gains from the ongoing war include growing influence over Russia, additional supplies of Russian energy resources at discounted prices, and extended access to the Russian market. However; those can hardly outweigh the risks of consolidation of the West, dramatic weakening of Russia, and deterioration of China's relations with the EU and the US, its two primary trade partners.

The war has affected global security arrangements in three most important ways. First, it undermined a rules-based international order which for a long time prevented a large conventional war in Europe accompanied by annexation of territories of neighboring states. That brings about less trust and more security dilemma into international politics on all levels and may result in overall grow of suspicion and arms races.

Second, the war has disrupted institutional basis of the global security by weakening several international regimes and organizations, most importantly regimes of strategic arms control and nuclear non-proliferation as well as the UN, OSCE and a number of other institutional settings for security. That can bring about escalation of regional crises and more tension in relations among great powers.

Third, the war is about to shift the balance of power among key poles and thus change the structure of the international system. A turning point between a transit to bipolarity through a successful challenge to the world order, and consolidation of Western alliances and influence, this war is thus a systemic game-changer.

### **Regional Level: New Roles for NATO, EU, and Germany**

In Europe consequences and impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war are particularly visible and far-reaching. The war has become a dramatic and direct threat to European security, turning the continent from one of the most secure to one of the least secure regions on the planet. The foundations of a lasting peace in Europe have been dismantled; while a traditional paradigm of enhancing security through interdependence has failed. Usual framework, built on transatlantic cooperation, limited security policy of the EU, reluctant leadership of Germany-France tandem and keeping the 'grey zone' in Eastern Europe through the policy of non-enlargement of NATO, has been questioned. As a result, Europe face a challenge of not only putting an end to the war, but also of looking for a different architecture of the regional security, capable of containing revisionism in the future and possessing a much bigger hard power component. It is to take into account modified perception of the threat from Russia, more active role of Germany and a new environment for NATO and the EU.

Before the war, European security has been built within institutional framework of the EU, relied on NATO protection and implied some level of cooperation with Russia. NATO and EU enlargement had led to problems in relations with Russia: from the Kremlin's perspective, expansion of NATO and EU

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threatened Russia's security interests. Gradually, a geopolitical rivalry started to emerge. With Russia consolidating its influence and shifting to authoritarianism, security architecture in Europe once again slipped to bipolarity. The stakes in regional conflicts went significantly up. That process accelerated when Moscow started to project its influence more actively through integration projects aimed at post-Soviet countries. The so-called 'near abroad' has become an area of Russia's special interests.

To somehow handle the situation an Eastern Partnership project has been launched by the EU. It suggested deeper cooperation with new eastern neighbors of the EU, but made membership perspective close to unrealistic. Even those EaP countries, which were willing to join the EU some day, were offered association agreements instead. That compromise didn't work the way it was planned and contributed into the deep crisis of regional security in 2014.

On the other hand, Russia remained important. It has been seen by Europe as a key, albeit difficult, security partner. Its military capabilities provided a strong argument in favor of respecting Russia's interests. Its energy resources have been irreplaceable on European market. Russia's close bilateral relations with some European countries, most notably Germany, were deeply rooted in history and provided wide lobbying opportunities for Moscow in European capitals. Even the Russian-Georgian war, which saw a direct military invasion into a neighboring country, didn't put an end to France's and Germany's desire to maintain partnership with Moscow. This kind of balancing, although complicated and volatile during several years before 2014, established what meant to be a long-term basis for European stability. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war has introduced some dramatic changes into that framework, making old regional security architecture obsolete.

One of the most striking lessons from the war is Russia's weakness. The country which pictured itself as a military and energy superpower and demanded an extended zone of privileged interests on that basis, found itself powerless to impose its will upon Ukraine, a country whose power potential was estimated at ten times less than that of Russia before the war. The first year of the war saw Russian troops defeated and retreating from suburbs of Kyiv, Kharkiv oblast and Kherson, the only major Ukrainian city they managed to occupy in the beginning of invasion. Instead of capturing Kyiv in two-three days, Russia has been facing a long-term and poorly managed campaign, which already resulted in six digit losses. Moscow's military underperformance by far generated geopolitical implications: Russia has significantly weakened its positions in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic Sea region, all of them traditionally being prioritized for the country's security. The costs of war continue to climb for Moscow, and Russia is likely to emerge after the war as a weakened regional power.

An image of militarily strong Russia has been an important element of European security arrangements, thus a weakened Russia implies some fundamental rearrangement of the regional security architecture. It will have to contain the risks of both further destabilization of Russia and possible another round of revisionism accompanied by aggression. Russia's weakness may make its alliance with China unavoidable and asymmetric. It can also have a wide range of consequences in areas of humanitarian, environmental and economic security for Europe. On a structural level weakening of Russia can lead to either another period of Western predominant influence in Europe or to consolidation of bipolar rivalry on the continent which would involve both the US and China.

The Russian-Ukrainian war and its possible consequences would also affect multilateral institutions, most importantly NATO and the EU, and redefine their role in the regional security setting.

NATO's role has been on the rise since annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. The Alliance has taken a number of steps to strengthen its military presence in Eastern Europe, ensure trust, and contain possible Russia's aggression against any member-state. Enhanced forward presence battle groups have

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been established in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Very High Readiness Joint Task Force has been set up. A new NATO command center has been established in Germany. NATO's naval forces have been enhanced, and additional jets have reinforced Alliance's military presence in the region. Exercises have become larger and more often. New types of threats, including cyber and hybrid, have been addressed.

After Russian invaded Ukraine in 2022, NATO's consolidation continued. The Alliance is expanding: Finland and Sweden are joining. It places a focus on a threat from Russia and established closer relations with partner countries, most importantly Ukraine. NATO is also strengthening its Eastern flank. Credibility of security guarantees within the Alliance goes up; the same is true about NATO's technical, financial and military capabilities. When it comes to providing international security after the war, NATO is going to play a crucial role. (NATO, 2022)

One of the key developments before the war was a deepening partnership between NATO and Ukraine. This has been a controversial process, which might have created overoptimistic hopes for membership in Ukraine, and at the same time didn't provide credible security guarantees for the country. Russia claimed such deepening partnership to be a threat to its own security. From any of these perspectives, this cooperation has become a key element of the regional security system before the invasion.

After the war the format of relations between NATO and Ukraine is likely to remain important. Ukraine's membership in the Alliance, once completely out of reach, looks more realistic due to the war: weakening of Russia; reframing of foreign and security policies of some European states, most notable Germany; and changed perception of threats throughout the continent are likely to significantly increase Ukraine's chances for membership.

However, it is still too early to assess them. The way the war ends would define possible options for Ukraine's relations with the Alliance. Ukraine's membership is still difficult to get. There are several competing views within the Alliance as to how the post-war security would look like and what role Ukraine should play there. Moreover, these views are dynamic and may change under the pressure of a long-term war. In a broader sense, the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO is a part of another puzzle: providing Ukraine with security guarantees enough to prevent another major war in Europe in the future. That puzzle may be resolved through bilateral security agreements or large-scale military assistance to Kyiv without security guarantees. These alternatives are to be compared while the war is still ongoing and after it's over. Each of them generates risks and has a price attached. What is clear by far is that the Russia-Ukrainian war made a cost of constructing effective security architecture in Europe much higher and reinforced NATO's role in it.

EU's also facing significant challenges. The war has revealed the Union's unpreparedness to long-term military standoff and, more generally, its lack of hard-power resources and power-projection capabilities. A strategy built on expansion of European normative influence largely failed. The Union is by and large facing a dilemma of either restructuring its whole approach to managing regional security or remaining vulnerable to ongoing transformations of the international order. The former strategy would entail revision of policy towards Russia and China, long-term increase in military spending and hard power capabilities, less emphasis on multilateral international institutions and, possible, changes of decision-making procedures inside the Union.

Germany appears to be the most affected among great European powers by geopolitical consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Not only it has to witness another major crisis at the EU borders and reconfigure its decades-long energy and trade cooperation with Russia, but also needs to reconsider the very fundamentals of security policy and strategic thinking. The German Chancellor's article referring to a now famous word *Zeitenwende* is reflecting the scope of expected transformations. (Scholz, 2022/2023)

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Major lines along which Germany is likely to transform its foreign and security policy in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, include fundamental changes in perceiving Russia, reassessment of relations with China, focusing on hard power component of security, and reinforcing coalitions.

Since the war broke out, Germany has critically examined its special relations with Russia. The policy of the latter is currently described as imperialistic and revisionist, and is no longer acceptable. Berlin is aware of its mistaken decisions which allowed further destabilization in Europe after the Russia-Georgian war of 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014. Authoritarian trend in Russia's development as well as growing disrespect for international norms and institutions from Moscow, hasn't met an adequate response from Berlin. Instead of being more attentive to problems of regional security in Eastern and Central Europe, Germany has been over-relying on trade interdependence with Russia and a hope for its democratization.

Those hopes have vanished. Now Germany is aiming at avoiding overdependence, doesn't trust Moscow anymore, and is ready to pay much more attention to the security concerns of Eastern European countries – instead of treating them like countries 'in between'. That also implies breaking up with a long-term historic tradition in relations between Germany and Russia, a tradition which shaped also the general landscape of security in Europe. It has been built, inter alia, on Germany's understanding of historical responsibility flowing from atrocities of World War II. Now it is likely to be replaced by responsibility for keeping regional security, for which Russia is a clear threat.

That is an element of a broader vision of the global security by Germany. 'Rules-based international order' is one of the keywords. Germany aims at common and sustainable security in Europe and globally, which would contain (neo)imperialism and be built on democratic foundations. To put it shortly, Germany is set to protect the status quo and ready to put much more resources into it, as well as to accept more risks flowing from containment of Russia and, possibly, China.

Reassessing relations with China is also a part of transformations Germany's foreign policy is going through as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Beijing has been an important trading partner to the EU and for Germany's export-oriented economy. It still is; however, political and security consideration can no longer be ignored. The Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the 20<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party have reinforced perception of China as a rising challenger for global hegemony; a country that is aiming at changing that 'rules-based order' Germany wants to protect. That will make partnership with China much more complicated. Finding a balance between partnership, competition and rivalry; ensuring resilience of Europe; diminishing dependence on supplies from China will shape the framework of Germany's policy towards the Asian giant.

Germany would want a stronger Europe. The country's contribution, at least as it's seen by the current government, will mean not only more investments into military and enhancing military presence at the Eastern flank of NATO, but also a new strategic culture, more adapted to confronting both old and new security challenges. Berlin is likely to take a more active stance in security area, in particular by increasing military spending, lifting barriers for arms exports, and investing more into transatlantic partnership. Shifts in Germany's security strategy are especially important given its power potential and the role within the EU.

Olaf Scholz has been referring to increasing multipolarity, but the structural results of the war are yet to be seen. Germany will be facing tougher global competition and may also find itself in a more dangerous geopolitical environment.

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The war has also had an impact on various regional networks and connections. Some of them are referred to in Ukraine as ‘small alliances’; however, they are rather formats for enhanced cooperation rather than alliances.

One of the key developments of that kind is alignment of Poland and Ukraine. What has been seen during the war – Ukrainian refugees going to Poland, massive military assistance and humanitarian aid, full-scale diplomatic support and strong international lobbying by Warsaw – may convert into a firm tandem after the war is over. Special relations with Ukraine as well as an active stance in Eastern Europe combined with a strong emphasis on deterring Russia may provide Warsaw with additional influence within the EU. An expansion of this alignment would also include Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia: a strong regional cluster is now visible in Eastern European security architecture; and it may be further reinforced by Sweden’s and Finland’s joining NATO.

The Black Sea region is also affected by the war and is likely to undergo changes of its security architecture after the war is over. Before the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, regional security has been defined by the balance involving Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and NATO. After 2014, that geometry has changed, since control over Crimea enhanced Russia’s influence in the region at the expense of Ukraine’s; but at the same time the annexation was a huge factor of regional destabilization leading to growing tensions between Russia and Turkey as well as between Russia and NATO. Interests of other countries of the region, such as Romania and Bulgaria, have also been affected. In the course of the war, Russia has been actively using its Black Sea fleet for military operations, as well as occupies significant part of Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline. Turkey, for its part, has been pursuing a mediating role, offering a platform in Istanbul in early months of war for talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations. As soon as perspective of any peace talks vanished, Turkey’s efforts have been aimed at consolidating its influence in the region and capitalizing on having normal relations with both Kyiv and Moscow. It may lead to further enhancement of Turkey’s role in the region after the war and, given the country’s weight in NATO, a possible fragmentation of the European security as a whole.

The war is likely to impact a number of the so-called ‘frozen’ conflicts in the region, most importantly developments in Moldova and in Nagorny Karabakh. Both conflicts have been for several decades been utilized and orchestrated by Moscow to enhance its own interests and retain influence on Moldova, Armenia and, to a lesser extent, on Azerbaijan. By controlling the escalation and through supplies of weapons, Russia managed to keep its presence; but at the same time it was undermining national security of a number of countries and negatively affected security of the whole region. The course of the Russian-Ukrainian war has so far weakened Russia’s positions in regional conflicts. Without the usual factor of the Russian presence, these conflicts may take unexpected paths. The same may also become true about the current situation in Georgia. Parts of the country, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, have been taken from the country by force of the Russian army in 2008 and subsequently proclaimed independent republics, unrecognized by international community. The scope of Russia’s weakness after the war in Ukraine is going to define the future of security in the Caucasus as well.

The Russian-Ukrainian war has affected regional security arrangements at several levels and in many ways. It has deteriorated security environment by generating suspicion and fear. It has weakened multi-lateral international institutions and usual frameworks for security cooperation. It pushed large powers in Europe to reconsider their security strategies and reassess challenges and threats.

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### **Rethinking Security: Are Wars Back?**

A prolonged and violent large-scale war in the heart of Europe makes one reconsider current political realities. A failure to prevent the war means that usual international security tools are no longer reliable; growing competition among great powers points at increased probability of regional war in the future. Are wars becoming normal again?

It has long been assumed that large conventional wars could be prevented by institutionalized interdependence. It has also been a common wisdom that states are unitary and rational gain-maximizers; thus they are extremely unlikely to launch a war today – because most wars are too expensive and risky to generate enough expected value. Long period of stability in Europe has been resulting from putting these assumptions into political practice.

The Russian-Ukrainian war challenges these views. Twice in less than a decade Russia's top decision-makers opted for a war even while facing high level of uncertainty and risk. If one recalls the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, the trend would be even more visible. Considerations of perceived security, relative gains, zero-sum thinking have outweighed benefits of interdependence and obeying the norms of international order.

It has been a quite long path before consequences of the decision to annex Crimea in 2014 brought Russia's leadership to a choice to invade in 2022. In the meanwhile Russia faced a difficult dilemma. Long-term costs of the Crimea annexation have been too high, while sanctions and strategic uncertainty reinforced that problem. Leaving things as they were left Russia too vulnerable in the long run – at least, that's how things might look from Moscow.

But a cost of invasion was also expected to be extremely high: the probability of winning a war against a large modern state enjoying international support was too low; while the expected price for war was enormous. Nevertheless, decision-makers in the Kremlin took the risk. For the global security this decision has important. It was one more time when a war has proven that interdependence may not be enough to hold off security-driven violence – and not for the last time. For more than three decades since the end of the Cold War, international political scene has been dominated by intrastate low-intensity conflicts, while interstate wars have been exceptionally rare and mostly concentrated in Asia. Splashes of violence in protracted conflicts, like those between India and Pakistan or Armenia and Azerbaijan, were rather semi-frozen conflicts out of control than 20-century style large wars; and the absence of institutionalized large-scale interstate violence has become a characteristic feature of international security. Now it's gone.

That is not to imply that wars ceased to be expensive. On the contrary: those stressing that modern warfare is exceptionally risky and costly, proved to be right. Russia's war in Ukraine costs hundreds of billions dollars of annual direct spending; with long-term structural effects for the economy and distant impact of sanctions also to be taken into account. Moscow opted for a war not because it was cheap, but regardless of how expensive it might have been. Thus, when we say that wars might be back, it doesn't imply states can easily afford them.

Large-scale conventional interstate wars are returning, accompanying the rise of the global competition among great powers. That competition is present at several levels. On the global level it is about challenging international order and shifting balance of power. On the regional level it is manifested in proxy wars and opposition of the alliances. On the national level it can reinforce ideological standoffs and promote institutional changes inside states. If not taking part directly in, then at least getting ready for a large-scale war may to once again become a key part of strategic planning for great powers.

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A demand for military strength has been on the rise. It proved to be a costly, but still effective and necessary instrument of foreign and security policy. Countries are increasing their defense budgets and boost military production – while expecting others to do the same. Military capabilities and the ability to project them are becoming cumulative power assets. Maintaining military advantage is perceived as a crucial condition for survival or success of nations in international politics. Although arms races not necessarily lead to wars, management of security in a highly militarized context would require much more skill and effort.

That is likely to be accompanied by reassessment of nuclear weapons. As a powerful component of hard power capabilities, nuclear weapons may become more demanded globally and regionally. Weakening of a non-proliferation regime, which has been underway for a while already, may bring about tactics of brinkmanship, threats and rise of tensions regionally and globally. In a world of arms races and weak/absent regimes for weapons control, a war is becoming more immediate danger.

A shadow of war is likely to raise the issue of coalitions. If we're experiencing a power transition period and a fight for global hegemony, then coalitions are becoming decisive since they offer an advantage to a reigning hegemon. Fragmentation of international security implies vulnerability of smaller states without security guarantees. Neutrality will not be paying off enough in a world dominated by military might. Furthermore, coalitions are becoming more important than international organizations. Apparent weakness of the UN, OSCE and other similar institutions in what concerned prevention and/or managing large-scale violence will make states seek other options. Progressive insufficiency of international norms and regimes promotes restoration of realist thinking in international politics, with its emphasis on hard power, zero-sum competitions and mistrust.

Within such framework wars are also becoming instrumental: states may be more willing to balance, in particular against aggressors. The conventional logic of balancing, typical for European diplomacy before World War 2, may also be back; and wars may return as instruments for checking potential revisionists. Some of such wars may be proxy.

The danger of this particular war is that it changes the way states perceive intentions of each other and see ways to enhance their security. It shifts security paradigms and challenges well-known norms. By doing so, it not only endangers Ukraine, neighboring countries or Europe as a whole; but increases chances of further destabilization. That's why it has been an exceptional challenge.

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# Chapter 4

## Internal and External Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Russian foreign policy is one of the most complex issues to examine, in terms of its internal and external determinants. In this research brief, the author focuses on analyzing the foreign policy of Russia according to the following aspects: Geography, economy, groups of social interest, Russian political structure and mechanism of decision-making, international commonwealth and Russia, and comparative analysis of Russian and Soviet foreign political behavior. The author will analyze the significance of these factors and how much they've contributed to shaping the foreign policy of Russia as it is today. Since this research will be based on foreign policy analysis, the author will use academic articles, books, journals, and documents from government websites. It should be noted that the author will use qualitative and quantitative analysis. The researcher will use thematic analysis to explain the behavior of the Russian Federation, as well as events and the developments that contributed to the development of Russian foreign policy.*

### **INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF THE STATE FOREIGN POLICY**

The concept of “statehood” is the most important characteristic of the state, revealing not only its internal nature, as R. Chellen would say, “form of life”, but also determining its place in the world system. That is why the use of this concept as a synonym for the state or to refer to fairly generalized and indirect forms of political organization seems to be erroneous. Methodological substantiation of the concept of “statehood” Statehood is a special sign, the state of development of a certain social entity (nation, group of nationalities, people), who managed to create their state, the national legal system or restore these institutions that were lost due to various reasons. Statehood is a property, quality, and state of society

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at a particular historical stage of its development. Statehood is the essence, the quality of the state. The state is a manifestation, a form of statehood. Thus, statehood is the qualitative side of the state, which fills the state-state with life and organizes not only the entire human but even partly geographical and biological environment. The concept of statehood is broader and deeper than the concept of the state. When we say that some nation has statehood, it means that this nation has or can have its state. Statehood determines the entire structure of social life, the political order, and hence the viability of the state. The state, in turn, must correspond to the statehood of this or that people. The most complete disclosure of the concept of “statehood” seems possible through the imposition of such characteristics as “status” and “consistency”. This was first noticed in the late 1960s by the American researcher J.P. Nettle (Nettle, 1968). those. allows you to determine the place and role of this state in the world system.

statehood is the result of the historical, economic, political, and foreign policy activities of a particular society to create a relatively rigid political framework that ensures territorial, institutional, and functional unity, i.e. to create their state-state, national political system. However, how the process of formation of statehood will proceed, and what will be its results - whether there will be a state-state capable of not only obtaining a certain status in the system of international relations but also playing a certain role in the world system, depends on a historically determined combination of internal and external factors. Therefore, the problem of factors influencing statehood seems to be decisive in the process of its development. Factors as analytical units are understood as material and non-material structures, institutions, and processes that determine the formation of statehood. For the most complete and adequate analysis of the development of domestic statehood, we propose to use a kind of factorial “funnel of causality”, namely, to take into account seven internal and seven external factors in the analysis. The internal factors that determine statehood include the dimension, demographic and ethnic-confessional, socioeconomic characteristics, the time of existence of statehood, the presence of internal (interethnic) conflicts, the political organization of society, and the nature of the political regime. External are the factors that show the level of economic, military, and political dependence/independence from other countries, supranational structures, and global problems of our time. Specifically highlighted are: external debt dependence, the share of foreign investment and foreign aid, the national currency pegging regime, the presence of foreign military contingents on the territory of the country, the recognition and inclusion of the country in supranational structures, the presence of territorial problems and global problems of our time (terrorism, arms trafficking, drugs, etc.). The selected factors can be considered basic for the analysis of the development of statehood. The rest, with undoubted interest, are secondary and do not change the overall picture.

### **Economy**

The economic factor significantly influences Russian foreign policy. For us to explain why the Russian economy is the way it is today, we have to understand some of the developments that occurred in the 1990s, and most notably, it is a period of so-called “gangster capitalism” and privatization. As the Russian government did not implement the correct economic policies at the time, whether it be the basic operations of tax collection, or controlling its borders/customs, as well as adopting its currency, the state institutions were ineffective and quite frankly, in turmoil. It suffered from skyrocketing inflation and shortages, terrible industrial formation, which was run by bureaucrats centrally, and naturally, the industries were unused to market approaches to conducting business. The inefficient distribution of resources in the 1990s and a heavy concentration of those assets into defense and military industry is what

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also drove the Soviet and then Russian economies into a deadlock. However, these industrial “bosses” maintained their influence from the Soviet times and transferred that effect into the contemporary Russian Federation, whereas many of the macroeconomic policies, and particularly, the privatization course in times of so-called “gangster capitalism” era in Russia influenced by these very people, the so-called industrial bosses who later came to be known as oligarchs (Young, 2012). It should also be underlined that certain reforms, conducted and implemented by Yelstin’s administration, were largely influenced by interest groups, in this case, the oligarchs, who, to a certain extent, tried to capture a state which was in a terrible condition. Particularly, besides the liberalization of the economy and foreign trade, they managed to severely limit the participation of foreign investors and businessmen in the economy of Russia, as well as the acquisition of its industries was quite limited. Wrong reforms and stop-go stabilization policies did not work out the way it was intended.

We saw a huge decline in the economy of Russia from 1996 to 1998, until the Russian default or the financial crisis, which was subsequently resolved by the IMF when they bailed out the Russian economy when they provided a financial package to them. All in all, the Russian economy fundamentally shrunk after the Cold War ended, as there was less consumption than production in the society. It should be underlined that during these developments, oligarchs weren’t as quite hurt as the regular citizens, and after the last decade of the 20th century ended, Yeltsin transferred the most problematic aspect of this presidency, the “oligarchy” to his successor, Putin, who had to deal with these people, with immense influence over critical energy resources, industries, and the media. (Young, 2012).

Putin’s era was fundamentally different, as he was met with these difficulties, he decided it was time to tackle these issues. He prioritized reforms as follows: exchange rate management in a careful manner, fiscal consolidation, and structural reform, so that the new market economy could emerge. He also introduced regulations and a new tax reform, which was more or less progressive. The economy of Russia, nonetheless, was always dependent on primary products. Primary products as such, accounted for almost 86% of total exports, and out of this 86%, oil and natural gas accounted for the largest share, which was up to 70%, as well as metals, such as titanium, and precious stones (13.2%). We can therefore hypothesize that judging from fluctuations in the oil market and political weaponization of natural gas, Russia’s economy and revenue were fundamentally dependent on these two crucial resources. The fact that oil prices always go up and down depending on crises and unstable periods, sometimes both benefit and hurt Russia. But there were lots of problems that were affecting Russia’s foreign policy, starting from these fluctuations, and ending with the overall demographics and urban/rural difference.

We can state that, despite its richness of natural resources, it can never satisfy the needs of both urban and rural populations, because these resources are not enough to satisfy their demands. It all comes down to diversification, which Russia lacked substantially. (Young, 2012). Therefore, we can hypothesize that oil and natural gas weren’t used to advance the agenda of welfare, but it was rather used for political and bargaining purposes by the Kremlin, it was demonstrated in Putin’s statements during his first presidency and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, because they are hugely dependent on Western technologies to utilize their natural resources, and they were importing these technologies and know-how up until they decided to invade Ukraine, this is also a factor that was and is affecting their foreign policy.

There is no doubt that the Russians weaponize their energy resources when it comes to distributing them to post-Soviet states and Western Europe. They have been very actively weaponizing gas prices and oil prices, and threatening to cut off gas supply fully. Russia is also very actively distributing gas to China as well. The Russian economic revival is also largely a by-product of increasing oil prices in the world. (Rumer, 2007). Therefore, it is safe to say that Russia has ambitions to become a “worldwide

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energy superpower”. (Rumer, 2007). There’s a worldwide trend of promoting renewable energy resources and emissions-free goods, and that is prevalent in Europe, whereas the Europeans have an ambitious plan to become the world’s first emissions-free region by 2050, and they want to reduce their dependency on fossil fuel goods, such as oil and gas, (Eurostat, 2020). and you can see the correlation here in terms of diminishing Russian influence in Europe, which will eventually make their threats negligible, and that includes post-Soviet states as well. They are also experiencing gas deficits from time to time, which they are not too good at dealing with. (Rumer, 2007).

Demographics play a huge role in the way in which the economy works and operates in the state. In the case of Russia, the demographic situation is catastrophic, in terms that there are more elderly in Russia nowadays than youth. Furthermore, ever since the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s population has been slowly decreasing, i.e. birth rates were significantly lower than death rates. According to some long-term forecasts, Russia’s population could shrink to 100 million by the year 2050. Demographics play a huge role in employment as well, in terms that Russia will even have to give some of its industries up in the next decade or so to sustain its employability, whether it be in their strategic industries, such as oil, natural gas, railway systems or high-tech in general. Furthermore, life expectancy in Russia is 65 in general, while in the case of males, who dominate the market, it’s 59. Demographics could be considered the “Achilles Heel” of Russia. (Rumer 2007).

Even nowadays, Russia’s future as an energy superpower is under grave threat, considering the latest developments in terms of European nations saying no to Russian gas and them not being able to diversify their energy exports to China and India, in a way that satisfies those countries’ market demands. (Russel, 2022). Geopolitical uncertainty plays a huge part about Chinese influence in gas and oil-rich Siberia and the Russian Far East. (Rumer, 2007). It’s worth mentioning that the Russians are very dependent on gas and oil since a huge proportion of their GDP depends on those very goods. Normally, the revenue of oil and gas GDP was around 10%, but after the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, sanctions crippled that income to a 5% margin. (Statista, 2021).

After the 24th of February, 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine devastated the Russian economy, as the sanctions were unprecedented and were way harsher than the ones adopted in 2014. Particularly, the trade, energy, and financial sector were hit the most, as well as the imports of crucial technologies, including microchips. More than 1000 companies have left Russia, which brought them back to Soviet-era isolation. These sanctions, however, need months for them to affect the regular citizens and the Russian war machine. Unemployment will also, naturally, significantly rise. Russia will resemble the Soviet Union of the 1980s. Considering that 60% of Russian assets abroad were frozen, and some of those assets will also be used to reconstruct Ukraine, and also taking into account Russia being cut off from the SWIFT payment system, they have come down to the ranks of Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, without crucial technologies, they cannot utilize their energy resources, industries, technologies, and even military production. There will be no economic growth in Russia and this of course will affect how they conduct and will conduct their foreign policy, which has been very aggressive and coercive. Judging from the aforementioned facts, Russian foreign policy will become even more aggressive and coercive. They will not be able to produce anything domestically, and therefore, they will be fundamentally dependent on China in these matters, even in the sphere of IT, since most IT specialists have fled Russia after the war. The fact that Russian oligarchs’ assets are frozen and their yachts are taken away might be problematic in the long term for Putin, as the oligarchs have immense influence over domestic affairs. This may lead to a change of policy sooner or later, or a potential ousting of Putin from power. (Chkhaidze, Kuzio, 2022).

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It should be noted that the statistics coming from the Kremlin are, most of the time, cherry-picked, as in, the real information and data about, including foreign trade data, were updated every month before the war, but during the war, key statistics were withheld from the public. These statistics mostly include imports and exports, financial information of certain companies and paperwork, monetary data in the central bank, FDI data, oil and gas, capital, etc. Therefore, it has been hard for policy-makers and researchers to identify real numbers, as they are not being disclosed to the public.

Still, there are certain myths and lies about how the state of the Russian economy is being portrayed to the world. There is a widespread myth that Russia can export its gas exports to Asia, considering the sanctions that were imposed on Russia but Europe. However, the so-called pivot to the East is not feasible, as less than 10 percent of Russia's natural gas is in a liquefied state. (Sonnenfield, Tian, 2022). Russian gas exports are mostly dependent on a fixed system of pipelines, which carry that gas. The absolute majority of Russian gas pipelines are in the direction of Europe, and they are indeed located in the Western part of the Russian Federation. Of course, from the point of view of logistics, it is practically impossible to link these gas pipelines with the one in Eastern Siberia, which then flows into Asia. That is why, as Russia was planning to invade Ukraine and more or less expected some sort of retaliation from the West in the form of sanctions, more particularly on the oil and gas industry, they have resorted to building pipelines that will enhance gas exports in Asia, but it will take years for those pipelines to start working and exporting gas to Asia, (Sonnenfield, Tian, 2022), and lack of finances prevents the Russian Federation from accelerating the process of pipelines becoming operational. (Yale School of Management, 2022). The same goes with the myth about oil, in terms of it being more fungible than gas and therefore, Putin could sell it to Asia for a cheaper price. However, in that case, the Russians are met with a different problem. China and India are getting an unprecedented discount of 35\$ on Russian oil purchases from Ural, which means that the revenue will not be as big as before. Furthermore, the Russians are faced with the problem of logistics, whereas it takes Russian oil tankers up to 35 days to reach the markets of East Asia, while in the case of Europe, it reaches the region in two to seven days, and this explains why throughout history, Europe was more prioritized than the Asian market in terms of oil exports. However, Russia is still forced to pivot to Asia, considering the sanctions imposed by Europe, and they will get less and less revenue, while the spheres of cooperation between China and Russia are expanding, especially nowadays in the realm of the military, as there are serious threats and chances of China sending arms to Russia, as it was said by many Western leaders. (Al Jazeera, 2023).

Therefore, the sanctions are indeed weakening Russia's ability to finance the war in Ukraine, and these sanctions were imposed to specifically target the political, economic, military, and business elite that are mostly responsible and complicit in the invasion of Ukraine.

## **Geography**

Geography is one of the most important determinants of Russian foreign policy, along with history, as it has been a factor that has either made Russia feel secure or insecure during the centuries of its existence. To assess Russian behavior in terms of geography, we have to take into account several historical developments, whether it be Russia supporting the cause of the war on terror, announced by President of the US, George W. Bush, which could be used to influence the situation in rebelling Chechnya. The expansion of the European Union, as well as NATO towards Russian borders. The countries that were once part of the USSR are now being incorporated into Western alliances and organizations, which of course, from Russia's point of view, is considered problematic. When taking the geographic factor into

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account, we should remember that Russia always preferred to have buffer zones near its borders with the West, and these buffer zone states would more or less be authoritarian or quite corrupt, i.e. they could be subject to influence. That is why when countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and later on, Armenia, went through the process of “colored revolutions”, this concerned the Kremlin, as these states would no longer act as buffer zones, and would have their agenda. When we’re talking about the Russian sphere of influence, it also comes down to promoting the existence of frozen conflicts, whether it be in the South Caucasus (Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as Nagorno Karabakh), and Moldova in Europe. (Young, 2012). However, the latest developments in the Nagorno Karabakh war already implies that Russia is losing its grip on the South Caucasus, as Turkish influence is growing and Russian influence is diminishing according to what happened in the second Nagorno Karabakh war in 2020 and the brief Azerbaijani military operation in Autumn of 2022.

With the fall of the USSR, Russia had to give up large parts of its lands and borders, and it marked the end of both the USSR and Russia as a superpower. Russia, from a Russian foreign policy establishment point of view, was vulnerable or exposed to foreign threats, considering its border with Europe and the non-existence of a buffer zone. This is where the theory of the heartland theory comes in, according to which, if a country controls Eastern Europe, it rules the heartland, and if he rules the heartland, he rules the world, so he who rules Eastern Europe, controls the world. (Clover, 2016). This, along with the fact that when the USSR collapsed, it lost its only defensive locations, which were the Baltic Sea and the Carpathian Mountains. These two locations have strategic importance, and they served as the buffer zones for Russian defense and sustainability. If the border of Russia with Europe is 2000 km-s nowadays, with the Carpathian Mountains incorporated into the Russian sphere of influence, it could only be 600 km-s, which, from a Russian point of view, is satisfactory to “prevent encroachment by the West”. This could be one of the reasons why Russia decided to invade Ukraine, even though the rhetoric focuses on the resolution of the Donbas issue, they, from an analytical standpoint, would benefit far more from taking the whole of Ukraine. All of this is influenced by the people in the Kremlin and nationalist ideologists, who still believe in the heartland theory and try to further advance that agenda and implement it into practice. (Clover, 2016). Naturally, we see why they’re behaving the way they are behaving today, which is a conquest and invading sovereign countries. Their Eastern flank is quite exposed to Chinese influence as well. One could say that Russian geography’s biggest problem is its size and vulnerabilities on all fronts, and that is why they act in such an aggressive manner.

Russia’s geopolitical outlook is to revive its diminished status as a former superpower and establish itself as an equal to the West. This geostrategic perspective corresponds with Russia’s aspirations to (re) gain the status of a great power, which is strongly attributable to its geographic location positioning and physical attributes of Russia as a police state, that ought to be strong enough to try and prevent possible future threats (i.e. army, separatist groups) that could jeopardize the integrity of its vast territories in the Eurasian continent. In this sense, President Vladimir Putin, taking on the legacy of former Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, the designer of Russia’s multi-vector foreign policy with common importance placed on “multi-polarity,” has the perspective of trying to transform Russia into an essential superpower through economic reforms and modernization, particularly, this applies to the energy sector and a different foreign policy. (Mankoff, 2012). Russia is the planet’s most “exposed” nation because of its direct authority of enormous territories in the Eurasian continent, as measured by the size of its territorial boundaries and the neighbors it has. Surrounded by historical incursions and invasions by foreign powers, Russia and its past entities) have established “physical barriers” or buffer zones conceived as the so-called “near abroad” (Camerona, Orenstein, 2012), in a wide range of government papers. (Gvosdev, Marsch, 2013). When

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we're looking at the developments since the 1990s, such as the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, NATO's humanitarian mission and intervention in Kosovo, energy corridors, enlargement of NATO and the EU, in a way have bred the sense of insecurity in terms of Russia's geographical location, according to what they did to Georgia in 2008 and to Ukraine in 2014 and now in 2022-2023.

### **Groups of Social Interest, Russian Political Structure, and Mechanism of Decision-Making**

Groups of social interest vary in Russia, and they affect the decision-making mechanism and overall structure of Russian politics. First of all, the major aspect of groups of social interest is the population itself, as there is a broad consensus on several issues that the Russian society and the government elite agree upon. This could be backed by the fact that Putin's popularity or approval rating has been quite high. (Rumer, 2007). Levada Center, one of the most objective and credible NGO-s in Russia, has been researching the data about Putin's approval, whilst subsequently analyzing how these numbers align with him starting wars. We can see that in the case of the 2014 Russian aggression in Ukraine, he had a maximum approval rating of 88, but before the war, in 2013, his rating was 61. The same goes for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, where his approval rating peaked at 83, but before the war, in 2021, it was only 63. (Levada Center, 2022).

These datasets show two scenarios, one of which demonstrates that whenever the Russian President's approval rating goes down, he always aims to increase these numbers by appealing to the masses using waging warfare on a sovereign country's territory. The second scenario demonstrates that, as we've mentioned above, since there's a mutual agreement between the Russian society and the elite, both of them condone such acts, or one could say that they complement each other, as both the society and elite demand war. This also could be explained by the fact that the Russian society, as well as the elite, still has a collective memory of the USSR and its alleged greatness, and when their so-called might was taken away from them as a consequence of the dissolution of the USSR, they think there's a need for them to re-establish themselves on the geopolitical map of the world, as it's laid out in the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy. (The Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015).

Siloviki or "Enforcers" are also a group that is amongst social interest. They are members of the Russian elite, that are the descendants of the senior ranks in the former KGB (now FSB), GRU (military intelligence), and the military itself. They have, for decades, run the country from the shadows. They have their status quo, which does not always coincide with Putin's agenda. Notable figures of the Siloviki circle include the current director of FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, Secretary of the Security of Council of Russia and Putin's right-hand man, Nikolai Patrushev, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Sergey Naryshkin, and others. Since 2020, when Russia started to resemble a country run by a President who can remain in his position for life, the latter started to reduce his meetings with Siloviki, and only aligned himself with people close to him. (Chkhaidze, Kuzio, 2022). In 2012, Putin established a national guard and has been empowering the military since then. (Rivera, Werning Rivera, 2018). These structures are only loyal to him, considering that they're run by Putin's former bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov. It should be underlined that Putin aligned himself with Kadyrov, the President of Chechnya, who has immense influence over how politics is conducted in Russia. Kadyrov has had problems with the Siloviki circle for a long time and it's still ongoing, (Taub, 2015), especially after Russia invaded Ukraine. (Warsaw Institute, 2022). There's a clear contradiction of Kadyrov being loyal to Putin and at the same time, being anti-Siloviki, and that, of course, affects decisions on a policy-making level.



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The other group of social interests is the oligarchs. It should be well understood that these people amassed their money in the 1990s when a Wild West or “Gangster Capitalism” era was booming in Russia. Alongside the security services and ministries, or shortly, the Siloviki, the oligarchs were involved in Russian politics and policy-making processes domestically and externally. One could say that even though both the Siloviki and the oligarchs tried to influence policy-making in the early 2000s, this ended with a fiasco for one of the most influential oligarchs, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, whose wealth was taken away from him, while subsequently being sentenced to jail for several years. This was, in a way, a course of events built upon the narrative that Siloviki wanted to achieve their much-needed revenge, against the oligarchs who amassed their wealth in the Yeltsin Era of the 1990s. Ever since the famous Yukos case, and the very mysterious death of Boris Berezovsky, another Russian oligarch, and after the consolidation of power by Putin and his Siloviki in the early stages of his presidency, one could say that he and the security service held more power than the oligarchs, and had much more influence than them. (Young, 2012). To conclude, nowadays, despite the resistance from a Putin loyalist Kadyrov, as well as from the oligarchs, the Siloviki circle now hold one of the highest levels of influence in Russian politics and policy-making decision. Their opinion is always taken into account, however wrong it can be. Sometimes, businesses as big as those who operate in the oil, natural gas, uranium, precious stones, etc. can be outweighed by some people in the security service, which in and by itself is unique, as we have this case famously in Russia.

Since 2020, after Putin declared himself as a President for life, alternative political thought, independent media, or freedom of gathering/protest was suppressed or completely crushed. Decisions are taken mostly by Putin, and the Siloviki circle, and sometimes, certain opinions voiced by the oligarchs are also taken into account. In Russia, the power structure is in the form of a pyramid, which was built by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, whereas he used his personal protection unit or the army to “divide and conquer”, in this case, the Russian nation into power and people. He was convinced, along with all of his successors afterward, that Russia, considering its hugeness, had to be cruel, strong, ruthless, and unpredictable not only to its enemies abroad but to the people domestically. People have no other choice but to get used to such a system, and one man is sitting on the top of this pyramid, nowadays, is the President of Russia. (Sorokin, 2022). Then there’s the Siloviki circle, followed up by the security services, then the business sector (including the oligarchs), ending with the general population.

However, it should be underlined that similar to Tsar’s advisors, contemporary Russia’s president has his circle of advisors, non-formal ones, such as Alexander Dugin, a far-right, ultranationalist, whose geopolitical ideas have, to a certain extent, influenced Putin. His writings, articles, speeches, and statements have influenced the actions and the way of thinking of the Russian political elite, including Vladimir Putin. He was the one, along with Vladislav Surkov, to have influenced the decision to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Tharoor, 2022). The same goes for ideologists circle or the so-called propagandists in basic terms, who influence the masses, but they do not possess the same sort of influence over the political elite. However, the very same Dugin who influenced these decisions came to criticize Vladimir Putin because of his inability to protect so-called “Russian lands”. This also reflects upon the changing power structure and pyramid in Russia, which is ever-changing and can be influenced by actors outside the Siloviki circles. (MacFarquhar, 2022). Based on far-reaching new research of leadership in military conflict by one of Britain’s most notable scholars in the research area, Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has been hindered by shortcomings faced by autocratic states during the conflict. Lawrence Freedman, a leading strategic studies expert, analyzes a sequence of well-known wars and conflicts throughout the history of the Cold War till Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. “Autocra-

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cies lack a feedback mechanism and dig themselves in by believing that the advantage of autocracy is bold and decisive decision-making. While in certain circumstances you can tolerate quite a lot of bad decision-making and come out all right, because you have superior numbers, where it is very tight, one poor decision or bit of bad luck can put you out completely.” (Beaumont, 2022).

Even though the current Russian regime and the government are profoundly frightened of elite and popular opposition towards its behavior and decision-making, neither oligarchy/siloviki nor the Russian population’s opinions on various problems have seemed to change or influence Russian domestic and foreign policy strategy. The government has made an effort to influence public sentiment rather than react to it. It has accomplished this by suppressing political rivals and alternative press. The Russian government also viewed the Maidan protests as risky since if such demonstrations might occur in Ukraine, they might also occur throughout Russia. To avoid this, significant changes were made to the decision-making system. Putin’s style of governance and views seem to have been probably crucial to the particular steps taken, but not to the sentiments that pushed them. The Kremlin’s process of making decisions can be described as profoundly concentrated in the hands of a single circle, with very few optional perspectives being expressed. The Kremlin blamed the Maidan demonstrations on Washington’s and Brussels’ “meddling” in Kyiv, testing individual conviction in a centralized government at the forefront of the Russian community. (Oliker, Chivvis, Crane, Tkacheva, Boston, 2015).

## **INTERNATIONAL COMMONWEALTH AND RUSSIA, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR**

Nowadays, Russia is almost completely isolated from the international commonwealth, considering its brutal, unjustified, and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Russia and key Russian figures were sanctioned in an unprecedented manner, whether it be through political or financial means, Russia is “way too deep into the ocean”. If we judge from United Nations votes, condemning Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine or even the sham referenda about annexing Ukrainian oblasts, Russia nowadays has four friends on a political level, which are Belarus, Nicaragua, Syria, and North Korea. Even China, who has interests in Ukraine and the wider Black Sea region, and India, have abstained from voting in favor of or against Russia at the United Nations, as both of these countries have publicly criticized Putin’s war. (Sussex, 2022).

On a military level, the only ally that Russia has at the moment is Iran, who has openly acknowledged the fact that they provide weapons to Russia, particularly, drones. (Pourahmadi, Tanno, 2022). We can therefore, hypothesize, that nowadays, Russia is more isolated than the Soviet Union was in its days. If we could bring an example of George F. Kennan’s most famous work “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” of 1947, and compare it to contemporary Russia, we’ll see that there are lots of similarities. The fact that way back in 1947, Kennan was warning us about Soviet expansionism as being “a fluid stream that moves constantly”, and that there was a need for the Truman Administration and following Presidents to “contain” communism in its lair, which was Russia. (Foreign Affairs, 1947). The rhetoric, used by then Soviet officials such as Stalin, is echoing the statements that Putin makes about the “collective West” today. The concept of “Western Encroachment” was already prevalent during the times of Stalin, and Putin is just repeating the policies that have been in action since the 1940s. Whether it be Russo-Soviet expansionism westward, or financing/influencing pro-Russian/Communist powers and actors in particular states, whether it be in Western, Central, or Eastern Europe, as well as in the Middle East. All

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of this was done by the USSR and is still done by Russia to further advance its agenda, which is inherently anti-Western. (Foreign Affairs, 1947).

Therefore, we can hypothesize that the Russian issue has always been considered one of the impeding factors for shaping the general landscape of the post-Soviet space. Since the Kremlin views Georgia and post-Soviet space in general as its “backyard” or “near abroad”, it’s natural for them to perceive that post-Soviet countries should fall under their sphere of influence. Therefore, it’s natural and logical for us to assume that post-Soviet states, including Georgia and Ukraine, which have declared a Eurocentric direction, are crossing the so-called “red lines” declared by the Russian Federation. Specifically, in the case of Georgia, we must understand that Russia aims to have Georgia under its sphere of influence for the very reason to assert dominance in the South Caucasus, in which Georgia is the most pro-Western nation. The latter fact does not fit into the plans or agenda of the Russian Federation. It aims to establish a strong military control in Georgia and through that, from their point of view, Russians can “stabilize” their so-called “near abroad”.

The Russian government also thinks that the North Caucasian issue, with its separatist threats and instability, could be resolved if Russia established its presence in Georgia. Most importantly, the energy issue is one of the most significant factors that Russia seeks to tackle when it comes to Georgia, as it serves as a transport hub and energy corridor, and it undermines the Russian monopoly on natural gas, as well as oil. (Kavadze, 2020).

As for today’s times and the contemporary situation in Georgia and the South Caucasus in general, we are seeing significant developments and improvements in regional cooperation, in terms of Georgian-Azerbaijani cooperation in the realm of security and energy, as well as the fact that the EU so desperately needs to the energy resources since it wants to remove its energy dependence on Russia, it needs Azerbaijan to make it happen, and the latter can offer its significant amount of natural gas to the EU by the help of Georgia as a transit hub/route. It is important to mention that Europe may struggle with diversifying its gas imports, but according to my research paper, published together with Dr. Taras Kuzio at the Henry Jackson Society, we concluded that Europe can diversify its energy income from the South Caucasus and Central Asia, through the Caspian Sea, then to Georgia or the South Caucasus, and then to Europe, but that’s a process which has to be coordinated with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and most importantly, energy exporting countries in Central Asia, such as Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, etc. (Chkhaidze, Kuzio, 2022).

Furthermore, we are seeing how the European Union understood the fact that it needs Georgia to improve its energy capabilities and integration policy, and this was indeed demonstrated by the fact that the EU, along with the heads of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Hungary, signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the development of the Black Sea Energy submarine cable. This will significantly improve and ensure the secure supply of energy and decarbonization of the EU’s respective economies with the help of Georgia and Azerbaijan. (European Union, 2022). All in all, we should be expecting a very positive development in terms of seeing Georgia’s role improve both on the regional and international levels in these turbulent times and such a geopolitically tense continent. The policies and cooperation of the Georgian authorities with its immediate neighbors (excluding Russia), along with its pragmatic non-irritation policy, are contributing to the fact that we are indeed drifting away from Russia and we are slowly, step by step achieving the decades-long goal of being accepted to the community of Western nations, along with establishing our role in that community.

The foreign policy of the Russian Federation is markedly different from the Soviet Union’s since Russia is significantly different from the old USSR. Russia’s landscape is different: it is relatively small;

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what were the USSR's southern and western counties before 1992 nowadays are sovereign states. The Soviet Union was a superpower consisting of multiple nations, with non-Russians constituting fifty percent of its citizens. In comparison, the Russian Federation is a nation-state, with ethnic Russians constituting 85% of the population. The USSR was dedicated to putting an aspirational, extravagant philosophy into practice. Marxism-Leninism as an ideology is practically non-existent in Russia. From a Western perspective, the USSR possessed a massive military-industrial complex: a substantial chunk of its economic system as much as one-third—was dedicated to defense equipment. Contemporary Russia's military forces are weaker and less powerful and its army sectors are much more insignificant than those of the Soviet Union. (Mandelbaum, 2023).

Russia's overall sentiment toward Ukraine is generally compatible with historical Russian (and Soviet) reasoning regarding strategic interests and foreign affairs, which has centered on states acting as buffers, impact over its "near abroad" and neighbors, and a perspective of the ongoing contest with the United States. Such long-term trends, nevertheless, are not enough to entirely describe Russian behavior. Moscow has wanted "buffer states" along its boundaries for a long time. Russians had also traditionally described Ukraine as profoundly Russian in terms of heritage and culture. Russia aspires to a position of enormous influence and authority and sees itself as competing against Washington. Long-held views about Russia's privileges in and around its regional area are aggravated by the post-Soviet perception that actors in its "near abroad" and their steps to integrate with the West are a means of subjugating and reducing Russia's influence. (Oliker, Chivvis, Crane, Tkacheva, Boston, 2015).

## **CONCLUSION**

All in all, there are both internal and external determinants that influence Russian Foreign Policy. For centuries and decades, Russian foreign policy has been influenced by the interior/security circle, or what we nowadays call the Siloviki circle, but as time progressed, the oligarchs also came to the political arena and started advocating for their agenda.

Economy, naturally, played and plays a huge part in the way in which Russian foreign policy was and is conducted, in terms of fluctuating oil prices, European dependency on Russian natural gas, and them slowly diversifying their energy income and removing their dependency on Russia, and most importantly the effect of sanctions on Russian foreign and domestic political behavior.

Geography is one of the most fundamental instruments that feed Russian paranoia about so-called "Western encroachment" to Russian borders.

Contemporary Russia, according to its actions, rhetoric, and operations abroad/overseas, came to resemble the USSR in its most aggressive days. One should take all of these factors into account before analyzing Russian Foreign Policy and its behavior on a policy-making level.

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## Chapter 5

# The Russian–Ukrainian Conflict: Catalyst for the Resovietization of the East

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### ABSTRACT

*Thirty-three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one thing is obvious: The resolution of several international crises still depends on relations between the West and Russia. Like it or not, this geopolitical situation is a fact which, however, Americans and Europeans have not been duly taken into consideration since 1989. This crisis, which has not stopped, experienced a more expansive phase on February 24, 2022: it is the Russian special military operation for some leaders in Ukraine, Russian interventionism for others, and the war in Ukraine for still others. It is particularly notable in the soaring prices of raw materials essential for the functioning of industries. The Ukrainian crisis has revealed the fragilities of the dependence of certain States and Unions on raw materials, but also certain military fragilities. A critical situation therefore prevails, and many hypotheses remain perceptible given the existence of several scenarios and possible balances. This insight analyzes the current geopolitical situation between blocs and considers a possible vision of the blocs by 2050.*

### INTRODUCTION: THE ROAD TOWARD THE RESOVETIZATION OF THE EAST

Thirty-three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one thing is obvious: The resolution of several international crises still depends on relations between the West and Russia. In Libya, Syria, Iran, Ukraine, and perhaps even the Balkans, relations between Moscow and Western countries always seem to be good or bad. Like it or not, this geopolitical situation is a fact which, however, Americans and Europeans have not been duly taken into consideration since 1989. A series of actions testify to this, in particular the European Union's (EU) neighborhood policy in 2003 and the Eastern Partnership in 2004, with the corollary of the accession of the countries of central Europe (Poland, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania) and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) to the EU. In addition, in 2009, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership to address six former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,

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Moldova, and Ukraine), with the aim of mooring them to the EU both economically and politically. The initiative provided for the negotiation of six new separate agreements, the famous Association Agreements (AA) which would unleash so much passion in Kyiv, in order to replace the old partnership and cooperation agreements, which were about to expire. On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership seems to have been created essentially for two reasons: To counterbalance the EU's Mediterranean policy and to strengthen the EU's democratic and free trade influence beyond its new eastern border, faced with a Russia perceived, since the Georgian crisis of 2008, as increasingly aggressive and less and less democratic. In response, in 2010, Moscow decided to relaunch its customs union project from Moscow to Astana, via Minsk and Kyiv. This goal would clearly and explicitly arouse fearful U.S. opposition to Russia's ambition to resovietize Eastern Europe.

This is the permanent confrontation between capitalism and communism.

This perception that Russia has of its own relations with the Western world was further accentuated when, in 2013, the EU offered the AA to Ukraine with special economic advantages, including a clause that prohibited their signatories from adhering to the customs union project proposed by their main trading partner, namely, Russia. Admittedly, the abovementioned agreement was never signed, but a series of actions followed, including the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its corollaries. This crisis has never stopped; rather, it entered a more expansive phase on February 24, 2022: It was the Russian special military operation, for some leaders in Ukraine, Russian interventionism, for others, and the war in Ukraine, for still others. This diversity of viewpoints has given rise to blocs, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies, Russia and its allies, and neutral countries, like most African countries.

Moreover, this very tense situation, although it is considered a military operation *par excellence*, hides an economic dimension that risks dragging the world economy into a certain economic and financial crisis. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is already revealing its economic repercussions, particularly the soaring prices of raw materials that are essential for the functioning of industries. Besides, this situation is not without repercussions on the production chain and may ultimately be noticed in the shopping basket, which had already been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. This scenario triggers an increased risk of growing poverty in the world, and especially in developing countries. Beyond the economic and financial consequences, it is also necessary to take into account all the serious political effects that could modify the world's economic trajectory forever.

Indeed, political configurations and considerations have always influenced economic policies within states and unions around the world. Thus, the Ukrainian crisis has revealed the fragilities of the dependence of certain states and unions on raw materials, but also certain military fragilities. Proof of this is Germany's decision to increase its military investment for the next few years. The world is thus preparing to experience a change in its economic and military trajectory similar to the situation after the Second World War, where each country seeks to reposition itself economically and militarily, but also to create alliances and unions. Therefore, a critical situation prevails and many hypotheses remain perceptible, given the existence of several scenarios and possible balances.

In view of all these elements, the legitimate question of knowing the real motivations for the formation of these groups led to this study. In this chapter, the author attempts to analyze the current geopolitical situation between the major world blocs through the geographical, economic, political, and military characteristics of the different countries. The chapter presents a possible futuristic vision of the NATO by a projection effect of current data (reference 2022) on the horizon 2050. It allows to predict the physiognomy of the blocs based on scenarios with hypotheses of the possible movements of the



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Ukraine. This reflection finally brings substance to the reading of the determinants of the preparation of a new world order in the making.

## **CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY**

### **Clarification of Key Concepts**

The population of a country includes all the nationals of the country in question, present or temporarily absent, as well as foreigners residing permanently in this country at a given time. This indicator shows the number of people usually living in a region. The world population is the total population of all countries on Earth at a given time. The land area of a country includes three subfields. The total area is the sum of all land and water areas delimited by international boundaries and/or coastlines. The land is all areas delimited by international boundaries and/or coastlines, excluding inland bodies of water (i.e., lakes, reservoirs, and rivers). The water area is the sum of the areas of all inland bodies of water (i.e., lakes, reservoirs or rivers) as delimited by international boundaries and/or coastlines. The population density of a country is the number of people per unit area (which may or may not include inland waters), although it may also be expressed in terms of habitable, inhabited, arable (or potentially arable) land or grown at any given time. It is frequently expressed in people per square kilometer or per hectare, and it is obtained by dividing the number of people by the area considered measured in square kilometers or hectares. In practice, this can be calculated for a city, an agglomeration, a country or the whole world.

The percentage of a country's population of the total world population is the share out of 100 of all the inhabitants of that country in the total world population. The gross domestic product (GDP) is an economic indicator of the economic growth and wealth created in a country over a given period. The ratio GDP/capita is the value of GDP divided by the number of inhabitants of a country; it measures the standard of living. The ratio percentage of country area/land area is the share of area in the total global land area. Military expenditure in GDP is based on the NATO's definition, which encompasses: Current and capital expenditure of the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; the Department of Defence and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces, if trained and equipped for military operations; military activities in space. Other elements also come under this definition which, however, due to the lack of precise data, can vary from one country to another. Military spending is a percentage of the GDP. The number of nuclear weapons is the number of strategic nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles or rockets in stock or being deployed on bases or at sea that a country has. The colonial weight in a bloc is the part of colonized countries which is found in the same set as countries having exercised this form of military, civilizational, commercial, and economic domination. This set can be either economic, political or geographical, or even military. The colonizing country is a country that has colonized another country at least once. The USSR bloc is the set of countries forming part of the USSR or supporting the military action of Russia in Ukraine. The NATO bloc is the collection of NATO countries. The bloc countries friends of the USSR is the set of countries that do not support the military action of Russia, but refrain from condemning it. The neutral Western countries bloc is made up of Western countries that observe neutrality both vis-à-vis the NATO and Russia in the context of the ongoing military operation on the Ukrainian territory. The country of interest is Ukraine, former colony of the USSR. The rank of the partner based on the value of exports to it (number) is an indica-

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tor that provides the name and rank of the five main markets for the exports of the reporting country/  
reporting economy.

### **Methodology**

From a methodological point of view, it should be considered that:

1. The author obtained the data covered by this chapter either from the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales's (CEPII) site the World Bank's or United Nations's site.
2. All defined indicators are dynamic.
3. Colonial weight is here a determining historical, cultural, and social indicator in the constitution of geopolitical blocs.
4. The relative colonial weight here reflects the colonial influence within a bloc.
5. The total colonial weight here translates the social influence independently of the bloc.
6. The author used descriptive statistics tools calculating different ratios and weights. Then, the author reported these calculations in Figures and Tables. Importantly, indicators such as the average, the median, the standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum, and the percentiles allowed to analyze the trends of position and dispersion.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

### **Ukraine and Its Positioning Between Two Historically Rival Blocs**

A former colony of the USSR, Ukraine maintains a centuries-old relationship with both Russia and the rest of the world. It is a country in Eastern Europe. The second largest country in Europe, after Russia, which borders it to the east and northeast, it also shares borders with Belarus to the north, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, to the west, Romania and then Moldova to the South. It has a coastline along the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. Covering approximately 603,548 km<sup>2</sup>, its population in 2022 is 43,506,326, with a GDP per capita of €3,085. Ukraine is characterized by its multiculturalism, multiethnicity, and multilingualism. On the economic level, apart from its worldwide reputation in the agricultural sector, Ukraine maintains its industrial fabric, and mining, but remains a highly service-oriented country. Thus, it remains for Russia one of the main export and import customers. In addition to these economic and historical relations with Russia, Ukraine remains the buffer zone between the latter and the NATO (Figure 2).

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
Figure 1. Geographical map of Ukraine

Source: <http://matumpa.canalblog.com/archives/2014/03/01/29337571.html> Consulted the 4th, march, 2023



Figure 2. Economic, military, and cultural map of the war in Ukraine

Source: *Le Figaro* (2015), NATO, RIA Novosti, (2009), AFP (2014, 2015)



### The History of Geopolitical Blocs


#### Bloc Statistics

Figure 3 below reflects the composition of the blocs at stake in the long-standing Ukrainian crisis, the military materialization of which has been known since February 24, 2022.

Figure 3 shows that the NATO bloc is the military alliance with the largest number of member countries with 30 Western countries against 13 of the Russian alliance made up of both countries of the USSR empire and friendly countries. All the same, it should be noted that, despite this imbalance in absolute terms of countries, there are still Western countries said to be neutral to the current crisis.

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*Figure 3. Distribution of the constituent countries of the geopolitical blocs of the Ukrainian military crisis*  
 Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)



**Analysis of the Composition of the Blocs From the Point of View of Civilizational and Cultural Relationship**

Like any geopolitical analysis, the search for issues to influence the choice of camps or even allies facilitates the understanding of this crisis. This analysis allowed the author to identify the historical sociocultural link due to colonization as a determining factor in joining one of the blocs animating the current crisis.

**Blocs and Colony Status, Colonizer of the Member Country**

The analysis of the composition of the blocs reveals that the NATO bloc is made up mostly of colonizing countries and their colonies, unlike the blocs of Russia and that of its friendly countries made up of the former colonies of NATO countries and some former Russian colonies. The Russian bloc appears heterogeneous, while the NATO shows homogeneity from the point of view of the factor in play. Moreover, the bloc of neutral Western countries includes as many countries which have never suffered the pangs of colonization as those which have suffered Western-style colonization and a minority of colonized people from the East, in particular by Russia (Table 1).

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*Table 1. Blocs and colony or colonizer statuses of countries*

	NATO countries	USSR friendly countries	Countries of the USSR empire	Western non-NATO countries	Country of interest
<b>No colonizers</b>	12	3	1	3	0
<b>Colonizing countries</b>					
<b>Germany</b>	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Austria</b>	3	0	0	0	0
<b>Denmark</b>	1	0	0	0	0
<b>France</b>	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Hungary</b>	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Japon</b>	0	0	1	0	0
<b>The Netherlands</b>	1	0	0	0	0
<b>United Kingdom</b>	3	5	1	2	0
<b>Russia</b>	3	0	1	2	1
<b>Turkey</b>	5	0	0	1	0


Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

**SITUATION OF THE COUNTRIES CONSTITUTING THE BLOCS ACCORDING TO THEIR EXPERIENCE OF COLONIZATION**

As Figure 4 shows, of the 52 countries involved in the crisis, regardless of the blocs formed, 26 were colonized by at least one NATO member country, compared to 7 on the side of the Russian bloc and 19 not colonized.

*Figure 4. Distribution of countries according to the bloc of the colonizing country*

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)




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**Colonial Weight Within Each Bloc**

Figure 5 shows that 50% of member countries of the NATO bloc have a colonial link, against 12.50% in the USSR bloc, leading to a total colonial weight of 30.77% in the composition of blocs.

*Figure 5. Distribution of colonial weights in the blocs*

*Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)*



**Demographic, Geographical, Economic, and Military Weight of the NATO**

Horizon 2022

Table 2 reveals that NATO has on average:

- A population of 31,849,130 inhabitants with a strong disparity within the population of the member states.
- An area of 819,819.67 km<sup>2</sup> with a strong disparity in the areas of the member states.
- 118.93 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, with extremes of 3.36 to 410.71 per km<sup>2</sup>.
- 0.40% of the share of the world population.
- 0.16% of the total land area of the world.
- €31,084.67 per inhabitant fluctuating between €4,610 and €114,370.
- 1.80% of their GDP in the military industry with an extent of 3.74% in 2020.

However, these brilliant geographical, demographic, and economic characteristics remain the fruit of hyper-industrialized countries. In other words, the economic, demographic, and geographic weights remain variable from one state to another. Nevertheless, despite this variability, from the point of view of other aspects, the NATO remains a military alliance because the effort in terms of military invest-

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ment in relation to the GDP reported to each state seems to be identical. This is true despite the fact that more than 50% of the NATO countries have not been able to reach the threshold for reducing the distribution of military burdens by 2% of the GDP. However, this uneven distribution of military burdens is compensated by the efforts of the superpowers of the bloc being in the upper third, headed by the United States of America, of the distribution of the shares of the finances committed to the war efforts such as personnel military and civilian, operation and maintenance, procurement, military research and development, and military aid. This fact provides an umbrella for all states in the bloc, even if pockets of vulnerability to external military attack exist.

Table 2. Distribution of the NATO's demographic, geographical, economic, and military indicators

		Population size in 2022	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population density (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )	% Population/world population	Ratio (% of country area/land area)	GDP/capita (Euro)	Military expenditure in GDP in 2020
Average		31,849,130.93	819,819.67	118.93	0.40	0.16	31,084.67	1.80
Median		9,856,277.50	92,500.00	99.26	0.12	0.02	22,700.00	1.82
Standard deviation		63,248,162.36	2,477,808.82	102.01	0.79	0.49	24,188.97	0.69
Minimum		345,514.00	2,590.00	3.36	0.00	0.00	4,610.00	0.00
Maximum		335,615,671.00	9,985,000.00	410.71	4.21	1.96	114,370.00	3.74
Percentiles	25	2,504,329.25	42,750.00	43.90	0.03	0.01	14,890.00	1.40
	50	9,856,277.50	92,500.00	99.26	0.12	0.02	22,700.00	1.82
	75	40,471,395.00	324,250.00	135.67	0.51	0.06	43,810.25	2.23

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

### Horizon 2050

In 2050, all other things being equal, the population of the NATO would be worth an average of 38,756,082.79, with 420,443.79 and 408,398,858.88 as the populations of the smallest state and the largest state, respectively. The density would be 118.93 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. The average NATO population share of the world population would be 0.40%, with half of the states having 0.12% of the world population and the other half 0.28%. This is demographic stagnation. In addition, the quality of life of the populations would remain unchanged, compared to that of 2022. To this is added 0.16% as the average share of surface area occupied by the bloc with an average GDP/capita of €31,084.67 ranging from €4,610 to €114,370.

The disparity within the economies of the NATO countries would have remained identical to that of 2022. Better still, 75% of the states would have at most €43,810.25, a fact which suggests that only 7 NATO countries would have two times the quality of life of the other 23 member countries of the bloc. It would be explained by the expression of a demographic shock whose impacts could affect the sphere of economic production and later rub off on GDP by lowering them. In other words, the factors of production such as savings and human capital cannot be renewed in all NATO countries because the

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social costs of an aging population coupled with a low birth rate would be prohibitive. This thesis is corroborated by a study on the future of world demography and its economic repercussions conducted by Bonnet, C., et al (2021). *In addition to this, Boussemart, J-M et al (2018) sufficiently illustrated this situation in “Europe 2050: Demographic Suicide” as demographic tectonic and its corollaries on GDP growth in an environment where human capital is seen as a long-term growth factor. Thus, on this time horizon, the NATO would still remain an alliance, a military umbrella.*

*Table 3. Projections of the demographic, economic, and geographical characteristics of the NATO in 2050*

		Number of people	Population density (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )	% Population/world population	Ratio (% of country area/ land area)	GDP/capita (Euro)
Average		38,756,082.79	118.93	0.40	0.16	31,084.67
Median		11,993,756.05	99.26	0.12	0.02	22,700.00
Standard deviation		76,964,455.37	102.01	0.79	0.49	24,188.97
Minimum		420,443.79	3.36	0.00	0.00	4,610.00
Maximum		408,398,858.88	410.71	4.21	1.96	114,370.00
Percentiles	25	3,047,429.83	43.90	0.03	0.01	14,890.00
	50	11,993,756.05	99.26	0.12	0.02	22,700.00
	75	49,248,211.46	135.67	0.51	0.06	43,810.25

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com) ; [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

**Demographic, Geographical, Economic, and Military Weight of the Countries of the Russian Bloc**

This section will address the demographic, geographic, economic, and military characteristics of the Russian bloc both by 2022 and 2050.

**Horizon 2022**

The Russian bloc is made up of 13 countries and in 2022 had a population of 227,944,228.36 inhabitants. Half of the states of the bloc makes 13,338,696.50 inhabitants, and the smallest followed by the largest state of the bloc have respectively 1,737,996.00 and 1,453,197,134.00 inhabitants. In terms of area, the bloc is worth an average of 2,460,201.88 km<sup>2</sup> still with these disparities. On one km<sup>2</sup>, the bloc hosts 413,930.57 inhabitants with extremes of 8.53 inhabitants and 5,793,320 inhabitants. The average weight of the population in the world population of the bloc of the former USSR is 2.86%, ranging from 0.02% to 18.23%. This same trend is observed at the level of the area of the countries of the bloc compared to the area of the Earth, that is 0.48% with extremes of 0.01 to 3.36%. In terms of quality of life, the GDP per capita in euros is €11,525.36, for at least half of the states with €9,067.50. It is also remarkable that the quality of life is very scattered in the countries of the bloc. The largest GDP/capita in the bloc (€36,687.00) is around twice what 9 of the countries in the bloc earn. On the military level,



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the bloc invests an average of 3.6% of its GDP in the military industry. This military investment varies from one country to another, ranging from 0.81% to 10.87%. Clearly, it emerges that no clear military, economic or demographic policy has been put in place, yet, in the abovementioned bloc. This general disparity makes this bloc a space with full investment potential of all kinds.

Indeed, this choice to leave free the cost to the military investment policies of each country could benefit countries without great means insofar, as remaining under the yoke of Russia would guarantee their security.

Table 4. Demographic, geographical, economic, and military characteristics of the countries of the Russian bloc in 2022

	Population size	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population density (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )	% Population/world population	Ratio (% of country area / land area)	GDP/capita (Euro)	Military expenditure in GDP in 2022	
Average	227,944,228.36	2,460,201.88	413,930.57	2.86	0.48	11,525.36	3.6	
Median	13,338,696.50	196,390.00	105.67	0.17	0.04	9,067.50	2.87	
Standard deviation	511,879,089.28	4,944,485.49	1,548,294.79	6.42	0.97	10,566.43	3.39	
Minimum	1,737,996.00	0.3	8.53	0.02	-	335	-	
Maximum	1,453,197,134.00	17,125,191.00	5,793,320.00	18.23	3.36	36,687.00	10.87	
Percentiles	25	4,707,449.00	67,154.50	28.44	0.06	0.01	1,595.50	0.81
	50	13,338,696.50	196,390.00	105.67	0.17	0.04	9,067.50	2.87
	75	81,786,806.50	2,434,075.75	264.2	1.03	0.48	18,832.50	6.5

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

### Horizon 2050

Table 5 shows that in 2050, on average, the Russian bloc would have the following characteristics:

- The population would reach 298,273,355.77 inhabitants and make 3.74% of the world population.
- The human density would be 542,418.72 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.
- The share of the bloc's population in the world population would be worth 3.74%.
- In terms of area, the bloc would occupy 0.52% of the total surface of the Earth.
- GDP/inhabitant would be €10,740.92.

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*Table 5. Projections of the demographic, geographical, economic, and military characteristics of the countries of the Russian bloc in 2050*

		Number of people in 2050	Population density 2050 (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )	% Population/ world population 2050	Ratio (% of country area/ land area) 2050	GDP/capita (EUR) 2050
Average		298,273,355.77	542,418.72	3.74	0.52	10,740.92
Median		19,987,443.01	107.94	0.25	0.04	9,013.00
Standard deviation		643,194,292.24	1,955,190.65	8.07	1.00	10,565.09
Minimum		2,114,905.96	10.38	0.03	-	335.00
Maximum		1,768,344,277.49	7,049,686.54	22.18	3.36	36,687.00
Percentiles	25	6,533,690.28	30.97	0.08	0.02	1,461.00
	50	19,987,443.01	107.94	0.25	0.04	9,013.00
	75	125,584,862.79	292.12	1.58	0.53	17,738.00

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

**Comparison of the Russian Bloc and the NATO in Terms of Demographic, Geographical, Economic and Military Superiority**

This part compares the USSR and NATO blocs taking into account economic, demographic, geographical, and military indicators.

**Demographic Characteristics**

**Population in 2022.** In terms of population, Figure 6 shows that the Russian bloc, despite the small number of countries that constitute it, has an absolute advantage, with an average of 227,944,228 against 27,016,841 inhabitants. This gap of at least eight times the population of the NATO remains a strong capital advantage in the process of creating wealth and supporting any industry, however military it may be. This large population constitutes a potential market for the rest of the world and is a factor of attractiveness of the territory of the Russian bloc. This also characterizes an available labor force and could possibly, *ceteris paribus*, contribute to a rapid growth of industrialization. Further, according to certain theories of the regional economy, an increased density would favor the agglomeration effect through the economies of agglomeration. It must be said that all this potential added to the strong power of the Russian economy would be decisive in the global distribution of income by 2050.

### The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Figure 6. Comparison of the populations of the Russian and NATO blocs

Source: The author's figure based on the data of Countrymeters.info ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)




**Population in 2050.** In 2050, the dynamic remains identical to that of 2022. The increase in the world population will lead to an increase in the average standard of living, with, of course, strong disparities. Indeed, a young population implies a labor force and therefore more economic dynamism, through innovation and the search for new products. These trends will have serious geopolitical consequences: Asia and Latin America, first, and Africa second, will embody the true growth potential of the planet. In 1913, Europe was more populated than China; in 2010 China represents twice Europe, which will represent only 6% of the world population in 2030 (against 15% for China).

Demographic factors are heavy trends, which take time to evolve, thus favoring economic growth in a “permanent” way, unlike the periods of reconstruction that follow wars.

Figure 7. Population distribution map of the Russian and NATO blocs in 2050

Source: The author's figure based on the data of Countrymeters.info ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)




### The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

#### Average Share of the Population of Each Bloc in the World Population in 2020

The Russian bloc's average share of the world's population is higher than that of the NATO bloc, that is, 11 times that of the NATO.


Figure 8. Comparison of World population shares held by the Russian and NATO blocs in 2022  
Source: The author's figure based on the data of Countrymeters.info ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)



#### Average Share of the Population of Each Bloc in the World Population in 2050

Exactly as in 2022, in 2050 the Russian bloc will have 11 times the average share of the population held by the NATO.

Figure 9. Comparison of World Population Shares Held by the Russian and NATO Blocs in 2050  
Source: The author's figure based on the data of Countrymeters.info ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)




## The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

### Geographical Characteristics

**Area.** The average area of the countries of the Russian bloc exceeds that of the NATO bloc (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Comparison of the average areas of the NATO and Russian blocs


Source: The author's figure based on the data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info)



**Population Density in 2022.** Each km<sup>2</sup> of the Russian bloc was inhabited by 413,930 individuals, on average, while it was 111.62 for the NATO.

Figure 11. Population density of the two blocs in 2022

Source: The author's figure based on the data of [Countrymeters.info](http://countrymeters.info) ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)




**The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict**

**Population Density in 2050.** In 2050 the Russian bloc becomes denser, while the NATO bloc remains static with respect to its density of 2022. According to Desmet et al. (2018), there is a correlation between economic growth and density. According to these authors, a doubling of the density induces an increase of 5% of the GDP/capita. According to Desmet et al. (2018), density phenomena alone are not enough because policies of openness and free trade are control variables in the validity of the theory. Indeed, an unproductive density will be useless. There are also other policies that must accompany this density. Research and development, quality human capital, an attractive tax policy, and a demand for existence are all elements to be taken into consideration.

*Figure 12. Comparison of population density in Russian and NATO blocs in 2050*


*Source: The author's figure based on the data of Countrymeters.info ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)*



**Average Ratio (Percentage of Country Area/Land Area) of Each Bloc in 2022.** The average share of land area occupied by the Russian bloc is greater than that of the NATO bloc, more than three times.

*Figure 13. Comparison of the average shares of land area occupied by the Russian and NATO blocs in 2022*

*Source: The author's figure based on the data of Countrymeters.info ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)*




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**Average Ratio (Percentage of Country Area/Land Area) of Each Bloc in 2050.** The average share of land area occupied by the Russian bloc is greater than that of the NATO bloc, namely, four times.

*Figure 14. Comparison of projected average shares of land area occupied by the Russian and NATO blocs in 2050*

*Source: The author's figure based on the data of [Countrymeters.info](http://Countrymeters.info) ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)*



## Economic Characteristics

In terms of economic characteristics, only GDP/capita is prioritized for its relative advantage, in particular that of facilitating international comparisons.


### Gross Domestic Product/Capita of Each Bloc in 2022 (Euro)

In 2022, the NATO bloc holds around three times the GDP/head of the Russian bloc. Nevertheless, it is useful to point out that, taking linear projections into account, China's GDP will be multiplied by 21 between 2008 and 2050, while Europe's GDP will only increase by 121%, assuming a 2% annual growth. However, more realistic projections, which take into account labor capital, energy, technological progress, and price adjustment, assume a factor of 16 for China, 21 for India, 2 for the United States, and rely on a 40% progression of the European economy (Fouré et al., 2010).

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Figure 15. Comparison of average GDP/head of the Russian and NATO blocs in 2022

Source: The author's figure based on the data of [Countrymeters.info](http://countrymeters.info) ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)




### Gross Domestic Product/Capita of Each Bloc in 2050 (Euro)

In 2050, the dynamics of 2022 will be maintained from the point of average economic growth at the NATO level, with a scattered distribution of this indicator at the country level. At best, this dynamic could be explained by the fact that technical progress will take place to compensate the imbalance of the bloc from a demographic and geographical point of view.

Figure 16. Comparison of projected average GDP/Head of the Russian and NATO blocs in 2050

Source: The author's figure based on the data of [Countrymeters.info](http://countrymeters.info) ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)





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
### Military Characteristics

#### Military Expenditure in Gross Domestic Product in 2020 for Each Bloc

On the military level, the investment made by the Russian bloc was on average twice that of the NATO bloc, in 2020.

Figure 17. Comparison of the average shares of GDP Invested in the military domain of the Russian and NATO Blocs in 2020

Source: The author's figure based on the data of [Countrymeters.info](http://Countrymeters.info) ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)




#### Proportion of Nuclear Weapons in 2022 for Each Bloc

On the military level, the Russia bloc holds 52% of the nuclear warheads in the world. This superiority gives it several tactical and strategic advantages in terms of security. It will help to ensure a higher quality of defense than their public opinion demands. Also the states that think they have to face a vital threat would feel no regret in benefiting from the nuclear umbrella offered by this bloc.

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*Figure 18. Distribution of nuclear warheads in the world according to the Russian and NATO blocs in 2022*  
Source: The author's figure based on the data of [Countrymeters.info](http://Countrymeters.info) ; [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)



**Commercial and Economic Dependence**

**NATO**

Table 6 shows not only the main export partners, but also USA's import partners.

Table 6 highlights that, within NATO, commercial relations are in one direction only, that is, from the USA to the others. Better, they are unbalanced. This is sufficiently proven by the fact that most NATO countries import products made in the USA. This fact illustrates the indicator, rank of the partner on the basis of the value of exports destined for the country, by showing that the five main markets for the exports of American products included all the countries of the NATO. In addition, the countries of the EU held the first place from 2015 to 2018 in terms of exports, although they were in last place in the top five suppliers of goods and services to the USA. This trade relationship, although unbalanced, also existed with Canada. This resulted in a favorable trade balance, which is the expression of various protectionist measures put in place by the American state. An example is the introduction of customs duties on imports of various products: Solar panels and washing machines (in January 2018) or steel and aluminium (in March 2018, then June 2018 for the EU, Mexico, and Canada, and finally August 2018 for Turkey), the taxation of Chinese imports (up to US\$50 billion in July 2018, then an additional US\$200 billion imposed in September 2018). These various restrictions during the first three quarters of 2018 of the American administration led to the restriction on trade in the amount of 12% of imports from the United States. These facts corroborate the results of the CEPII's study (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018), carried out on 110 countries for the period from 1989 to 2013, showing that an increase of 1% of customs duties on a country's products would cause, all other things being equal, a drop in imports from that country of 1.4%.

However, only China, a friendly country of Russia, is listed among both the import and export partners of the United States of America.

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*Table 6. Rank of the main trading partners of the USA in the period 2015-2018*

<b>USA customer countries</b>				
	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>NATO member states</b>				
Albania	2	2	3	3
Canada	1	1	1	1
Islande	3	2	2	2
North Macedonia	5	5		4
Montenegro		5		
Norway	2	2	2	2
EU	1	1	1	1
Türkye	3	2	3	3
<b>Friends of the USSR</b>				
South Africa			5	5
China	4	4	4	4
India	2	2	2	2
<b>Neutal Countries</b>				
Swiss	2	2	2	3
<b>U.S. supplier countries</b>				
<b>NATO</b>				
Canada	2	2	2	1
EU	5	5	5	5
<b>Friends of the USSR</b>				
China	1	1	1	3

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by the WTO <https://stats.wto.org/> consulted in February 2023

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**Russia**

Table 7 shows the status of Russia’s trading partners in the period from 2015 to 2018.

*Table 7. Rank of the main trading partners of the USSR in the period 2015-2018*

<b>Customer countries of Russia</b>				
	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>
<b>NATO</b>				
<b>North Macedonia</b>	4	4	3	3
<b>Montenegro</b>	5			
<b>Norway</b>	4	3		3
<b>Neutral counties</b>				
<b>Serbia</b>	3	3	3	3
<b>Swiss</b>			4	5
<b>Supplier countries of Russia</b>				
<b>Russia-friendly countries</b>				
<b>Belarus</b>	5	5	5	5
<b>NATO</b>				
<b>Türkiye</b>	1	1	2	2
<b>European Union</b>	2	2	4	3

Source: Author’s calculations using data provided by WTO <https://stats.wto.org/> . The site is consulted in February 2023

Table 7 evidence that Russia’s trade relations are diversified. Among these main customers are none of the allied countries or former countries of the USSR bloc. Rather, it shows neutral countries buyers of Russian products. Although Russian partners are numerous both for export and import, it should be noted that the countries of the European Union export much more of their goods and services to Russia.

To this end, the Russian Federation remains a privileged export partner for Europeans and NATO countries during the period under review. Based on Table 7, all economic and trade sanctions against Russia will affect not only the Russians, but also the global production chain. Crises of various kinds will follow, namely, energy, food, and social crises.

**An Analysis of the Positioning of Western Non-NATO Countries Except Ukraine**

In this section, the author analyses regrouping scenarios, in particular that of the accession of neutral countries to the NATO.

**Horizon 2022**

After neutral Western states joined the NATO, the indicators were as follows:

### **The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict**

- The average population was 26,582,907.24 inhabitants.
- The area was on average 677,688.61 km<sup>2</sup>.
- The human density was 113 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.
- The average share of the NATO population in the world was 0.33%.
- The average share of the surface areas of the countries compared to all the surface areas of the Earth was 0.13%.
- The average GDP/head was €30,805.84.
- The average share of military expenditure in relation to the country's GDP was 1.63%.

The accession of new countries would constitute an opportunity for military investment for the USA and the continuation of its policy of vassalization of Europe. Then, from a commercial and economic point of view, an added value could influence the quality of life.

*Table 8. Demographic, geographical, economic, and military characteristics of the NATO bloc after the accession of neutral countries, except Ukraine by 2022*

		<b>Number of people in 2050</b>	<b>Population density 2050 (inhab/km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>% Population/world population 2050</b>	<b>Ratio (% of country area/ land area) 2050</b>	<b>GDP/capita (EUR) 2050</b>	<b>Number of people in 2050</b>	<b>Population density 2050 (inhab/km<sup>2</sup>)</b>
Average		26,582,907.24	677,688.61	112.66	0.33	0.13	30,805.84	1.63
Median		8,756,345.00	86,120.00	98.63	0.11	0.02	21,445.00	1.55
Standard deviation		56,952,126.05	2,212,374.89	95.15	0.71	0.43	25,363.33	0.74
Minimum		345,514.00	2,590.00	3.35	-	-	3,981.00	-
Maximum		335,615,671.00	9,985,000.00	410.71	4.21	1.96	114,370.00	3.74
Percentiles	25	3,180,238.00	42,750.00	43.90	0.04	0.01	9,776.50	1.19
	50	8,756,345.00	86,120.00	98.63	0.11	0.02	21,445.00	1.55
	75	23,692,022.50	319,360.00	124.68	0.30	0.06	44,765.75	2.13

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com) ; [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

### **Horizon 2050**

At this time horizon, the NATO with its new allies, except Ukraine, will have the following characteristics:

- The average population will be 32,350,299.48 inhabitants.
- The area will be worth an average of 677,688.61 km<sup>2</sup>.
- The human density will be 113 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.
- The average share of the NATO population in the world will be 0.33%.
- The average share of the surface areas of the countries compared to all the surface areas of the Earth will be 0.13%.

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- The average GDP/head will be 30,805.84. To date, the demographic stagnation would be observed with its economic and social corollaries, thus making this membership hostile on the economic level.

*Table 9. Demographic, geographical, economic, and military characteristics of the NATO bloc after the accession of neutral countries, except Ukraine by 2050*

		Number of people in 2050	Population density 2050 (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )	% Population/ world population 2050	Ratio (% of country area / land area) 2050	GDP/ capita (EUR) 2050
Average		32,350,299.48	112.66	0.33	0.13	30,805.84
Median		10,702,755.79	98.63	0.11	0.02	21,445.00
Standard deviation		69,302,233.82	95.15	0.71	0.43	25,363.33
Minimum		420,443.79	3.35	-	-	3,981.00
Maximum		408,398,858.88	410.71	4.21	1.96	114,370.00
Percentiles	25	3,869,919.32	43.90	0.04	0.01	9,776.50
	50	10,702,755.79	98.63	0.11	0.02	21,445.00
	75	28,829,985.57	124.68	0.30	0.06	44,765.75

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com) ; [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

**Consequences of Ukraine’s Possible NATO Membership**

**Horizon 2020**

In the scenario where Ukraine joins the NATO, the characteristics of the bloc would be as follows:

- The average population would be 332,225,169.48 inhabitants.
- The area would be worth an average of 812,843.16 km<sup>2</sup>.
- The human density would be 117.42 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.
- The average share of the NATO population in the world would reach 0.40%.
- The average share of the areas of the countries in relation to all the areas of the Earth would be 0.16%.
- The average GDP/head would be €30,181.45.
- The average share of military expenditure in relation to the country’s GDP is estimated at 1.87%.

### The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Table 10. Characteristics by 2022 of the demographic, geographical, economic, and military of the NATO bloc after the accession of Ukraine

		Number of people in 2050	Population density 2050 (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )	% Population/world population 2050	Ratio (% of country area/ land area) 2050	GDP/ capita (EUR) 2050	Number of people in 2050	Population density 2050 (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )
Average		32,225,169.48	812,843.16	117.42	0.40	0.16	30,181.45	1.87
Median		10,109,288.00	93,000.00	99.21	0.13	0.02	22,340.00	1.82
Standard deviation		62,220,328.36	2,436,471.66	100.64	0.78	0.48	24,308.28	0.80
Minimum		345,514.00	2,590.00	3.35	-	-	3,085.00	-
Maximum		335,615,671.00	9,985,000.00	410.71	4.21	1.96	114,370.00	4.13
Percentiles	25	2,642,227.00	43,000.00	44.98	0.03	0.01	14,740.00	1.40
	50	10,109,288.00	93,000.00	99.21	0.13	0.02	22,340.00	1.82
	75	43,506,326.00	358,000.00	135.64	0.55	0.07	43,740.00	2.25

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

### Horizon 2050

In 2050, the NATO with the membership of Ukraine would have the following characteristics:

- The average population would be 39,213,670.83 inhabitants.
- The area would be worth an average of 812,843.16 km<sup>2</sup>.
- The human density would be 117.42 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.
- The average share of the NATO population in the world would be 0.40%.
- The average share of the areas of the countries in relation to all the areas of the Earth would be 0.16%.
- The average GDP/capita would be €30,181.45.

**The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict**

*Table 11. Characteristics by 2050 of the demographic, geographical, economic and military of the NATO bloc after the accession of Ukraine*

		Number of people in 2050	Population density 2050 (inhab/km <sup>2</sup> )	% Population/world population 2050	Ratio (% of country area/ land area) 2050	GDP/capita (EUR) 2050
Average		39,213,670.83	117.42	0.40	0.16	30,181.45
Median		12,301,635.59	99.21	0.13	0.02	22,340.00
Standard deviation		75,713,720.48	100.64	0.78	0.48	24,308.28
Minimum		420,443.79	3.35	-	-	3,085.00
Maximum		408,398,858.88	410.71	4.21	1.96	114,370.00
Percentiles	25	3,215,232.73	44.98	0.03	0.01	14,740.00
	50	12,301,635.59	99.21	0.13	0.02	22,340.00
	75	52,941,312.13	135.64	0.55	0.07	43,740.00

Source: Author's calculations using data provided by [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_pays\\_et\\_territoires\\_par\\_superficie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_pays_et_territoires_par_superficie); [www.notre-planete.info](http://www.notre-planete.info); [countryeconomy.com](http://countryeconomy.com); [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_des\\_arm%C3%A9es\\_nationales\\_par\\_effectif](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_arm%C3%A9es_nationales_par_effectif); [www.un.org](http://www.un.org); [http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd\\_modele/bdd\\_modele.asp](http://cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.asp)

**Influence of the Russian-Ukrainian Armed Crisis of 2022 on the Global Geopolitical Future**

In view of previous developments, it is important to note that a new world order is in its incubation phase. This is motivated by the comparative advantage of each country vis-à-vis the parties involved in the Russian-Ukrainian armed crisis. However, these relative advantages are not based on cultural, sociological or civilizational values because, overall, through the social weight enjoyed by the metropolis-colony relationship, 7 out of 10 countries have not joined a bloc for this reason. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in the NATO block, this weight exists and up to 50% against 12% in the Russian block. Also, it does not even exist in the bloc of neutral Westerners. The direct implication of this situation is that other factors (i.e., economic, demographic, geographical, and military) of the blocs that define the position of each country in relation to the constituted blocs.

As to the economic factor in 2022 as in 2050, the NATO bloc ensures a very appreciable quality of life for the inhabitants of its space, but with a high coefficient of variation (300%), ensuring the very scattered nature of the quality of life, thus, overtaking the Russian bloc with these perspectivist assets in terms of growth.

As to the demographic, geographical, and military factors, the Russian bloc offers a definite advantage over the NATO bloc.

Thus, the following scenarios are possible:

1. Ukraine remains neutral vis-à-vis the two blocs for the maintenance of peace and stability.
2. Ukraine joins the NATO and the war continues, forcing the west neutral countries to position themselves behind the Russian bloc for military protection and to guarantee a prospect of long-term sustainable economic growth thanks to the size of the population which will initially increase the same for the area of the block, resulting in a high and sustained human density. In addition, the



### ***The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict***

economic, financial, and human costs linked to the war and the military convergence pact of 2% of the NATO's GDP will be enormous and unsustainable for these neutral countries. It would be a geopolitical Big Bang.

3. Ukraine and neutral countries join the NATO, with assurance of economic growth and well-being under benefits despite protection. Indeed, the very high gap between rich countries and countries with low GDP/capita and the fact that half of the current NATO countries inject about 2% of their GDP/capita into their military investment plan point out that, in the NATO bloc, the war effort is more supported by the USA, thereby creating a strategic dependence vis-à-vis the USA. This dependence on the United States is reassuring or sustainable in the long term because the United States' military industry would send other customers for military equipment, the maintenance of this equipment, and military surveillance to consolidate their position in the concert of nations. However, crises such as the dedollarization of the world economy or other financial crises or the change in foreign policy specific to the United States could facilitate the abandonment in full flight of the new allies.

In short, the scenarios suggest that the Russian bloc would remain the choice with certain relative advantages for the long term, compared to the NATO bloc. Thus, the eventualities or the possibilities of the resovietization of Eastern Europe cannot be concealed because it is the choice of the future.

This analysis cannot be continued without mentioning the situation of countries under direct or indirect influence of the former Soviet Union. By the way, the case of Hungary is instructive when it is a member of the EU and the NATO. Hungary's positions vis-à-vis the war, these criticisms of the EU and the NATO, and the commercial activities it maintains with Russia are characteristic of the limits of its membership not only with the NATO, but also with the EU.

In addition, all NATO countries, including those of the former USSR bloc, are among the USA's export partners. Thus, these countries are militarily, economically, and commercially disadvantaged with increased exposure to the energy crisis and its corollaries because only countries that have their own energy benefit from the current situation. While the GAZPROM production is falling, its revenues could be multiplied by two or more and the Chinese who were previously at the mercy of the Arabs will take advantage of this.

## **CONCLUSION**

In short, the Ukraine crisis evidences that the economic, military, and peace needs of the countries of the world will determine their mooring to one or the other of the blocs at stake. Against the war effort which will be supported with the obligation of involvement of the member states, the NATO offers solutions to economic needs with the possibility of stagnation linked to its low rate of long-term demographic growth. On the other hand, the Russian bloc offers military support and long-term economic growth thanks to its strong demography, its increasing human density, and the share of the occupied area on the Earth. Thus, the positions will be made according to a military analysis, but also an economic one.

Ultimately, this tense situation hides an economic trend likely to materialize in the days to come. This state of affairs would not be without consequences on the economy of developing countries which are struggling to enhance their growth curve after the severe impact of the Covid-19 crisis and ongoing

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climate change. Harms of this repercussion are already visible in the decrease in purchasing power due to the rise in the price of certain essential goods for daily life.

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## Chapter 6

# The Russia–Ukraine War: Derailment in the Belt and Road Initiative

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### ABSTRACT

*This study intends to analyze the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Belt and Road Initiative. As the Belt and Road Initiative is the President Xi Jinping's flagship foreign policy agenda, the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Belt and Road Initiative are worth discussing. Although the Russia-Ukraine war is a geopolitical event, the consequences of the war on geoeconomics could be seen. Through its six economic corridors the Belt and Road Initiative sets up trade, financial, people-to-people, and digital connectivities across the world. The Russia-Ukraine war disrupted connectivities across the regions that the Belt and Road Initiative aspires to set up. Especially, China's land connection to Europe through the Northern Route stalled because of war conditions. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine war damaged China's political, economic, and infrastructural linkages to European countries. The course of the war between Russia and Ukraine could have drastic results on the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative.*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The most important geopolitical event in 2022 was the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine war is the manifestation of the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the Atlantic alliance. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia could do little but watch NATO's expansion to the post-Soviet space. After the ouster of Russian leaning president Victor Yanukovich in 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula and supported separatists in eastern Ukraine. In 2022, Putin's fear that Ukraine would be a formal member of NATO and its road to develop Western-style democracy would destroy his hopes of maintaining his autocratic rule and re-establishing Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe (Masters, 2022). Russia's war of aggression posed threat to international order in that Russia tries to violate territorial integrity of Ukraine with the use of force. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its horrific actions during the war demonstrates its imperial geopolitical mindset inherent in the minds of Russian policy-makers (Kotoulas & Pustzai, 2022, p. 18).

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## ***The Russia-Ukraine War***

Although the Russia-Ukraine war is primarily a geopolitical event, it has consequences in geoeconomics. The term geoeconomics firstly coined by Edward Luttwak. He describes it as “the admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce” (Luttwak, 1990, p. 19). As a foreign policy strategy geoeconomics refers to relying on economic means to achieve strategic objectives. It offers an alternative to military-based power politics. Geoeconomics is a power projection through economic forms. It also has geographic dimension because economic connectivity is set up through vital economic corridors (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, pp. 4–5). Therefore, economic corridors are important components of geoeconomics. They connect economic agents across the regions by linking economic nodes or hubs, mainly centered on cities, where economic resources and actors are located (Brunner, 2013, p. 1).

China with its enormous economic power is increasingly employing geoeconomics in order to establish itself as a global power. The Belt and Road Initiative is the key manifestation of China’s growing assertiveness in the global arena. It is the materialization of China’s attempts of leveraging its economic power to realize its strategic ambitions (Beeson, 2018, p. 250). The Belt and Road Initiative has also evolved into President Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy agenda. It is observed that the President Xi always stands in the center of the group photographs taken at Belt and Road summits (Shirk, 2023, p. 9). This demonstrates the President’s Xi’s personal investment to the initiative. The Communist Party of China also adopted the Belt and Road Initiative as a top policy priority immediately after its start in 2013 (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2013).

However, the Russia-Ukraine war disrupted the flow on the Belt and Road economic corridors because of the combined effects of war conditions and sanctions. This study especially focuses on the disruption on the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the Northern Route that passes through Russian and Belarussian territories. The physical inability to move towards on this route due to the existing war between Russia and Ukraine combined with the imposition of sanctions. These effects interrupted transportation of goods on this corridor. This paper considers China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor as an alternative land route that would connect China and Europe. It evaluates the potential of China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor by discussing its advantages and hurdles. It will also make predictions about deepening integration among the countries which participate in this economic corridor.


## **2. THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE**

The Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious and important infrastructure project, that aims to promote connectivity across the world. As of June 2022, 147 countries signed cooperation agreements that signified their participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (Nedopil, 2022). Since its start, as much as \$650-\$850 billion were committed within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is estimated that the total investment would reach \$4 trillion by 2049 (Kohli & Zucker, 2020, p. 8).

To finance infrastructure investments several financial institutions were created. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the most notable financial institution. It is a multilateral bank whose primary purpose is financing infrastructure development. It has 105 members and \$100 billion of capital stock (AIIB, 2022). The President Xi claimed that the AIIB would redirect Asian savings for upgrading Asian infrastructure (Callaghan & Hubbard, 2016, p. 121). The Silk Road Fund, created by China’s \$40 billion contribution, is another financial institution. The fund provides funding for Belt and Road infrastructure projects (Silk Road Fund, n.d.).

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Figure 1. Belt and Road corridors  
(Losos et al., 2019, p. 46).



The Belt and Road Initiative consists of two main parts: The Silk Road Economic Belt aims to link China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe, connecting China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, and bring together China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Maritime Silk Road is designed to link China's coasts to Europe via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and China's coasts to the South Pacific through the South China Sea. In total, the Belt and Road Initiative envisions six main economic corridors: The New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

These six economic corridors lay out a process of corridorialization which makes "sovereign entities less important than logistical hubs" (Mayer & Balazs, 2018, p. 212). Transportation sector dominates the Belt and Road Initiative, accounting for 43 percent of all projects (Refinitiv, 2022). The vast Russian landmass was the most reliable land route to transport goods produced in China to European market. Yet, the Russia-Ukraine war emerged as a big impediment to China's connectivity dreams as it disrupts the flow of transportation (Forough, 2022). The Northern Route, envisioned as a New Eurasian Land Bridge, is the most affected economic corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative.

### 3. THE NEW EURASIAN LAND BRIDGE

The New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor links China's northwest to Europe through Central Asia and Russia. The New Eurasian Land engenders a new phase of cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, promoting transportation and trade connections (Jinbo, 2019, p. 202). By 2015, there were seven main lines on the New Eurasian Land Bridge, linking the cities in the Southeast, eastern coastal, and inland cities of China to Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland,

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Czechia, Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom (Hongjian, 2016). The New Eurasian Land Bridge reduces transit time by completing journey 14-18 days between China and Europe, depending on the destination. This duration is much lower the maritime transportation, which takes 37-50 days (Tekir, 2022, p. 59). Air freight is faster than railway and maritime transportation, taking only five days. However, it is also more expensive. As of 2019, for a route from Shanghai to Rotterdam, the estimated shipping cost per container is \$2,000 for sea, \$5,000 for rail, and \$37,000 for air (Keuper, 2022, p. 2). Wang Wenbin, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, said that as of January 2022, the China-Europe line operated 78 different lines, reaching 180 cities in 70 European countries. He stated that these lines transport more than 50,000 different kinds of goods (Global Times, 2022).

Since the operationalization of the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the cargo traffic on the corridor has gradually increased. Trade on the New Eurasian Land Bridge accounted for four percent of bilateral trade between China and Europe. It was valued over \$75 billion (Keuper, 2022, p. 1). In 2015, traffic on the corridor amounted to 46,000 TEU. It rose to 104,500 TEU in 2016. In 2017, traffic grew to 175,000 TEU. In 2018, the total volume was 245,000 TEU. Traffic on the route increased to 725,000 TEU in 2019. In 2020, traffic experienced a growth rate of 56 percent with 1.135 million TEU. In 2021, 1.46 million TEUs of cargo was shipped by train between China and Europe. This amount indicates 29 percent increase compared to the previous year (Leijen, 2022e). Even the COVID-19 pandemic, which puts a stress on supply chains, did not affect the volume of traffic on the New Eurasian Land Bridge.

Yet, the start of the Russia-Ukraine war affected the trade and transportation flow on the corridor. The EU, the UK, and the USA imposed a series of sanctions against Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine. More than 1,000 individuals are targeted. These are the President Putin, the Foreign Minister Lavrov, high ranking officials, oligarchs who have close ties with the Kremlin. The sanctions have also been imposed on entities such as banks, military and defense sectors. Furthermore, export of high technology and luxury goods to Russia have been banned. The EU also stopped importing materials such as crude oil (from December), steel, gold, cement, paper, iron, and seafood (European Council of the European Union, 2022). Prominent Russian banks have been excluded international financial messaging system Swift (BBC News, 2022). In addition to commercial and financial sectors, sanctions on transportation have been introduced. The EU has banned Russian and Belarusian road transport operators from entering into EU territory, including for products in transit. The sanctions in transportation sector aimed at preventing Russia from acquiring key goods and disrupting road trade (European Council of the European Union, 2022).

Despite these sanctions, transportation on the New Eurasian Land Bridge is still technically possible. Theoretically, cargoes can be transferred from China to Europe via Russia. However, they cannot stop there (Papatolios, 2022a). Goods can be blocked at Europe's borders if they are suspected of being replaced by Russian goods. That brings huge commercial risks. Dentons' Pfeil, a law firm located in Frankfurt, relates one example of a customer who bought coal in China and encountered a risk of it being replaced by Russian coal. Since Russian coal cannot be used in the EU, this customer would lose a lot of money (Regalado et al., 2022). Moreover, the sanctions created uncertainty for transaction. 70 percent of Russian banks have been sanctioned. That means if one of these banks in a company's supply chain, payments cannot occur (Papatolios, 2022a). The exclusion of Russian banks from Swift further complicated transaction between European and Russian companies, making payments difficult for trade occurring the New Eurasian Land Bridge.

The side effects of the sanctions were combined with the war conditions. Confiscation risks and damage of cargoes due to artillery became real threats to their safe transportation. The insurers fear that

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they would not enforce claims if cargoes are damaged or lost while in Russia (Regalado et al., 2022). It must be expected that the war's risks would raise logistic companies' insurance premium risks. China had already subsidized containers to increase the attractiveness of the corridor. Before the war, the average subsidy per container had been \$3,500 and \$4,000 (Brinza, 2017). After the war, it can be predicted that Chinese subsidies would increase.

The largest logistics companies suspended their operations to and from Russia. In March 2022, DP Schenker and Hapag-Lloyd declared that they would not accept bookings involving Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine (Hutson, 2022). CMA, Maersk, CGM, and MSC also announced that they would cease their operations for all modes of transportation. A Dutch logistics company, RailBridgeCargo stated that although the sanctions do not target rail transportation between China and Europe directly, it would stop its operations because it does not want to support invasion and aggression (Leijen, 2022d). This demonstrates that besides logistical problems caused by the war, ethical considerations also play role in the decision of the companies to stop moving cargoes on the corridor.

The uncertainty of the war led some companies to stop using New Eurasian Bridge in transporting their products. A networking gear maker Zyxel Communications Corp. has stopped freight on the corridor (Seal, 2022). Automobile manufacturers such as BMW and Audi also suspended shipments from Germany to China via railways on the New Eurasian Land Bridge. A spokesman from BMW stated that the exports are handled by ship (Reuters, 2022). These are the main examples that indicate international companies' reticence in using the Northern Route.

First time in six years monthly freight traffic between China and Europe via Russia declined in April 2022. At the port of Duisburg, the main terminal of Belt and Road railway links, eastbound reservations have fallen by 30 percent since February 2022 (Regalado et al., 2022). Already as of the end of March 2022, the freight traffic decreased by 40 percent (Keuper, 2022, p. 4). Between January and July, the transportation via the New Eurasian Land Bridge decreased by 24 percent westbound and 35 percent eastbound. Moreover, flows to and from Germany, which accounted 45 percent of volumes in 2021, dropped by 38 percent in the west-east direction and 21 percent in the east-west direction (Zhang, 2022). Jacky Yan, Managing Director of New Silk Road, predicted that even if the war ends and sanctions cease it will take three or four years for the volumes on the New Eurasian Land Bridge to return pre-war levels (Felber, 2022).

## **4. CHINA'S STANCE ON THE WAR AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE**

Besides disrupting cargo traffic on the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the Russia-Ukraine war also complicated China's relations with the countries on the corridor. China was cautious about supporting Russia so as not to incur sanctions, but it provided its rhetorical support to Russia. It did not endorse Russia's invasion but it did not condemn it (Carlson, 2022). China tries to avoid antagonizing its trading partners in Europe. Simultaneously, it seeks not to upset its energy and ideological partner, Russia. Therefore, its stance is defined as "pro-Russian neutrality" (Ni, 2022).

On the New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor Russia plays a prominent role in China-led Belt and Road Initiative. It is the biggest country in terms of its size in the world, spanning from the Bering Sea to the Baltic Sea. Russia and China have increasingly stood a united front in diplomatic stage. They viewed the Maidan Revolution in 2014, as a part of color revolutions, which threaten sovereignty

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and stability of the countries. At the height of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, they concluded \$400 billion gas supply deal (Kuhrt, 2018, p. 258).

In 2020 Belt and Road related investments in Russia consisted of 122 projects. The main investment areas are transportation and energy. In the same year, Russia was the highest recipient of Belt and Road investments with \$287 billion (Prebilič & Jereb, 2022, p. 3). It was reported that just before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials shared intelligence concerning the imminent invasion with their Chinese counterparts and requested them to convince Russia to desist. However, their attempts were unsuccessful. Instead, on 4 February the President Putin and the President Xi met and declared that their partnership recognizes no limits. Despite this declaration, some analysts argue that China did not predict a full-scale invasion because it did not attempt to evacuate their citizens from Ukraine. Nevertheless, the joint declaration expressed the united stance of China and Russia against NATO (Carlson, 2022). After the war started, China accused NATO of provoking war in Ukraine. Chinese officials even avoided using the word of invasion while describing the war. Yet, its support to Russia remained in a rhetorical level. It has avoided providing tangible military and economic support to Russia (Shirk, 2023).

The sanctions played role in dissuading China to commit economic and political aid to Russia. The USA warned China that any form of military or financial help would be considered as complicity and will be sanctioned. China officially protested and declared that it would maintain normal trade and economic relations with Russia. However, behind the scenes, the Chinese government was wary of sanctions. It urged Chinese companies to be careful with their deals in Russia (Prebilič & Jereb, 2022, p. 4). China's cautious attitude not to incur sanctions over its dealings with Russia affected its Belt and Road investments. In the first half of 2022, China's new Belt and Road investments in Russia have declined to zero. Christoph Nedopil Wang, the director of the Green Finance & Development Center at Fudan University in Shanghai, claimed that the threat of the sanctions led to the drop of Chinese investments (White, 2022). Thus, despite the alignment of the President Xi and the President Putin, the pragmatic implications coerced China to revise its economic ties with Russia.

Besides Russia, China's Belt and Road investments in Belarus have also been disturbed by the Russia-Ukraine war. Belarus has an important role in the New Eurasian Land Bridge. It connects Russia with Central European countries, serving as a getaway to European market. It is also located near the port cities in the Baltic Sea. Yet, Belarus was not the first choice of China. China had considered Ukraine as the main connection point but the Maidan Revolution in 2014 and the conflict in the eastern Ukraine forced Beijing to change its plans. Belarus appeared to offer an appearance of stability. Thus, Chinese investment to Belarus increased 200 times in the last decade. The most ambitious example of close Chinese-Belarusian economic relations is the Great Stone Industrial Park. The President Xi called this area as the pearl of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Great Stone Industrial Park has already attracted \$1.2 billion investment. Over 60 companies, including the Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE invest in this zone (Jaszczyk, 2022). The sanctions affect the development of the Great Stone Industrial Park. The Duisburg terminal sold its shares in the Great Stone Industrial Park immediately after the start of the Russian invasion. It also closed its representative office in Minsk. The share in Eurasian Rail Getaway CJSC which planned the construction and operation of the intermodal terminal will also be sold (Leijen, 2022b). Without a link to Europe, China's investments in the Great Stone Industrial Park might be turning into a white elephant. The Great Stone Industrial Park was announced as a trade and IT center, but it may be a wasteful investment for China (Hutson, 2022).

In March 2022, the AIIB suspended all operations with Russia and Belarus. The bank officials stated that the bank would "safeguard its financial integrity" (The Financial Times, 2022). Gary Ng, a senior



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economist at Natixis, argued that despite the symbolic character of the decision, it is an indication of the pressure on financial institutions (Power, 2022). It also demonstrates that China calculates geopolitical risks that its support to Russia would bring.

Central and Eastern European countries also offer significant linkages for the New Eurasian Land Bridge. Since the start of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has increased its engagement with these countries. China set up 16+1 cooperation format with 11 EU member states and five Western Balkan states. It is an attractive format for China to increase its political influence and promote Belt and Road vision in the region. The EU suspected that this mechanism offers China a way to give prioritize Chinese interests over EU interests (EU Parliament, 2018).

Among Central European countries Poland is the heartland of the corridor. It is located near the border of Belarus. Poland has built Malaszewicze dry cargo terminal, which is connected to the Polish seaport in Gdansk (SSW Solutions, 2021). Malaszewicze is a significant node on the New Eurasian Land Bridge because it facilitates necessary rail gauge adjustment for the trains. While trains pass through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, their rail gauge is arranged to the Russian gauge system. In Malaszewicze the Russian gauge is turned into international standards (Cargo Forwarder Global, 2022). The privileged position of Poland in 16+1 cooperation format is accentuated by Chinese foreign direct investments. As of 2018 out of 16 countries Poland, Hungary, and Czechia received two-thirds of Chinese foreign direct investments (Choroś-Mrozowska, 2019, p. 45). Under 16+1 mechanism two countries' economic cooperation evolved into good political relationship. The Presidents of Poland and China even described the relationship as a strategic partnership (The President of the Republic of Poland, 2016).

However, the Russia-Ukraine war affected the relations between Poland and China. The President Duda visited Beijing for the Winter Olympics' Opening Ceremony. He met with the President Xi and warned him that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would disrupt transportation routes. After the invasion, Jakob Kumoch, the Secretary of State, expressed his hope that China would intervene to mediate the conflict. The President Duda also talked with the President Xi on a phone call in which he urged China to assume a more active role in ending the conflict. These contacts suggest that the high-level communication between two countries still exist. However, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki wrote a paper where he alerted the Western world about Chinese seizure of Western assets. In May, Polish Foreign Ministry refused to meet with Chinese delegation which toured 16 Central and Eastern European countries. At the Poland-China Intergovernmental Committee held in June, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau called for condemnation of Russia's aggressiveness and recognition of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Moreover, China-originated disinformation infiltrated into Polish digital space, suggesting Polish soldiers went to Ukraine to fight (Wu & Matusiewicz, 2022). These developments show that the Russia-Ukraine war strained the relations between Poland and China and exposed contentious areas. Since Poland is one of the most vocal members of NATO concerning the Russia-Ukraine war, the continuation of war would further accentuate points of disagreement between China and Poland.

The terminal Malaszewicze has also been hit by financial sanctions. The EU has cut its financial funds to Malaszewicze. This curtailed Malaszewicze's status as a transportation hub (Cargo Forwarder Global, 2022). Pawel Pucek, member of the board for sales at DB Cargo Polska, said that as China has suspended its Belt and Road investments in Russia, this will limit activity in Malaszewicze (Kucner, 2022). Besides the direct impact, the interconnectivity requires a willingness to cooperate. EU member states such as Germany and Poland are being pressure to cooperate less with other countries on the corridor such as Kazakhstan, and Belarus. This would also complicate operationalization of the corridor (Mendez et al., 2022, p. 493).

## 5. MIDDLE CORRIDOR: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE?

China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor starts from Urumqi, traversing Kazakhstani, Azerbaijani, Georgian territories. Finally, through Turkey it is connected to Europe. The current sanctions on Russian and Belarussian territories increased the attractiveness of China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor as an alternative route for China's linkage to Europe as this corridor, also known since the Middle Corridor, bypasses Russian territories (Eldem, 2022, p. 1).

Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine the corridor's popularity has risen. It accommodated 29,000 TEUs of cargo in 2021. This volume indicates 53 percent rise from the previous year (Keuper, 2022, p. 3). Audi officials, which suspended their companies' shipment via the New Eurasian Land Bridge, commented that they are investigating the opportunities of China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor to transport their products (Reuters, 2022). The Dutch logistics company, Rail Bridge Cargo, stopped their services on the New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor and began servicing on the Middle Corridor, from Zhengzhou, China to Duisburg, Germany through Trans-Caspian routes. Chinese operators also started to use this corridor along with Adi Container, subsidiary company of Azerbaijan Railways (Keuper, 2022, p. 3). Danish Maersk, Finnish Nurminen Logistics, Dutch Rail Bridge Cargo, and German CEVA Logistics are other logistics companies that started to use the Middle Corridor. From January to March 2022, cargo transferred on the corridor increased by 120 percent (Eldem, 2022, p. 4). Alexander Craicun, head of marketing of DP World, commented that the Middle Corridor can be useful in transporting goods to Europe in times of crisis. This opinion was shared by the other participants at the European Silk Road Summit, held in December 2022 (Leijen, 2022f). Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Foreign Minister of Türkiye, predicted that the volume of cargo transferred on the corridor will be six times higher in 2022 (Zorlu, 2022).

When cargo containers are transshipped through the Caspian Sea, the main linkage is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway which became operational in 2017. The Presidents of Türkiye and Azerbaijan, the Prime Ministers of Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan attended the opening ceremony. The total length of the railway is 849 kilometers. The trains on the railway are undergone rail gauge change in Akhalkalaki, Georgia before continuing their journey to Kars. The initial capacity of the railway is 6.5 million tons of freight and 1 million passengers. This capacity is expected to rise to 17 million tons of freight and 3 million passengers by 2034 (Ee, 2017, p. 11). The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is not limited to these three countries. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan expressed their interest in setting up railway linkages to the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. For this purpose, Turkmen and Uzbek officials held meetings with Azerbaijani and Georgian officials in 2017 (Tekir, 2022, p. 89). On December 16, 2022, Uzbekistan sent its first train to Europe, following Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye route (Leijen, 2022g).

The opening of direct link between Azerbaijan and Türkiye completed the shortest railway corridor between China and Europe. It also enhanced connectivity between Türkiye and states of the Caucasus and the Central Asia (Eldem, 2022, p. 2). This corridor provides alternative route not only to China but also to the participant countries. In 1992, Andre Gunder Frank observed that: "the region appears as a sort of black hole in the middle of the world" (Frank, 1992, p. 43). Ian Rawlinson, Chief Commercial Officer at APM Terminals in Georgia, suggested that Central Asia has remained invisible (Leijen, 2022f). Transportation infrastructure laid out within the framework of China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor would elevate Central Asia's status from being a periphery to an interconnected region in the global economy. Central Asia had appeared on the western fringe of maps of Asia, the eastern fringe of

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maps of Europe, or the southern fringe of maps of Russia. The goods produced in Central Asia can be transferred by newly built roads and rail roads to foreign markets. This interconnectivity places Central Asia at the center (Starr, 2017). This corridor also enhances the geoeconomic profile of the countries on the corridor.

Azerbaijan's strategic importance has risen because of its position in the east-west trade. EU leaders' recent visit underlined this significance. Georgia also benefits from additional revenues emanated from the increasing cargo traffic on the Middle Corridor. Geopolitically, Georgia comes closer to its regional partners, Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and its global partners, the EU and China. The Middle Corridor also offers an alternative route to Kazakhstan. Russia tried to restrict Kazakhstan's access to global markets due to its refusal to support the Russian invasion. Thus, the corridor gained significance for Kazakhstan. The Middle Corridor enables Türkiye to extend its reach to the South Caucasus and the Central Asia. Moreover, Türkiye would transport their products to these markets. Türkiye also enhances its geopolitical power. As its political and economic clout in the region increases, it would compete with Russia (Mammadov, 2022, p. 6). Türkiye aims to capture 30 percent of the trade flow that moves through the Northern Route by diverting it to the Middle Corridor. Türkiye considers the Middle Corridor not only a trade route but also a route that reduces the regional countries' dependence on Russia and Iran (Eldem, 2022, pp. 2–3).

On the other hand, the inclusion of Armenia would contribute to success and stability of the corridor. Armenian Economy Minister Vahan Kerobyan suggested that opening Armenia's borders and its participation in Azerbaijan-Türkiye transportation route would increase Armenian GDP by 30 percent. The end of Armenia's isolation would prevent Armenia to deepen its relations with Iran and Russia (Eldem, 2022, p. 5).

Although the Middle Corridor offers an alternative for transportation of cargoes and development opportunities for regional economies, it has problems. The foremost challenge is its lack of capacity. In 2021, this corridor carried 29,000 TEU. In that year, the New Eurasian Land Bridge carried 1,46 million TEU. The observed 40 percent decline in the New Eurasian Land Bridge cannot be shifted to the Middle Corridor (Keuper, 2022, p. 4). Current infrastructure of the Middle Corridor accommodates five percent of the New Eurasian Land Bridge (Carafano & Nate, 2022). The drastic increase in the Middle Corridor has reportedly caused congestion on the corridor. The logistics companies worried about the congestion reports and tried to offer solutions, but these efforts were limited due to capacity limits. Cankat Yıldız, who is from Middle Corridor Logistics said that "the corridor cannot handle the demand from the northern side" (Leijen, 2022a).

The second challenge is that the Middle Corridor is a multimodal network (see Figure 2). The Middle Corridor appears to be a puzzle consisted of rail roads and sea travel. Synchronization of transportation has been difficult. For instance, the irregular timing of the Caspian Sea ferries causes uncertainties about the transportation. Weather conditions also create delays for cargo ships operating across the Caspian Sea. Due to big waves ferries are unable to operate about 90 days in a year (Tekir, 2022, p. 114). The cargo ferries are insufficient for the Caspian Sea crossing. Even the problems of the Caspian Sea are resolved, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is congested because of the Russia-Ukraine war and COVID-19 pandemic. For this, parties diverted some of traffic to the Georgian port Poti and Romanian port of Constanza via the Black Sea link. Then, the route extends to Hungary's capital, Budapest through rail or truck shipping. However, the Port of Costanza is also congested. This route also lengthens transportation time due to transfer and waiting process. In the European part of the transportation using railways is not feasible; thus, trucks are used between Romania and Central Europe. Furthermore, insurance companies

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*Figure 2. Multimodal transportation system of the middle corridor (Losos et al., 2019, p. 46).*



are unwilling to insure cargoes along this route due to risks brought by the Russia-Ukraine war (Papatolios, 2022b). Port infrastructure in Georgia is also inadequate. Minor steps have been taken to upgrade the ports of Poti and Batumi, but a deep seaport is required. The Anaklia port construction stopped due to domestic politics in Georgia and the intervention of Russia, which does not want a competitor to its Novorossiysk port. Domestic infighting in Georgia complicates the long-term plans for infrastructure development (Avdaliani, 2022).

There are also problems in Türkiye’s domestic infrastructure networks. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway ends Kars, located at the northeastern Türkiye. Although the high-speed railway became operational between Ankara, the capital located at central Türkiye, and Istanbul, Türkiye’s gateway to Europe, the high-speed railway line between Kars and Ankara does not exist (İnan & Yayloyan, 2018, p. 48). Nils Müller from DSV Global Transport commented that although there was improvement on Turkish side in terms of railway transportation, using sea as a way of transport is unavoidable (Papatolios, 2022b).

In addition to hard infrastructure deficit, challenges emerged related to soft infrastructure. Customs union, tariff coordination or transnational digital integration do not exist among the countries on the Middle Corridor (Carafano & Nate, 2022). Different countries on the corridor implement different custom procedures, which cause delays at border crossings. Central Asian countries require more documents than other countries in the world. An entrepreneur commented that although Khorgos Free Trade Zone, located at Chinese-Kazakh border, is a free trade zone, passports are still required. Another trader claimed that the procedures on the Chinese side are very fast, but the process becomes complicated and unpredictable on the Kazakh side. Bribes and corruption are also experienced on the corridor (Tekir, 2022, pp. 110–111).

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The Russia-Ukraine war boosted attempts to improve soft infrastructure. In order to make border crossing between China and Kazakhstan more efficient, digitalization steps have been taken. All forwarding operations have already been digitalized. After this development, the first focus is to provide paperless custom crossing. Kazakhstan national company railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy has requested ASA Technologies to develop a system, which process information related to customs, digitally. This upgrade would enable custom workers to work remotely and efficiently (Leijen, 2022c). In March 2022, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Türkiye signed a quadrilateral agreement on the establishment of a joint venture on the Middle Corridor (Mammadov, 2022, p. 5). In June, the foreign and transportation ministers of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Türkiye decided to coordinate tariff conditions on the corridor. In August, the foreign, transportation, and economy ministers of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan met to establish the establishment of trilateral mechanism, especially on issues related to the Middle Corridor. They discussed linking the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to the Middle Corridor (Eldem, 2022, p. 5). These efforts turn the Middle Corridor more efficient. New solutions to the challenges are being offered as demand to this corridor rises. Yet, with its current hard and soft infrastructure mechanisms, the Middle Corridor cannot replace the New Eurasian Land Bridge.

## **6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PREDICTIONS**

The Russia-Ukraine war is a mainly a geopolitical event. Yet, it has geoeconomic implications. The most ambitious geoeconomic project of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the Belt and Road Initiative. It consists of six main economic corridors, envisioning connectivity between regions. However, the Russia-Ukraine war disrupted connectivity on the Belt and Road Corridors. The New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, known as the Northern Route, is the most inflicted economic corridor by the Russia-Ukraine war. Although there are no direct sanctions on transit trade, due to war conditions and sanctions imposed on Russian and Belarussian territories the logistics and insurance companies avoided this corridor.

China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, also referred as the Middle Corridor, emerged as an alternative route for the cargo transport between China and Europe. The logistics companies increasingly prefer this corridor as this route bypasses troubled Russian and Belarussian territories. This route not only links China to Europe but also solidifies economic and political linkages among the countries on the corridor.

Yet, the Middle Corridor experiences challenges such as lack of capacity, undeveloped hard and soft infrastructure. Due to increasing volume of traffic, the ports and roads of the corridor are congested. The diversification of the roads is one solution to address this problem. Yet, multimodal transportation remains complicated. Another problem is the delays due to exhaustive custom procedures. The non-existence of tariff coordination and customs union bottlenecks at border crossings on the corridor. Considering that the value of China's exports via railways approximates \$75 billion, the cost of congestion and delays would be considerable (Brinza, 2022). Turkic states sought to upgrade soft infrastructure through bilateral and trilateral agreements by easing custom procedures and trying to coordinate tariff conditions. The alignment of the Middle Corridor countries' policies on transport and the EU procedures is vital for the corridor's long-term viability. The adoption of EU practices will be helpful in overcoming red tape and corruption that inflicted the countries on the corridor (Eldem, 2022, p. 5).

However, even if cargo transport proceeds smoothly on the Middle Corridor, its full capacity could handle only five percent of the volume of cargo that passes through the New Eurasian Land Bridge.

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Several crossing points are congested when only 40 percent of traffic shifted from the New Eurasian Land Bridge to the Middle Corridor. It is almost impossible that the Middle Corridor would absorb the whole cargo traffic if the Russia-Ukraine war continues.

Another implication of the Russia-Ukraine war is on China's diplomatic position. Although China tries to remain in a gray zone concerning the Russia-Ukraine war not to upset its economic partners in Western Europe, its ambivalent stance is interpreted as a support to Russia's invasion. The Russia-Ukraine war also complicates China's relations with Poland. The disruption of cargo freight on the New Eurasian Land Bridge has impacted Poland's important status as a gateway to Europe in the Belt and Road Initiative. China's implicit support to Russia led to tarnishing of its image in Poland and exposed contentious issues between two countries. The continuation of the war would fracture economic and political connectivities between China and Europe.

One of the side effects of the Russia-Ukraine war is the loss of consumer confidence in European countries emanated from rising energy prices. Diminishing purchasing power leads European consumers to spend money on goods produced in China. Decreasing demand could be experienced in other markets such as the UK and the USA, which import goods from China (Brinza, 2022). Combined effect of disruption of cargo traffic and falling demand could limit the scope of the Belt and Road Initiative.

With these effects, it is likely that the Belt and Road Initiative will rearrange its geography. In its current form, the Belt and Road Initiative covers the whole globe with six main economic corridors. The constrains of the Russia-Ukraine war on China-Europe connection could lead China to strengthen its economic ties with its periphery. In this scenario, Belt and Road related projects in South Asia could take precedence in the eyes of the Chinese policymakers. The opening of the China-Laos-Thai railway and the China-Vietnam railway indicates Belt and Road's new emphasis on South Asia. China also has initiated soft mechanisms with South Asia such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Free Trade Agreement between China and ASEAN (Zongyi, 2022). If this prediction occurs, this means scaling back in China's global ambitions as the Belt and Road Initiative is China's display of its economic and political power. This grand connectivity project, however, is being hampered by Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war in Ukraine. As the war prolongs, China's connections to Europe will be severed. The long-term implication would be curtailment of Belt and Road's connectivity areas and its geographical scope.

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### **KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**The Belt and Road Initiative:** The Belt and Road Initiative is a geoeconomic strategy employed by China. It seeks to connect China with the rest of the world through infrastructure. It also aims at establishing financial, trade, digital and people-to-people connectivities.

**Connectivity:** It refers to degree to one node is linked to another node. The term covers geographical, financial, economic, and digital linkages.

**Geoeconomics:** Geoeconomics is the interplay between geography, economics, and strategy. It is employment of economics tools to advance strategic objectives.

**Logistics:** Logistics describes the process of moving goods from one location to another and storing them. It is essential to the function of business as the complex supply chain requires a proper management of logistics.

**Sanctions:** Sanctions are economic penalties applied to a particular organizations or states to change their behavior.

**Soft infrastructure:** Soft infrastructure encompasses state institutions, laws and human capital that manage the flow on the physical infrastructure.

**TEU:** TEU is the standart unit, equivalent to 20-foot long container.

## Chapter 7

# The Russia–Ukraine War and Its Consequences on the Geopolitics of the World: Nation Branding Attempts of India in the 21st Century

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### **ABSTRACT**

*The idea of a time being divided into two-time era in the form of B.C. and A.D. has been prevalent based on the life of Jesus Christ. An iconic messiah which had divided the global history into two different precincts. One before the birth of Christ and the other after his demise. Now the global Covid-19 pandemic could also be looked at exactly the same way. One where we could look at the similar way the world that existed before Covid-19 pandemic and the other that is now while we are still in the process and looking for a time period which may be considered as something post-Covid-19. This is why we are going back to the notion of dividing the era into two different times, to understand how the dynamics of geo-politics has changed especially post-Covid. Amidst all of this the Russia-Ukraine war spread out which created a huge impact on world politics. In this scenario of world politics, India has been a key player in the realm of geo-politics. The sudden rise of India has also provided the opportunity to play a role as a mediator in dynamics of Russia-Ukraine conflict.*

### **1.0 INTRODUCTION**

The idea of a time being divided into two-time era in the form of B.C. and A.D. had been prevalent based on the life of Jesus Christ. An iconic messiah which had divided the global history into two different precincts. One before the birth of Christ and the other after his demise. Now the global covid19 pandemic could be also exactly looked at the same way. One where we could look at the similar way

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is world which existed before Covid-19 pandemic and the other which is now while we are still in the process and looking for a time period which may be considered as something post covid19 (Yunling, 2015). This is why we are going back to the notion of dividing the era into two different times as to understand how the dynamics of geo-politics has changed especially post covid. Amidst all of this the Russia-Ukraine war spread out which created a huge impact on world politics. In this scenario of world politics, India has been a key player in the realm of geo-politics. The sudden rise of India has also provided the opportunity for India to play a role as a mediator in the dynamics of Russia-Ukraine conflict. In this regard it must be remembered that Indian prime minister has a very personal rapport with Putin. This was leveraged by India in bringing forth its own prerogative in terms of the national message that it wanted to put out. The messages were basically on protecting its own citizens especially getting the students out from Ukraine where a number of Indian students were studying medicine. In fact, India has constructively worked on its positioning as a nation that believes in the cause of peace. The Prime Minister of India had put out a message saying to Putin “This is not the time for War”

#### **1.1 A Changing World**

The covid19 crisis was born in the times of the already crumbling times of the globalisation if not completely shattered<sup>1</sup>. There have been times of the way that the world has faced multiple challenges and all the same time. The world wars or the epidemics coupled with economic recessions, social tension have been there spread across the history of the world. However there comes a question on how the world in the times of contrasts where on one hand there is a limit of globalisation being reached and on the other decoupling based on mistrust and suspicions if not unprecedented is definitely a new in the contemporary times. The covid19 is one of those times of breaking barriers and creating new chapters in the world divided between geo-politics of “Global North versus Global South development agenda” and/or the “Socio-economic and cultural clash of the Eastern part of the world against the West”. In between all of this there is an important question to be asked that whether the onus of not just leading the world by a sole hegemonic power but a collection of powers in a collective position (Chee, 2015). There is also an extension of this idea as to if the dynamics are being revisited or revision happening in the global quadrant divided globally in the North vs South and the East vs West. It is a challenge which may not be met by the arrogance and the vanity of the west but maybe looking towards a new global order. In this world the idea of a multipolar world is key to the future of geo-politics. It is exactly where the role of India becomes key. In the current scenario of geo-politics, the nature of India has been to put it out that it be seen as a responsible nation. India has made it clear that it wants to be seen as a nation that cares about the world. This includes G-20 summits, holding sports events, medical and cultural conferences. Now if one move back to the Ukraine conflict, in continuation with the soft power and inclusive approach, India has tried to showcase the world importance of dialogue. One of the few countries in the world today that holds a great rapport with the Russians as well as US political establishment in a world full of surprises and contradictions setting up a new tone. The other nations in the world such as France have also asked for help and support from India considering it as a responsible power culminating in a winning scenario for nation branding and image perception of India.

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### **2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW**

The idea of power and politics is traversed with the idea of the third world is so reductionist in approach and so clichédly discussed that personally this article does not want to fall into the same trap. However, what about the parameters of the quality of life, the expectation of the billion plus people looking for a society free of corruption as well as the new idea of a truly democratic society not necessarily conforming to western standards may be the real deal for the people of Asia.

India today ranks in the top 5 GDP ranked countries and aims to come in top 3 by 2030. However, the most important question is where India needs to project its economic strength for branding and how has it been able to do it. On the question of Indian lobbying in international forums it is no more a secret but rather a very established fact that Prime Minister, Modi had been there in the international forums amidst his heavy campaigning for India to make it the investment decision. India had achieved the world's fastest growing economy but the main question of India's trade actually chugging the economy is the most important. India's demographic dividend can be a serious problem unless that is turned into a proper workforce (*Khodabakhshi, 2011*). The political situation in India which is now trying to focus on the enactment of new laws in India related to reinforcing political economy. That includes the newly introduced Bankruptcy code, labour law reforms which will try to break the shackles of the age old Indian economic deficiencies. It is very important for the Indian economy to have farsightedness which needs to involve skilling the young workforce of the country. India has unfortunately built on an education which is commercialized and uses education as a gateway to escape poverty. India has a huge pool of engineers and scientists but is the quality and research work necessary for global standards being reached. However, the focus should be on India trying to garner its image as a holistic country of skilled resources and not just mere labour in the form of some other economies (*Harish, 2010*). The idea of mere assembling and labour pools is also important but if only supplemented with the use of modern industrial revolution known as Industrial Revolution 4.0. The engines of growth coming in from developing world had been driven by Asia starting from East, moving into South East Asia and of course China and India as the two giants.

### **2.1 Using of Current Geo-Politics to Further the Indian Branding**

Speaking of the economic investment and growth energy plays a big role and this is where the next phase comes in for India. Now the question is what makes the region of central Asia so important and what steps it can take forth for a greater prosperity and cooperation within Asia. That would require these central Asian countries to come together. Although they are a part of the *Eurasian union* and also *Shanghai Cooperation organisation* both these organizations show a very different proposition altogether. The former is more like a union designed to keep Russia in charge. Whereas the latter is more multilateral and has multiple players which includes China, India, Pakistan and of course Russia as well. Therefore, this is the platform which could be looked into for using central Asia apart from maintaining closer relationship with the soviet sphere to build on energy infrastructure projects as the first step. That could be seen as the first platform and this is from where the shared prosperity of Asia especially when it comes to energy security despite playing the game of real politik could be worked out. To make the matters clearer, in SCO both China and India are a part of the group however there is also the internal competition dynamic going on for them with the similar logic which can be applied for Russia and Ukraine. Most of the central Asian countries does not function on democracy or are pseudo

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democracy however to keep the unrest away it all depends on keeping the development work going. In terms of prosperity there are a few countries which are ahead but some of the bunches of the countries in central Asia have still low human development where countries like India despite its own human development challenges can come in promoting its own soft power. Not to mention China has already been investing in their neighbourhood but may not want to irk Russia which considers it their exclusive backyard. Therefore, there is a lot of fine line to tread and talk about when it comes to the Chinese and Indian relationship in terms of geo-political rivalry.

The idea of energy corridor in Asia and most importantly the dynamics of energy trade is where the region of central Asia has a prime importance. If we look at the countries of central Asia which also includes countries mostly ending with “*stan*” such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan out of which Kazakh is also a big country there is a lot more to play for this region. Their trading partners can be more of Asian countries. China already has invested a lot in these countries not to mention that India too looks at the region in terms of the energy and the security policy pre covid19 pandemic. However, post this pandemic the equation of all the countries would have changed and Asian countries especially who play a more bridging role and take can forward the “Asian Energy Sphere” (Ramadhan, 2018). The whole idea of the Asian energy producing countries from the west such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar & Iran to central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and even up to South and South East Asia may seem far-fetched but it is possible. In fact, much like the cargo trains which operate between Asia and Europe by China and India could also be a reality in the form of energy pipelines. The investment has happened in some of the areas but there is a lot more which could be expected. Iran with its Chabahar port has emerged as a new energy and trade route overcoming the sanctions of the west pragmatically. However, if we move from the domestic policy orientation of India which is being made to go through a lot of changes for competing with China, one cannot overlook the energy related policy and strategic dynamics.

The whole region of central Asia once it starts building infrastructure albeit not just projects dreamt of by China in the form of “*One Belt, One Road*” initiative but similar on those lines and more inclusive as well. Central Asia could become the platform from where Asia can dream of securing energy, infrastructure development and most importantly developing prosperity for the lives of the people. Some countries have been able to do or are in the process while there are others which seem to be still grasping their own identity as a country and there could be more time needed for them to find that direction (Narins & Agnew, 2020). However, one thing which is important is to note that infrastructure coupled with energy trading and a balanced geo-political view can bring in prosperity in the region<sup>2</sup>. Asia which has a huge economic development road ahead despite doing well in the last 40 years or so in terms of the economic growth and reducing poverty needs to take it a notch further. This is where the role of central Asia would come in. Europe is dependent on Russia for energy but also trades with other central Asian countries. However, when it comes to Asia the central Asian countries have a lot of markets to look at and also potential for cooperation as mentioned earlier to build this region as the place where all parts of the Asia can connect.

### **3.0 CONCLUSION**

The role of India has been to improve the brand image of the nation in the changing world scenario. In this way, Indian leadership is being able to reach to the exact point where the vision and politics of the

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nation align with multipolarity. This has been time and again verified by the world leaders who appreciate the stance of India as a nation looking to build on the world of cooperative multilateralism as a stance that has been repeated by Indian government establishment in the recent times.

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### **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> (Steven A. Altman, 2020) "Will Covid19 have a lasting impact on globalization?"
- <sup>2</sup> (Eleanor Albert, 2019) accessed from Thediplomat.com "Russia, China's neighbourhood energy alternative"

# Chapter 8

## Turkey's Role During the Russia and Ukraine War

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### **ABSTRACT**

*This study aims to examine the national roles Turkey adopted during Russia-Ukraine War. The national role concept was developed in the second half of the 20th century. Holsti carried the concept from sociology to international relations. According to this concept, every state plays a particular role that its leaders specify as appropriate for their countries. Turkiye also played a national role in the international arena during the war between Russia and Ukraine. These roles have been highlighted by their differing political aims. On the one hand, Turkey has desired to repair its political image as “aggressive.” Turkey adopted a mediator-integrator role between Putin and Zelensky. On the other side, Turkey didn't reject its political maneuvers of recent times which formed in trajectory of being “independent” of western or Eurasian oriented policies. Turkey criticized Russia's invasions acts. It also criticized NATO because it ruled out Russia's existential concerns over NATO's plans.*

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Turkey has been ruled by AKP (Justice and Development Party) governments since 2002 parliamentary election. Since then, Turkey experienced political and social change. Furthermore, reflected in both soft, ideational and hard power in different region. At the beginning of the office, AKP adopted a political agenda in compliance with EU integration process. During this time, AKP emphasized human rights, economic liberalism and collaboration with neighbors and western allies, especially the USA. This convergence of AKP rule and international society had impact on Turkey's economic and societal development and make peace both of inner and external political areas. Turkey's political attitudes and acts within this period reflected a certain national roles such as mediator-integrator role or regional collaborator according to scholars. In this era, AKP's mentor and foreign policy's director was Ahmet Davutoğlu and his ideas about political role of Turkey at international and regional scale that positioned Turkey on an unexperienced route that it was before. Then, a series of events took place in the middle east

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such as Arab Spring and followed by Syrian civil war. These events and Syrian civil war were assessed as opportunity for Turkish politicians to make real their political desires called as “neo-Ottomanism that combined with Islamism and Nationalism. In that era, Turkey changed its perspective toward more aggressive and interventionist side. In the second decade of AKP rule, understanding the national role concept converted into autonomy and military interventionism from mediator-integrator pattern or regional leader pattern. The new pattern easily comply with the role of “regional leader” in terms of Holsti’s categorization. The point which this approach brought Turkey, is aloneness in foreign policy and economic degradation within the country. Unfortunately 15 July coup attempt strengthened this approach and Turkey adopted more aggressive attitude in foreign policy to protect its autonomy and security, however, especially after 2020, Turkey realised that its aggressive policy united its political rivals such as Egypt, Greece and Israel at Mediterranean policy whereas this extraordinary political alliance would be able to damage Turkey’s interests at the region. These developments induced a manoeuvre changing for Turkish foreign policy. Erdoğan and his ministers and diplomats set again the national act type and political attitudes towards their counterparts to mitigate mutual relations and to become a political ally and collaborative actor again.

Russia-Ukraine war gave the an opportunity that Turkey expected. Moreover, Turkey’s recent political position ensured an extra political advantage such as being a bridge between West and Russia due to that the only indispensable political actor has been Turkey which has able to maintain diplomatic conversation all of sides of the conflict. On the other side, it should be added that Turkey has repositioned itself as a mediator role but also Turkey has continued to pursue its national interests. Turkey joined western allies to support sanctions, closed the straits to the Russian vessels, but maintained regular dialog with Putin, sold the military equipments, like game changer drones to the Ukraine, and supported Ukraine territorial integrity and sovereignty, joined in In this study, I aim to examine what political roles Turkey adopted during the Russia-Ukraine war. To achieve this aim, I started by examining the Holsti’s role theory. Then I looked into research about Turkey’s national role approach both of pre-AKP rule and post-AKP rule diligently. This endeavour ensured a clear viewpoint for Turkey’s role in terms of Russia-Ukraine war. Lastly I interpreted the roles Turkey adopted during the process. To diligently interpret the process, I looked for political and official statements, academic articles and reports.

## **2. THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE ROLE THEORY**

Holsti in his study titled *National Role Conceptions in the study of Foreign Policy* listed national roles. Under his study we are going to look into Turkiye national role conceptions (TNRCs). First of all, the “role” concept was transformed to the academic literature in 1920’s and 1930’s, basically, the “role concept” is connoted with theatre platforms or cinema. At theatre, the role is about a behavioral presentation type which player presents (Ties, 2009: 3). As a result, the role has a decomposable feature from the player’s itself and the role, by academic view, refers to a particular behavior but not a position. So, a player may perform a specific role but never he/she cannot occupy a role (Holsti, 1970: 238). The concept converted into a theory named the “role theory” and tended to examine and to interpret the behavioral types of humans. The founders of the role theory principally wielded it within the social sciences such as sociology, psychology and anthropology but it was incorporated into the foreign policy analysis in 1970’s by Holsti. At the very beginning, theorists aimed to interpret the states’ behavioral approaches during the Cold War by the role theory (Harnich, 2011: 7). According to the theory, the

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foregoing actors of the international relations attribute a certain roles for their nations and act within the expectations which the role is necessitated. As a result, the role theory argues that the states behave according to their international roles which they identify (Adigbuo, 2007: 88). It concerns how leaders see the right orientations or functions of their state in relation to its external environment. The third component of role theory, referred to as the role prescriptions, is comprised of the norms and expectations that certain cultures, communities, organizations, or institutions ascribe to various roles. The role theory also presents the role performance notion, which is concerned with the implementation-related attitudes, choices, and behaviors of governments. Thus, the execution of their own programs is referred to as the role performance of governments. (Holsti, 1970).

The states can take on a variety of roles such as aggressive, mediator, autonomy, interdependent, militarily interventionist or passive. Holsti uses these patterns and a set of analytical tools called performance, role conceptions and rule prescriptions in order to classify the state roles. From that viewpoint, the role performance can be identified in such a way that it is general behavioral pattern of a particular state in international area (Ovalı and Bozdağlıoğlu, 2012: 7). Theorists attributes a general context to the role performance and they include patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and commitments toward other states within their investigations. Also Holsti defines the national role performance by moving from observer's viewpoint, at his seminal work named "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", as follows (Holsti, 246):

*"the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or subordinate regional systems. It is their image of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment"*

What's more, Holsti defines role prescriptions, which are understood as "the norms, expectations cultures, societies, institutions, or groups attach to particular positions." (Holsti, 1970: 239) By moving from this viewpoint, it can be argued that, a nation, which permanently attributes a political role on itself, probably highlights the national identity to define the own state's attitudes. Therefore there is a close relationship between a certain nation's role at foreign policy and its national identity. We see this interpretation at works of Alexander Wendt, famous social constructivist. He stresses that the social identity of an actor and the actions and perceptions of others (Wendt, 1999; 8). It reflects the actor's self-being, his/her values, culture, self-image or collective-psyche, so all of parts which form the identity. (Breunning, 2011: 22) However, in terms of social sciences, concepts of "role" and "identity" can be used as interchangeable terms. That's why, their subjective aspects relating to foreign policy should be emphasized. A particular role can be gained or lost by an actor but an identity is strictly tied with personality. (Alkan, 2021). According to Wendt, the states, just like people, have their own statical and unchangeable identities and these are designated both of by state's own image and by how the state is perceived by other states. The leaders of the countries generally emphasize the national interests and strategies relying on the specific "we" discourse. The emphasizing on "we" of these discourses reflect the tradition, culture and identity of the country. (Ak, 2019: 226-227). However, the states can claim some roles at international area and can take on these roles initiatively thanks to their foregoing political, economical or geo-strategical aspects (Cahafetz vd., 1996: 733; Wendt, 1999). The descriptive aspect of the role theory to examine the particular state's behavioral position at international relations, based on to establish a bridge between state identity and foreign policy. So the identity, from the viewpoint of

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constructivist theorists, is a principal element of foreign political choice and it obviously tied up with national role conception. We detect this interpretation from the explanations of Thies and Breuning's comments. Their views is as follow (Hudson, and Day, 2020: 214):

*FPA generally, as well as cognitive approaches specifically, and IR theory generally, as well as constructivism specifically, stand to benefit from the results of dialogue between the former's largely agent-based role theory and the latter's largely system-based agent–structure debate . . . there is so much common ground that bridging the divide between these two research traditions not only brings them closer together but also advances knowledge in both FPA and IR theory. (2)*

The roles of the states can be formed by domestic political/social facts or by foreign affects or by both of them, and, as a consequence, the impacts of them set forth the state's foreign policy. Thus, states can be defined regional power or super power by being focused on their material capacities or anti-imperialist, believer, independent or socialist within their ideological, cultural, traditional political positions (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2013: 142). In addition to these role explanations, it should not be ruled out the domestic power conflicts between political actors. The domestic political conflicts over roles also can provide an insight for role theory the underlying mechanisms to account for the emergence of shared roles, the imposition of a dominant role and the changes in roles and foreign policy, specifically, when domestic political conditions change (Hudson and Day, 2020: 214-215). As dependent to the national attitudes and leaders' choices, national roles may be differentiated from each others drastically.

Holsti, by his seminal work, argues the seventeen different national roles which the countries may adopt. These roles are generated due to that countries self evaluation and position as global or regional protectors or arise because of the fact that leaders adopt a specific attributions for themselves such as liberator, protector, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist, defender of the faith etc. On the other side, some countries or leaders accomodate in an independent position in compare of present global compartments and endeavour to act independently from regional or global power centers. To ensure their position, these leaders tend to create a line of mediation or propose integrative role between conflicting parts of the particular challenge or to built/became a bridge among the non-communicative international actors. Indeed, the Holsti theorized the National roles by these attributions and a specific perspective, then he applied them over several countries included Turkey (Holsti, 1970: 261-290). The concept was handled as a social origin or social phenomena at the beginning. Theorists thought that the roles have only ability to be shared attitudes of the government members and even general populations within a state. Later, theorists developed a more sophisticated vision for role theory up to be able to contain the circumstances, which the roles could be formed by national leaders even if it was apart from national identities. Because, in practice, it was seen that even if the bureaucrats and leaders of the state didn't believe that their state's identity, culture or feelings reflect what they mentioned or behaved, they took on a specific roles to establish a different political impact on international area. Therefore, a national role can be weared artificially. Their argument was that even if the role which was adopted by themselves, didn't comply with the national identity nevertheless, their people wouldn't reject aloudly to their position (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2011: 7). Surely the issue of how long the artificial role may traceable is questionable. At the point, some questions arise. For example, who decides the nature or definition of national roles? What role has the oppositional groups in that process? Can sub-national regions or groups be effective on the determination process of national role or Do major political actors designate

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them and impose on the population or manipulate them? These questions form the shortages of the role theory (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2011: 8).

Finally, we should mention the views of Holsti, Siverson and George about systematical changing of the countries and their national roles concepts. They underline that sometimes countries experience systematical transformations and the transformations may cause to extinction of new or abandonment of previous, commitments and therefore signify a change in the goals and/or objectives of participating actors (Genco, 1980: 68). In a nutshell, the national roles concepts don't have stability and irremovable structures. Contrary, the practice often shows that the role concepts change routinely from government to government, even from time to time within same government era (Kutlay and Öniş, 2021: 1088).

## **3. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **3.1. Turkey's Traditional National Role Since Its Establishment and Ozal's Effect**

After Turkey Republic was founded, meantime the the Turkish foreign policy also was formed by founder elites, especially Musfafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk's ideas basically was to create a Western-oriented development understanding of the state and society as a whole. To achieve the understanding, republican elites read the world by perspective of western countries. Therefore, the republican state institutions were designed to prevent any deviation from the original position of the Turkish foreign policy. On that issue, Turkey concentrated its insights and perspectives to its insider issues and were not interested actively in its neighbours' issues. The foreign policy of that area can be summarised as "*Peace in the country, peace in the World*" which was one of Kemal Ataturk's seminal sentences. It meant that Turkey adopted a passive foreign policy and committed to not act as an interventionist political actor in terms of foreign policy. This political assignment can put in the passive role in terms of Holsti's categorization (Aras and Görener, 2010: 78).

Turkey joined in the Western unions and organizations after Second World War and it has been accepted a member of western family against SSCB during Cold War era. This understanding has shaped the Turkish national roles concepts for a long time. However the ending of the Cold War made a radical change on political expectations and perspectives on western countries' foreign policy and also Turkish foreign policy (Kara and Sözen, 2016: 50). Additionally it should be noted that the leaders, which governed the country, reflected their political desires and positions on Turkish foreign policy. We have to calculate these two elements together because AKP has been ruled the Turkey since 2002 parliamentary elections. It means that AKP and Erdogan's political manoeuvres have set forth Turkish foreign policy for 20 years. So, to make an separation between Turkey's national identity and national role at foreign policy and AKP's and Erdoğan's viewpoint is almost impossible. Also the political transformation, has been experienced after the Cold War era, was ended and the new era came forth. Thus, since 1980, each of political leaders and foreign ministers gave new direction for foreign policy in comply with their political expectations and ideologies. Obviously all of these leaders and ministers adopted new roles concepts at national scope. We need to touch on these transformation shortly.

Traditional Turkish foreign policy based on westernization of the Turkish partnerships and being member of the family of the democratic countries as general. During 22 years after 1980 Coup realised, Turkish foreign policy had been executed in comply with western values and western countries because

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the Cold War continued for a while and then the Western culture dominated the other parts of the world due to the fact that a equalizer power didn't arised immediately. Turkey's participation in 1990's Gulf War besides of western countries can be read from this perspective because Turkey, since its establishment at 1923, had strategically avoided from being involved into Middle Eastern countries' domestic affairs (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). Nevertheless it should be mentioned that Turgut Ozal represented a highlighting and active political figure when he rised up to first non-military origin President of the Republic after 1960 Coup D'etat. He reflected his political agenda underlying the importancy of foreign policy which has its own characteristical aspects and put forward the own interests along with western political ideals. These activist interventions on foreign policy shaped 1990's. Surely it didn't guaranteed the same foreign policy perspective was adopted by every political actor which was in power.

For example, the Islamist groups prioritized to create an economic market or alliance with other Muslim countries that was radically different Principal desire in comparison to Ozal's political commitments. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the Turkish foreign policy and its international accomodation was gradually moving a passive and western-oriented position to one which gave a political importancy to its own interests first (Aras and Gorener, 2010: 79-80). The main focus of the study is not Ozal's foreign or foreign policy shaping before AKP but Turkey gained a political "bridge" position between East and West thanks to Ozal's political manoeuvres and that being a political "bridge", is using by Erdoğan to play an independent international role at Russia-Ukraine war. On the countrary, left the non interventionist policy during Kemalist parties and Turkey is more assertively agresor during the Azerbaijan and Armenian skirmish.

since 1980, each of political leaders and foreign ministers gave new direction for foreign policy in comply with their political expectations and ideologies. Obviously all of these leaders and ministers adopted new roles concepts at national scope.

*Table 1. Turkey national roles AKP rule*

Political Figures	Time Period	Foreign Minister	Party	NRC
Abdullah Gül	March 14, 2003- August 28, 2007 November 18, 2002 – March 14, 2003 August 28, 2007- August 28, 2014	Foreign Minister Prime Minister President	Justice and Development Party	passive independent
R. T. Erdoğan	March 14, 2003– August 28, 2014 August 28, 2014- Incumbent	Prime Minister President	Justice and Development Party	loyal ally, independent, isolate, and protector
Ali Babacan	August 29, 2007- May 2, 2009	Foreign Minister	Justice and Development Party	subsystem- collaborator, developer,
Ahmet Davutoğlu	May 2, 2009- August 28, 2014 August 28, 2014- May 24, 2016	Foreign Minister Prime Minister	Justice and Development Party	defender of the faith. active independent,
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	2014 August 29, Incumbent	Foreign Minister	Justice and Development Party	mediator- integrator. active independent, regional leader, bridge



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### **3.2. National Role Conceptions**

National Role Conceptualization defines the national role conceptions comprise leaders', or policymakers', possess interpretations of the type of decision - making, commitments, rules, and actions that are appropriate for their state, as well as the features, if any, that their state should continue to perform in the international system or subordinate regional structures. It relates to how imaginatively state leaders determine the right orientations or roles of their country in relation to its external environment. In to fully understand how certain NRCs influence the perspectives of state leaders on foreign policy problems, it is necessary to conduct a thorough examination of these major NRCs. In his work titled National Role Conceptions in the study of Foreign Policy, Holsti specifies around 17 role conceptions. These include the bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist agent, defender of the faith, mediator-integrator, regional subsystem-collaborator, developer, bridge, loyal ally, independent, example, internal development, isolate, and protector. In addition to the NRCs identified by Holsti, he concentrates on many NRCs briefly addressed in his work. (Holsti, 1970: 260)

### **3.3. AKP's National Role Understanding Until Russia Ukraine War**

Together with AKP's rule began, Turkish foreign policy re-shaped dramatically. Turkey looked for a new partnerships to develop and launched new initiatives with its neighbour countries. The Turkish politicians described it as "Turkey's soft power" and the political background of it based on the enhancing the relations with Ottoman era's culturally dominated regions such as Middle East and Balkans. However, moving from Holsti's National roles categorization, the main role, Turkey adopted in AKP rule's beginnings, can be mentioned as Turkey followed a consecutive and component national roles "*mediator-integrator*" and "*regional leader*" to success it's regional plans. (Holsti, 1970, s. 261, 265).

Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ defines the changing Turkish foreign policy at AKP's rule as "*under the AKP, Turkey's foreign policy shifted from being based on Principles of caution and uni-dimonsionality to being based on those of relative Activism and multi-dimensionality*" (Çakır, Arıkan Akdağ, 2017: 334). Davutoğlu, former foreign minister and prime minister of Turkey, drawn a large line for Turkish political perspective after Cold-war era and he argued that Turkey's historical backgrounds and new international developments needs a new orientation to be accomodated. Due to the fact that Turkey's enormous interactions between Asian and Caucasus, Middle East, Balkans and European countries, Turkey cannot be squeezed through one-dimensional political viewpoint or a unified category. He defines Turkey's Unique Position as follows (Davutoğlu, 2008: 77-78):

*"As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia's vast landmass, it may be defi ned as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unifi ed character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey's diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of infl uence in its immediate environs"*

Davutoğlu's new approach to Turkish foreign policy paved the way the emergence of the new political imagination and a new perspective regarding as the neighbour countries of Middle East at minds of policymakers. The cognitive point of the transformation appeared as enlargement of Turkish borderline

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toward the cultural heritage roots. Therefore the Middle East or Balkans became new rotates of Turkish foreign relations. According to Aras, Davutoğlu's new perspective can be defined as "strategical depth" which references to Davutoğlu's book which has same name, and it have expanded beyond the homeland in the cognitive map of policymaker's minds (Aras, 2009: 4) Indeed, Turkey developed an interactive policy and pursued proactive regional integration policy; led the bilateral or multilateral agreements relied on economy or cooperation, became a neutral mediator between Israel and Syria, launched an initiative to resolve the protracted crisis among balkan countries at first period of AKP rule (Kutlay and Öniş, 2021: 1085). As Kutlay and Öniş remembered rightly, these initiatives and proactive attitudes of AKP leaders were praised by international society and were interpreted as "its '*vibrant democracy that in spite of its imperfections is seen as an example of reform in the region*' (Kutlay and Öniş, 2021: 1085)

In the second decade of AKP rule, the national role concept understanding converted into autonomy and military interventionism from mediator-integrator pattern or regional Leader pattern. The new pattern easily comply with the role of "*regional leader*" in terms of Holsti's categorization. This type describes the state's manoeuvres are directed to identify itself by regional/historical commitments and state assigns itself a duty or responsibility to observe and protect its region's interests and to reserve the order in Principe (Holsti, 1970, s. 261). Especially after Arap Spring and Syrian Civil War broke out, AKP government felt a necessity to involve into Syrian Civil War to protect Turkey's borders. In addition to this fact, AKP government strictly put a political distance at relationships with Egypt and Israel. On the otherside, AKP Government also doesn't have a good political relations with western countries. The relationships between Turkey and EU confronted with tensions because of energy exploration at East Mediterrean Sea and Aegean Sea. The claims on Greece's territorial sea border claim are not acceptable characteristically and this tension has disrupted the political arrangements among EU and Turkey. (Rubin and Eiran, 2019: 979). As Holsti appropriately foreseen, countries frequently change their national roles concepts. Also Turkey, in AKP rule, changed its national roles concepts at least three times. Nowadays, Turkey endeavours to fix a mediator-integrator role again. In fact, among the reasons of this transformation can be counted the USA presidency has been gained by a Democrat Party member, Joe Biden and the energy crisis between Turkey and other countries which has coast close to Mediterrean Sea such as Greece, Egypt and Israel. These tensions forced the Turkey to change its foreign policy since 2020's. To achieve this aim, Turkey became volunteer to protect Afghanistan Airport after Taliban re-gained the rule of the country (Yetkin, 2021). As a consequence of these international developments, Turkey has dramatically transformed its national role concept again. However, this time, it is really hard to define Turkey's unique role in the war.

## **4. METHODOLOGY**

In this study, we benefited from theoretical studies which researchers made about Turkey and Turkish policy by using the national role theory by Holsti. Due to that the study aimed to look into the Turkey's national roles during the war between, I required to investigate how the political process has continued among the political actors. That's why, I scanned the newspapers, academic researches and official statements of the governments and statements of the politicians individually. Recep Tayyip Erdogan diplomatic phone calls with Putin is scrutinized in order to find the characteristic role of Turkey. In this regards, 75 phone calls have been examined. After that first scanning, the material, which I gathered, shown that Turkey has played three different national roles during the war in terms of Holsti's catego-

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rization. Then I diligently instilled these informations in relevant categories by interpreting them by academic perspective as shown in table 1.

## **5. NATIONAL ROLES TURKEY ADOPTED DURING THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR**

### **5.1. An Uncertain Place Between Bridge Role and Mediator-Integrator Role**

It can be useful to evoke the Holsti's categories again. Holsti describes the mediator-integrator role as "*capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of state*" (Holsti, 1970: 265). On the other side, the role of bridge is, according to Holsti, accomodates in a vague position in contrast to mediator-integrator role which emphasizes the diplomatic channels. This role is defined as a mission of "translator or conveyor of messages and information between peoples of different cultures by Holsti (Holsti, 1970: 167)

Today, Turkey discovered an opportunity in the Russia-Ukraine war to prove itself as a mediator country. In a circumstance that Europe and USA put a strict distance between Russia and themselves, Turkey chose to be in a neutral position. Thus, Ankara didn't waste its chance to negotiate both of Ukraine and Russia. Doing this, Ankara also carefully worked out not to endanger its geostrategical calculations in Black Sea. Ankara planned that if it joined in Western side of the tension and applied heavy sanctions against Russia, Ankara would lost advantage its "friend country" position with both of Kyiv and Moscow. On the others side, Erdoğan did not only accomodate at median line between Russia and Ukraine, but also Erdoğan positioned Turkey between West and Russia. Western countries and their corporations which have trade interactions with Russia, were forced to finish their relationships with Russia and to exit from Russian market immediately because of USA's oppressions (Kusa, 2022). Therefore neither USA nor European countries didn't hesitate to burn all of bridges to wield for possible arrangements with Russia. It can be mentioned that their strict attitude disrupted future diplomatic ties. At the moment, Turkey maintained the position of hotline and it is seen that Turkey achieved to not being eroded of the diplomatic and economic cooperation neither western countries nor Russia.

In fact, the arised question is "why does Turkey want to stay neutral?" Indeed western block also questioned the position of Turkey but they also glad Turkey's close ties with Russia. So, Turkey intentionally select to gamble. Because, resisting to stay neutral, Turkey annoying its westernian allies and it may be paved the way that they may demand from Turkey to make a certain and clear decision about the war and to select whether or not Turkey would take a seat within in the block. For example, an article, published at Washington Post, evaluated Turkey's neutrality as follows:

*"The longer the war drags on, the harder it will be to sustain Turkey's carefully calibrated neutrality. Erdogan's calculation at the start of the conflict was that he could use his friendship with Putin as leverage with the West. NATO, he reckoned, would be simultaneously anxious to keep him in the Western camp and glad to use him as a backchannel to communicate with his "dear friend" in Moscow"*

Obviously Ukraine War is threatening international interests of Turkey because Turkey benefits from its multi-facet geostrategic place. However the war pushes Turkey to accomodate in the block permanently, especially in western block. Turkey's political commitments to NATO and EU stimulates Turkey to involve in sanctions which western countries initiated and thus to preserve its economical and

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political ties with western countries. On the otherside, western countries are not unique trade partners of Turkey. Russia also is an important trade partner in terms of Turkey. Data exhibits that at 2021, bilateral economic trade reached at \$32.5 billion and Russia plans to make investment which include to plant nuclear plant, into Turkey (Kusa, 2022). If we take into considered that Russia responded these economic sanctions cutting of its energy delivery toward Europe, Turkey's decision to not involve in sanctions can be interpreted more intelligent attitude, especially at the moment which Turkey challenged Economic straits (Chausovsky, 2022). In addition to these bilateral relations, Russian tourists provide enormous contribution to Turkish economy during summer seasons. When one is took into considered that Turkey has a deep economic regression since 2017, it cannot venture to lost a big economic income source such as Russia. In terms of Turkey, Russia is also a key political ally at South Caucasia and even Levant. Turkey endeavoured to develop their diplomatic ties and to share some of political advantages of regional developments with Russia. Turkey's primoral benefit from being a diplomatic and strategic partner with a powerful Russia is to obtain an strategical and political superiority against Iran who is a historical competitor for Turkey into the Middle East and Caucasia. In a nutsell, Turkey feared of destabilizing of Russia because of the fact that it would paved the way of economical, diplomatical and regional regression of Turkey. Moreover The fact, that Turkey has experienced the economic regression since last autumn, makes harder to involve in sanctions against Russia (Kusa, 2022).

In addition to Erdoğan's mediator role, the advantage, which his unique position is being gained for him appreciated leaders around the world. Being in median position, Erdoğan is able to became a bridge between non-communicative states and civilizations. There is also a discussion wheather he does for his political interests, roles or national interests. He strictly makes telephone calls and organizes the communication traffic between Biden-Zelensky-Putin consecutively (White House, 2022; Presidency of Republic of Turkiye, 2022; AA, 2022). These negotiations are not only directed toward organization of opening of grain corridor or organization of meetings, but also these negotiations are directed toward conveying of messages of leaders to each others (Yetkin, 2022).

### **5.2. Independent Role**

Turkey diligently processed an independent position when the Russia Ukrain conflicts broke out. Turkey permanently criticized Russian invasion on Ukraine territory clearly and loudly and by certain terms however Turkey also mentioned Russia's concerns about its Sovereignty and the fear about to being coverd. To be forced to select its side, Turkey insistly rejected to be part of the war and it reflected Turkish represents' official statements Moreover, Turkey's independent position is appreciated other states' diplomatic officers. At the point, I examined the formal discourses of all sides of the tension. Turkey, Ukraine and Russia can be counted as sides of the tension. First of all, one should be accepted that Turkey criticized Russia's movement within Ukraine territory and praised Ukraine's territorial unity. For Example, at 28 February, Turkish President Erdoğan made an announcement after cabinet meeting ended and he argued that Turkey is a member of NATO and will honour its commitments to the alliance however Turkey has right to pursue own national interests within the region. Additionally in that discourse, Erdoğan evoked Montreux Convention, which Turkey is part of it, saying that "Turkey is determined to use the authority given by the Montreux Convention on Turkish Straits in a manner to prevent escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis," At the same discourse, Erdoğan stressed that the invasion of Ukraine territory is unacceptable but Turkey will keep its ties both of countries (RFL/RL, 2022).

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Similarly, Turkish Foreign Minister, Çavuşoğlu, rejected aggressive attitude of Russia against Ukraine and agreed that Russian invasion of Ukraine is a grand violation of international law, at October 1, 2022.

I must emphasize that Turkey-Ukraine relations are also not new. Post-Crimea invasion era, Turkey announced its support for Ukraine. Therefore two countries developed a close friendship at international area which includes trade and military cooperation. It was so clear that, at a meeting which was held during Azerbaijan and Armenia were at the war over Nagorno-Karabakh region, Erdoğan stressed that “Turkey considers Ukraine a pivotal country to ensure stability, security, peace and prosperity in the region” and in the same speech, Erdoğan asserted the Russian invasion of Crimea as “illegal” reiterately. Similarly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye made an official announcement to criticize the Russia’s plan to regulate referenda in places which it controlled because of siege. According to official statement, the ministry stressed that, *we concerns about the initiatives which tended to regulate referendas in Ukraine’s territories under Russia’s control*” and ministry evaluates these initiatives as “*fait accompli*”. (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2022). In fact, the situation shows us that Turkey emotionally and strategically supports the Ukraine but its diplomatic approach necessitates to stay neutral or independent. Because Turkey, after 2015 when two Russian military plane was fallen by Turkish misilles and 2016 when a Russian ambassador was assassinated by a terrorist in Ankara, gave an importancy to develop again bilateral relations with Russia (Kaddorah, 2022: 8).

Turkey’s the strategical approach has been celebrated by Ukraine and its western allies. Additionally, Turkey didn’t hesitate to sell its military drones, called TB2 in spite of the fact that these sellings were accused by Russia stressing that “*Turkey is militarizing the process*” (Ceyhan and Göğüş, 2022). Also Turkey initiated and endeavored to open a grain corridor from Black Sea toward Europe and Africa otherwise an important grain crisis and starvation would broken out (Gaber, 2022). This arguments clearly shown that Turkey desired to stay at median position and, if it is necessitated, Turkey would wield this neutrality to resolve the humanitarian crisis

Also Çavuşoğlu reiterated that Turkey is a member of NATO and is a determined position to protect the diplomatic balance between conflicting sides. However Çavuşoğlu criticized also western sanctions against Russia (Reuters, 2022) We understand that Turkey evaluates as a “mistake” the expanding of NATO territories toward East. As can be known, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, broken out because of the fact that Ukraine intended to participate in NATO and Russia saw it as a threat against its national interests. Güler explains Turkey’s concerns about NATO’s decisions as follows: (Güler, 2022)

*“Meanwhile, NATO’s expansion in Europe was a mistake. The current tacit issues among NATO members are visible. Going head to head with Russia without solving the existing problems in the alliance has surfaced hypocrisy and deepened the thought that Turkey is on one side and other members on the other. Several times, Ankara warned the NATO allies and called for a collective stance; however, they didn’t respond. Now, unfortunately, the war is on the European continent. We have seen this scenario in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Libya, Syria and Iraq.*

### **5.3. Turkey’s “Mediator Role” During the Process and Solution of Grain Crisis**

Turkey’s aim to being neutral during Russia and Ukraine is required to not being help to any side of the war. To achieve this goal, Turkey immediately closed its straits to any warships, especially warships which belong to the sides of the war. Turkey has this right thanks to Montreux Convention of 1936 and the right provides to stay neutral during the war. Turkey informed Russia on not being allowed for pas-

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sage of any warships and Russia responded positively that the ships will not cross the strait.” Also this decision will corresponded positively by Ukraine President, Zelensky (Kaddorah, 2022).

Turkey's mediator role performed itself as a position making positive consequences at grain crisis. The war caused a significant and negative impact on global markets because of that two belligerent countries have a huge share on the global agricultural production and export. Among the world's largest wheat exporters, Russia has the first place by its 37.3 million tones of exportation rates and Ukraine has fifth place by its 18.1 million tones of exportation rates. Coming up of the war quickly hit the transportation of the Ukrainian grains, especially wheats to other countries and the situation triggered a rapid and unforeseen increase of grain prices, especially in import-dependent countries. For example, Interantional Grain Council announced that the wheat prices in the World grain markets increased by 40 percent during the year. Surely the economically undeveloped countries encountered with a food shorage (Ural, 2022). Fortunately, by the announcement about the opening of grain corridor, a healing on the grain prices has experinced. For example the wheat prices degraded to January 2022 levels again. Obviously this succesful agreement and economic improvement was made thanks to Turkey's initivatives and endeavours to gather at one pot interests of both of belligerent countries. Ural appreciated Turkey's position within the whole process as follows: (Ural, 2022)

*“Up to this point, Turkiye carried out a multi-layered foreign policy during the Russia-Ukraine war. The mediating role played by the country in the grain corridor negotiations can also be seen as part of Turkiye's latest diplomatic offensive. In this sense, we are witnessing that Turkiye is moving towards a line where soft power elements are used in a more balanced way compared to the foreign policy line in which hard power elements and security come to the fore. This successful mediation in wheat corridor negotiations, especially with his Western allies, helped to normalize relations that had been damaged in recent years and has given Ankara more visibility in the international arena.”*

Surely the other actors such as United Nations, accompanied to Turkey at the process but key actor at the Process was undoubtely Turkey. Turkey cleverly held on its geo-strategical position and frequently touched on both of sides of the war and resolved the crisis even it was happened partly succesful. Chausovsky evaluates the manoeuvres of Turkey make it a “swing player” because of the fact that Turkey contributes to being resolved of global crisis while it pursues its National interests meantime. The author columns how the mediator role of Turkey can be evaluated as follows (Chausovsky, 2022):

*“Much of Ukraine's food and grain exports (as well as those from Russia) must transit Turkey's maritime waters in the Black Sea and Bosphorus to reach global markets in the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. Turkey was the only member of NATO that has good working relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and thus, it could help guarantee the safe passage of maritime vessels through this area. Ankara was able to seize on an opportunity where both Ukraine and Russia benefited from cooperation (Western sanctions on Russia were selectively eased to allow food shipments to go forward), whereas polarization among Moscow, Kyiv, and the West would likely have prevented such cooperation efforts without an independently minded mediator.”*

Chausovsky asserts that Turkey's multifacet position yields results that USA and Europe couldn't get by their economic sanctions. By stressing that, the author never aims to underrate the sanctions but he

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argues that Turkey's approach to Russia as a friend or neighbour country produced positive and tangible results even if it was partly. Chausovsky argues it as follows (Chausovsky, 2022):

*“While the West is right to stand up to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, it is important to recognize that a multifaceted connectivity strategy that combines pressure with constructive engagement along the lines of Turkey's approach can be more effective in yielding results when it comes to dealing with Moscow. This is something the United States and EU can learn from and adapt to their own connectivity strategies, if only to mitigate against the most disruptive elements of the war and build the grounds for peace.”*

#### **5.4. Turkey's National Concerns and National Interests During the Process: Active Independency**

According to Holsti, the role of active independent can be described, a state makes a foreign policy decisions to serve National interests rather than the interests of others. He defines the “others” imply much more diplomatic activity. The themes suggest active efforts to cultivate relations with as many states as possible and occasional interposition into bloc conflicts. The role conception emphasizes at once independence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the World. (Holsti, 1970: 262). During the war, Turkey interpreted some developments to harvest national interests from them rather than to play a key role to mitigate the international concerns. As mentioned above, one of Turkey's key concerns is economic degrading because of the losing the trade interaction with Russia. That's why Turkey has continued to economic and trade relations with Russia. On the other side, these relations discomfort the western countries and they have argued that Turkey has illegally transported Russian goods by Turkish ports toward Europe and other destinations and thus Russia is able to overcome western sanctions. Surely these accusations incline to that Turkey erupts its neutrality in favor of Russia (Gaber, 2022). However Turkey's strategical neutral position is supported Turkey's important aids which send to Ukraine. Turkey step up military assistance since the war has began and these aids rised up Ukraine's defence capability. Turkey recently delivered “Kirpi” mine-resistant ambush Protected vehicles, combat drones called “Akinci” and Turkish multi-launch rocket Systems with heavy firepower capabilities (Gaber, 2022). Nevertheless, Turkey, to strengthen its neutral position, denied that Turkey sold these arms up to being used specifically against Russia.

After 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt, Turkey revised its foreign policy and prioritized own national interests infavor of its allies. For its sake, Turkey bought S-400 missiles at the expense of exposing Economic Sanctions of USA. Also Turkey executed cross border military operations at Iraq and Syria to surpass Kurdish milis unions such as PKK and YPG who are backed by USA. Therefore, it can be said that Turkey adopted a role concept that highlights own national interests aloudly at international area as foreign policy.

During Russia-Ukraine War, Turkey tried to keep side by side its mediator role and being Protected its National interests. For example, Sweden and Norway applied to NATO for membership because of their fears based on that Russia can invade them after Ukraine fallen. As a rule, all of NATO members should ratify the applications and Turkey is one of NATO members. Turkey, amid of regional war Crisis, put forward its National interests and stipulated to being made real of them by these candidate countries. These Conditions are generally about delivering some of members of dissidents, member of Gulen movement living the Sweden which Turkey recognized these organizations as terrorist and can-

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didate countries allowed these people to resident within their countries. After a couple of negotiations, the Crisis almost has been over but the attitude of Turkey shoen that in spite of that Turkey endeavoured to balance the Crisis between Russia and Ukraine and to be a global actor again, it Will not hesitate to benefit from any circumstances to protect own interests.

## **CONCLUSION**

The study aimed to investigate what roles Turkey has adopted during Russia-Ukraine war. The national role concepts of the countries can varied in time. Political actors or institutional approaches can be change. This renovation can be observed in whole AKP rule. AKP governments principally executed their foreign policy as mediator and collaborator. Then their attitudes became tough and aggressive behaviours highlighted. Today AKP government tries again to mitigate its political position at international scale. However Erdoğan and its ministers/diplomats also realised that a complete restoration is not possible. Therefore they have pursued a triple approach at international area such as roles of mediator-integrator, independent and active independent. Turkey's unique geopolitical and historical ties with both of western civilization and Russia gave it an advantage in order to continue for communication each of sides of the conflict. Therefore Erdoğan easily invited the both of parts to negotiate the process by a summit in Istanbul and had carried out the resolution process of a sensitive issue like grain crisis by meeting constantly with Putin and Zelensky together with United Nations representatives. But it doesn't mean that Turkey passively executed its mediator role. Contrary, Turkey criticized Russia for its invasion and initiative to make referenda in Ukraine territories, which were under Russian control and also Turkey kept up to send technological arms to Ukraine such as TB2s. Meanwhile Turkey also criticized EU and NATO not to calculate Russia's national interests. Moreover it is seen that Turkey didn't rule out its national interests during the process. When the Sweden and Finland submit their applications to join in NATO.

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## Chapter 9

# Understanding the “Balancing Act” of Turkey in the Russia–Ukraine War

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### ABSTRACT

*Since the beginning of the conflict, Turkey, as a regional powerhouse, has remained intact in its position as the “honest broker.” In a nutshell, Turkey has been trying to consolidate a balance between the resurgence of Russian aggressiveness and the Western aspirations to protect Ukraine at all costs. For so many in the West, Turkish actions were defined as even damaging at some point to the causes of NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, Turkey’s role conception in this war is nothing new and rooted very well back to the earlier Republican experience with the Black Sea. In other words, Turkish foreign policy towards the Black Sea and Ukraine/Russia has always leaned toward a strategic behavior of balancing these significant powers. The latest act has been no different from a Turkish way of “sticking with the plan.” Therefore, deciphering the dynamics of this role is undoubtedly a must to undercover the geopolitical interest of Turkey from the region amid a fully-fledged war. This chapter proposes three related sections to understand and analyze the story’s Turkish side.*

### INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the war, Turkey, a regional powerhouse, has remained intact in its position of being an “honest broker” among its Western allies and Russia. To be more specific, Turkey has been balancing the equilibrium between the resurgence of Russian expansionism in the Black Sea and the Western involvement in defending Ukraine adamantly. Interestingly enough, for so many in the Western sphere of influence, especially in the media, Turkish actions have been defined as unorthodox for a NATO member and even damaging at some point to the EU/US efforts, for example, Turkey’s insistence on not collaborating in economic sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey’s role conception in this war is nothing new when one looks at the history of Turkish foreign policy since the formation of the modern

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republic. Turkish foreign policy toward the conflicts in the Black Sea, and precisely the Ukraine/Russia issue, has always leaned toward a strategic behavior of staying cautious and transactional. And the latest act has been no different from a Turkish way of “sticking with the plan.” This chapter is designed to identify Turkey’s “balancing act” through historical analysis and deciphers the dynamics behind this geopolitical foreign policy behavior. The chapter is composed of three sections. The first section delivers the history behind the development of Turkey’s foreign policy behavior in the Black Sea concerning two factors explaining this choice. The second section offers a critical analysis of the ongoing relationship between Turkey and Russia/Ukraine, and the final section evaluates the sustainability of Turkey’s approach in the long run by introducing policy implications and future projections.

### **A Short History of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Black Sea After 1920**

To understand Turkish actions in the war, one must revisit history and see the continuation or repetition of this act in almost every conflict that has ever happened in the Black Sea since Cold War. But, of course, this suggested role does not mean somehow an (in)direct support to Russia or any Russian cause in the Black Sea. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a NATO member since the beginning of the Cold War and a candidate state of the EU. Therefore, the already settled rapprochements have aligned the country moderately with these organizations’ regulations and organizational principles and automatically limit Turkey’s hypothetical convergence with Russia. To keep this in mind, the aftermath of the Turkish War of Independence and Turkish-Soviet relations in this post-WWI era could be a good starting point.

At the beginning of the 1920s, the decade that signified the formation of the modern Turkish republic, Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and various tensions in the Black Sea had been very careful and prudent (Üstün, 2010, p.232). The official standpoint towards the Soviet Union was relatively positive and appreciative of Moscow’s economic and military support for the Turkish War of Independence (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2018, p.73). In the 1920 and 1930s, calming bilateral relations resulted in expanding political and economic ties along with continuous dialogue, which eventually played a prominent role in the signing of the Lausanne and Montreux conventions (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2018, p.73). In terms of Black Sea geopolitics, the Montreux convention’s importance must be stated and explained. The Convention has given Turkey the right to arm and defend the straits in wartime, and Russia has taken the ability to access the Mediterranean with Turkey’s permission (Koru, 2017). According to Koru (2017), the convention has settled a delicate balance between Russian aggression over straits and Western efforts to contain this aggression. Yet, Joseph Stalin had become the game changer. His constant attempts to compromise the Montreux Convention and threats of expansionism on Turkey’s northeastern provinces during WWII led Turkey to reconsider its options and become ever closer to its Western allies (Koru, 2017). The covert aspirations of Stalin and the increasing threat of communism were only some of the reasons for Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952.

The start of the Cold War came with Turkey’s allegiance to the Western camp and the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in the Warsaw Pact. This Cold War equilibrium strengthened NATO’s position in the Black Sea via Turkey while relinquishing the Soviet hopes of having complete control over the region (Özdamar, 2012, p.23). However, despite becoming adversaries and being members of two opposing blocs, Turkish-Russian cooperation and Turkey’s aspirations to keep the balance among West and East managed to exist during the Cold War (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2018, p.73). A détente came after a deterioration in Turkey-US relations associated mainly due to the imposed arms embargo after Turkish

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intervention to Cyprus in 1974 (Yılmaz, 2010, p.28). As a retaliation to the US, Turkey once again had approached the USSR as a trump card, and this détente resulted in a series of agreements such as the Declaration of Principle of Good Neighborhood (1972), Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (1975), the establishment of the Inter-governmental joint commission (1976) and the agreement concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black Sea (1978) (Anlar, 2015, p. 20).

Speaking about the Cold War, one should also not hesitate to mention the influence of prominent Turkish leaders in creating this balance despite Turkey’s official alignment with NATO. Süleyman Demirel was one of those trademark leaders in Turkish foreign policy history. Although staunchly opposed to communism and a firm neoliberal, his vision towards geopolitical politics had been pragmatic and developmentalist. Based on keeping national interest as the main priority, Demirel continuously supported maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union and identified this policy doctrine as a “multidimensional” foreign policy (Koritsky, 2016), which located the Soviet Union as the “necessary evil” to consolidate political stability and economic development in the Black Sea. In addition to his détente era pragmatism in the Black Sea, Demirel sustained his interest in the region during the post-Soviet era, which resulted in a bilateral agreement with Russia dated back to 1992 (Başar & Mikail, 2013, pp.58-59) and visits to Crimean Tatars in Ukraine (1994-1998) and to Turkic Gagauz minority (1994) in Moldova (Koru, 2017). Until the end of the Cold War, the regional equilibrium was consolidated by the political leadership and international law, namely, the Montreux Convention. Especially the legal framework of the Convention refrained the region from geopolitical competition between NATO and Warsaw Pact (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2018, p.76).

The 1980s brought more geopolitical shifts in the region and welcomed the end of the Cold War. Heavily shaken by the political and social consequences of the 1980 coup, the political spectrum in Turkey was reshuffled, and let new leaders emerged. As an aspiring neoliberal, Turgut Özal anchored Turkey even more to the West but did not miss any opportunity for regional economic development, including the Black Sea partnerships. To reach new alternative export markets and, indeed, the newly formed post-Soviet independent nations, Özal had raised the idea of regional integration in the Black Sea, which later came into existence (1998) as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) through the adoption of its charter in Bosphorus Declaration in 1992 (Aydın, 2014, p. 384). The established organization is composed of 12 member states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Albania, and Serbia) and provides a platform for these countries on bilateral economic relations, namely, on energy, tourism, and trade (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2014). In BSEC, Özal identified the need for such an organization over functionalism. As Özdemir (2018, p.6) indicates, Özal believed in the lesson drawing from past grievances, so economic integration for him had the power to soften regional unsettlement and prevent possible escalations. Another prominent Turkish scholar, Mustafa Aydın (2014), on the other hand, defines Özal’s latent motivation in BSEC as creating a distant alternative to the European Union (p.385). Unfortunately, the organization has never reached the level that Özal had thought it would have, but it worked to solve the frozen conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasia (Daban, 2017).

Turkey’s quest to establish stability in a post-Soviet world continued throughout the 90s and 2000s. Amid the increase of regional problems, Turkey’s role as the “balancer” was imperative (Özdamar, 2015). Acting like a smart power, collaborating with soft and hard instruments, Turkey increased multinational cooperation in the region through initiatives such as the formation of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and conducting maritime operations entitled Black Sea Harmony (Üstün, 2010). These were also initiatives to show Turkey’s willingness to maintain healthy relations with Russia

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without irritating the NATO partners by unconditional support for the full membership of Bulgaria and Romania in NATO (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2018, p.75). With respect to that, Turkey, along with Russia, opposed to contributing Operation Active Endeavour in the Black Sea (Özdamar, 2015, p.184), a NATO proposal in response to the trigger of Article 5 of NATO after 9/11 with the support of the EU. Turkey’s motivation and justification were to keep the legal framework, the Montreux Convention, intact for the Turkish Straits and, accordingly, the political balances (Aydın, 2014, p.389).

The 2000s also welcomed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the leader that controlled the flow of Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea, with principal testing grounds like Georgia-Russia, the annexation of Crimea, and finally Russian-Ukrainian War. He revealed his policies toward Russia and the region at the very early stages of his reign, at the beginning of the Russo-Georgian War:

“People try to push us towards one side of the Georgia incident. Some push entirely towards the USA, and some towards Russia. Now the USA is our closest ally, and Russia is a country with which we have a significant trade volume, most of all in energy. I will not allow Turkey to be pushed entirely to either side. We will act as Turkey’s national interests require.” (Koru, 2017).

In the first litmus test, Russo-Georgian War, Turkey’s position was more on the side of calming tensions together with the Black Sea nations rather than allowing external powers to issue influence (Çelikpala & Erşen, 2018, p.76). The main concern was the potential escalation of violence and probability of significant power theatre within a very dangerous geography. On that note, the EU and Turkey had a shared concern (Üstün, 2010, p.232). Therefore, Turkey’s initial step was to support the territorial integrity of Georgia and complement de-escalation efforts to balance the eager US and aggressive Russia. Furthermore, to boost multilateral efforts, Turkey appreciated the EU’s Black Sea Synergy policy of 2007 and the Eastern Partnership of 2009 for the same reasons as Özal did at the beginning of the 90s, creating functional opportunities and benefits for all sides, including concrete projects in the fields of transport and energy (Aydın, 2014, p.387). Yet, the second test was much more complicated and challenging to manage. For many in the West, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has been counted as a missed opportunity to defend Ukraine at a very early stage of the conflict. As expectedly, Turkey’s position was not different. Balcer (2014) explains the Turkish response as a classic example of “delicate balancing.” Turkey started with a condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea (Özdamar, 2015, p.184) and was aligned with the Ukrainian protest but did not entirely engage with Western actions (Balcer, 2014, p.2). Specifically, Turkey neither participated in Western sanctions nor raised considerable objection to the pro-Russian insurgency in Donbas and Luhansk.

The “delicate balancing” has both created challenges and opportunities for Turkey. To act on this slippery slope, Erdoğan has always maintained constructive relations with Vladimir Putin during his reign. Even in the most chaotic episodes, problems have never turned into fully-fledged conflicts. In November 2015, over the Syria border, the Turkish air force shot down a Russian jet because of the alleged violation of the airspace (Koru, 2017). The consequences of this act were detrimental to economic relations; thus, Russia’s response included economic sanctions, visa restrictions, and severely reduced diplomatic ties (Koru, 2017). Moreover, Russia’s military modernization and active support of the Assad regime in Syria added more to the pile of uneasy relations and pushed Turkey more to the Ukrainian side (Başol, 2020). However, the growing unease took only two years to resolve despite Turkey’s issued apology (Yeğın, 2019, p.3). Erdoğan, as pragmatic as Özal, usually defines his favorite foreign policy routine as “turning crisis into opportunity,” and the famous equilibrium in Russo-Turkish relations once again settled in 2017 with Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400 air defense missiles from Russia amid vast criticisms and warnings from NATO allies. Having similarities with the détente period of the Cold

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War, Erdoğan used troubled relations with the US due to Obama Administration’s stubbornness to sell Turkey air missiles, retaliating and making amendments with Russia. Yeğin (2019, p.3) also notes that this move was a potential gesture to Putin for his swift support to Erdoğan after the coup attempt in 2016.

As one can see from the detailed historical background above, Turkey has been pursuing this very own “balancing act” for more than a decade (Özdamar, 2015) and indeed had started it long before the existence of contemporary Russian-Ukrainian issues. So, what are the dynamics behind this firmly established foreign policy doctrine? Or, from the words of a seasoned Turkish journalist Cengiz Çandar, how would it be possible for Turkey to remain a NATO member with a non-aligned policy in the Black Sea? (Triantaphyllou, 2014, p.291). Whether it is a well-calculated act or not, it could be said as the natural result of Turkey’s initial purpose to protect its interests in a region filled with great power rivalry (Özdamar, 2015, p.183). On that basis, the two key variables that construct Turkish national interests are security and the economy.

When it comes to security, the “balancing act” or coming to terms with Russia is rather simply a necessity for Turkey than a choice. The Black Sea is a region surrounded by frozen and ongoing conflicts and is still prone to more escalation. Ossetia, Chechnya, Donbas/Luhansk, Crimea, and Transnistria are the only few which could be counted as more visible than micro-scale conflicts within these countries. As one of these countries, Turkey had long feared mass-scale violence and an assertive Russia to shake up delicate balances that could result in destabilization. In addition to that, Turkey also has the emotional factor of prioritizing regional security. Cultural, religious, and kinship relations between Turkey and minorities in many of these Black Sea nations are incrementally vital and heartfelt issues for the Turkish people. Consolidating close ties with the Bulgarian Turkish community and preserving their political position in Bulgaria (Zankina, 2022, pp.74-75), protecting Gagauz Turks and their minority rights in a very unstable Moldova, upholding the very livelihood of Crimean Tatars and being the voice of many Turkish and Muslim communities living in Russia (Özdemir, 2018) has always been the stimulus of Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea. Counting all these together, Turkey’s priority has been the containment of a potentially detrimental threat of instability and a multidimensional foreign policy to clamp down on heightening tensions when they occur. This notion has become a cornerstone for Turkey, where supporting NATO/EU against the danger of Russian expansionism met with cooperation with Russia when it is necessary to protect mutual interests and the rights of minorities.

Naturally, the mutual interests between Turkey and Russia contain mostly economic partnerships and energy/construction agreements. A high level of mutual interdependence would be the correct word to define Turkish-Russian relations on an economic level. Transaction on oil and gas has been the epicenter of this interdependency. Just last year, Turkey imported nearly %45 of its gas and %17 of its oil from Russia (EPDK, 2021). On Russia’s side, after a devastating year in terms of market losses and rising inflation, Turkey’s dependency on the Russian market has never been more significant. Besides, Turkey is not solely a lucrative customer but also a crucial factor in the transit of oil and gas (Balcer, 2014, p.5). Turkey has been slowly becoming a transit hub for Russia to reach European and other broader markets via popular projects such as “Blue Stream” and “Turkish Stream”. It is important to note that the latter came into existence just a few years after the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 (Başol, 2020, p.237). Adding more to this, and concerning other areas of the economy, Russians constitute the second most numerous group of tourists in Turkey (Balcer, 2014, p.6); Turkish firms have a very lively and active place in the Russian construction sector with an ever-increasing market share (Başar & Mikail, 2013, p.45), Ankara has an interest on Russian arms supplies (Başar & Mikail, 2013, p.45), and there has been an ongoing partnership among Russian Rosatom and Turkish state for the construction and operation of the Akkuyu

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Nuclear Power Plant (Anlar, 2015, p.29). Albeit the mutual interdependence is one undeniable fact, the trade imbalance is the other. Statistically, the trade balance is firmly in favor of Russia, and the difference was more than 24 billion dollars in the first half of 2022 (Ibadoghlu, 2022). This imbalance also creates a gulf of asymmetry within the mutual interdependency among partners and raises the question of “who holds the leverage against the other?”. As predicted, the asymmetry of interdependence, willingly or unwillingly, has been pushing Turkey to keep relations with Russia at all projected future costs, tangible or intangible. Combining these two factors, what had started as a foreign policy choice after the interwar years, seems to become a necessity for Turkish policymakers to pursue in the present and the future. In the next section, the current Turkish balancing act amid the last chapter of the Russo-Ukrainian war will be analyzed in light of the above-mentioned factors.

#### **Turkey’s Current “Balancing Act”: Staying Non-Aligned in an Overtly Polarized Region**

Whether what the world has been facing would turn into a new cold war or not, mass polarization is here to stay. In an era where the synchronization among East and West has been disappearing daily, the ability to make decisions with prudence is troublesome, primarily for middle powers like Turkey. Turkey’s balancing act, in fact, is getting more complex than ever in the unstable Black Sea. On one side, the US and other NATO allies expect Turkey to take rigorous action to shake up regional dynamics and diminish Russia’s sphere of influence even more. On the other, amid war and increasing inflation and energy prices, the asymmetric interdependence has not been helping Turkey’s hands to turf out the Russian influence. Syria can be a textbook case for this dilemma. Even though Turkey’s insistence on the regime change to topple the al-Assad regime was an enduring tenet of the foreign agenda before the war (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016, pp.81-82), the outbreak and Russia’s persistence at the expense of capital flows have brought Erdoğan to soften his tone against the Syrian regime and even, calls for bilateral talks (Euronews, 2023). Both security dilemmas and economic uncertainties have put Erdoğan’s Turkey between “a rock and a hard place” where decision-making could become a grueling exercise, but at the same time, necessary.

Different conceptual frameworks could understand the present “balancing act” in the Black Sea geopolitics. Köstem (2022, p.1661) names the relations as a “managed regional rivalry,” meaning a learning process among actors about their demands and interests. As a result of decades-long rapprochement, mutual respect on national security issues and the needs of economies are well-known and communicated in Turkish and Russian chambers (Köstem, 2022, p.1661). Similarly, Dalay’s (2022, p.2) paper raises the concept of “geopolitical balancing” in Turkish foreign policy toward Russia, including strategic cooperation and military procurement along with thriving anti-Western rhetoric on both sides’ leadership. Dalay (2022, p.2), additively to economic and security sentiments, founds Turkish rhetorical discontent with the West as a remarkable factor that explains the “geopolitical balancing” in increasing multipolar and less Western global politics. All these factors combined have pushed Turkey to strike the equilibrium through a self-assumed “mediatory” role in Russian-Ukrainian War. It also serves the deteriorated image of President Erdoğan as a reconciliatory figure rather than a hawkish one seeking more escalation (Dalay, 2022, p.3), making diplomacy the critical instrument in which Turkey strives to protect its fragile economy and security. Even before the breakout, Turkey had offered a negotiation process to the sides, yet it did not affect the eventual outcome (Altunışık, 2022).



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Soon after the first glimpses of Russian aggression, Turkey claimed the military intervention as illegitimate and a clear violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Altunışık, 2022) but was adamant about pulling itself from the imposition of economic sanctions, which could have brought grave dangers to the inflation-stricken economy. Despite the outcry of the Western allies, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu clearly underlined Turkey’s neutral position and potential introduction of unilateral measures only if it seems necessary (Alim, 2022, p.471). In support of his Minister’s declaration, Erdoğan commentated on the situation as “nothing can be done” by implying that the decision is imperative, based solely on Turkey’s economic needs, and quoted, “We must maintain our sensitivity on this issue. Firstly, I cannot leave my people in the cold of the winter. I cannot halt our industry. We must defend these. We are buying nearly half of the natural gas we use from Russia. We cannot set these aside” (Al Arabiya News, 2022). Nevertheless, keeping a balance is a two-way street, and Turkey had more incentives in its pocket for Ukraine too.

Just as much as Russia, Turkey sees Ukraine’s existence and power as crucial for maintaining the post-Cold War regional stability in the Black Sea (Alim, 2022, p.471). Turkey and Ukraine have been engaged in a strategic partnership since the latter’s independence, and war has not changed the course of imminence. So far, the parties signed a free trade agreement in February 2022, but the primary “piece de resistance” has undoubtedly been the developments in defense cooperation. Ukraine had purchased unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from a Turkish private firm called Baykar before the outbreak, and these drones turned out to be a game changer in the course of the war due to their superiority against the Russian-made defense systems (Köstem, 2022, p.1667). Making Turkey a counterbalance to Russian military expansionism and modernization, the UAV named Bayraktar TB-2 has become a talking point in international media, remarking its skills of disturbing the Russian anti-aircraft artillery systems (Köstem, 2002, p.1667). Up until the war, Ukraine had bought nearly 20 armed drones, and in later June 2022, the number reached 50 UAVs (Al Jazeera, 2022a). This success story of Turkish military technology and modernization has created jubilant voices in the public and private spheres. Erdoğan cheered the surging international demands for old and newer models of drones, whereas Baykar company executives repeatedly showed their appreciation and pride for their technology’s role in Ukrainian resistance against Russia (Al Jazeera, 2022a). Existing Ukrainian-Turkish defense partnerships are not limited to drones; in 2017, the Ukrainian army made a deal with a Turkish state-owned defense corporation, ASELSAN, regarding the export of military radios and their local production in Kyiv (Köstem, 2002, p.1667). As expected, Russia found drone diplomacy in the Black Sea as a signal of hostility to alter military balances in the region and NATO’s way to infiltrate the region by delivering arms to Ukraine (Washington Post, 2022). At times, Russia made this discomfort very clear to Turkey, complaints have been made at the bureaucratic level during meetings with the foreign media (Reuters, 2022b). Turkey’s tone has been far less than soothing but more on the fact that the purchase was directed to a private company and had been done before the war (Reuters, 2022a), ruling out a contentious misunderstanding of “military aid.” It is unclear what the future holds for Russia’s view on this particular issue, but the company, Baykar, has ruled out a potential sale of the Bayraktar drone to Moscow, and neither Russia has made an attempt to purchase one.

While supporting Ukraine with military technology, Turkey has also clarified its mediatory role by refraining from widespread sanctions, keeping economic interaction alive, and opening communication channels with Moscow. One of the results of enduring economic ties was adoption of Russia’s payment system, MIR, by five Turkish banks. In August 2022, President Erdoğan fervently advertised the decision as a “very serious development,” which led Russians in Turkey to pay for their purchases easily (Business

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Insider, 2022). The motivation behind the decree was two-fold, according to Galip Dalay (2022): it led Russian tourists to make payments and Turkey to find alternative payment systems to expand economic links with Russia in order to fill the created void in the Russian market owing to the departure of Western companies. On a different note, Moscow has allegedly been using MIR in Turkey to circle around the exclusion from international credit cards, which are a part of the western sanction package, so Turkey's role has been instrumental in Moscow's aspirations (VOA, 2022). The capital flows issue had been the other catalyst. Turkey has long been short of foreign exchange, and after repeated currency shocks, Erdoğan has become more dependent on Russia for wiring money to save elections (VOA, 2022). To pull Erdoğan from economic hardships, Russia agreed to take partial gas payments in rubles and spilled billions of dollars as part payment for the nuclear power plant project (Al-Monitor, 2022). Needless to say, the war has made Russia more dependent on Turkey too. Turkey's position has been safeguarding Russia from more Western pressure in the Black Sea but also providing the much-needed area for free economic activity, human mobility, and the last standing stronghold for reaching or communicating with the West. Recently on the MIR saga, Turkey's dependency on the Western markets has exceeded its dependency on Russia. After severe unprecedented pressure from the US Treasury and the EU officials, Turkish banks decided to withdraw from the MIR payment system, leaving Russia with greater isolation and a financial blow (VOA, 2022).

Although the MIR saga has ended with dire consequences for Turkey and Russia, parties have been persistent in giving a lifeline to each other's tightened economies. As it had been in different episodes of history, natural gas is still a safeguard option for new economic partnerships. Turkey wants to keep the lid on rising gas prices; on the other hand, Russia seeks to fill the gap created by Western withdrawal by squeezing the existing good customers. Developments of the last year have validated this argument in different cases. The first case was Turkey's search to delay some of its natural gas payments to Russia. In October 2022, Botaş, a state-owned energy importer, officially asked Putin to postpone the amount until 2024 (Middle East Monitor, 2022). Before the proposal, Russia had already agreed to a 25 percent payment in rubles, but the ultimate decision for this assumed delay is yet to come. Would Russia throw another hand into Turkey's currency crisis? This will probably remain a question mark for some time.

The second case came forward out of an interesting Russian proposal. The repeated sanctions and problems in the Nord Stream 2 pipelines have led Russia to search for alternative routes to supply natural gas to enduring European allies. Especially the newly elected governments in Bulgaria and Italy, along with long-lasting allies like Serbia and Hungary, could still be in demand for Russian supply (TRT World, 2022). Moscow thinks that Turkey, as an intermediary, could be the perfect place to reach the markets, specifically in Southeast Europe, and make the sanctions issue less problematic. (TRT World, 2022). In Putin's own words: “If Türkiye and our possible buyers in other countries are interested, we could consider building another gas pipeline system and creating a gas hub in Türkiye for sales to third countries, especially, of course, the European ones, if they are interested in this, of course.” (TRT World, 2022). Unsurprisingly, Ankara's response to the idea was overwhelmingly positive. Erdoğan asked his officials to study the proposal (Al Jazeera, 2022b) technically. Turkish expectations have been evident and understandable amid an economic crisis; being a gas hub could create new jobs, a source of income, and another leverage against the EU (TRT World, 2022), just like the migration crisis. Although all seems well for both administrations, creating a gas hub from scratch is not an easy matter to establish. Experts claim that Turkey's prospect of being a gas hub in the medium term is unachievable (Tastan, 2022). It is impossible to become a gas hub by only receiving a single source of gas but by taking multiple sources of supply from various directions intersecting in the same geography (TRT World, 2022).

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Another lurking question is the position of the EU. Given the facts of deteriorating Turkey-EU relations and the EU’s foremost long-term policy to reduce Russian dependency to achieve the goal of a green transition (Tastan, 2022), why would the EU member or candidate states give the green light to such a Turkish intermediary measure?

Turkey’s “balancing act” in Russian-Ukrainian War and its conciliatory position also helps Erdoğan to build the country’s image as a soft power. Despite looming criticisms regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms at home, mediation efforts abroad assist Turkey in securing national interests and patching up the external imagery of the government. Similar to the gas partnership, two cases have already been evident for Turkey’s image-building exercise as a part of its “balancing act.” One would be the efforts to open a food corridor in the Black Sea, and the second is Erdoğan’s self-assessed role of chief mediator in ongoing peace talks. Identified as a “major success” (Güney, 2022) by experts close to the government, Turkey’s role in exporting grain out of war-torn Ukraine’s ports could be seen as remarkable. Ukraine and Russia are the world’s largest grain exporters; the parties account for 40% of worldwide grain exports (Lin et al., 2023). Depending on the expected continuation of the war, it could create more disruptions in the agricultural production of grain and its global trade due to the mass displacement of civilians and damage to infrastructure (Lin et al., 2023). As a result of the blockades on exports, not only the prices of wheat and barley but also the fertilizer prices have gone upwards (Anadolu Agency, 2022b), leaving primarily the vulnerable global South to potential famines and hunger. Aiming to end abysmal projections, Turkey, in company with the assistance of the UN, has brokered a deal with the sides of the war by using skillful diplomatic measures. The “food corridor” has constituted a relatively safe passage for taking grain out of Ukrainian ports. Although Russians were quite hesitant at the beginning of negotiations, Güney (2022) admits that the importance of Turkey’s balancing act (Ankara’s tendency towards sanctions, Turkey’s ability in limiting the passage of ships through the Black Sea) has convinced Russians to agree on the promises of the deal reluctantly. Ultimately, the sincere appreciation of the UN Secretary-General Guterres was an essential boost for Erdoğan’s endeavor to shape his government’s image at home and abroad. However, the “food corridor” sustainability has been less than stable since Russia recently withdrew from it, citing security issues (Politico, 2022a). Even though another traffic of diplomacy has made Russia return to the initial agreement, fragility and distrust endure.

The second part of the soft power imagery is Erdoğan’s self-assessed role of chief peace negotiator. The Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu suggests this curious position is nothing more than a result of the country’s geography, where compromise on peace is seemingly unthinkable during a period of economic weakness (The Guardian, 2022). Besides its inevitability, it could be said that mediation practices and efforts can give Turkey a more explicit presence in and out of the region, including abilities to repair its reputation and extend its influence (Kusa, 2022). To date, Erdoğan has managed to host two Russia-Ukraine bilateral talks in Turkey (Euronews, 2022). One of those meetings was arranged indirectly as a part of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on 10 March 2022, whereas the second was held in Istanbul (Altunışık, 2022). Throughout this period, Turkey did not hesitate to send humanitarian aid to Ukraine (Altunışık, 2022). Albeit these two meetings, the horrific images of the Bucha massacre on 29 March 2022 led the Ukrainian team to leave the table without specific terms of peace settlement (Euronews, 2022). The only gain that Turkey can drive out from the short period of negotiation would be the successful coordination of prisoner exchange between the US and Russia (Euronews, 2022). Whether Turkey will continue to pursue another round of talks soon is yet to see.

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## **What Does the Future Hold? The Following Steps of the “Balancing Act” and Its Permanency**

The last section of the chapter will try to settle some projections about the stability of Turkey’s “balancing act” in the Black Sea amid the Russia-Ukraine War. Until now, Erdoğan has not changed his position of simultaneously condemning the invasion and criticizing the Western escalation efforts. It is a fact that Turkey was one of the leading nations to step forward and disclaim Russian hostility, but it was also the same leader who made this infamous speech about NATO while elucidating on the causes of war: “the outbreak of the conflict is due to years of expansionism that did not respect the agreements after the fall of the Berlin Wall” (Euronews, 2022). Therefore, to make a healthy projection, this chapter aims to decipher the future of Turkey’s geopolitical dance in the Black Sea by offering three analysis steps: relations with the West, Ukraine, and Russia.

For the US and Western organizations, such as the EU, the question that bears an immediate answer should be, “Is Turkey still a faithful ally?”. Indeed, Turkey has already prioritized the national economy and security over the status of being a committed ally to the West (Kara, 2022, p.16). Kara (2022, p.16) believes that US-Turkey relations were ruptured long before the start of the war mainly because of the infamous S-400 purchase from Russia and the decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program. Plus, the sides have drawn apart on handling Syria, where the US continues to support YPG, and Turkey officially considers the organization as the extension of Kurdish terrorism at home. It can be said that the war has only made the Western side much more impatient with the acts of the Turkish government. Alarm bells have been ringing all over the chambers of the EU and the US Congress owing to enlarging economic cooperation in the Turkey-Russia axis. The most frequent discussion point has been economic sanctions and trade circumvention. The EU and the US have mentioned their apparent fears over the reputational risks of Turkey’s insistence on not joining the sanctions policy. Risks include Turkey being an export base to resupply Russia, resold of sanctioned goods to Russia over Turkey, the threat of Turkey becoming a haven for sanctioned oligarchs, and increasing trade in rubles (Politico, 2022b). Distressed about the next steps, US Treasury warned Turkish banks and companies concerning potential trade circumvention and the possibility of secondary sanctions (Euractiv, 2022). The EU raised the same worry during a Joseph Borell speech, where he openly urged Turkey to join sanctions (Anadolu Agency, 2022a).

Nonetheless, the tipping point for the West has been the recent political rumbling on the acceptance of Sweden and Finland to NATO. Amid Russian fears of NATO expansion in Northern Europe, Western allies have agreed to back the swift membership of two Nordic countries for contributing more to the Ukrainian cause. Turkey has stayed as the only exception to a robust Western stance on NATO expansionism. Pulling an ultimate trump card (Tuncer, 2022), Turkey has been using its veto power as leverage over the West for the sake of national interest, namely, to reduce the US support for YPG in Syria (Politics Today, 2023), accelerate the crackdown of terrorist groups in Sweden and Finland, and finally to lure the US for a sale of F-16 fighter jets (BNN Bloomberg, 2023). Ultimately, it all comes down to identifying “who has the most leverage towards the other?”. The debate is far from over, but when it comes to Turkey’s leverage over the West, it is undeniable that the war has placed Turkey in the spotlight (Crocker, 2022, p.189). For Turkey, saving the “balancing act” is only achievable by satisfying the necessities of security and economic concerns. Thus, it should be expected that Turkey will continue to use its geopolitical importance to silence the Western uproar. What would be the Western response then? Suppose the war escalates even more, and Turkey’s position gets even more unmanageable. In that case, the EU has some political leverage over Turkey, including visa restrictions and imposing more

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obstacles to the modernization of the Customs Union (Politico, 2022b). But the stakes are seemingly very high. Turkey has already been using migrants as a bargaining chip, and reports claim a continuous push of migrants to the Greek waters (Politico, 2022b). To break the “balancing act,” the EU needs either more sticks or maybe some carrots. On the US side, altering Turkish policymaking can also be costly. The US may attract Turkey to its side through a possible modernization of the Turkish F-16 fleet or could even cut some ties with the YPG in Syria. Some negative reinforcements are also available, such as recommending Western companies draw out their investment from Turkey or imposing secondary sanctions (Politico, 2022b). Since Turkey has long been unhappy with its relationship with Washington (Cook, 2023) and the geostrategic significance of the country for NATO missions has not changed (Kara, 2022, p.16), the US’ space for political maneuver is also limited. The US might let Turkey be a NATO ally without considering it an unreliable partner (Cook, 2023), especially when shaping NATO’s future military activities (Kara, 2022, p.16).

All this hustle on Turkey vs. West front has also had gripping effects on the Ukraine side of the war. Turkey’s persistence in quarreling with the West, at a time when Ukraine needs the pressure on Russia most, has deteriorated the image of Turkey in Kyiv. The aspect of being a “strategic ally” has not changed the fact that it is disappointing for Ukraine to see Turkey as anti-sanction and against NATO’s expansion (Kusa, 2022). As Kusa (2022) informs, the anger toward Ankara has been noticeable in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, which summoned the Turkish ambassador twice last year for protest. At the same time, displaced Ukrainians have been seeking refuge in Turkey and have reached the extent of forming a diaspora (Deniz & Özgür, 2022). The Ukrainian government has a solid relationship with its abroad communities, and an organized diaspora in Turkey could play a definitive role in future relations (Deniz & Özgür, 2022). The same goes for the Turkic communities living in the annexed parts of Ukraine. It is still essential for Turkey to protect the Crimean Tatars’ well-being during the war (Kusa, 2022). To sum up, by combining the existing military partnerships with the deteriorating image of Turkey and the protection of diasporas reciprocally, one could only presume a more functional relationship between Turkey and Ukraine. Ukraine has already stopped looking at Turkey as a part of its partnership with the West and coordinated itself to a more ad hoc and pragmatic bilateral dynamic (Kusa, 2022).

Finally, what about the other side of the balance? Economically speaking, Russia is one country that Turkey must recognize at a time of rising inflation and the cost of living at home. Accordingly, that dependency has been growing since the start of the war. In 2022, more than 500 companies opened in Turkey, which is more than double compared of the year before (Euractiv, 2022). Mutually beneficial trading is still the key to two strongmen leaders. Putin enjoys Turkey’s position as the protector of the straits, along with lucrative energy and arms sales (The New York Times, 2022). During the war, when mediation is needed, Putin must have a direct, frictionless connection with a NATO member and an EU candidate. Erdoğan, on the other hand, clearly has been benefiting from flowing cash, tourist numbers, and cheap energy to finance his upcoming election campaign (The New York Times, 2022). As a final verdict, it could be said that mutually beneficial operations on defense, finance, and energy would sustain if interdependency stayed at the same level (Pierini, 2022). One key dynamic here, though, is the upcoming Turkish elections in the early summer of 2023. Turkish-Russian interdependency, as mentioned above, has been profoundly asymmetric, favoring Russia mostly. Giving so much leverage to an authoritarian and expansionist figure like Putin could create problematic consequences for Turkey and any Black Sea nation. Erdoğan has sustained this relatively so far thanks to good personal relations and similarities to his Russian counterpart (RT, 2023). However, a possible opposition victory in the election could shake up the Russo-Turkish relationship on the way to a more symmetric interdependence, lesser

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Russian influence, and better Euro-Atlantic connections. This could even pave the opportunity for more NATO presence in the Black Sea.

## **CONCLUSION**

Since the outbreak of the war, Turkey’s balancing act has become a matter of serious discussion regarding its timing and maintainability. Whether it seems unprecedented or unorthodox to many in the West, it was nothing new to those who have certain historical knowledge about the Black Sea. Sometimes as a choice but mainly as a geopolitical necessity, Turkish foreign policy has pursued a balanced, mediatory approach ever since the formation of the modern republic. Therefore, this chapter was designed to understand this foreign policy tenet by examining its historical development and dynamics. Firstly, a thorough historical background has been offered along with identifying two distinct variables, security and economy, which shaped Turkey’s actions in the Black Sea region throughout history. The second section explained how these two dynamics played out in the current Russian-Ukrainian war. Motivated mainly by economic dependency on Russia and the aims of national security, Turkey has so far consolidated a much soft power role, a role that dictates Turkey act as an arbitrator rather than an assailant. Last but not least, the final section tried to analyze the future of Turkish foreign policy action in the Black Sea amid the war. Although Turkey has so far been able to sustain its aims in the region, deteriorating relations with the Western/Ukrainian axis and transmitting too much dependency on Putin’s regime could cause troubles for the famous “balancing act” soon.

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## Chapter 10

# The Regional Geopolitics and Reaction of EU and OSCE Towards Russia: Ukraine Conflict – Preventive Measures to Avoid a Major Armed Conflict

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Numerous organizations have battled for global peace and stability since the end of World War II. The difficult situation in Ukraine turned into an armed conflict in February 2022 when Russia launched a military offensive, despite efforts by organizations and world leaders to prevent it. This essay will look at the conflict prevention efforts made by the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) concerning the war in Ukraine. The notion behind conflict prevention measures is supported by a study done by the Carnegie organization. The analysis findings show that both companies employ strategies from Carnegie's conflict-prevention theory. None of the organizations use all seven metrics from the theory, resulting in two different centers of gravity for the measurements. Conclusions can be taken from the various organizational types and their capacity to employ various tactics.*

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### **INTRODUCTION**

The belief in eternal peace and the improbable armed attack against countries has characterized the defense policy in recent decades and the public's view of the world situation (Mantzikos, 2014). Countries and their surrounding area around the Baltic Sea have been spared precisely against armed attacks. The fact that there have been no armed attacks or even stated threats has partly enabled disarmament of the defense capability but also led to a worsening crisis awareness among citizens (Henderson, 2022). At the same time that the world situation is constantly changing and not always in the right direction, there were probably few who thought that in 2022 we would experience a large-scale war in the immediate area. Russia's military offensive against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has been developed and built up for a long time; in 2014, they annexed the Crimean Peninsula. In between, the situation has been tense and gradually continued to escalate over time (Green et al., 2022).

International communities and the outside world have stood back, afraid of possibly escalating the conflict, and witnessed how the conflict went from a threat to a full-blown armed war. Avoiding large-scale and armed conflicts, like the one we are now seeing in Ukraine, has engaged several organizations since the Second World War (Götz, 2016). Both nationally and internationally, today's security policy development and the deteriorating security policy situation make the topic even more relevant today than ever. Where international organizations play an important role as political tools (Davis, 2011). The research problem underlying the investigation is that despite the work of international organizations on conflict prevention measures, the conflict in Ukraine has continued to escalate. The investigation, therefore, intends to examine which conflict prevention measures the two organizations, the European Union, EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE, used in the conflict in Ukraine (Remler, 2021). The theory of conflict prevention measures used in the study is based on the organization Carnegie's writing on conflict prevention measures to avoid deadly conflicts. The investigation intends to examine the conflict prevention measures following the theoretical framework developed by Carnegie and is limited to only touching on this particular theory of conflict prevention measures (Dubský & Havlová, 2019). The concept of conflict prevention measures is broad, and the definition of the concept is also done concerning the theoretical framework. Demarcations are also linked to the organizations, where only the EU and OSCE are examined. The case for the investigation, the Ukraine conflict, is ongoing at the time the investigation is conducted. This means that a limitation in time must also be made, where actions from and including the year 2014 up to and including March 2022 are used (Dubský & Havlová, 2019).

### **PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS**

The purpose of the study is to use a comparative study to investigate which conflict prevention measures the EU and OSCE have used in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The conflict prevention measures are studied based on Carnegie's theory of conflict prevention measures to avoid large-scale armed conflicts. The following question is used to achieve the aim: *What conflict prevention measures did the EU and the OSCE use to prevent an escalating armed conflict in Ukraine?*

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### **THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS**

Conflict prevention measures are a broad concept that deals with various diplomatic measures, activities, strategies, and actions. The idea of conflict prevention, specifically preventive diplomacy, was founded by Dag Hammarskjöld in the 1950s when he was Secretary General of the United Nations (Yan & Guo, 2020). In a difficult time with great contradictions between the great powers, Hammarskjöld understood the limited opportunities to influence the great powers in particular. Instead, he focused on preventing local conflicts and that these would spread further. This, in turn, could avoid further escalating the ongoing conflict between the great powers (Yan & Guo, 2020). At the end of the Cold War, Boutros Boutros-Ghali took over as UN Secretary-General and redefined the term to fit the new world situation. In Boutros-Ghali's report, *An Agenda for Peace*, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping actions are described (Jakobsen, 1996). Boutros-Ghali's preventive diplomacy builds on a focus on looking for early signs of conflict and eliminating sources of danger before violence erupts. But also, in the broadest sense, find the underlying causes of conflicts (Jakobsen, 1996). Väyrynen also describes how conflicts can be handled through instrumental actions, but like Boutros-Ghali, that violent conflicts can only be eliminated by identifying the underlying causes of the conflict (Väyrynen, 1991, p. 23).

He further describes that conflict prevention measures are an important political issue as they save human lives, prevent internal disorder within the state, and restore stability in their external relations (Väyrynen, 1991, p. 1). According to Ackermann, however, there is confusion around the definition of conflict prevention measures linked to two main issues; should conflict prevention measures be limited to the early and non-escalating stage of a conflict or include the escalation and post-war period of a conflict? Should conflict prevention measures only address the immediate causes or only the underlying causes, or include both (Ackermann, 2003, p. 341)? The division between the focus on immediate measures and the underlying causes is sometimes referred to as direct/operational or structural prevention. Which is a breakdown of conflict prevention measures that Ackermann believes has been widely accepted (Ackermann, 2003, p. 341). It is also a division that the government uses in this context. Björkdahl also describes where she also believes that the existing conflict prevention measures are an ideological strategy that is difficult to practice in reality. She believes that clearer and more concrete measures are required that are flexible enough to fit different contexts but at the same time specific enough to be operationalized (Björkdahl, 2000, p. 17). She describes preventive actions that the international community can undertake by avoiding the outbreak of war, avoiding escalation, and finally preventing recurrence (Björkdahl, 2000, p. 20-21).

Carnegie also describes in his report preventive actions to avoid deadly conflicts at an early stage (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 9). A commission wrote Carnegie's report of 16 international leaders and researchers. The preventive measures described are aimed at world leaders, international organizations, and states and are divided according to the accepted division, operational, and structural preventive measures, like SKR and Ackermann. The preventive measures are based on long-term perspectives, expectations, and actions, where the commission uses its experience and knowledge to distinguish factors that increase the likelihood of mass violence. They further argue that it is not impossible to prevent deadly conflicts, but the problem is that we choose not to act rather than not knowing how to act (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 17). The theoretical background from Carnegie's report will be the basis for examining the conflict prevention measures to prevent an armed conflict in Ukraine, which are described in more detail in the section below.

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### **Conflict Prevention Measures**

Carnegie divides the instruments for conflict prevention into two main categories, structural and operational methods. Structural conflict prevention includes long-term strategies to deal with the very root cause of the conflict and to avoid conflicts even arising in the first place (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 69). Operational conflict prevention includes measures and strategies when there is an imminent threat of violent conflict (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 39). A mix of structural and operational conflict prevention measures is required to avoid an armed conflict, which means that both categories will be examined. Since the Ukraine conflict in recent years has developed and escalated into the use of violence, already during the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, but especially during the escalation to the invasion in February 2022, this should mean that we will probably see measures from the organizations within both operational and structural conflict prevention.

### **Structural Conflict Prevention**

Structural conflict prevention includes establishing international legal systems, cooperative arrangements to meet basic human economic, social, and cultural needs, and rebuilding societies torn apart by war. Carnegie believes that no matter how a society chooses, there are three core needs for an increased standard of living: security, social and economic, and political-institutional needs. Meeting these three core needs enables a better standard of living and minimizes the risk of a potentially deadly conflict arising from the outset (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 28). In terms of security, Carnegie believes that there are three main causes of insecurity in today's society: the threat of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, the possibility of confrontation by conventional military forces, and finally, violence in the form of terrorism, organized crime, insurgents, and oppressed regimes. Here, the possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons should be controlled and monitored. Finally, strive to reduce these holdings (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 29). Stability in intra-state security requires enforcing fair laws, a visible, active, and honest police force, an independent and impartial judiciary, and a functioning and fair penal system (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 31). International organizations and outsiders can contribute to increased security by promoting norms and practices to governments, thereby reducing and possibly eliminating military threats and tensions between and within states. Furthermore, it is also important to carefully weigh external parties' actions to avoid aggravating conflicts through a third-party intervention that is unwanted and unwarranted (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 31).

In the social and economic aspect, it is about meeting elementary economic and humanitarian needs. Here it is not only about access to clean water, food, heat, and electricity but also the possibility of health-care, education, and a job (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 33). The international community can support by promoting trade partnerships and co-operation projects, and the World Bank and other international financial institutions can create bilateral and multilateral co-operation agreements and trade promotion efforts. It can also be about promoting co-operation between the two counterparties in the conflict to avoid an escalation—a fundamental factor within the political-institutional instrument in compliance with and understanding the rule of law. A sound legal system ensures the protection of basic human rights, social adjustment for different groups, and equal economic opportunities. But perhaps the greatest fundamental political right, the right to choose who governs the country through democratic elections, ensures the rights of citizens to improve and change their circumstances (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 34). Here, international organizations can support democratically developing programs, support for

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conducting democratic elections, and grants that create conditions for forming political parties and organizations. In the aftermath of war, international tribunals play an important role in accountability and deterrence because it is a legitimate forum in which individuals rather than states are held accountable for their transgressions (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 34).

### **Operational Conflict Prevention**

Operational conflict prevention deals with measures and instruments when the risk of an armed conflict is already imminent. The responsibility for operational prevention often tends to fall on those who are closest to the potential conflict. Because these parties are in a crisis, they often see no solution to the conflict other than resorting to violence. This means that outside help is necessary for many instances. However, it is also important that these external measures do not risk escalating the conflict further (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 19). Operational prevention relies on early engagement to foster conditions where leaders can resolve emerging conflicts instead. Carnegie divides the measures to avoid imminent conflicts into four broad categories: early warning and action, preventive diplomacy, economic measures such as sanctions and incentives, and finally, coercion, the threat of force, and the use of force. These four categories also form the division that the survey is based on. The classification is used to clarify the actors' different roles and actions in the various conflict prevention measures.

In the area of early warnings and early action, the ability to anticipate and analyze possible conflicts early is a prerequisite. Indications of emerging violence include abusing human rights, building military and weapons assets, and increased political hatred (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 21). A systematic and practical system for early warnings should be combined with constantly updated contingency plans for preventive measures. States, international organizations, and the media all have different ways of implementing early warnings. Non-governmental organizations have a particularly important role, as they tend to be the first to know about and act in crisis areas (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 22). For example, unarmed observers can monitor compliance with peace agreements, control arms flows, report on troop movements, and contribute to the observance of human rights. Through preventive diplomacy, the parties are pressured, mediated, and encouraged to dialogue to reach a non-violent solution to the conflict. The parties are urged to maintain open communication and completely resist the traditional solution of closing diplomatic channels. It is also important that the crisis be taken up on the UN Security Council's agenda (Ibid, xxiii). Preventive diplomacy includes several instruments, such as negotiations, peace conferences, public condemnations, travel restrictions, political statements, and the suspension of co-operation agreements. Within economic measures, there are various measures and instruments for states and international organizations, such as targeted economic and financial sanctions and incentives. They are freezing power holders' assets abroad and interrupting negotiations on trade agreements. Sanctions serve three broad policy functions: to signal international concern to the offending state, punish a state's behavior, and act as a proxy for more drastic measures, such as using force (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 24).

If diplomatic efforts prove insufficient, more forceful measures such as threats or the use of force are ultimately needed. Although it may seem contradictory to use violence when the whole purpose is to avoid violence and deadly conflicts. But as the situation continues to develop, despite the diplomatic efforts and economic measures, it may be the only way to stop even greater destruction of life and property (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 25). Initially, the threat of the use of force and the use of force must be globally accepted under the UN Charter and carefully calculated and planned. Second, the threat

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or use of force should not be seen as a last resort in desperate circumstances. Finally, states, especially great powers, should accept that the threat or use of force must be integrated, usually in a multilateral strategy, but also used in conjunction with political and economic instruments. One way to meet these requirements is to only deploy peacekeeping forces through UN Security Council mandates (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. 26). Each conflict is unique, so each will involve using different conflict prevention measures. Carnegie believes that using structural and operational measures is beneficial, but there may be a particular emphasis on different instruments for different conflicts. This is because individual instruments can be more powerful than others for the specific conflict; thus, more scope is given to conflict prevention.

## **METHODOLOGY**

A qualitative research method is intended to analyze the conflict prevention measures used by the EU and the OSCE in the Ukraine conflict. The qualitative method focuses on research questions that answer what, which and how rather than finding quantifiable answers and answering why (Pathak et al., 2013). Thus, the qualitative method allows one to interpret and understand the problem more deeply. In this case, it is beneficial to understand what conflict prevention measures were used and how they differ in an individual case. The study is conducted as a comparative one-case study, comparing the actions and actions of the organizations in the case of Ukraine. The research is theory-consuming and is carried out with an individual case in focus, where existing conflict management theories try to explain what has happened in this particular case. The survey, therefore, does not intend to be able to comment in general on conflict management, but a deeper understanding of the individual case is prioritized over generalizability (Pathak et al., 2013).

## **ANALYSIS AND REPORTING OF RESULTS**

The organizations' actions and measures in each area are reported below. Worth noting is that the actions after February 24, 2022, are after Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. The analyses are also not carried out in chronological order but follow the structure of the theoretical framework. Therefore, certain events, meetings, and actions may recur under different headings. Some action packages also contain several different commitments that can span different areas and actions within the framework of the theory. To avoid repetition, the measure is described in detail under each measure and then briefly mentioned if they are also part of other measure packages.

### **European Union (EU)**

#### **Structural Conflict Prevention Security**

On July 29, 2014, The EU introduced an arms trade embargo and an export ban on dual-use items for military end users. A limitation of Russian access to sensitive technology, especially in the oil sector, is also introduced. The EU describes the measures as a powerful signal to Russian leaders, partly after the downing of Malaysian Airline MH17, but also as a response to the continued worsening of devel-



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opments in Ukraine (European Commission, 2014c). The day after the outbreak of war, February 25, 2022, sanctions against the technology sector are included in one of the EU's sanctions packages against Russia. Here, additional restrictions are imposed on the export of dual-use goods and technology, as well as on goods and technology that can enhance the country's defense and security sector, such as semiconductors and cutting-edge technologies (European Commission, 2022h). In December 2014, the EU's Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) was established, and international advisers arrived in Ukraine in connection with this.

After the protests in Ukraine, also called the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, mistrust between the population, the state, and the judiciary deepened. The Ukrainian state asked the EU to support reforming the judiciary to rebuild public trust. EUAM's overall goal is to help Ukraine develop sustainable and effective security services to strengthen confidence in the country's civilian security services. EUAM is an unarmed mission. These limitations and restrictions on goods and technologies, directly linked to the defense industry, security, and technology sectors, can be seen as attempts to limit Russia's ability to continue military rearmament. EUAM and its work in Ukraine can be seen as an attempt by the EU to promote intra-state security. Where work around a fair and honest police force and a transparent judiciary is sought.

### **Social and Economic**

As mentioned, Ukraine is not an EU member state, but since 2017 has had strong co-operation with the EU through an association agreement. The Association Agreement fosters deeper political ties, stronger economic links, and respect for similar values. The agreement also increases the impetus for co-operation in foreign and security policy, justice, freedom and security, science, technology, and education. The Association Agreement's main purpose is to bring Ukraine and the EU closer. The economic part of the agreement involves the modernization of Ukraine's trade relations and economic development by opening up markets and harmonizing laws, standards and regulations. To adapt key sectors to the EU standard (European Commission, 2017). As a result of the tense geopolitical situation in 2022, the EU has also provided a loan of 1.2 million euros to increase Ukraine's economic and financial stability (Reuters, 2022a). Ukraine has also received financial aid due to the corona pandemic, where Ukraine alone was allocated 190 million euros. Thus, the association agreement is important in strengthening and developing Ukraine's economic and social sectors. Where the co-operation agreement promotes a more democratic Ukraine in many ways. But the EU also contributes financially to strengthen Ukraine's economic opportunities and increase stability.

### **Political-Institutional**

No information has been found that the EU would have organized an international presence of peace-promoting organizations or observers. However, since early 2014 they have been in contact with the OSCE and have been positive about their work (Reuters, 2022b).

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### **Operational Conflict Prevention**

#### **Early Warnings and Early Action**

Since 2014, the EU has involved itself in the conflict. Although nothing has been found that the EU as an organization itself has reported on developments in the area, they have followed developments and introduced measures in connection with specific events. Generally speaking, it can be said that the EU's measures increased sharply after the military offensive in February 2022, where several so-called sanctions packages were introduced (Reuters, 2022b). This may contradict whether this corresponds to early action since the strong measures were introduced after the armed conflict had already broken out. At the same time, they have continuously followed developments and acted accordingly.

#### **Preventive Diplomacy**

Since March 2014, the EU has continuously acted on events and the situation in Ukraine. At an extraordinary meeting on March 3, 2014, the EU announced that a peaceful solution to the crisis must be reached concerning international law. They called on Russia to immediately withdraw its troops to their regular stations. At the same time, they announced that they are prepared for a constructive dialogue between all parties and welcome a possible OSCE mission, which is described in more detail in the next section (Reuters, 2022b). Since then, several special meetings have been held, where the EU countries continue to condemn Russia's activities in Ukraine. On March 20, 2014, the European Council canceled a planned summit between the EU and Russia and further stated that EU countries would no longer hold regular bilateral summits with Russia (BBC, 2014). In June 2015, Ukrainian President Poroshenko presented his peace plan, but the EU expressed displeasure that no ceasefire had been achieved (Sparrow, 2014). On February 12, 2015, President Poroshenko presented the results of the reduction agreement to EU leaders. The EU gave the agreement cautious support until the ceasefire is fully respected and a proper de-escalation of the conflict occurs (European Commission, 2015c).

As a result of Russia's military aggression, on February 24, 2022, an extraordinary meeting of the European Council was held on the same day. There, the aggression was condemned, and full solidarity with Ukraine was expressed. Charles Michael, President of the European Council, expressed that we now see the devastating reality of a full-scale war in Europe. With Russia solely responsible, they will also have to pay a high price for their actions (European Commission, 2022d). On February 25, 2022, the EU demanded that Russia immediately cease its military commitments and unconditionally withdraw its forces.

Furthermore, the EU describes how it will continue to cooperate with its neighbors and continue the strong co-ordination with partners and allies within the UN, OSCE, NATO, and G7. The EU also describes how tensions and conflicts should be resolved exclusively through dialogue and diplomacy (European Commission, 2022h). Since 2014, the EU has continuously introduced restrictions linked to individuals and institutions. In addition to financial restrictions, detailed in the next section on financial measures, these restrictions include travel bans for individuals. This means that these individuals on the sanctions list cannot enter the territory of EU countries (European Commission, 2014c). After Russia's aggression in 2022, several additional bans and restrictions will be introduced. A ban on overflights of European airspace and access to European airports for Russian aviation was introduced on February 28, 2022 (European Commission, 2022a). On March 2, 2022, a ban was also introduced for the state-owned

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media Sputnik and Russia today to broadcast in the EU. The ban applies until the attack on Ukraine ceases and disinformation and information manipulation via these channels cease (European Commission, 2022c).

On March 15, 2022, the EU will also act against Belarus. The EU decided that Belarus' accession process to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is suspended, given their support for Russia's actions. The statement also describes Belarus as a henchman of Russia, and thus also them, like Russia, fully responsible for the war of aggression in Ukraine. The Council is also preparing for other statements with WTO members that may deal with aid to Ukraine. But also measures which mean that concessions or obligations cease concerning Russia (European Commission, 2022b). Within preventive diplomacy, the EU uses several different tools. The partly political boycott by canceling meetings and bilateral summits with Russia. Russia's actions have been publicly condemned several times, and travel restrictions for individuals have also been introduced. At the same time, the majority of extra meetings have been held within the EU. However, no major approach to establishing dialogue, mediation, and negotiation between the parties has been noted. At the same time, it is worth noting that most measures in preventive diplomacy were carried out in 2014 and 2015, and the remaining measures were imposed after the invasion in February 2022. Between the years 2015 and 2022, only most existing sanctions were extended.

### **Economic Measures**

Since 2014, the EU has introduced restrictive measures against individuals and institutions. On March 17, 2014, the first restrictive measures were imposed against 21 Russian and Ukrainian officials, who, according to the EU, are responsible for actions threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity (BBC, 2014). After Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, the EU added twelve names to the sanctions list, which means that in addition to freezing assets, travel bans are also imposed on the individuals (European Commission, 2014a). The sanctions mean, in addition to individuals not being able to enter the territory of EU countries, that their assets within the EU are frozen and that these funds may not be made available to them either.

The existing sanctions against individuals and entities are extended the same year on July 25. As of this date, the sanctions apply to 87 individuals and 20 entities (Rankin, 2022). Over the years, these restrictions have been extended regularly and continuously expanded with new individuals and entities. As of March 13, 2015, the sanctions concern 150 individuals and 37 entities (European Commission, 2015b). In 2016 and 2017, the sanctions were still continuously extended and renewed. In 2018, 14 persons and seven entities were added, and the sanctions now apply to 164 persons and 44 entities (European Commission, 2018). In 2019, the restrictions were extended again and applied to 170 people and 44 units (European Commission, 2019). As of October 2020, the sanctions apply to 177 persons and 48 entities, with the construction of a bridge with rail connections between Russia and the Crimean Peninsula being the background to adding more persons and entities to the sanctions list (European Commission, 2020). In 2021, additional persons and entities are added to the sanctions list, which now applies to 185 persons and 48 entities (European Commission, 2021). On February 21, 2022, the EU added five more individuals.

These individuals belonged to the Russian lower house and, thus, the Russian Federation and were selected to represent annexed Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (European Commission, 2022i). On February 23, 2022, Russia recognized the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent and decided to send Russian troops into these areas. This led the European Council to extend the sanctions to apply

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to the 351 members who voted in favor of this call and 27 high-profile individuals and entities. The sanctions currently apply to 555 persons and 52 entities (Mann et al., 2022). In March 2022, the EU launched a fourth sanctions package for 877 people and 62 entities. The sanctions are also extended until September 15, 2022 (European Commission, 2022e). Since February 25, 2022, the sanctions also concern President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and individuals from Belarus (European Commission, 2022h).

In addition to sanctions against individuals and entities, the EU has since June 2014 introduced an import ban on goods from the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula. Goods from the area will not be brought into the EU unless they have been granted a certificate of origin from the Ukrainian authorities (Kelly & Richard Balmforth, 2014). Sanctions directed at banks and specific sectors have also been carried out continuously since 2014. On September 11, 2014, the economic sanctions against Russia were strengthened, where, among other things, EU citizens and companies were no longer allowed to grant loans to five large Russian state-owned banks (European Commission, 2014b). These restrictions were extended on June 19, 2015, and they were also extended to include a ban on investing in the Crimea region and Sevastopol. Tourist services are also restricted, with European cruise ships not allowed to use the ports in the Crimea and Sevastopol areas ((European Commission, 2015a).

On February 23, 2022, a ban on financing the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation will be introduced. This means limiting Russian opportunities to gain access to the capital and financial market and financial services in the EU (Mann et al., 2022). On February 25, 2022, the day after the outbreak of war, the European Council introduced additional economic sanctions targeting five different sectors of Russia: financial, energy, transport, technology, and visa. The financial sector means Russia's access to the most important capital markets is blocked. Listing and providing services linked to shares in Russian state-owned companies on EU trading venues are also prohibited. The financial flow between the EU and Russia is also limited, where a ban on deposits exceeding certain values is introduced. Sanctions are also directed at 70% of the Russian banking market, including the defense sector. In the energy sector, the sale, supply, transfer, or export to Russia of goods and technologies in oil refining is prohibited. In the transport sector, the EU is introducing an export ban on goods and technologies in the aviation and space industry. It also prohibits providing insurance, reinsurance, and maintenance services related to these goods. The technology sector restrictions have been described earlier under the security section.

Regarding visa policy, diplomats, Russian government employees, and Russian businesspeople will no longer be able to benefit from the simplified visa procedures that provide privileged access to the EU (European Commission, 2022h). On March 2, 2022, the EU excluded seven Russian banks from the international financial system SWIFT. It will also be prohibited to sell, deliver, transfer, or export euro banknotes to Russia (European Commission, 2022g). On March 9, the EU further extended its sanctions against Belarus. Three Belarusian banks' use of SWIFT is restricted. Transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus are prohibited; listing and providing services linked to state-owned enterprises are prohibited on EU trading venues. The financial inflow from the EU is severely limited. As well as banning the provision of euro banknotes to Belarus (European Commission, 2022f). Since 2014, the EU has used targeted economic and financial sanctions. Also, freezing the assets of those in power abroad applies to President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov. Until and including the Russian military offensive in February 2022, the sanctions were limited in scope, while after the invasion, they increased significantly. The sanctions were also introduced quickly after the invasion and have continuously increased and been built on as development continued in the wrong direction.

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### **Threats or Use of Force**

On February 28, 2022, the EU adopted support measures to strengthen the Ukrainian Armed Forces' ability to defend the country's territorial integrity and defend the country's civilian population. The support measures of 500 million euros will finance equipment and supplies for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The support measures include terminal equipment, the first time the EU has ever provided terminal equipment to a country outside the EU (European Commission, 2022a). The measures do not involve the introduction of armed preventive troops but the supply of weapons, military equipment, and financial support. This helps Ukraine strengthen its defense capabilities.

### **Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)**

#### **Structural Conflict Prevention (Security)**

As of 2014, the OSCE was given an important role in the Trilateral Contact Group – TCG, to ensure compliance with the reduction agreement. The TCG and the meeting are described in more depth under the Preventive Diplomacy section. The OSCE's roles and specific missions under the reduction agreement were, among other things, to facilitate and verify the withdrawal of heavy weapons systems supported by the TCG. Monitor and verify the observance of ceasefires, and withdrawals of weapons, including the use of technological equipment such as drones, satellites, and radar equipment. They were also tasked with overseeing the withdrawal of foreign armed formations, military hardware, militants, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory (OSCE, 2021, p. 28).

#### **Political-Institutional**

In March 2014, the OSCE sent 56 unarmed military personnel to Ukraine, following a Ukrainian request, when unusual military activity was seen (OSCE, 2021, p. 72). On March 21, 2014, the OSCE's observation mission (Special monitoring mission - SMM) was introduced to Ukraine. Where the first observers arrive in Ukraine within 24 hours. Initially, the observation mission was a smaller mission to observe political and security developments in Ukraine. Over time, however, the mission developed into a larger peacekeeping operation (OSCE, 2021, p. 36). In connection with the initial work on the withdrawal agreement, the OSCE began a job to take a leading international role in monitoring the ceasefire (OSCE, 2021, p. 26). On March 12, 2015, the SMM was expanded to 1,000 observers, and the mandate was extended from six months to one year. The expansion of observers and the establishment of observation hubs and patrol bases led to observers demonstrating a continuous presence in the area. This led to less shelling in so-called hotspots close to the civilian population, which also led to a more protective atmosphere for civilians (OSCE, 2021, p. 37).

SMM has also provided humanitarian assistance over the years by repairing power lines, bridges, and other infrastructure. In 2019 alone, they repaired infrastructure linked to water, electricity, gas, and communication affecting over five million people (OSCE, 2021, p. 75). After the offensive in February 2022, the OSCE further believed on March 7, 2022, that the people fleeing Ukraine must be able to guarantee safety and secure passages for escape (OSCE, 2022f). In addition, the OSCE described on March 15, 2022, how over three million people, including mainly women and children, have left Ukraine in recent weeks. Linked to this, the OSCE believes that women and children, in particular, run a greater risk of

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being exposed to trafficking. Policy recommendations were made for countries to avoid and reduce the risks of this (OSCE, 2022e). The OSCE has also observed the election process in Ukraine for several years, most recently in 2020. The aim is to assess whether the elections are aligned with democratic guidelines and international and national laws and obligations (OSCE, 2020). The OSCE's observation mission to Ukraine ended on March 31, 2022, when the mandate expired (OSCE, 2022a).

Through the observation mission's presence in the area, basic human rights could be protected, among other things, by their presence reducing the number of shelling. But they have also provided humanitarian assistance by, among other things, repairing vital infrastructure and promoting safety for people on the run. In addition to the humanitarian work, they have also monitored compliance with various agreements, not least the reduction agreement. Where they continuously and daily also reported from the area. They have also observed the democratic process in connection with monitoring the electoral processes.

#### **Operational Conflict Prevention (Early Warnings and Early Action)**

In the OSCE's monitoring mission, reporting is one of the central parts, where all reports must be impartial and contain detailed information from the observations. Since 2014, they had provided daily updates from Ukraine until March 7, 2022, when the daily reports ended. The reports are aimed at the press and the public, where the situation and developments in the area are described. They have also reported on specific details of ceasefire violations, where the exact date, time, and place, as well as what was observed, have been noted. For example, if a projectile, explosion, or muzzle flare is observed (Verjee, 2022). Over time, as observers became better at identifying military equipment, reports could also become more detailed about abnormal military activity and troop movements (OSCE, 2021, p. 44). A spot report is issued when a specific event or development of particular importance is noted. These are used to obtain important and special information about critical developments quickly. An example of when such a report was written was in connection with the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 in July 2014 (OSCE, 2021, p. 43). Since 2018, they have also issued an annual summary of trends and observations from the past year. Here they summarize ceasefire violations, how many explosions have occurred from artillery, rocket artillery vehicles, grenade launchers, and tanks, and how many civilians have been injured and killed during the past year.

But also imposed restrictions that violate the right to free movement (OSCE, 2021). They have also published various thematic reports, which aim to provide a more analytical view of specific topics to increase awareness and understanding. For example, these thematic reports have addressed landmines, their impact on the civilian population, and the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure (OSCE, 2021, p. 46). SMM and their reports showed great importance in connection with the reduction agreement. Since the OSCE was the largest international actor in eastern Ukraine, the SMM's reporting became the most important source of information regarding the situation on the ground and the implementation process of the withdrawal agreement (OSCE, 2021, p. 43). They have also reported on political events, such as Russia's withdrawal from the JCCC on December 19, 2017 (OSCE, 2021, p. 34). Reporting on developments in the area and compliance with the agreements has been one of the observation mission's biggest tasks in the conflict. Through their reports, other actors and organizations could follow developments in the area. The mission has been in the area since 2014 and has thus been able to report since then.

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**Preventive Diplomacy**

The OSCE has, in various ways, acted as a mediation body in the conflict, where they have been involved in negotiations and dialogue creations in various forms. In Geneva on April 17, 2014, the EU, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the USA met to agree on a joint statement, the so-called Geneva. The statement specified the number of different de-escalation measures and actions. The OSCE observation mission assisted Ukrainian authorities in immediately implementing these de-escalation measures (OSCE, 2021, p. 17). Early in June 2014, a new diplomatic initiative, known as the Norman format, was launched to deal with the continued tense situation in Ukraine. France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine met, and one of the key outcomes of the meeting was to establish a so-called trilateral contact group, TCG. The group consisted of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE, with the OSCE having a special representative to manage the negotiation processes (OSCE, 2021, p. 26).

Furthermore, Ukrainian President Poroshenko presented a 15-point peace plan on June 20, 2014, which later, together with the Norman format, laid the foundation for the withdrawal agreement. In the context of Poroshenko’s peace plan, the OSCE began to take a leading international role in monitoring the ceasefire (OSCE, 2021, p. 26). The Minsk agreement was expanded in 2015 and 2016 with supplementary documents to peacefully resolve the conflict in Ukraine (OSCE, 2021, p. 26–29). The JCCC, Joint Center for Control and Co-ordination, was established on September 26, 2014, by an agreement between Ukraine and Russia (OSCE, 2021, p. 34)

The bilateral initiative, the JCCC, initially consisted of 75 Russian and 75 Ukrainian officers working to reduce tension between the parties. The JCCC also had specific commitments linked to the reduction agreement, where they would, among other things, ensure that the ceasefire was followed by supporting the SMM and ensuring their security. However, the co-operation between the Ukrainian and Russian officers deteriorated continuously, and the work was finally carried out in parallel rather than jointly. On December 19, 2017, after several attempts by, among others, the SMM to improve co-operation, the Russian Federation left the co-operation (OSCE, 2021, p. 34). In connection with the Russian offensive against Ukraine in February 2022, representatives from the OSCE gathered in a meeting where they condemned Russia’s actions. They called for an immediate halt to the offensive and a return to diplomatic solutions (OSCE, 2022d).

*Table 1. Analysis results*

Category		EU	OSSE
Structural conflict prevention	Safety	Yes	Yes
	Social And Economic	Yes	×
	Political-Institutional	X	Yes
Operational conflict prevention	Early Warnings and Early Warnings Action	Yes	Yes
	Preventive Diplomacy	Yes	Yes
	Economic Measures	Yes	×
	Threats or Use of Force	Yes	×

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Furthermore, they have continued to condemn and comment on Russia's actions, where, among other things, on March 16, 2022, during a speech to the UN, they believe that it is high time for both the UN, as well as the OSCE to strengthen now efforts to restore peace (OSCE, 2022c). On March 18, 2022, they also condemned the bombing of a theater in Mariupol, which killed hundreds of civilians (OSCE, 2022b). Within preventive democracy, the OSCE has primarily had a mediating and negotiating role. The OSCE, as an organization, has also publicly condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The table above shows in a clear way measures the analysis revealed that the organizations used. However, the table does not illustrate the extent to which the respective measures have been used or where the organizations' emphasis lies, which can lead to a somewhat misleading picture of the analysis. If the empirical evidence has yielded results in any way for the respective measure, it has been noted as a used measure and illustrated in the table with a green tick. The table should, therefore, only be seen as a supplement to provide an overview of the analysis. It only shows which measures the organizations used that were recovered from the selected empirical data for this analysis, which means that there may be actions and measures that have not been successfully found or that the organizations, for that matter, have not reported on.

## **CONCLUSION**

*What conflict prevention measures did the EU and the OSCE use to prevent an escalating armed conflict in Ukraine?*

The analysis shows that both organizations use the conflict prevention measures that Carnegie describes in his theory. Although none of the organizations use all measures, the EU uses six out of seven measures, and the OSCE uses four out of seven. Like Carnegie's description, a certain center of gravity of measures will be used depending on the conflict, as some instruments may be more powerful than others. However, the organizations point to different points of emphasis in using conflict prevention measures, which shows that it is not only the nature of the conflict that affects which measures are used but also which organization uses the measures, which can be seen as a matter of course, as different organizations have different aims, conditions, and opportunities. At the same time, both organizations describe themselves as conflict prevention, making it interesting to see which conflict prevention measures they can use and choose to focus on.

The study aimed to investigate which conflict management measures the EU, and the OSCE have used in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which is considered fulfilled. Here, the effect the respective measures have given has not been analyzed in this study, even if their extent of them has been noted. This means that even if a certain measure only occurred to a small extent, such as for the EU and the threat and use of force, it has been included in the analysis as a used measure. At the same time, the emphasis points of the various organizations have been noted, which should not be seen as that these measures have produced more or less effective than any other measure. But should rather be seen as which measures the organizations are mainly targeting. Both organizations also show that structural and operational measures have been used, which Carnegie believes is beneficial in his theory. Sweden's government also described that every conflict situation is unique, where preventive measures require different instruments to be combined by several actors. This is also illustrated in the Ukraine conflict, where the two organizations have used different emphases and main focuses but where their different



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focuses on different emphases complement each other in the larger context. Whether this is coordinated and organized or just a coincidence is difficult to say.

Furthermore, this confirms that it is not necessarily the case that an individual organization should fulfill all seven conflict prevention measures according to the theory. Without that, it is required that several actors are involved and cooperate, which also focus on different focal points. It may also be the case that it is beneficial for individual organizations to focus on a few conflict prevention measures, similar to what the OSCE has done, to cover all measures in the larger context jointly.

Furthermore, it would have been interesting to investigate precisely the effect of these conflict prevention measures. Since the Ukraine conflict has continuously escalated, it can be assumed that these measures have not been sufficient to prevent this particular conflict successfully. Thus, the use of these measures, the scope, and the choice of emphasis on certain measures may not have been beneficial. Even the implementation and the choice of timing for the measures can affect the effectiveness of the measures. Specifically, the EU's measures introduced after the invasion in 2022 might have had a different effect if these had been implemented earlier. It would also have been interesting to examine and compare conflicts where the conflict prevention measures succeeded in preventing an armed conflict. At the same time, each conflict is unique and usually incredibly complex, so there is no single conclusion to prevent all conflicts. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the conflict prevention measures, even if a study of more cases could have provided a possible generalizing picture. Although it is impossible to draw generalizing conclusions from this analysis, it contributes to an increased understanding of the general conflict prevention measures and how the EU and OSCE as organizations have used them. The analysis also shows that it is not only the conflict that affects which conflict prevention measures can be used, but it also differs between organizations, despite the same conflict.

A difficulty with the study was conducting the analysis simultaneously, as the conflict was ongoing and continuously escalating. This meant that a delimitation in the time needed to be made. Despite the limitation in time, in the meantime, an amount of information has come out, which has made it difficult to sort out the empirical evidence. This may mean that actions have been missed because the flow of information has become too great. Perhaps an even tighter time limit would have been required here. A limitation in the use of Carnegie's theory is also that the dividing lines between the various measures are somewhat unclear. It was sometimes perceived as difficult to specify which measures and actions from the organizations represented which action, especially for social and economic, political-institutional, and preventive diplomacy, which in some cases were perceived to go into each other. This, in turn, can affect the replicability and reliability of the analysis. At the same time, it is difficult for an all-embracing theory, like Carnegie's, to be both exactly all-embracing simultaneously as narrow and sufficiently specific.

Working to prevent armed conflict may be one of our most important tasks. Armed conflicts affect societies and the world in many ways other than the obvious. The aftermath of conflicts lives on for years, and human rights, communities, families, and lives must be rebuilt. Theories around conflict prevention measures exist but must continue to be developed and continuously worked on actively. It is a difficult challenge, as each conflict is unique and requires a unique solution. Pursuing a single theory to deal with this can be impossible. Therefore, these theories should be seen as tools rather than as a conclusion for solving an armed conflict. At the same time, they should be continuously developed and improved to adapt to the reality we live in today and the threats we may face. Hopefully, lessons will be learned from which conflict prevention measures were used and how these were used, in the Ukraine conflict, to be able to avoid and work to prevent a similar conflict from happening again in the future.

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### KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**Carnegie's conflict preventive theory:** Carnegie Commission was set up in 1997 to this search and publish a report which will address the increasing threats to World Peace due to intercountry violence and to preventive techniques to avoid deadly conflict.

**Conflict prevention:** Conflict prevention in the context of this chapter means to take preventive measures and implement legal instruments to avoid the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

**European Union:** It's a political and economic union of 27 member states that are located primarily in Europe.

**Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE):** It's the world's largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organization under the supervision of the United Nations which is focused on issues such as protecting and promoting human rights, controlling arms, freedom of the press and free and fair elections.

**Ukraine-Russia Conflict:** On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, which escalated into a major Russia-Ukrainian war that originally started in 2014.

# Chapter 11

## The Montreux Convention (1936) as a Geopolitical Lens Since the Russia– Ukraine Conflict 2022–

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### ABSTRACT

*This chapter examines the geopolitics of the Regime of the Straits, (the Montreux Convention 1936), governing the Turkish Straights connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It is on the agenda following the military attack launched by Russia on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russia initiated a naval blockade of Ukrainian ports. The Convention prevents countries outside the Black Sea area from sending ships to break the blockade. In July 2022, an agreement brokered by the United Nations and Turkey was reached for limited exports of some products as many countries worldwide rely on Ukrainian grain, and without it, there would be hundreds of millions of starving people. However, the same agreement also prevents any ships entering the Black Sea to import goods to Ukraine as Russia is concerned that foreign weapons could be shipped there. The Agreement must be renewed every 120 days and so remains at the fore of international attention and may well put to the test other similar international conventions.*

### INTRODUCTION


Geopolitics is politics, especially international relations, as influenced by geographical factors. This chapter takes the geographical factors of sea routes and so maritime trade with the international relations of the Russia Ukraine conflict since 2022 to revisit the Regime of the Straits, often known simply as the Montreux Convention (1936).

The Russia Ukraine war that erupted when Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is a manifestation of renewed geopolitical rivalry between major world powers. Ukraine was a cornerstone of

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Figure 1. The Black Sea corridor/straits/maritime choke point as provided by The Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Service (TSVTS)



the Soviet Union, the archrival of the United States during the Cold War. Behind only Russia, it was the second-most-populous and -powerful of the fifteen Soviet republics, home to much of the union's agricultural production, defense industries, and military, including the Black Sea Fleet and some of the nuclear arsenal. Ukraine was so vital to the union that its decision to sever ties in 1991 proved to be a *coup de grâce* for the ailing superpower.

In its three decades of independence since then, Ukraine has sought to forge its own path as a sovereign state while looking to align more closely with Western institutions, including the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ukraine became a battleground in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began arming and abetting separatists in the Donbas region in the country's southeast. Russia's seizure of Crimea was the first time since World War II that a European state annexed the territory of another.

The potential for the current Russia-Ukraine conflict to impact global geopolitics results from the disruption to maritime trade. The seas, and especially narrow sea passages, are critical to ensuring maritime transport and preventing possible threats. One such significant maritime passage is the Turkish Straits, formed by the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. The Turkish Straits constitute the sole connection from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, and so to the rest of the world. The significance is that whoever controls that maritime choke point controls the passage of all ships between the two seas. In this case, control has been granted to Turkey by international agreement

This control was granted by the Regime of the Straits, often known simply as the Montreux Convention (1936), and whose full original text can be read on the Web of the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (1936). It is an international agreement—signed by Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and



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Turkey—governing the Turkish Straits, and it is still in effect. It gives Turkey control over access to key straits of the Black Sea—an agreement that is considered a big win for the country’s foreign policy to this day.

The Convention relates not only to the passage of ships but also to the security of Turkey and the other Black Sea countries (Bulgaria and Romania, who are European Union and NATO members, as well as Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). The regime it established is once again on the agenda following the military attack launched by Russia on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 as reported by Sangal et al (2022) on CNN and subsequent events also reported in the public media including the total blockade of Ukrainian ports by Russia between February and July 2022; the United Nations and Turkey brokered agreement to permit grain exports since July 2022; and the ongoing blockade of imports into Ukrainian ports.

Five geopolitical issues are under discussion as a consequence: (1) the dilemma of Turkey wanting to be neutral in the Ukraine war but being bound by the 1936 Convention; (2) whether Russian and Ukrainian warships will be allowed to pass through the Turkish Straits; (3) whether the future passage of warships from other states will be allowed in the event of possible international military measures against Russia; (4) whether such ships could have established a naval humanitarian corridor between February and July 2022 to ensure the export of grain to prevent a global shortage due to the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports; and (5) whether such ships could be used to enable imports to Ukrainian ports given the ongoing Russian blockade.

This chapter will examine these issues through six lenses: (1) the context of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict; (2) the Montreux Convention of 1936; (3) the geopolitical dimensions of the Montreux Convention of 1936; (4) the terms of the Montreux Convention of 1936; (5) adhering to the terms of the Montreux Convention of 1936; and (6) revisiting the terms of the Montreux Convention of 1936. The conclusions explore whether the Convention can survive this conflict, whether it needs to be renegotiated as naval warships and technology have changed dramatically since its signing, and, if renegotiated, whether this may well challenge other similar international agreements.

## **THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT**

The political dimension of The Montreux Convention was aimed at providing some security assurances to Turkey and other countries on the Black Sea in the 1930s arising from the presence of foreign warships that threatened their security and trade (the Convention uses the concept of “warship” instead of “military ship”). The significant geographical aspect is that the Straits are the only sea passage between the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea, and thus constitute a maritime choke point as discussed by Alexander (1992, 503). Maritime choke points are located throughout indispensable marine trade routes, and in case of global security problems, avoiding these choke points has often been suggested as a workable option. However, as these Straits are the only sea passage between the two seas, going through them is the only viable option for any maritime trade with the eight states on the Black Sea.

A recent crisis arose as Russia implemented a full naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports between February and July 2022 and since then a blockade of imports to Ukraine. Russia has permitted exports of grain following a United Nations brokered agreement, as discussed by (Coombs, 2022). At the onset of the conflict in February 2022, more than 100 foreign-flagged vessels and hundreds of mariners were stranded in Ukrainian ports. On July 22, the United Nations, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and

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Ukraine agreed to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, at a signing ceremony in Istanbul, Turkey's largest city and whose details are updated on the United Nations Web (2022).

The Russian military strategy aimed at cutting Ukraine off from its access to the sea to decapitate its economy, and between February and July, threatened world food security. At the height of the export blockade, world leaders expressed their anger at the situation at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in May 2022, where McCausland (2002) reported that they called it the "weaponization of food." The export of Ukrainian grain provides food security for more than 300 million people around the world. Davidzon (2022) informs that the six-month blockade of exports left millions of tons of grain sitting in Ukrainian grain elevators or the cargo holds of the foreign ships stuck in Ukrainian ports, and much of this grain spoiled.

The July deal allows the exports of grain, other foodstuffs, and fertilizer—including ammonia—to resume through a safe maritime humanitarian corridor, but from only three Ukrainian ports: Chornomorsk, Odessa, and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi. To implement the deal, a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) was established in Istanbul Turkey, comprising senior representatives from the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Nations. According to procedures issued by the United Nations (2022), vessels wishing to participate in the initiative must undergo inspection off the coast of Istanbul to ensure they are empty of cargo, after which they will be permitted to sail through the maritime humanitarian corridor to Ukrainian ports to load. Vessels on the return journey must be inspected again at the Istanbul inspection area.

This six-month embargo on the export of Ukrainian grain by the Russian Black Sea fleet represented a serious global food security threat; and the ongoing blockade of imports, while aimed at preventing the flow of weapons, further cripples the Ukrainian economy causing suffering to its civilians. Frustrating the situation is the absence of laws, national or international, on such a situation. The options open to the world are like those in all such global crises involving conflict: diplomacy and/or the use of military might to force an immediate solution. Further complicating the options is the Montreux Convention that would prevent foreign navies from entering the Black Sea.

Sanctions or embargoes are less effective because they take longer to implement. The situation was summed up by UN Secretary-General António Guterres who pointed out that, while most attention is focused on the effects of the war on Ukrainians, the war is also having a global impact—in a world that was already witnessing increased poverty, hunger, and social unrest. Even though the export blockade has been broken by diplomatic means, the war has dramatically reduced grain production to less than a quarter of what it was. So, research from the United Nations (2022a) shows that Ukraine crisis still risks tipping up to 1.7 billion people worldwide—more than one-fifth of humanity—into poverty, destitution, and hunger.

Prior to the conflict, Ukraine was one of the world's largest grain exporters and, in 2021, supplied around 45 million tons of grain to the global market. Following Russia's attack on the country in late February 2022, mountains of grain built up in silos, with ships unable to secure safe passage to and from Ukrainian ports; land routes unable to compensate. Much of this harvested grain spoiled and became unusable. Given the war, yield decline is assumed for all scenarios since agri-technology applications will suffer due to a deficit of fuel, finances, and manpower. It is projected that wheat production in Ukraine in 2022 will be 19.8 million tons. Thus, exports could be estimated by UkrAgroConsult (2022) at no more than 14–16 million tons or a quarter of the production compared to 2021.

A report issued by the Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance as reported in UkrAgroConsult (2022) called on international financial institutions to release funding for the most vul-

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nerable countries, help governments in developing countries to invest in the poorest and most vulnerable by increasing social protection, and work toward reforming the global financial system so that inequalities are reduced. However, that would be addressing the symptoms in the short term but not the cause. It could be said that it is imperative that the world act. There is hope in this direction as Russia has shown flexibility. Ateşçi (2022) covered the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's visit to Turkey in June 2022 for intense negotiations on this issue of breaking the blockade and, while seemingly fruitless at the time, nevertheless led to compromise by July to enable exports but still preventing imports. Only an end to the conflict would bring grain production back to its previous levels and end the global shortage.

While diplomatic efforts continue, the other alternative is military means. Since the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, the use of military means for humanitarian purposes is normally preceded by a debate in the UN and the granting of a resolution. Those willing to implement the resolution have been a coalition either as part of a United Nations force or another regional organization such as the European Union or NATO. This is a significant point as the Convention permits warships to pass through the Straits from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea in the case of assistance rendered to a state that is the victim of aggression by virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance. This would bind Turkey, as concluded within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations (Article 51) available online at the United Nations (2000).

However, Malekshahi et al (2002) show that Russia as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council would no doubt veto such a United Nations Security Council Resolution, thereby bringing into question the validity of any NATO action. Furthermore, should any state proceed to break the naval blockade on humanitarian grounds, the act would clearly bring that state into direct conflict with Russia.

The presence of a Western naval flotilla in nearby waters for the express purpose of countering Moscow's war strategy would no doubt be perceived as a military threat by Russia. That such a convoy would have an ultimate humanitarian objective will not negate Russia's perception. Thus, the cooperating states would need to balance the options and decide if they wish to enter the war on the side of Ukraine. Even short of Russia directly and deliberately attacking coalition ships, the risk of accidental escalation would be high, where the example provided by Margulies (2002) is the 1988 US downing of an Iranian civilian airliner (IR655) by the US Navy ship USS Vincennes while conducting a similar operation to protect oil shipments through the Arabian Gulf.

In the face of these conditions, the contention that the United States and its allies can break Moscow's ongoing blockade of imports to Ukraine (or the February to July export blockade) "without firing a shot" is dubious at best. Here, neither the United States nor any other NATO member appear eager to challenge Turkey's implementation of the Convention. To illustrate, NATO warships have not transited through the Turkish Straits since the onset of the conflict in February 2022.

## **THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936**

A mission that seeks to achieve humanitarian objectives through military means is still a military operation, carrying all the risks that this kind of action would normally entail. In addition, should any states proceed as a "coalition of the willing" to establish a "maritime corridor" or to break the ongoing naval blockade of imports (or the February to July export blockade) using their own naval vessels, then at the fore would be the need to adhere to the Montreux Convention of 1936, if they are to abide by international law and custom. Signed on July 20, 1936, at the Montreux Palace in Switzerland, the Convention

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went into effect on November 9, 1936, addressing the long-running “Straits Question” over who should control the strategically vital link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The agreement concerns the Dardanelles Strait, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus Strait.

The “Straits Question” was originated in the Treaty of Lausanne, a peace treaty negotiated during the Lausanne Conference of 1922–23 and signed in the Palais de Rumine, Lausanne, Switzerland, on July 24, 1923. The treaty officially settled the conflict that had originally existed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied French Republic, British Empire, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan, Kingdom of Greece, and the Kingdom of Romania since the onset of World War I. The Treaty of Lausanne had demilitarized the Dardanelles and opened the Straits to unrestricted civilian and military traffic, under the supervision of the International Straits Commission of the League of Nations.

Doğar (2021) provides the history informing that by the mid-1930s, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean had altered with the rise of Fascist Italy, which controlled the Greek-inhabited Dodecanese Islands off the west coast of Turkey and constructed fortifications on Rhodes, Leros, and Kos. The Turks feared that Italy would seek to exploit access to the Straits to expand its power into Anatolia and the Black Sea region.

Oztig and Okur (2022) also show there were also fears of Bulgarian rearmament. Turkey was not permitted to refortify the Straits. In April 1935, the Turkish government dispatched a lengthy diplomatic note to the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne proposing a conference on the agreement of a new regime for the Straits and requested that the League of Nations authorize the reconstruction of the Dardanelles forts. The Abyssinia Crisis of 1934–35, the denunciation by Germany of the Treaty of Versailles, and international moves toward rearmament meant that the only guarantee intended to guard against the total insecurity of the Straits had just disappeared.

The history is further detailed by Chachko and Linos (2022) that in 1936, in response to Turkey’s request to refortify the maritime area, the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne and others met in Montreux, Switzerland, and reached an agreement to return the zone to Turkish military control. The Convention allowed Turkey to close the Straits to all warships in times of war and to permit merchant ships free passage. It remains in effect in 2022 and is thus relevant to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The emphasis here is times of war. In order for the provisions of the Montreux Convention to go into effect, especially for Turkey to start using its powers and responsibilities, a war situation must exist. According to international law, a formal declaration of war is not required for the definitive determination of a state of war. Even if there is no official declaration of war by the state using armed force, the laws of war should begin to apply when there is a substantial use of armed force. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia officially declared that it had launched a special military operation against Ukraine on the morning of February 24, 2022—an official declaration of the start of a comprehensive military operation against another state.

Pedrozo (2022) has found evidence that from the negotiations in 1936 the British, supported by France, sought to exclude the Soviet fleet from the Mediterranean Sea during World War II, where it might have threatened the vital shipping lanes to India, Egypt, and the Far East. Britain’s willingness to permit Turkey to have control has been attributed to a desire to avoid Turkey being driven to ally itself with or to fall under the influence of Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. Myers (2022) adds to this that Turkey has used the Convention’s powers before. During World War II, Turkey closed the Straits to warships belonging to combatant nations. That prevented the Axis powers from sending their warships to attack the Soviet Union and blocked the Soviet navy from participating in combat in the Mediterranean.

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Baldıran (2022) who is monitoring the current situation informs that now, the Montreux Convention is serving an important role in the Ukraine conflict. Ukraine asked Turkey to close the Straits to Russian warships, highlighting the Turkish role in keeping regional peace. The Turkish government agreed to this on February 28, 2022. However, several Russian warships have continued to enter and leave the Black Sea, with Turkey saying that it could not and would not prevent this if Russia claimed they were returning to their home port as that is permitted in the Montreux Convention.

UNANSEA (2022) provides data that Russia is taking advantage of this, and in essence, the freedom of movement enables its Black Sea fleet to conduct business as usual. For example, these ships exit the Black Sea to perform tasks in the Sea of Japan—interacting with the Russian Baltic Sea fleet—and undertake regular patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. They then return to their home port in the Black Sea as and when they wish. At the time of the 2014 Crimean crisis, Russia's intent was to create a base on the Crimean Peninsula that would meet all the requirements for performing combat missions.

## **THE GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936**

Ekici et al (2022) quote a Turkish saying, “Did your ships sink in the Black Sea?” They explain that the expression is used when a person is lost in thought, trying to resolve a seemingly unsolvable problem. As it turns out, the Black Sea is the very body of water that put Turkey on a geopolitical tightrope since Russia initiated its attack on Ukraine and began military operations from those waters.

The geographic details are provided by Usluer et al (2022) that the Straits are in the western part of the landmass of Eurasia, the Straits are conventionally considered the boundary between the continents of Europe and Asia, as well as the dividing line between European Turkey and Asian Turkey. The Straits -the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus - are two internationally significant waterways in northwestern Turkey on opposite sides of the Sea of Marmara that create a series of passages that connect the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea. The Straits and the Sea of Marmara are part of the sovereign sea territory of Turkey and subject to the regime of internal waters, yet also subject to international agreements such as the Montreux Convention of 1936.

Staveleyfa.com (2022) provides further details that the Dardanelles is a narrow strait in northwestern Turkey, 61 kilometers long and 1.2 to 6.5 kilometers wide, linking the Aegean Sea (in the Mediterranean Sea) with the Sea of Marmara (in the Black Sea). Kermack (1919) tells that the city of Dardanus in the Troad (territory around ancient Troy) is where Mithradates VI (King of Pontus) and Sulla (the Roman general) signed a treaty in 85 BCE, giving the Strait its name. The location of the Dardanelles has given it international political importance.

Gökaşan et al (1997) note that the name “Bosphorus” was derived from the ancient Greek word “Bosporos,” meaning “cattle strait” or “ox ford.” The Strait is in northwestern Turkey and separates Thrace from Anatolia. It is the narrowest strait in the world, with a maximum length of 31 kilometers and a maximum width of 3.7 kilometers. The narrowest point is 700 meters wide, which is located between Anadoluhisari and Rumelihisari. Its depth ranges from 36.5 meters to 124 meters below the sea surface. It runs through Istanbul, the only city located on two continents. The Strait's shore is heavily settled and part of the Istanbul metropolitan area, Turkey's largest metropolis with 17 million people. Two suspension bridges are constructed across the Strait: Bosphorus Bridge I (15th July Martyrs Bridge) was constructed in 1973, while Bosphorus Bridge II (Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge) was completed in 1988.

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Owing to their strategic importance in international commerce, politics, and warfare, the sea straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea have played a significant role in European and global political and military history. A historical example of significance is described by Knight (2022) that in 1807 during the Napoleonic Wars, the British fleet under Sir John T. Duckworth closed the straits connecting the two seas and then forced them. Fairley (2022) provides another example that during World War I, the Allies failed to capture this sea route, though a British submarine penetrated the minefields blocking the sea route and sank a Turkish battleship off the Golden Horn, an inlet on the Bosphorus.

Ang (2021) states the Straits are recognized as one of the seven maritime choke points that have gained immense ill-fame in both past and present times, especially due to the heavy geopolitical pressure surrounding them. The Montreux Convention regulates maritime traffic through the Black Sea and guarantees “complete freedom” of passage for all civilian vessels in all circumstances in times of peace.

## **THE TERMS OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936**

The Convention consists of 29 Articles, four Annexes and one Protocol. Articles 2 through 7 consider the passage of merchant ships and Articles 8 through 22 consider the passage of war vessels. The key principle of freedom of passage and navigation is stated in Articles 1 and 2. Article 1 provides that “the High Contracting Parties recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of passage and navigation by sea in the Straits,” while Article 2 states that “in time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of passage and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag with any kind of cargo.”

The Republic of Turkey (2011) details that in peacetime, military vessels are limited in number, tonnage, and weaponry, with specific provisions governing their mode of entry and duration of stay. Warships must provide advance notification to Turkish authorities, which, in turn, must inform the parties to the Convention. There is a formal process for ships, both military and non-military, in transiting the Straits. These are detailed in the Turkish Straits Maritime Traffic Order Regulations Enforcement Directives.

There are also guidelines and recommended procedures by international organizations such as the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF). The Turkish authorities observe the vessels as they transit the Straits, confirming that each ship matches the request for passage and the international registry of ships while also confirming its weight, at least relative to the date of its construction.

According to the Treaty Turkey is authorized to close the Straits to all foreign warships during a war or when it is threatened by aggression. Turkey is also authorized to refuse the transit of merchant ships belonging to countries at war with it. In wartime, with Turkey not involved in the conflict, warships of the nations at war may not pass through the Straits, except when returning to their base (Article 19). Articles 14 and 18 impose several highly specific restrictions on what type of warships are allowed passage. Only Black Sea states may transit capital ships of any tonnage, escorted by no more than two destroyers. Any revisions to Articles 14 and 18 require a 75 percent majority of signatory countries and must include Turkey.

Non-Black Sea powers wishing to send a vessel must notify Turkish authorities fifteen days prior to the requested passing, while Black Sea states must submit their request eight days prior to passage. Furthermore, no more than nine foreign warships, with a total aggregate tonnage of 15,000 tons, may pass at any one time. Passage is also denied to a single ship heavier than 10,000 tons. An aggregate tonnage of all non-Black Sea warships in the Black Sea must be no more than 45,000 tons, with no one

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state exceeding 30,000 tons at any given time. Non-Black Sea warships are not permitted to stay in the Black Sea for more than twenty-one days

Under Article 12, Black Sea states are allowed to send submarines through the Straits with prior notice if the vessels have been constructed, purchased, or sent for repair outside the Black Sea. The less restrictive rules applicable to Black Sea states were agreed as effectively a concession to the Soviet Union, the only Black Sea state other than Turkey with any significant number of capital ships or submarines.

The treaty contains no explicit prohibition on aircraft carriers. However, modern aircraft carriers are heavier than the 15,000-ton limit imposed on warships, which makes it impossible for non-Black Sea powers to transit modern aircraft carriers through the Straits.

## **ADHERING TO THE TERMS OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936**

While the Montreux Convention was designed for a particular geopolitical context in 1936, where Towle (1981) has found that it remains unchanged since its adoption, it has endured as a “solid example of a rules-based international order” since most of the intent of its terms are still followed.

To follow the intent of the terms, Pape (2020) describes how the former Soviet Union during the Cold War designated its Kiev-class and Kuznetsov-class ships as aircraft-carrying cruisers as the ships were armed with P-500 and P-700 cruise missiles, which also form the main armament of the Slava-class cruiser and the Kirov-class battlecruiser. The result was that the Soviet navy could send these aircraft-carrying cruisers through the Straits in compliance with the Convention, but at the same time, the Convention denied access to NATO aircraft carriers, which exceeded the 15,000-ton limit.

Turkey chose to accept the designation of the Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers as aircraft cruisers, as any revision of the Convention could leave Turkey with less control over the Straits, especially as another agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), had already established more liberal passage through other straits. Technically UNCLOS governs transit passage through international straits around the world. However, Article 35 clarifies that UNCLOS does not apply to long-standing international conventions in force.

By allowing the Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers to transit the Straits, Turkey could leave the other elements of the more restrictive Montreux Convention in place. The upshot: it is the Montreux Convention, and not UNCLOS, that governs the Turkish Straits—which enjoy a truly unique legal status in international transit governance.

## **REVISITING THE TERMS OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936**

The Convention remains in force but not without dispute. Capsaskis (2022) describes how it was repeatedly challenged by the Soviet Union during World War II and the Cold War. For example, for several years after World War II, the Soviets exploited the restriction on the number of warships by ensuring that one of theirs was always in the Straits, thus effectively blocking any state other than Turkey from sending warships through the Straits.

Hasanli (2022) places this in context by showing that Soviet pressure expanded into actual demands to revise the Montreux Convention, giving rise to the 1946 Turkish Straits crisis, which led to Turkey abandoning its policy of neutrality. In 1947, it became the recipient of US military and economic as-

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sistance under the Truman Doctrine of containment and joined NATO, along with Greece, in 1952. It can therefore be said that the “Straits Question” is the reason why Turkey became a member of NATO.

Aliano (2022) tells that the United States has not signed the Convention but generally abides by it under customary international law. In doing so, the Montreux Convention is an obstacle to US naval build-up in the Black Sea due to the Convention’s stipulations regulating warship traffic by nations not sharing a Black Sea coastline. Those stipulations place Turkey’s relationship with the United States and its obligations as a NATO member in potential dispute with Russia and thus the regulations of the Montreux Convention. Russia may see an increased NATO presence in the Black Sea as escalation.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which entered into force in November 1994, may well prompt calls for the Montreux Convention to be revised and adapted to make it compatible with UNCLOS’s regime governing straits used for international navigation. However, Turkey’s long-standing refusal to sign UNCLOS has meant that the Montreux Convention remains in force without further amendments. Furthermore, disregarding the Convention and permitting NATO warships into the Black Sea would immediately escalate tensions between Russia and Turkey.

Ozberk (2022) places this in the current conflict describing that following Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian government appealed to Turkey to exercise its authority under the Montreux Convention to limit the transit of Russian warships from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. After initial reluctance, attributed to the country’s close ties with both Russia and Ukraine, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced on February 27 that his government would legally recognize the Russian attack as a war, which provided grounds for implementing the Convention with respect to military vessels. This meant denying passage to all military naval vessels, including those of NATO powers, who now cannot move their vessels from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

However, Çavuşoğlu reiterated that pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Turkey cannot block Russian warships based in the Black Sea from returning to their registered base. Around February 27–29, Aliano (2022a) informs that Turkey denied three of four Russian warships permission to enter the Black Sea as they did not have a home base in the Black Sea. Russia had previously been deploying its Kilo-class submarines from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean for extensive periods of time, after which they would return to their home port in the Black Sea, thereby enjoying freedom of movement in both seas. At least six Russian warships and a submarine have crossed the Turkish Straits since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022.

## **CONCLUSION**

Geopolitics is focus of the Russia Ukraine conflict since 2022 as it is the struggle over the control of geographical entities with an international and global dimension, and the use of such geographical entities for political advantage. This chapter examined the geographical factors of sea routes and so maritime trade with the international relations of the Russia Ukraine conflict since 2022 to revisit the Regime of the Straits, often known simply as the Montreux Convention (1936). The global dimension was the global grain and wheat shortage resulting from the blockade of Ukrainian ports by the Russian Navy and the United Nations negotiated agreement to enable exports but not imports through these ports.

At the time of writing, February 2023, the Russia-Ukraine war continues, and the terms of the Montreux Convention remain a focus. Between February and July 2022, Russia maintained a total naval blockade of Ukrainian ports. Grain was not exported, threatening to leave hundreds of millions worldwide starv-



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ing. The period was tense, questioning if other states, especially NATO members, would contravene the Montreux Convention and send naval warships to break the blockade to alleviate the global grain shortage.

The United Nations and Turkey brokered a deal to enable exports, but the same agreement also prevents any ships entering the Black Sea to import goods to Ukraine as Russia is concerned that foreign weapons could be shipped there. Since July 2022, the terms of the Montreux Convention remain a focus of the humanitarian crises as imports are now blockaded by international agreement to Ukrainian ports. Unless another agreement can be reached, foreign naval forces might need to enter the Black Sea and contravene the Convention. If this happens, it may open the door to challenging any other similar international conventions.

The agreement was for 120 days, and on November 17, Russia agreed to extend it for another 120 days under existing conditions without changes. In the weeks leading up to this, Russia had repeatedly warned that it might not agree to extend the agreement because a separate deal that was also signed in July, exempting Russian fertilizers from sanctions, had not been implemented. Ozerka (2022) notes that Russia also temporarily pulled out of the agreement at the end of October accusing Ukraine of a massive drone attack on its Black Sea fleet in Crimea.

As the implementor of the Convention, the Turkish government finds itself in a difficult position. Article 19 of the Montreux Convention provides that if Turkey is not belligerent in a time of war, warships of any warring state will be prohibited from passing through the Straits except to return to their home bases. Herein lies a weakness as it is possible to change a home port. Thus, while a home port of any ship (military or non-military) is defined when it is commissioned and enters service, this can change. The most common time to shift home port is in conjunction with major yard maintenance and docking availability. When a conflict breaks out, such as the current one, Turkey would rely on information that had been provided by Russia and Ukraine prior to the onset of the conflict. There is no legal means for Turkey to challenge them should they inform Turkey during the conflict that more ships had been added to that list. At the same time, the warships of other countries that are sent to support Ukraine or Russia or to break the Russian naval blockade of Ukrainian imports, or the earlier blockade of exports as well, would similarly need to be banned, as these countries are regarded as warring countries, and their home ports are not in the Black Sea. It would rest on Turkey to ban them.

Nevertheless, both Ukraine and Russia are important partners in critical energy and trade agreements for Turkey. Disregarding the Montreux Convention would immediately escalate tensions between Russia and Turkey. At the same time, Turkey, who has been a NATO member since 1952, wants to maintain or even strengthen its ties with the West. Its control over these key Straits may test its balancing act of relations with Russia and members of NATO and the EU.

Furthermore, it is fair to say that the main things aggravating Turkey's difficult position are the very fundamental tenets of the international community—peace and stability. The justification of letting foreign naval ships into the Black Sea in contravention of the Montreux Convention would be based on humanitarian grounds. The need to end the conflict and restore grain production to its prewar levels remains a priority even if exports are now permitted. With the war ongoing, the risk and potential remains that there will be no grain to export. Furthermore, as of October 2022, imports are still blockaded, and this has resulted in an ever-growing humanitarian crisis in Ukraine.

Foreign naval ships entering the Black Sea regardless of the reason would put the Montreux Convention of 1936 to the test, and it may not survive. A rationale for its renegotiation could be the fact that the Convention was signed more than eighty-five years ago, and naval warships and technology have changed dramatically since that time, thus making it difficult to apply the Convention's highly technical

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transit limitations to modern warships. Another reason is that the nature of just and unjust wars and what is permissible in war (*jus ad bellum* that refers to the conditions under which states may resort to war or to the use of armed force in general and *jus in bello* that regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict in legal terms) is no longer the same as it was between the two World Wars. So other instruments such as conventions might also need to be amended to reflect this.

If this happens, it may well challenge similar international agreements. To be sure, international agreements are sane and civilized instruments by which states and other subjects of international law, such as certain international organizations, regulate matters of concern to them in a normative manner. The bottom line then is that the international community must be sensitive to the effects of any potential naval responses to Russia, as they could implicate or even undermine the Montreux Convention as well as other conventions. However, if diplomacy does not bring an end to the conflict, then this might be the only means for global humanitarian relief in a food crisis. Clearly then the underlying geographical factors of the narrow sea passage between the Black and Mediterranean Seas as examined in this article lead to the Montreux Convention that in turn has emerged as a political conundrum and highlights the significance of the field of study of geopolitics.

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### **KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**Choke Point:** A strategic narrow geographic route for providing passage through or to another region for example a sea strait between two land points from one sea to another sea.

**Geopolitics:** Politics, especially international relations, as influenced by geographical factors.

**Naval Blockade:** An act of war whereby one-party blocks entry to or departure from a defined part of an enemy's territory, most often its coasts or ports, part of economic warfare.

# Chapter 12

## Global Geo–Economic Consequences of the Russia–Ukraine War

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Russia-Ukraine war and sanctions, which have been adopted against Russia, have seriously affected on the socio-economic development of Russia and world economy in general. In 2022, GDP of Russia reduced by about 2.1%, but after the entrance into force the sanctions in the field of energy, the damage for Russian economy in the beginning of 2023 have been increased significantly. First of all, those sanctions affected on the increasing the budget deficit of Russia, which prevailed 30 billion USD within the first three months of 2023.*

### **INTRODUCTION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN GEOECONOMICS?**

Geoeconomics is a scientific discipline that studies the economic situation in a particular country, based on various indicators - its geographical location, historical development, culture, in order to determine its level of economic development and place in world politics, taking into account only the level of economic influence. It is closely related to other social and social sciences, therefore it also comes into contact with geopolitics, the study of globalization.

As a political strategy, geoeconomics is a new geopolitics (geopolitical economy), which develops a strategy for increasing the influence of the state from the standpoint of its economic power and ensures the achievement of foreign policy goals, world or regional power by economic means.

### **Geoeconomics as Politics**

Geoeconomics is the politics of redistributing resources and world income. The main super-incomes (the rent of frontier energy) are received by the most economically developed countries.

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### ***Global Geo-Economic Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War***

Geoeconomics can be considered a variation of mondialist geopolitics. However, it considers only the economic level of development of the state, for it the very concepts of statehood, nationality, territorial features recede to a secondary level.

Geo-economic policy is aimed at conquest of power by increasing the economic power of the country, all actions of which should be aimed at extracting economic benefits from relations with other countries. In addition, within the framework of this policy, it is characteristic to establish the dependence of economically weaker states on stronger ones in order to ensure the strengthening of the position of the latter.

This type of policy is inextricably linked with such a concept as geo-economic rivalry, which consists of two components. The so-called applied geopolitics involves a combination of two types of protectionism - "defensive" and "offensive". In the first case, the state suppresses the competition of producers in its domestic market and promotes the fastest possible development of various industries. After such preparation, it moves to "offensive" rivalry, during which, on the contrary, it increases competition while selectively supporting individual producers. The second type of protectionism is also called "effective" and, among other things, such a policy consists in ensuring the development of its national industries by the state.

The state development strategies proposed by geoeconomics are by no means always safe for it. Such a policy may run counter to the national and other interests of the country.

Luttwak himself argues that at this stage of world development, geo-economic policy differs from geopolitics primarily in that if earlier states created certain national territories within the framework of geopolitics, now they are forced to act in a "neutral" economic space (Chitadze, 2011).

One of the components of the geo-economic strategy is also the preservation and development of the nation state, with its features in production and economic activity, since they are mainly due to its original geographical location. Since national characteristics in the sphere of production, in the specialization of the state are due precisely to natural, natural factors, it is in its interests to give priority to the development of precisely those areas of economic activity (for example, agriculture with favorable soil) that are natural for it due to national and natural factors. features, because it will use its resources more efficiently, increase production and, accordingly, strengthen its position in the economic space.

The German economist and political scientist F. List argued that one of the strategies for achieving world domination is the rapid development of one country in all spheres of production (agriculture, manufacturing) and its retention of such a comprehensive development in other states, which will contribute to the formation of economic dependence of these states on this world power (Chitadze, 2011).

In modern realities, one of the goals of geo-economics as a policy is to seize such territories where information and financial flows are concentrated, so-called "financial nodes" are formed. Gaining control over precisely such territories allows the state to really increase its geo-economic competitiveness. The management of such economic flows contributes to the formation of economic clusters or networks of various entities that are competitive in their totality and at the same time compete with each other.

Another group of effective ways of conducting geo-economic policy are geo-economic wars. They are, in essence, a fusion of concepts such as trade and the cold war. In this situation, there is no open military conflict, the pressure on the competitor is carried out exclusively by economic means, and such actions are carried out within the framework of a specific and full-fledged strategic plan. Popular methods of such a war are the destruction of the trade communications of the enemy country with the outside world, drawing it into debt, and the withdrawal of capital from it.

In addition to camouflaged interference in the economy of competitors, one of the methods of geo-economic warfare is to strengthen the state's own competitiveness. Moreover, it consists not only in

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building up its economic power, but also in establishing special rules in the common economic space, which its closest competitors will be forced to obey. The danger of such a strategy lies in the possibility of destroying the entire international economic system, therefore, along with direct methods of competition, hidden, indirect ones are also used.

In the aggregate of many methods and ways of conducting geo-economic warfare, the following can be distinguished. This is an increase in the share of the national capital of the state in investments in other countries, the share of imports of its national product in competing countries; drawing developing countries and countries of the periphery into debt pits, increasing their external debt; establishing the dependence of the exchange rate of competitors on the currency of the state waging a geo-economic war.

### **Geoeconomics as a Science**

The subject of study of geoeconomics includes the processes of development not only of state and regional entities, but also of real international structures - economic, financial and integration associations, transnational corporations of euroregions, free economic zones (special economic zones), as well as geopolitical entities (or blocs).

Geoeconomics studies the development of states in various aspects - cultural, historical, territorial. The purpose of this study is to identify the reasons for the formation of a particular economic system in a particular country, as well as to build a further strategy for the economic development of the state using information about its geopolitical, geographical and other features.

The basis for studying the state for geoeconomics is the territorial position of the state and the influence of the environment in a given territory on its economic activity, the characteristic features of various economic aspects, such as the nature of the redistribution of resources, the type of division of labor, and the traditions of the production of certain goods.

Geoeconomics also studies the political actions of the state in the geopolitical arena, aimed primarily at increasing its competitiveness in the face of constant rivalry between countries.

### **Sanctions Against Russia and Their Consequences on the Geo-Economic Environment of the Country**

As it is known, The Western democratic community imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine and recognition of the “independence” of the separatist regions (Lugansk and Donetsk regions). For the first time, President Putin himself and the highest officials from the vertical of Russian power were included in the list of individuals – who are considered as a war criminals. The sky of Europe and America was closed for Russia, billions were lost by the oligarchs, and several million citizens of Russia lost their jobs places.

Added to this are sports and cultural boycotts, as well as the suspension of exports by technology giants. In this chapter, we have focused on important sanctions against Russia taking into consideration the business and economic aspects of those sanctions.

In general, the West, in addition to political support for Ukraine, responded to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine with severe economic sanctions, which was reflected in an unprecedented package of sanctions. The move by the West is seen as an attempt to impose an economic price for military aggression and is ultimately aimed at reducing Russia’s military-economic capabilities, which are currently costing thousands of innocent lives. It is a fact that the imposed restrictions have already brought quite heavy



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economic consequences to Russia, although it is interesting to what extent it is possible to achieve the political goals that push President Putin to stop military operations with sanctions. In general, it takes a medium to long term for sanctions to take effect. At this stage, Russia manages to live under mass restrictions, despite heavy economic losses. Russia is now experiencing its worst economic downturn since the end of the Cold War. According to the calculations of the World Bank, having been done at the first half of 2022, till the end of 2022 Russia's gross domestic product was expected to decrease by 11% (World Bank, 2022), and according to the forecast of the International Monetary Fund, this figure was 8.5% (IMF, 2022). Some estimated put the economic scale of the decline as high as 15% (IIF, 2022). All this largely depended on the potential consequences of the already imposed restrictions and the possibility of new sanctions, including the embargo on energy products. As a result of the world economic crisis of 2008, the Russian economy shrank by about 8%. At the same time, it should be recognized, that within 2022, according to the statistical data of the Ministry of Finance of Russia, GDP decreased by 2,1%. At the same time, several experts of the World Bank Group have mentioned, that in 2022 GDP of Russia has been reduced by more than 3% (Business Press News, 2023).

At the same time, over time the losses caused by the sanctions must become more visible and tangible, which will greatly aggravate the socio-economic situation in Russia in the coming years. According to the calculations of the International Financial Institute, by the end of 2023, Russia will lose the wealth created in the last 15 years (IIF, 2022). The reason for this, on the one hand, will be reduced domestic demand, and on the other hand, in the case of the expansion of the package of trade-related sanctions, there will be a sharp decrease in budget revenues due to more than expected exports. Russian military aggression has also had global economic consequences: the prices of basic consumer goods have risen, supply chains have been disrupted, and international trade has been disrupted. However, Russia's financial losses after the invasion of Ukraine are quite large. It is interesting to see what actual consequences the Russian Federation faced due to the impact of sanctions, and to what extent it will be able to continue living under restrictions and pursuing an aggressive foreign policy.

### **A Brief Overview of the Sanctions Within 2022**

Year 2022, with the scale of sanctions imposed by the West, Russia has set an anti-record and surpassed such countries as Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea. This is the most extensive package of sanctions that the international community has imposed on any country. The restrictions affected almost all industries, financial institutions, and individuals important to Russia. It cannot be discussed all the restrictions here, but it can be single out some of them, which caused the greatest damage to the Russian economy. First, Russia's central bank froze most of its \$640 billion in financial reserves and disconnected most of its banking system from the "Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications" (SWIFT). Russia's largest banks, such as Sberbank and VTB Bank, have banned dollar transactions and frozen assets. "Visa", "Mastercard" and "American Express" left the country. Russian companies were banned from participating in EU public procurement. To limit Russia's production capabilities, Western countries have banned their companies from supplying microchips, military technologies, military and dual-purpose goods, and production raw materials. Several countries refused to buy Russian oil, gas, and coal. Germany has suspended the certification process of "North Stream 2", and most European ports have banned the reception of Russian ships. More than 400 international companies left the country (Shatakishvili, 2022). Automobile and aviation giants, including the largest manufacturers of spare

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parts, refused to sell their products in Russia. The world's largest aircraft leasing company has decided to stop leasing activities with Russian airlines.

The latest, tenth package of sanctions having been adopted in the beginning of 2023 contains new listings plus trade and financial sanctions, including further export bans worth more than €11 billion, depriving the Russian economy of critical tech and industrial goods (BPN, 2023). It also steps up enforcement and anti-circumvention measures, including a new reporting obligation on Russian Central Bank assets.

### **The Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy**

Very soon after the implementation of Western economic sanctions, Russia faced concrete consequences - a record devalued national currency (later the rate of the Russian ruble increased because of increasing the interest rates by the Central Bank of Russia and decreasing volume of imports on the Russian market), the closed Moscow stock exchange, a dramatic fall in the prices of shares of Russian companies on international exchanges, empty shelves in stores, etc. In the wake of continued Russian military aggression, the restrictions have spread across a variety of areas, affecting nearly every major Russian industry or financial institution.

### **Energy Resources**

The Kremlin's expansionist policy changed the energy strategy of the West, primarily Europe. In particular, the war forced the West to think more about "green technologies and the use of nuclear energy (due to the increase in prices of traditional energy resources - gas and oil), as well as alternative energy projects, in particular, about receiving natural gas from the USA (shale gas), North Africa, Norway, as well as receiving oil and gas from the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia, etc.

As a result, gas imports from Russia decreased. In particular, compared to 2021, in 2022, gas production in Russia was 12% less, and exports decreased by about a quarter. The reduction took place especially in the EU countries. For example, before the Russia-Ukraine war, the share of fuel supplied by "Gazprom" in the volume of natural gas consumed by the EU countries exceeded 40%, and the highest rate of dependence on Russian gas - 55% - was in Germany (a total of 90 billion cubic meters were consumed per year). As we know, only after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU countries and, first of all, Germany, decided to reduce the consumption of Russian gas. Just two months after the start of the war, Germany reduced its dependence on Russian gas to 35%, and the shutdown of the "Nord Stream" made it theoretically impossible to consume Russian natural gas.

In total, by the fall of 2022, the EU's dependence on Russian natural gas has decreased from 40% to 7% (BPN, 2022).

### **Banking Industry**

In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation became a target of Western sanctions. As a result of the imposed restrictions, the activities of foreign businesses in Crimea were prohibited, and the supply of high-tech oil drilling equipment to Russia and the access of Russian companies to Western capital markets was reduced. These sanctions turned out to be less effective in terms of both oil production and investment and economic growth. Obviously, Russia knew that any aggressive ac-

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tion it would take in the future would be followed by severe economic sanctions from the West. That is why, since 2014, the Kremlin's strategy has been aimed at reducing dependence on the dollar, so that foreign currency has less impact on the country's economy (for the record, 60% of world reserves and 80% of international trade are denominated in dollars) (Shatakishvili, 2022). This strategy of Russia included increasing the central bank's reserves and simultaneously reducing the share of the dollar in it, strengthening the national currency, and creating its own internal tax system. Since 2014, its national reserves have increased from 370 billion to 640 billion US dollars, including a doubling of the share of the gold. In addition, Russia tried to reduce the share of its reserves in European countries and distributed them to countries such as China and Japan (Miller, 2022). This approach would be a good opportunity to deal with Western sanctions if the reserves of the Russian Central Bank itself were not frozen. The Central Bank plays an important role in maintaining the stability of the country's domestic currency market. Consequently, the blow to its reserves turned out to be quite heavy for Russia. One of the main purposes of the central bank's reserves is to insure against the risks of speculative actions and to ensure the stability of the national currency, for example, in the case of currency speculation, it could strengthen the value of the ruble by converting dollars, euros, and pounds sterling into national currencies. This time this possibility has been reduced to a minimum. The mentioned 640 billion US dollars were distributed both in European banking institutions and in Asia. After the West froze the reserves of the Russian central bank, Russia can use its reserves in Chinese yuan, which is about 13% of total assets, and gold reserves located on its territory, which is 21%. In total, this amount reaches 220 billion US dollars. However, it should be taken into account that the London Gold Center has banned the purchase of gold bars from Russia, thereby closing the biggest market for it. This decision was joined by the United States of America, which prohibited its citizens from any transaction with Russian gold. After the invasion of Ukraine, the international financial services corporations Visa, MasterCard, and American Express, which own 90% of the world's debit and credit cards, left Russia (BBC, 2022). This means that payments cannot be made with these cards on the territory of Russia, and its citizens cannot use cards issued in Russia in other countries either. Since 2014, Russia has been working on its own payment system "MIR", which is used in only a few countries. One of the biggest restrictions imposed on the Russian banking system was the exclusion from the "Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications" (SWIFT). This has made it difficult to carry out financial operations from abroad, which directly affects the smooth operation of the business. In addition, some countries have imposed individual sanctions on Russian banks. Day-sanctioned large financial institutions make up more than 50% of the Russian banking sector (Shatakishvili, 2022). This package included such giants as Sberbank, VTB Bank and Alfa Bank.

### **National Currency**

Sanctions imposed in response to Russian military aggression were immediately followed by a sharp devaluation of the ruble. Before the war, the value of one American dollar was 80 rubles, and by March 7, this figure had risen to 142 rubles. To prevent a complete collapse of the national currency, the central bank has resorted to various methods, for example, Russian exporters are obliged to convert 80 percent of their dollar earnings into rubles in order to supply dollars to the country's foreign exchange market. In addition, foreigners are temporarily not allowed to sell their own shares or bonds in Russian companies and transfer dividends abroad (Interfax, 2022).

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Disconnecting Russian banks from SWIFT and freezing the reserves of the National Bank are the sanctions that contributed the most to the depreciation of the ruble. From the second half of March, the ruble began to strengthen due to several reasons: firstly, the central bank made it difficult to exchange the ruble for foreign currency and imposed a 30% commission on the purchase of foreign currency through brokerage, which, in turn, affected the demand for the currency (Reuters, 2022). At the same time, within January-March 2023, due to the decreasing the income from the energy resources export, Russian ruble was again be devaluated.

In addition, the central bank increased the monetary policy rate from 9.5% to 20%, and on April 11, reduced it to 17%, which was explained by the recent slowdown in consumer price growth and the tendency of the ruble to strengthen (Nelson, 2022). The main objective of the monetary policy rate increase was to reduce loans in rubles, which also reduced the demand for foreign currency, as it would be less likely to be converted into foreign currency for credit and/or trade operations. In addition, until September 9, 2022, in action was a \$10,000 upper limit on deposit withdrawals and a restriction that prohibits Russian residents from lending to non-residents in foreign currency (Ljunggren, 2022). From the monetary point of view, the steps of the Russian government, on the one hand, include factors promoting the supply of foreign currency to the market, and on the other hand, measures limiting its demand, which were the main factors for maintaining the value of the national currency. In the case of Russia, the determining factor in the stability of the national currency especially at the first half of 2022 was its energy resources. Within this period, despite the imposed sanctions and economic barriers, energy prices have increased since the beginning of the war. For example, the price of natural gas increased by 60% to the highest level since 2008 (Bloomberg, 2022), while the price of crude oil increased by 35% (Mascarenhas, 2022). Obviously, this meant additional income for the Russian Federation before the adoption of the sanctions against Russia in the field of energy on December 5, 2022 (sanctions related to the crude oil) and January 5, 2023 (oil products). According to Bloomberg's calculations, in 2022 Russia had to receive 320.7 billion dollars from the export of energy resources, while in 2021 year this amount was 235.6 billion (Bloomberg, 2022). Against the background, when many countries have banned exports to Russia, and the exit of foreign companies from the country reduced imports, there was less outflow of foreign currency, which had a positive effect on the exchange rate. Thus, the most effective of the fundamental factors affecting the ruble and the Russian economy, in general, had to be the reduction of funds received from energy resources, which would lead to the collapse of the national currency. Thus, as it was mentioned above, from the 2023, when the embargo on Russian oil and oil products entered into force (embargo on crude oil from December 2022), in January – March 2023, income of occupant country from the oil and gas export decreased by about 46%, which determined again the devaluation of national currency ruble by 10 points (BPN, 2023).

With regard to the processes before, despite the economic sanctions imposed by the West, cash flows in Russia increased in the two quarters of the 2022, which was due to the increased price of energy resources as a result of the attack on Ukraine. In the first quarter, the Russian Federation showed a record surplus on the current account balance, as the increase in the prices of energy resources led to an increase in export earnings. According to the published data of the Central Bank of Russia, the increase in the first three months of 2022 reached 58.2 billion USD, which was by 2.5 times more than the same period last year (22.5 billion USD) (Phillips, Peck, 2022).

Given that Russia is effectively cut off from much of the world economy, an account surplus at the first half of 2022 meant that the country could get the money it needed to finance the war, pay public sector workers, and stabilize the currency in foreign exchange markets. The Russian ruble, which had

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fallen by around 75% at the end of February, has for August/September 2022 effectively recovered, indicating that Russia was trying to come to terms with its status as an “economic outlier”. Obviously, a account surplus did not mean that Russia’s economy or its population was booming, which has been shown within the later period.

However, the surplus, or exports minus imports, partly reflected the fact that the country’s imports fell sharply due to the exit of Western companies and the weakness of the ruble in the first quarter. Foreign investors were also leaving Russia. Compared to 2021 year, the net outflow of capital increased by 270%, which, expressed in the amount, was 64.2 billion dollars. Net capital outflow for the same period of 2021 year was \$17.5 billion. Obviously, this process has a negative impact on Russia’s long-term economic health, but the fact was that it hardly hindered Putin from pursuing his chosen path in Ukraine (Phillips, Peck, 2022).

### **Inflation and Consumer Prices**

The world economy has not yet recovered from the shocks caused by the pandemic. The year 2022, even before Russia’s military aggression, many countries were experiencing an increase in the overall price level, which was largely caused by the imbalance between supply and demand and the tightening of monetary policy by central banks. Obviously, along with the global economic influences, first of all, this issue affected the population of Russia quite painfully. In parallel with the military actions of the aggressor country, the level of inflation in Russia increased. According to available data, the annual inflation rate in Russia reached 16.7% in March and in August 2022 this data was 14,3% (Smith, 2022). It is necessary to point out, that the average rate of inflation for 2021 was approximately 8,5%. The living wage in the country increased by 14%. The price increase of some products in the consumer basket even exceeded 40% (Liang, 2022). Four days after the military intervention, the Central Bank of Russia increased the monetary policy rate from 9.5% to 20%, which automatically led to an increase in the interest rate on loans issued and payable by commercial banks, which reduces the demand for goods and services in the country and slows down the growth of prices (Kalish, 2022). In Western countries, the annual inflation rate ranged from 5% to 8%, and in the case of Russia, this rate was twice as high. In the country, the prices of some items with high market value, such as electrical equipment, cars, and others, have become even more expensive. Due to the sharp and rapid devaluation of the ruble, people were trying to buy expensive products, which, they think, would bring minimal financial losses. In addition, the country’s reduced imports were another important factor in the growth of inflation (Ivanova, 2022). After the second half of Summer, the rate of inflation has slowed down, although since 2023 it again remained at a high level. This was largely due to households stocking up on non-perishables and continuing to buy consumer durables out of fear that future sanctions will further complicate the country’s domestic supply woes.

### **Unemployment**

Unemployment is probably the number one problem for the average Russian citizen. There is no doubt that from this point of view the situation in the country has radically deteriorated. This process is determined by several fundamental factors. First of all, more than 400 international companies left the country’s market (McDonald’s employed 60,000 people in Russia, Renault - 45,000, PepsiCo - 20,000, and Ikea - 15,000) (Pashaeva, 2022). 120,000 people were left without jobs as a result of the exit of only the 10

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largest companies. Supply chains in the country are confused, and Russian-made factories are often not supplied with foreign raw materials to make the final product. Therefore, they simply have no choice but to close. Thus, the number of unemployed people is increasing dramatically, which is expected to increase over time. Western sanctions also affected the service industry, for example, due to the ban on international flights, Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport laid off 40% of its employees (about 7,000 people). (WAN, 2022). In January of 2022, the unemployment rate in Russia was 4.4%. At the same time, by the end of 2022, this indicator reached about 8% and during the next years, it will be stable at 6.5%. The unemployment rate in Russia was the same, about 6.5% during the COVID-19 pandemic. For information, during the world financial crisis of 2008, the level of unemployment in Russia was 8.5%, and its peak was 1998 – 12% (Intellines, 2022). According to the employment platform HeadHunter, only in the first week of April, compared to the week before February 24 (the date of the invasion of Ukraine), the number of job seekers doubled, while the number of vacancies decreased by more than a quarter. After June 2020, when enterprises and service companies were closed due to restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, in the first half of this year, the service sector again contracted the fastest, and the number of employees there fell sharply. Most of the international businesses that left the Russian market were working in the service sector. Overall, the World Bank estimated that 2.6 million people in Russia could fall below the official poverty line before the end of the first half of 2023 (Reuters, 2022).

Another acute problem for the Russian Federation is the “brain drain” from the country, which has become more massive in recent years. As a result of Western sanctions, many people have lost their jobs or lost their income. According to various data, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, thousands of people left the country and started looking for work in other countries. Basically, such people belong to the city-dwelling, educated, middle social class citizens. According to the Russian Electronic Communications Association, more than 70,000 IT specialists have left the country within the first half of 2022 (Volpicelli, 2022). Obviously, this situation will have a great impact on the economic, technological, and creative development of the country. According to experts, “brain drain” may become the biggest problem for Russia in the coming years (LallJee, 2022).

### **Manufacturing and Supply Chains**

As a result of Western sanctions, enterprises faced the biggest problem. On the one hand, international companies that produced certain products in Russia left the country, and on the other hand, local factories faced significant delays, as they, in most cases, no longer receive the materials or semi-finished products needed to create the final product. Even, if there is a potential supplier, the lack of sufficient financial resources is a problem. Due to the cessation of operations in Russia by various heavy equipment and automobile manufacturers, production volume in the country has experienced a marked decline. In 12 industrial sectors, the Russian Federation has limited access to Western-made semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, automation, and information security equipment, which will be a major blow to its technological development in the medium and long term, and this will lead to disruption of the country's manufacturing and extractive industries. In addition, Europe, America, and the technologically advanced countries of Asia have banned the import of microelectronic products and microcircuits into Russia, which are critically important in almost all industrial production - from household appliances to high-tech equipment. The largest manufacturer of microchips, accounting for more than 50% of the global market, is located in Taiwan (Khavanekar, 2022). These microchips are actively used in the production of defense equipment. The Taiwanese company refused to supply Russia, which, of course,

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will pose a great threat to its technological development. In addition, Europe has banned its companies from supplying Russian arms companies with production materials. From the point of view of supply of production facilities, several main problems appeared. On the one hand, this is the suspension of bank transfers, and on the other hand, the attitude of producers towards the aggressive Russian policy. They do not want to conduct trade operations with Russia.

Other factors contribute to this, such as unstable currency, unstable economic environment, financial and political risks, and others. Since March of the 2022, the Russian manufacturing sector has experienced a sharp decline. Reduced demand from foreign and local customers has generally led to a reduction in production. In addition, the supplier's delivery time has been significantly extended. Consequently, a serious shortage of materials, rising vendor prices, restrictions on air transportation, and rising prices for this service led to a rapid increase in input costs in the country (S&P Global, 2022). Due to the above situation, the smooth functioning of supply chains in Russia, which is the basis of effective business operations, has been disrupted. However, it should also be noted here that the global problem of supply chains began as early as during the COVID-19 pandemic when the world remained completely closed to China.

### **International Trade**

International trade is extremely important for Russia both in terms of obtaining production facilities and purchasing consumer products. Even though China is one of the main import partners for Russia, in 2022, most of the products still were coming from 13 countries that imposed strict sanctions on the aggressor. Russia's trade balance was in surplus in 2022, that is, the country's exports exceed its imports, thanks to its energy resources. At this stage, imported goods are hard to find in the country and their stocks are not being restored. In Russia, no one sells their products for fear that they will not get paid or will only be paid in rubles. Effective functioning of the manufacturing, extractive, and consumer industries of the Russian Federation is practically impossible without international trade.

The blocking of some goods by the countries that have joined the sanctions will lead to the collapse of several sectors in Russia, in case the country cannot find an alternative supplier. It should be noted that the total price of products exported to Russia from 46 countries that have joined international sanctions reached 180 billion dollars as of October 2022 (Van Dam, Shin, Fowers, 2022). According to Trade Data Monitor, Russia spends \$11.5 billion annually on its largest import product, automobiles. Germany, South Korea, and Japan are leading here, with 63% of the Russian automobile market. The discontinued exports from these countries account for only 3% of their total sales, and for Russia, it is a much more painful blow (Van Dam, Shin, Fowers, 2022).

Sanctions imposed in the field of trade affected all industries, including aviation. Russian airlines depend on Boeing for scheduled aircraft maintenance and repair, and Airbus for spare parts. Both giants of the aviation industry refused to cooperate with Russia. Consequently, the country is at risk of running out of specialized parts needed to maintain its aircraft. This is a specific industry in which it is quite difficult to find an alternative supplier that fully meets aviation standards. Thus, if Russia can restore air traffic with certain countries, the safety of its flights will be greatly questioned. The President of Russia himself recognizes the severe effect of international sanctions. In one of his speeches, he said; "It is difficult for us at the moment. Russian financial companies, large enterprises, small and medium-sized businesses are under unprecedented pressure" (Shatakishvili, 2022).

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Diversification of trade partners for Russia will be quite a difficult task. Although China already supplies it with much of its hardware and electronics, substitution is not always possible. This is especially true for high-tech equipment. At the same time, there is no guarantee that China will be ready to supply all kinds of goods or equipment to Russia since there is great competition between them in terms of regional dominance. Even if China expresses readiness for more comprehensive cooperation and can create specific products, it will take some time to produce and deliver, which Russia may simply not have (Van Dam, Shin, Fowers, 2022).

Russia is closely integrated with Western markets in business services, insurance, finance, and logistics. International supply chains and imported products are one of the main components of its production. Because of this, Russia is heavily dependent on access to components and tools from the US, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The fact is that at this stage in the absence of components in Russia, the automotive, aviation industries, and other sectors of mass production are struggling to survive. Numerous factories across the country have already closed due to component shortages, and all types of complex manufacturing are at risk of disruption (Miller, 2022). Russia's trade restrictions will certainly make it difficult to finance its aggressive foreign policy, both in terms of military pay and arms production. In this case, too Russia depends on components supplied from other countries. If we look at the picture from a wider angle, we will see that due to the decrease in production capacity, the country may find it difficult to sell its military equipment and machinery. For example, India, which is one of the major buyers of Russian-made weapons (more than 50% of its weapons come from Russia), may find another partner, which will significantly reduce the income of the aggressor country (Shatakishvili, 2022). Obtaining energy resources is critically important for Russia. In this field, it actively uses western technologies, including drilling tools. According to experts, without Western technological investments in the energy industry, Russia's oil production will deteriorate. Russia, like most oil-producing countries, began to extract oil from easily accessible places, but over time this process has become more and more difficult (eg, Siberia and shale deposits). In both cases, oil extraction requires technology beyond Russia's production capacity and needs to be obtained from the West. Without European and American technologies, the country may find itself in a difficult situation and oil production may decrease in the coming years.

### **Foreign Direct Investments**

Russia has experienced a noticeable decline in foreign direct investments in recent years. A few years ago, many international publications wrote that Russia is no longer an interesting country for investors. This is largely determined by the political environment inside the country, which is considered to be a big risk for international capital investments. In addition, important factors are that the economy is under the state pressure, the judicial system, and the legal status of the investor. The most significant investments in Russia were made in 2008, the value of which reached 75 billion US dollars (Shatakishvili, 2022).

After that, the investment volume in the country decreases. If we do not take into account the circumstances of the pandemic period, in 2019 only 31 billion was invested in Russia. Sanctions imposed after the start of aggressive military actions in Ukraine, which will lead to a complete collapse of the Russian investment environment (World Bank, 2020). One of the latest decisions in the package of sanctions imposed by the United States of America provides for the prohibition of investment activities in Russia for American citizens, which applies to all Russian industries. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control has interpreted the term "investment" broadly. It includes any transaction involving the transfer of funds, assets, or credit to an enterprise operating in Russia. US citizens are also prohibited from promoting



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new investment in Russia in any way, which will directly affect non-US companies operating in the country that want to hire staff from the US, or include banks, insurance services, suppliers, information technology, and software companies in their activities. This ban will affect not only existing companies but also potential investors (National Law Review, 2022).

Strict restrictions and controls on the export of luxury goods, oil refining equipment, military goods, software, and technology have had a significant impact on the supply chains of foreign manufacturers. This limitation is also quite broad. For example, many non-US semiconductor companies are no longer allowed to supply their products to manufacturers in Russia because they rely on US technology and software. Along with America, the restrictions imposed by the European Union and Great Britain isolate the Russian economy and have a strong impact on foreign investment in the country (National Law Review, 2022). Factors such as domestic consumption, national currency, stable economic indicators, and opportunities for the sale of manufactured products are important for the implementation of direct foreign investments. When a country has limited access to the world's leading markets, it cannot carry out financial operations, and those factors have deteriorated economic determinants and as a result, the domestic consumption market does not have the money to buy the product. Under those circumstances, making a profitable investment is unlikely.

### **Tourism**

Tourism accounts for approximately 3.4% of Russia's gross domestic product. In 2019, more than 24 million visitors entered the country, from which the country received a total of 18 billion US dollars in revenue (World Data, 2020). Even during the pandemic, in 2020, more than 6 million visitors entered the country, bringing the country up to 5 billion USD (Shatakishvili, 2022). According to the data from the World Tourism Organization, Russia occupied one of the leading places in the world in the field of international tourism. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tourism industry in Russia grew. However, due to recent events, the further development of tourism has been questioned. First of all, there was a protest against Russia's actions among the population of many countries. Campaigns have started, where people urge each other not to buy Russian-made products and not to contribute to the country's economic benefits. The same attitude applies to traveling to Russia. And those people who decide to travel to this country will face several problems, for example, inflated prices, lack of food products, mostly closed tourist attractions, difficult general economic background, and others. Therefore, the development of tourism in Russia in such a way that it reaches the pre-war level is practically impossible from this point of view (Shatakishvili, 2022).

### **Global Macroeconomic Impact**

Russia was one of the largest links in international trade and supply chains, maintaining a leading position in supplying critical products to the world. In terms of the production of this type of product, it ranked third in the world in terms of oil production, second in the production of natural gas, in the top five in the production of steel, nickel, and aluminum, and in the first place in the production of wheat. For information, 20% of the global wheat trade was coming from Russia, and the products obtained from it occupy the first place in the consumer basket of all countries. Ukraine was the largest producer of sunflower oil in the world, with a 40% share of the market. In addition, it supplied 9% of the world wheat market and 16% of the corn market (Whiting, 2022). Due to this fact, since the first day of the

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Russian military aggression in Ukraine, the prices of oil products, metals, and certain types of food products have increased dramatically in the world. After Russia invaded Ukraine, on February 24 of 2022, the world's population and manufacturing companies experienced increased prices. These processes in many countries, especially in Europe, have led to accelerated and prolonged inflation, which, in turn, reduced the opportunities for economic growth. Even before the Russian aggression, the central banks of some leading countries continued the course of monetary policy tightening, which was necessary to deal with the already high inflation. Given this situation, monetary policy tightening was expected, but at a slightly slower pace. On the other hand, higher prices of energy resources and disruption of supply chains could lead to higher inflation. Thus, central banks had to make difficult decisions to balance the situation (Kalish, 2022).

Along with the increase in the general level of prices in the first half of 2022, the world's biggest problem has been created in terms of the proper functioning of supply chains. Although many hoped for an improvement in the situation after the global pandemic, the fact is that essentially nothing has changed and it can be said that the situation has even worsened. This process could not have a significant impact on some manufacturers, but delays and changes in timelines affected almost every supply chain. This process manifested itself at the global level in the form of disrupted trade routes, reduced availability of raw materials, increased oil and energy costs within the first half of 2022, and unstable or rising costs of transportation (Whiting, 2022). After the sanctions were imposed, some countries took steps that potentially increased the likelihood of negative impacts on supply chains. However, from a political point of view, these steps were considered correct, as they were aimed at causing economic damage to Russia. Among such decisions, we can recall, for example, Britain's closing of ports to Russian ships, which was later joined by Italy, Belgium, Romania, and Lithuania; Closing the sky, and more. As a result, planes traveling between Europe and Asia have to take longer and more expensive routes. The disruption of Russian and Ukrainian cargo aircraft was reducing global capacity, which means that less product were transported and more flights had to be made. It is also noted that about 14% of sailors on cargo ships in 2022 were Russian or Ukrainian, and if there was a need to replace them, the shipping industry could face a labor problem. Along with this, the cost of cargo insurance has increased dramatically. Fears of potential shortages or disruptions pushed up industrial metals (e.g., aluminum) and food commodities. The cost of transporting oil by tanker has also increased, as Russian and Ukrainian pipelines were disrupted and demand for oil from the Middle East and West Africa has been increased (Kalish, 2022). Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 accelerated the long-term decline in Russia's importance as Europe's trading partner. However, Europe's trade relations with Russia were closely related to energy. Before the war, Russia held 40% of EU gas imports, 25% of oil imports, and 47% of solid fuel imports. In general, During January-October 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and the countries of the European Union was 227.7 bn euro. According to Eurostat, while import from EU countries into Russia was down 36.3% during the 10 months of 2022 to 46.5 bn euro, export from Russia to the European Union surged by 42.6% up to 181.2 bn euro (SeaNews, 2023).

### **Several Aspects Related to the Effectiveness of the Sanctions of the Russian Economy in 2022**

As it was mentioned, Russia has been living under unprecedented Western sanctions within (2022). But the war goes on continuously. Consequently, there are a number of experts who are asking why the sanctions were not working within the 2022 as intended.

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More than 40 countries have imposed financial, trade and personal sanctions on Russia: starting from the USA and the European Union, ending with South Korea, Switzerland and Albania. The West has frozen Russia's foreign reserves, seized the yachts and real estate of wealthy Russians, cut it off from the global financial system, refused to buy oil and coal from Russia, and banned the sale of equipment, technology and luxury goods. Consequently, in some cases, questions arise as to why the Russian economy did not collapse as a result of sanctions.

As Konstantin Sonin, an economist at the University of Chicago, states, Russia is a rich country with poor people, and it prepared for war in good financial shape.

“At the time of the imposition of sanctions, there was still excess money in the treasury and the inflow of foreign currency exceeded the need. Under these conditions, it is impossible to cause a financial crisis with the sanctions imposed on Russia, although, of course, this is only temporary,” said economist Oleg Yitzchoki from the University of California, Los Angeles (Interpressnews, 2023).

Yitzchok cites statistics: if in a normal year the share of income from the export of raw materials in the budget did not exceed 40%, then in 2022 it increased by 1,5 times and amounted to about 60%” (Interpressnews, 2023).

In the words of Ben Harris, one of the architects of the current sanctions, from the US Treasury, “Russia created the crisis itself and made money from it” (Interpressnews, 2023).

Considering that the main goal of the sanctions was to provoke a large-scale financial crisis that would deprive Russia of the ability to finance the war, this did not happen at this stage.

“Sanctions are a long game,” Yitzchok noted, “the next goal could be to make a hole in the budget, which will make military spending difficult in the medium term. Gradually this is already happening, but it is happening slowly and not on the scale to become a decisive factor in the financing of the war” (Interpressnews, 2023).

## **Putin`s Disinformation That Sanctions Have Failed**

“The so-called “The blitzkrieg that our enemies planned against Russia, the economic blitzkrieg, has certainly failed,” Putin boasted in one of his addresses (Interpressnews, 2023).

Economic recession and inflation in 2022 turned out to be better than expected. But if you compare it not to 2022 spring's gloomy predictions, but to what Ukraine would have been like without the invasion, the picture doesn't look so good. After 12 years of stagnation, 2022 was supposed to be the year of rapid economic recovery after the pandemic with 3-4% growth and even higher oil prices. However, instead, it was a recession” (Interpressnews, 2023).

It turns out that Russia has already missed out on 6-7% of welfare growth (Interpressnews, 2023). And that's just in terms of GDP, which takes into account both record exports and war spending. They have grown significantly. But imports and consumption in general decreased.

## **How Have Sanctions Changed Russia's Place in the World?**

Putin considers himself the leader of the crusade against the West. He called the decision to invade Ukraine “the beginning of a radical rupture of world - style world order” (Interpressnews, 2023). And at the same time he expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the West has imposed sanctions in response.

The result was the growing insulation of the Kremlin. Putin was personally banned from entering the West-Eastern neighbors lost respect for him: If Putin had previously delayed meetings with both the

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President of the United States and the Pope, at the Samarkand of Autumn, he was waiting for the Indian Prime Minister, the Turkish president and even the leaders of Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan.

The sanctions will complicate or make it impossible to develop new oil and gas deposits, especially in the Arctic.

Before the war, Russia was the world's largest energy exporter. The invasion of Ukraine has led to a decrease in Kremlin oil and gas extraction. According to BP, the production of the main Russian product-oil will be reduced by 2035 to 7-9 million barrels per day. This is about 13% lower than last year's war for prognosis (Interpressnews, 2023).

### **Many Countries Have Not Joined Sanctions. Will They Replace the West?**

No, they can't replace. West - about 60% of the world economy, China - less than 20%, Russia - 2%. Hence the three important conclusions:

1. Before the war, Russia traded all over the world. Now half the world is closed to him and this is the most developed part of the world, the source of investment and a know-how. Instead of the United States (25% of the World Economy) and the EU (17%), Russia's main partners are India (3.5%), Middle East (5%), Africa (3%) and Turkey (less than 1%) (Interpressnews, 2023).
2. China is much larger, richer, more aggressive and closer than any of the remaining Russia's partner. Its economy is 10 times larger than the Russian economy, and its attitude to Russian energy resources is much lower than in pre-war Europe (Interpressnews, 2023).
3. The well-being of China, India and other developing countries depends on Western markets, technology and money access. They are not ready for Russia's sake of quarreling with the West, and even one threat of secondary sanctions from the US and the EU forces them to be cautious in any contact with the Kremlin.

Did the West be affected by its own sanctions?

### **Effects of Western Sanctions in 2023**

Against the background of the worldwide price reduction of Russian oil and the introduction of international sanctions, the budget revenues of the Russian Federation are sharply decreasing. In February 2023, the budget deficit reached \$34 billion, the highest figure since 1998.

In February, Russia's total budget revenue amounted to \$42 billion (₽3.16 trillion), and the amount of expenditure was \$76 billion (₽5.74 trillion), therefore, February 2023 ended with a deficit of \$34 billion (₽2.58 trillion).

By comparison, in January 2023, spending was \$44 billion, and the budget deficit was \$25 billion.

The deepening of the deficit is due to the reduction of oil and gas sales revenues. In one year, revenues from energy resources are almost halved. As for the income received from non-energy sectors, the rate of decline in this direction in February is 9%.

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### **CONCLUSION**

Actual data on how the war will go, whether new sanctions will be imposed on the aggressor, what their main targets will be, and how Russia will respond to existing or potential restrictions will largely determine the economic outcomes for both Russia and the world. Uncertainty and different expectations contribute to general price increases, national currency fluctuations, and delays in strategic market decisions. The sanctions imposed by the West bring severe economic consequences for Russia, which have a great impact on the daily life of ordinary people.

Nevertheless, the sanctions have not yet achieved the political goal of stopping President Putin's military aggression. At this point, the major targets of the international community remain the disconnection of the entire Russian banking system from SWIFT, and, most importantly, the embargo on Russian energy products. However, these decisions will be difficult not only for Russia but also for Europe. Therefore, in case of their adoption, Europe should develop such a mechanism that will harm its economy less. It is a fact that continuing to live in such conditions will be more and more difficult for the population of Russia. Over time, the country's economic situation will further deteriorate. Let's see what steps Europe will take and what Russia will do to maintain its economic balance.

At the same time, in light of the sanctions imposed on Russia, the question is whether a global recession is inevitable. This question is now one of the most relevant for economists, and although it is probably impossible to give an exact answer to it, the World Bank publishes a new study with this title.

Against the backdrop of high inflation, economic growth forecasts have been significantly reduced this year, and the tightening of monetary policy has raised the risk of a global recession - a decrease in GDP per capita. Based on the experience of previous global recessions, the study analyzes current economic activities and policies, as well as development scenarios for the short term.

According to the WB economists, although the lowered forecasts do not directly point to an economic recession by 2022-23, experience shows that every global recession since 1970 has been preceded by a slowdown in economic growth a year earlier and a simultaneous contraction of the 7 largest economies.

"Despite the slowdown in economic growth, inflation is at its highest level in several decades in many countries. Under these conditions, governments cut monetary and fiscal support to reduce risks. As a result, we have had the most synchronous monetary and fiscal policy tightening episodes in the international arena in the last 5 decades. "These actions are necessary to contain inflation, but the overall effect of them may have a greater impact on the global economy than anticipated and cause a delay in economic growth," the study said.

Economists distinguish three scenarios for the development of the global economy for the years 2022-24. First, the baseline scenario largely matches existing forecasts for economic growth and inflation, as well as market expectations for rising interest rates. According to this scenario, the current pace of monetary policy tightening will not be enough to bring down the inflation rate in time.

Second - the sharp decline scenario assumes an increase in inflation expectations, which forces national banks to further tighten their policies. Under this scenario, the global economy will survive recession at least in 2023, although the low level of inflation will not recover until the end of the forecast period.

According to the third scenario, there will be a recession in 2023, which will significantly hamper the economic growth of developing countries already affected by the pandemic in the long term.

According to the study, a recession in 2022-23 is not inevitable, but for this policymakers will have to cross a fur bridge, they must maintain balance, take timely monetary decisions to stabilize prices, and

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their fiscal mechanisms must include targeted support for different groups and reduce the energy sector, trade networks or labor markets. hindering factors.

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## Chapter 13

# The Extension of Solidarity and the Polish Role in Ukrainian Refugee Management

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Russian aggression has been once again triggered towards Ukraine after 2014 but this time it has come with a more catastrophic collapse of a democratic country. Russia attacked Ukraine on 24 February 2022 resulting in a mass migration of Ukrainian citizens towards Polish borders and other European nations. As to data, most war refugees fled to Poland, and the Polish government and its citizen welcomed most of them. This chapter explores the Polish role in the management of Ukrainian refugees and in providing them with facilities for immediate integration into society. Although Poland is frequently regarded as a country that wants to be a ‘solidarity superpower’, the article also analyses the status of Polish facilitation of Ukrainian war refugees. Recently, the Polish government regarded its vision on migration and refugee accommodation as ‘flexible solidarity’. Likewise, qualitative content and discourse analysis are applied to generate Poland as a ‘solidarity superpower’. The initial finding indicated that Poland has gained more advantages in being a regional player in Europe.*

### **INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY**

The word ‘solidarity’ is defined as unity, harmony, unification, or/and agreement between individuals which means showing support for a cause or a joint responsibility for the consequences. But the term ‘solidarity’ originally derived from the Latin word ‘*soliditas*’ and the modern meaning inspired by the Latin ‘*in solidum*’ meaning ‘in entirety’ from Roman Law that expressed as joint payment responsibility of family members (Grosse & Hetnarowicz, 2016, p. 37). Its sense is also found in the French word

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### ***Extension of Solidarity, Polish Role in Ukrainian Refugee Management***

‘*solidarité*’ as per Encyclopaedia in 1765 and Napoleon’s Code Civil in 1804. The term was widely started using by the international labour movement and adopted in German and English to be politicised. This word becomes popular in social science, especially in sociology, political science, and international affairs (Laitinen & Pessi, 2014, p. 1). French social philosopher Émile Durkheim was one of the first that brought the concept of solidarity into social science as a sociological understanding in his writings as solidarity, mechanical, and organic solidarity. He frequently refers to ‘collective representations and solidarity.’ Mainly, his mechanical solidarity understands that he ‘sees people as they group together in a social unit or in an association’ (Mechtraud, 1955, p. 23-24). In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, solidarity became a liberal meaning of social integration and started to be used by sociological and political thought in France. In the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, it started as the prototype for labour movement solidarity as an application of concepts like brotherhood, fraternity, and unity (Stjernø, 2011, p. 156, 158-159).

Hannah Arendt brought a clearer picture in her political thought as ‘collective responsibility’ on solidarity that “people establish deliberately and, as it were, dispassionately a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited” (Bernauer, 1987, p. 43). Reshaur (1992, p. 726) viewed solidarity mainly as a “political since national identity usually has political as well as cultural significance”. Solidarity as a concept was also conceived through Catholic social teaching across Europe over the last century. The purpose is to provide a social norm in the form of the social obligations of individuals, communities, institutions, and nations. Pope John Paul II referred to that “solidarity helps us to see the ‘other’ — whether a person, people or nation — not just as some kind of instrument” (Beyer, 2014, p. 8-9). He extended the concept, which became a key value for the Church as a form of social teaching about solidarity, especially in Poland. His Polish origin and deeply rooted in Polish society, his association with the labour struggle in Poland. John Paul II also wrote about wages and social issues, including health care and social insurance in 1981. Lech Wałęsa became a very influential leader in the labour union struggle and he worked for worker solidarity (Stjernø, 2011, p. 164).

In the 1980s, solidarity (Polish *Solidarność*) started practically using by the Polish trade union, which was suppressed by the soviet bloc Polish government. It all started with a strike over rising food prices, poor economic conditions, and labour rights as resistance to the communist Polish government at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdańsk. Lech Wałęsa who was an electrician by trade, became a voice for freedom of religious and political expression, and Gdańsk become the home of the solidarity movement. Solidarity was formally founded by the delegates of 36 regional trade unions under the name of ‘*Solidarność*’ on September 22, 1980 (Britannica, 2020). After that, the solidarity movement has been speeded up and spread very fast not only in Poland but also in other parts of central and eastern Europe as a demand for freedom from the dependence on the Soviet Union. Then, ‘S’ was accepted as a permanent element in Polish society (Friszke, 2011). The solidarity movement was one of the factors behind the disintegration of the Soviet Union along with Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) in the late 1980s. In the second phase of Solidarity, it re-emerged to push a revolution against the Soviet Union, and solidarity becomes a symbol of the group of public dissatisfaction. In the results, solidarity was legally recognised as the political party and it defeated the Communist Party in the first free election of the Senate in 1989. It was only possible after the Round Table Agreement between independent labour unions and the communist government. The solidarity-based party won 99 per cent of the seats in the Polish Parliament, and Poland become a democratic republic (Shvangiradze, 2022).

However, Hayden (2020) perceived it as the solidarity umbrella which “sheltered all political persuasions – anti-communists, communists who rejected Soviet communism, nationalists, neo-Marxists, Trotskyists and soon-to-be liberal marketers of all shades”. At that time, Solidarity was shaped as the

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guiding principle against political phenomena related to corruption, unlawful governance, and mismanagement of the state by the Russian-led Soviet Union. Once again, the currently ongoing war in Ukraine reinitiates the concept of solidarity. Brunkhorst (2014, p. 178) referred to the solidarity that it emerged as an evolutionary concept according to constitutional norms and its normative constraints make it possible pathways to deal with challenges in times of crisis. It has flexible adaptation to deal with any crisis in order to provide social assistance, poverty relief packages, and any modern-time challenges such as humanmade disasters or natural ones. It has also become a very popular instrument for achieving national interests. Likewise, this study explores the Polish role in Ukrainian crisis management and its solidarity not only in a war-torn country but also in other parts of Europe and the world. It also provides an assessment of Polish foreign policy motives and its solidarity actorness as flexible characteristics.

### **Re-Emergence of Ukrainian Migration and Humanitarian Crisis**

Ukrainian Refugees have been coming to the European Union countries since 2014 when the first Russia-Ukraine tension broke. Although Ukraine always has been stuck between the dilemma of pro-Western and pro-Russian. The numbers of geopolitical and geo-economic ambitions aspired both powers Ukraine failed to balance the power to take foreign policy benefits from both sides. As Kissinger (2014) suggested that Ukraine should not join any side, and it would be better to work as a bridge between them. It has never worked ideally so the country could not hold longer due to economic aspiration and prosperity more influenced to go with the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There has been an ideological divide between Ukrainian scholars and leaders. Some of them got closer to Russia and started a rebellion against Ukrainian forces with Russian support in 2014. The Kremlin has never liked Ukraine's Western dream. Moreover, its increasing interest in European aspiration made Russia uncomfortable and perceived as a threat. After 2014, the tension between Russia and Ukraine never been stopped and frequent ceasefire violation took place as established under the Minsk Agreement, which also considered the so-called peace agreement (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 77; Bharti, 2022, p. 6-7).

Nevertheless, once again Ukrainian refugee crisis re-emerged in late February 2022 after Russia attacked Ukraine. The escalation of the armed conflict in Ukraine resulted in civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. In addition, this has caused forcing people to flee their homes and seek safety, protection and assistance. Millions of people left their homes to have crossed into neighbouring countries. According to data from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Refugees from Ukraine have recorded 8,073,182 (8 million) across Europe as of February 15, 2023. The number of 4,848,209 (4.8 million) have registered for temporary protection or under a similar national protection scheme in Europe as of February 13, 2023 (UNHCR, 2023). The total number of refugees consists of around 19 per cent of the Ukrainian population. The Russian invasion of Ukraine not only occurred large-scale humanitarian, migration, and refugee crisis, but it has contributed to more vulnerability to the Ukrainian people and economy, also globally. In April 2022, UNHCR marked that 5.5 million Ukrainians left for Poland and other European countries. It caused a rapid displacement of people internally and externally in the middle of fragility, conflict, and violence. This all happened when Ukraine could not reach the mass vaccination target against COVID-19 and the pandemic already added a downside risk to the Ukrainian economy (Ratha, 2022).

Likewise, UNHCR and its partners in Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia applied Protection, Profiling and Monitoring tools for data regulations. This team has found 99 per cent of respondents were Ukrainian, 87 per cent of them were female, the average age was 45 and

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had 2.4 average sizes of the household (UNHCR, 2023). The regional forced displacement crisis involved not only Western allied countries but also other European countries. Even since the invasion, almost 2,772,010 Ukrainian refugees have also registered to cross the border into Russia. Some reports also mentioned that it voluntarily moved through Russia to eventually reach the EU. The US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield mentioned that almost one million to 1.6 million Ukrainians were ‘interrogated, detained, and forcibly deported’ to Russia, as mentioned in a UN Security Council Meeting in September 2022. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield stated that “there is mounting and credible evidence that those considered threatening to Russian control because of perceived pro-Ukrainian leanings are ‘disappeared’ or further detained.” The Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) critical question cited Human Watch’s report in their critical questions that Russian authorities during the refugees of refugee ‘filtration’ process involved ‘subject to body searches, biometric data collection, interrogation about their political views, and sometimes beatings’. Those refugees who have a connection with the Ukrainian military or any association with nationalist groups were reportedly sent to detention centres running in Russian-controlled territories (Yayboke, Strouboulis & Edwards, 2022). As several reports highlighted, many Ukrainians were forcibly transferred to Russia and also have trouble while trying to return to Ukraine.

In addition, Karasapan (2022) referred to Russia this act as an emerging report of war crime, as evidence included ‘executions and torture’. He alleged that the EU member states have been more welcoming to Ukrainian and this kind of treatment was never welcomed by asylum seekers from the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan. Mainly asylum seekers from these regions faced violent pushback by the EU border agency Frontex, especially in Poland, Italy, and Greece (Karasapan, 2022). Since 1945, mass refugee waves in Ukraine are considered one of the largest exoduses in Europe. Paul Robert Magocsi mentioned that more than 31 million people were displaced alone during 1944-1948 in Central Europe (People in Need, 2022). In the recent follow-up of Ukrainian refugees, effective policy responses have been seen as being fair by European citizens and European countries. Ukrainian refugees got better preference and were well-regulated or controlled. Dražanová and Geddes (2022) cited that there is a difference from previous large-scale influxes that occurred in 2015-16 as the so-called ‘migration crisis’. First, notably in Central European Countries treated Ukrainian refugees with ‘much more favourable governmental and media responses’. Their study also indicated that the EU and its member states could also suffer from a crisis of displacement into a political and institutional one.

### **Conceptual Understanding of the Extension of Solidarity**

Thome (p. 102-3) presented theoretical perspectives for empirical research by using solidarity as a multi-dimensional construct and certain form of behaviour: 1) meant to be helpful, supportive, cooperative to other individuals or collectivises, and 2) based on or associated with a sense of obligation or value-based commitment. The word ‘solidarity’ carries many positive images of sympathy, cooperation, and altruism in the form of the strength of togetherness and community. Many scholars considered the psychological bond of human solidarity in ‘situations of bitter conflict’. But there are several philosophical meanings in both the forms of ‘radical humanism’ and ‘the rejection of liberal nationalism’. In this way, solidarity was proposed as ‘human solidarity versus national community’. If one has normative goals such as ‘fulfilment of productiveness, rationality, love and solidarity among all people’ (Wilde, 2004, p. 162-163). In this case, it can be understood as an extension of solidarity dealing with contemporary challenges in the form of social and political theory. If there is war and it’s about a warfare state, means solidarity use to

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emerge as the moral basis to realise them ‘normative significant’ (Niznik, 2012, p. 18). There are several flaws of the solidarity discussed in the discourse among social scientists but the instrumental approach can see as a large common interest, normative values of democracy and togetherness of nations when threats are around related to sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Many literatures presented solidarity discourse on the migration crisis and its key concept cannot be separately treated in the context of the welfare state. Grosse & Hetnarowicz (2011, p. 48-49) presented four distinct types of political argumentation as the use of solidarity while the crisis in the context of EU refugee management: 1) the principle of voluntary participation in solidarity action, 2) common asylum and migration policy, 3) fair sharing of responsibility among EU members of the fixed refugee quotas and distributive mechanisms, 4) manifestation of the forcible imposition of ‘solidarity’. Although solidarity for migration crisis management was a proposed action as a shared burden sharing which was broken by some of the members. Habermas (2015, p. 22-23) observed solidarity as an important political concept of moral and legal norms ‘just’ to regulate practices in the context of equal interest. He also referred to them as ‘ethical’ obligations and was treated as ‘obliged to do anything by law or morality’. Although solidarity carries particular interests and veiled agendas, it can use as an important political instrument even through foreign policy. Despite criticism, solidarity provides many political weapons to deal with modern challenges such as climate change, environmental crisis, the migration crisis and war. The normative nature is also carried by solidarity and we also referred to it as ‘flexible solidarity’ due to its adaptive nature of norms that can help solve many modern challenges.

For the first time, solidarity was redefined as ‘flexible solidarity’ in the context EU’s role in previous crisis management during the war in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other African countries (Grimmel, 2021, p. 243). In those times, solidarity especially applied to help EU member states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, or Cyprus) in need. However, this factor is also considered one of the negative impacts such as Brexit and the Eurozone crisis. Grimmel (2021, p. 245) also argued that solidarity is also linked to practises of voluntariness, selflessness, and identification. Solidarity action is an instrument that can use for the refugee and migrant crisis. In a crisis situation, it is ‘an important litmus test for the use of solidarity (ibid., p 258). Studying solidarity in foreign policy requires understanding the concept from discourse in the sociology of international relations. The field of academic literature is broadly associated with the field of law and development. In foreign policy analysis, it is a more traditional approach as solidarity included activities of international organisations and non-governmental organisations and philanthropic actions. Tulmets (2011, p. 14-15) mentioned that “solidarity represents one of the forms of expression of foreign policy identities”. The expression of solidarity depends on the operationalities of foreign policy as a bridge between the political agenda of self and other(s). Its foreign policy implementation can be processed via theoretical lenses like constructivism and rationalism and can be also used as methodological approaches, but there are differences in the approaches of ontological and epistemological reasoning. Identical and rational factors of solidarity can be provided through the implementation of foreign policy, eg, political support, extended assistance policy (crisis management in the form of migration assistance), and promotion of the country’s norms and values.

### **The Polish Role in Ukrainian Refugee Management**

Following Russia’s military action in Ukraine, the EU and its member states immediately responded and showed solidarity with the Ukrainian people especially action by extending help to people in need. The EU helps included such direct humanitarian aid, emergency civil protection assistance, and sup-

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port. These people were fleeing from war and entering the EU also provided protection. In response, the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) for the first time. The EU and its migration management coordinated the Solidarity Platform to properly assisting to Ukrainian refugees (European Commission, 2023). As discussed earlier and data also whooped that most of the Ukrainian refugees fled to Poland. If we see the Polish-Ukraine geographical point of view, both countries share an almost 526 km long geopolitical delamination and almost a million inhabitants surrounding from both sides of the border. Therefore, historically there have always been geopolitical factors between both countries that also decide an important socio-economic factor (Pacocho, 2021, p. 149).

Likewise, despite the long-run war, Ukrainian refugees are keep entering EU territories and nearly 1.5 million got Polish special visas (People in Need, 2022). The OECD report cited that “Poland is by far their main destination country” (Dumont & Lauren, 2022, p. 2). The OECD also mentioned that employment facilitation integration was relatively easy with Ukrainian refugees than with others refugees because of existing social networks, educational profiles, and immediate access to the job markets. Poland was one of the EU states that provided information on employment to Ukrainian refugees. Poland’s unemployment rate was also 2.7 per cent and this data also turned into a welcome treatment for Ukrainians (Karasapan, 2022). Albeit, the Ukraine crisis could ‘turbocharge Poland’s \$670 billion economy. Even the Polish government wants as many people as possible to stay on their territory. Ukrainian refugees filled employment gaps without kitchens, hotels, clinics, and welfare offices. Polish society is doing their maximum effort to ‘make Ukrainians feel welcome’, as Anstey (2022) mentioned in the estimations of the Bloomberg report: 1) the Polish Economic Institute estimations mentioned that ‘private citizens spent up to \$2.1 billion on aid’ in the first three months of the war, 2) the Polish government pledged \$3.4 billion of aid for 2022 and 3) almost 1.2 million Ukrainians have been provided with social security numbers (PESEL stands in Polish Powszechny Elektroniczny System Ewidencji Ludności), access to healthcare services, education and other social benefits.

Poland plays the most effective role in Ukrainian refugee management among the receiving countries. Poland has never been a typical emigration country, but the current war changed its status and made it a key player in the middle of the crisis. It has been going to be one year of the re-emergence of the Ukraine crisis and Poland’s refugee management has also been a focus in media and political discussions at the highest level of leadership. Duszczuk and Kaczmarczyk (2022, p. 164-165) referred to the medium- and long-term impact of Polish perception in the world and could be the more ‘a subject of internal political debate’. Just one decade ago, Poland was not an immigration country, and it was the last of all EU countries. According to estimated data, Poland has seen an unprecedented increase in immigrants it was around 100,000 in 2011 but more than two million were recorded by 2019. Suddenly, Poland became one of the leaders in newly issued resident permits in the EU. It changed substantially after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Ukrainian citizens are dominant in the total share of the Polish migration population. Duszczuk and Kaczmarczyk also noted that the “transformation” of Poland into a migration country was due to it becoming the fastest-growing economy in the EU. Poland has one of the most liberal regimes in the context of accessibility of the Polish labour market for foreigners.

There another factor of Ukrainian refugees has chosen Poland as the most desired destination: 1) linguistic integration is easy for them due to long historical geopolitical and cultural engagement, 2) easy mobility between these two countries due to its connection with well-developed transportation routes. In the 2022 war situation, the President of the Republic of Poland signed an act amending in order to provide assistance to the citizens of Ukraine on 26 March. The new resolution came into force on the same day and applied to people who entered on the territory of Poland retroactively from 24 February

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2022. While processing citizens of Ukraine, the following provisions of law shall not be applied: 1) permanent residence permit, 2) residence permit for long-term EU resident, 3) temporary residence permit, 4) refugee status, 5) subsidiary protection, and 6) approval for tolerated stay. The access to the Polish labour market was also guaranteed for Ukrainian citizens (The Republic of Poland, 2022).

Moreover, other benefits are also provided under “labour market services in the form of inter alia, job placement, vocational counselling and training - on the same principles as Polish citizens”. Ukrainian citizens can also carry out economic activities on the territory of Poland the same as Polish citizens, but who have obtained a PESEL number. Social assistance and maintenance support were also provided to Ukrainian citizens by provincial governors and local authorities. Such assistance and support included; 1) accommodation, 2) any particular entity or a natural person providing such facilities accommodation and food to Ukrainian citizens, got a maximum benefit of 60 days under a Council of Ministers regulation, 3) Ukrainian citizens can also get a one-off living allowance of PLN 300 per person, especially for food, clothing, footwear, personal hygiene products, and housing costs, and 4) food aid also covered under the “Food Aid Operational Programme 2014-2020 co-financed by the European Fund for Aid to the Most Deprived”. Furthermore, Ukrainian citizens who have children and toddlers also receive social benefits in form of “parental benefit, family benefits, Good Start, family care capital or funding to reduce the fee paid by the parent for the stay of a child in a crèche, children’s club or day-care centre” (The Republic of Poland, 2022).

### **Flexible Solidarity: Assessment of the Solidarity Approach and Poland as an Actor**

Karakiewicz-Krawczyk et al. (2022, p. 1-2) measured as active humanitarian support of Poland to Ukraine as ‘a very visible sign of human solidarity’. Here, flexible solidarity has been based on elements of Polish kindness and empathy, and resources included ‘open hearts, houses and institutions and humanitarian and medical aid’. Their study also found that the great interest of Polish society showed solidarity because the conflict in Ukraine can also spread in Poland. These Poles felt fear and threat towards Poland’s security. In particular, those Poles who live near to border areas of Podlasie, Lubuskie, and Podkarpackie felt greater anxiety. Since 2015, public narratives and attitudes also changed towards refugees and other migrants in the term ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Ukrainian refugees are frequently characterised as part of ‘us’ and this solidarity reflects that Poles are against Russian aggression. Although, earlier ‘them’ was used for refugees from the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa. Poland is generally considered a homogeneous society that has been transformed in the last one decade. Russian aggression drove a wave of solidarity towards Ukrainian refugees. There was a long emphasis on European, Catholic and Polish values along with human rights norms that need to translate into empathy, solidarity, compassion and tolerance towards refugee arrival to Poland’s territories. Even in 2015, opposition parties realised and emphasised the extension of solidarity with refugees. Along with this, members of local authorities, liberal-leaning media outlets church representatives and academics raised a similar voice for the extension of Polish solidarity to continue its national tradition of hospitality (Hargrave, Homel & Dražanová, 2023, p. 31).

Next, Hargrave, Homel, & Dražanová (2023, p. 32-33) argued in the current situation of war in Ukraine, refugees from neighbouring countries have been ‘welcomed across Polish public life, from all levels of government, the media, and public figures to Polish society at large’. Polish solidarity has been seen from the first day of the crisis in form of social media awareness; many travelled with necessary items (included with food, toys, and warm clothes) to the borders. These efforts have been seen as coordinated

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and offer support. Even many ‘free shops’ were also opened for Ukrainian refugees to collect essentials free of charge, cook food in shelters, staff assistance points for Ukrainians, and offer of transportation or housing. The private sector has also been part of the solidarity and provided support to Ukrainian refugees. This is the first time that Polish businesses have actively participated in supporting refugees. The latest report from the Narodowy Bank Polski highlighted that approximately 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees are well-taken care of under Polish solidarity. As for refugee integration into Polish society, about 30 per cent of refugees from Ukraine have already gotten a place and almost 50 per cent are still looking (Chmielewska-Kalińska, Dudek & Strzelecki, 2022). Another report mentioned that “Poland has achieved unprecedented success in vocational activation of Ukrainian citizens (...) so far, no country in history has ever managed to provide employment for such a number of refugees” (Zymnin et al., 2022).

Polish solidarity in the management of Ukrainian refugees is also supported by people, NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs). This solidarity has been much more visible in almost every town in Poland (EEAS, 2022). Nahorska (2022) called it ‘new solidarity’ and mentioned: “A hundred days into the crisis, the cracks in this new solidarity are starting to show, as the volunteers and civil society organisations at the frontlines become increasingly exhausted”. Her story also covered that when there is a critical time for Europe, Europe along with Poland has extended solidarity to boost support also beyond Polish borders. A Ukrainian refugee appreciated the Polish solidarity saying that “the Polish people just took me in. I lived at my friend’s place for about a year and I got so much help. And I just thought, it’s time to give back” (Nahorska, 2022). The United Nations acknowledged the solidarity and dignity of Central and Eastern European countries with Ukrainian refugees, especially in cities of Poland, Moldova, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia (UNECE, 2022).

Gozdziaik and Main (2020, p. 1) called ‘new forms of solidarity are shaping in the response to the European refuge crisis’ In their study emphasised the evolution of the new form of ‘solidarity with migrants and refugees in local Polish communities and abroad’. Initially, the Polish government called it a ‘flexible solidarity’ mechanism within the EU in the context of border securitisation. At the grassroots level effort, several Polish cities before the ongoing Ukraine crisis (before 2022) welcomed migrants and refugees in order to facilitate integration. Homo Faber is an NGO based in Lublin and its director Anna Dąbrowska mentioned that “The solidarity is amazing (...) our two peoples have always had close relations. The most important building in Lublin, the Holy Trinity Church, has a Ukrainian inscription. Of course, we help our neighbours” (Melzer, 2022). She expressed that the Catholic Church is also an important driver in this solidarity. Furthermore, the Polish ambassador to the United Nations also mentioned in the UN Security Council meeting that Poland is proud to say it has earned to be a ‘superpower of solidarity’ and spent 1.5 per cent of its GDP on humanitarian assistance for Ukraine. Krzysztof Szczerski mentioned that “we are very proud to live up to our reputation as a ‘superpower of solidarity’ and will not rest in our efforts until victory and a just peace” (The First News, 2023).

Likewise, the Polish president mentioned that “all of us the solidarity of nations, especially under current threats to our common security, is one of the cornerstones of peace, stability, development, prosperity and resilience” (Duda, 2022). Even US President Joe Biden appreciated the Polish role in the Ukraine crisis and the management of refugees. He delivered his speech from Warsaw’s Royal Castle that “in moments of great upheaval and uncertainty, knowing what you stand for is most important, and knowing who stands with you makes all the difference (...) the people of Poland know (...) better than anyone (...) what that solidarity means”. At the end of his speech, he expressed that “Poland’s generosity, your willingness to open your hearts and your homes, is extraordinary... In that darkest moment, you,



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the people of Poland, offered them safety and light...God bless you” (Ptak, 2023). He also thanked the Polish people for their solidarity with Ukraine and the accommodation of refugees.

## **CONCLUSION**

Considering all of the above discussions, just a decade ago, Poland was not a migration-friendly country. Everything has changed just after the first Ukraine crisis occurred in 2014-2015 when Russia first started its so-called military operation in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine with rebels. That was the first time a large number of refugees entered Poland. It happened once again when the presidential election results of the 2020 Belarusian election were not accepted by the opposition and its supporters. It was the time when many protesters fled to seek asylum in Poland. The Russian attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 resulted in mass Ukrainian citizens fleeing to Poland and other neighbouring countries. There were unprecedented numbers for the first time occurred after WWII. Poland has had a long history of solidarity since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russian aggression since 2014 has once again forced not only Polish but also Western-allied to adopt solidarity. Poland emerged as a solidarity superpower at least in the Ukraine crisis in Central and Eastern Ukraine. Polish solidarity is highly appreciated in the world for managing and contributing to support the Ukrainian people. The act of Poland is emerging as an image changing in the world. But Poland still has to go a long mile to achieve the true goal of its foreign policy to be the solidarity superpower in the world.

However, Poland was always blamed for not accepting refugees from Afghanistan, the Middle East and African countries and perceived these behaviours as discriminatory. But Polish's new solidarity, or so-called solidarity, now emerged as an opportunity to change the image and Poland also got a chance to be a true leader in Central and Eastern European politics. Poland is already one of the emerging labour markets for foreigners, but the country still needs to be liberalised in the case of integration of people from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. If Poland does this, it can be widely accepted as a 'solidarity superpower'.

## **Disclaimer**

We have used the term 'Ukrainian refugees' to define their specificity. Ukrainian people are not granted refugee status as per the 1951 Geneva Convention. As per the report, most of them also do not anticipate applying any forms of international protection. The most of reports and articles mentioned 'special visa status' and the EU mentioned the status under the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). In our analysis, the term 'Ukrainian refugees' and 'migration crisis' refer to forced migration. We have also used the term 'invasion' according to reports from popular media and scholarly articles.

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## Chapter 14

# How the Russia–Ukraine War Will Be Reflected in the Geopolitics of the European Union

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### **ABSTRACT**

*In the 21st century, information is easily disseminated using various technologies. At this stage, all such means are “preoccupied” with spreading the information about the Ukraine-Russia war. In the wake of this war, there is even more interest in what EU foreign policy and security looks like. The chapter serves to discuss this issue in detail. It also describes whether the current war has changed the EU’s attitude towards foreign policy and security. The sources that provide the latest information on the issue from time to time, as well as the opinions of non-member countries and other organizations about the attitude of the European Union, are discussed in the chapter.*

### **INTRODUCTION**

27 European countries are united in the European Union, which have joined together to ensure peace, prosperity and freedom in the world. Of course, the position of an organization with similar goals to current events in the world is noteworthy and important. The most shocking of these events is the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, which has already claimed the lives of thousands of civilians. Residential houses and all the facilities that people could use if needed are also destroyed. All shops, pharmacies and hospitals have been destroyed, and people are receiving food, medicine and even medical care in special bunkers.

However, there are also those who managed to leave the country before the war became uncontrollable and merciless. These people are currently in different European countries as refugees and receive the assistance that is allocated to them individually in each country. The foreign policy and security of the

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European Union become much more important with this situation. The Ukrainian people expect the EU to take steps related to direct assistance, not just the provision of necessary resources. Ukraine, Europe and the attitude of European countries towards the war are the epicenter of world interest (Kirby, 2022).

The objectives of the research paper are:

The purpose of the research is to determine what the EU foreign policy is like in the period when the genocidal war is taking place in the Eastern part of Europe in the 21st century. It is clear that in order to determine this goal, it is not enough to find only superficial information, and it is necessary that the issue be discussed in depth and argumentatively. For this, we can talk not only about the current foreign policy and security, but also whether there was a case when the European Union had to change it for some reason and how it had a negative effect on any of the countries of the Union. Many countries celebrate the European Union as a kind of hope. However, it is also important to consider how acceptable and correct it is for non-member states to have similar thinking in relation to this relationship.

### **EU Neighborhood and External Security Policy**

Talks about creating a neighborhood policy should start in 2003. The goal of this policy is to establish relations with neighboring countries. In exchange for this relationship, the European Union offers its neighboring countries a share of security, prosperity and stability. Of course, the benefits are not one-sided and the European Union is trying to promote the process of political, economic and cultural rapprochement between member and neighboring countries, which will be beneficial for Europe as a whole.

Currently, 16 countries are united in the neighborhood policy. These are: Azerbaijan, Egypt, Algeria, Belarus, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Palestine, Syria, Georgia, Ukraine and Tunisia. From this list, only 12 countries participate fully in the implementation of the neighborhood policy, and the remaining four are partially involved in the mentioned process.

Participation, of course, is carried out in accordance with a specially created action plan. The duty of the European Commission is to define the necessary political and economic parameters for countries to evaluate their progress. However, the principle of the current action plan is still the same. If there are differences, it is because they are adapted to the level of development, needs and interests of a particular country. The monitoring of all this is included in the duties of the Social Commission of the European Union and the External Action Service. The EU plan report is published once a year.

The importance of this relationship for the European Union is indicated by the fact that in 2007-2013, 12 billion euros were allocated for the purpose of financial assistance to implement projects planned in individual countries. Also, the European Union simplified the visa regime with its neighboring countries, facilitated their integration and more. The Eastern Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy are also forms of cooperation developed by the European Union (Information Center on NATO and EU, 2023).

The main goal of creating the foreign and security policy of the European Union is to resolve conflicts and strengthen international relations. This, of course, also includes respect for existing diplomacy and international rules. In the international arena, the European Union conducts trade, allocates humanitarian aid, and tries to develop existing cooperation with its non-member countries.

To summarize, the foreign policy and security objectives look like this:

- Keeping the peace.
- Strengthening international security.

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- Promotion of international cooperation.
- Respect for human rights, basic freedom, rule of law and democracy, their development and consolidation, that is, unification.
- Even summaries of EU foreign policy and security legislation.

The EU needs to get these policy goals right. Because relations with other countries have mutual benefits, maintaining them is important not only for the interests of the EU but also for the interests of non-member countries. That is, the benefits that such a relationship brings are mutual.

This union does not have its army and can “use” the resources of member countries if necessary. And in this usage, it means sending on missions to areas of the world where there is a problem that conflicts with foreign policy and security objectives. Monitoring law and order, maintaining them, participating in peacekeeping operations or providing humanitarian aid are the possibilities that the EU has.

In order to protect the interests and core values of the European Union, the External Action Service (EEAS) exists. The above-mentioned includes more than 140 objects and mainly focuses on monitoring. However, this specific one does not have any other load, because the final decision-making body is the European Council. This council is composed of the heads of government of the member countries, and a common decision is made after a kind of agreement (Dandashly, 2021).

It should be noted that the common foreign and security policy of the European Union is based on the Maastricht Treaty. This agreement entered into force in 1993. After that, the Treaty of Amsterdam was created in 1999, the Treaty of Nice in 2003, and finally, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which strengthened the above. On the part of the European Union, it is clear that the creation of a new treaty once again underlines the importance of the foreign and security policy (Chitadze, 2011).

## **THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SECURITY IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE**

### **2014 Annexation of Crimea**

In 2014, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine faced the greatest threat to national security for the first time. In November 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich rejected an agreement on greater integration with the European Union, sparking mass protests that Yanukovich tried to suppress violently. Russia supported Yanukovich in the crisis, while the US and Europe supported the protesters.

In February 2014, anti-government protests overthrew the government and forced Yanukovich out of the country. Instead of the president, the interim government came to rule the country. The economic situation was an important challenge for this government. However, at the same time, the situation in Crimea was much more serious. Because pro-Russian separatists took over government buildings in Crimea and declared independence with the support of Russian troops. After the resignation of the allied president, Russia decided to act on its own in order not to lose its influence on the territory of Ukraine.

This case is known as the annexation of Crimea, and it even caused quite a lot of criticism in the West. And Russia again and again continued to violate international law and carry out separatist actions in Eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian security services were initially unable to resist a similar type of attack carried out by Russian soldiers.



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In April, pro-Russian separatists began occupying territories in eastern Ukraine. Rebels shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, killing 298 people. The fight between the rebels and the Ukrainian military intensified. As the rebels faced defeat, Russia began to infiltrate eastern Ukraine to aid the rebels (Chitadze, 2023).

The rebels began to lose ground, and in August the Russian army invaded eastern Ukraine in support of the rebels. All this brought the relations between Russia and the West to the lowest point since the Cold War. Sanctions have pushed the Russian economy to the brink of recession and killed more than 2,500 Ukrainians. After Ukrainian forces began systematically retaking disputed territories ahead of the May 2014 presidential election, the United States and the European Union expanded economic sanctions against Russian companies and individuals. Many innocent people died as a result of this initial confrontation (Chitadze, 2023).

### **2022 War Between Russia and Ukraine**

On February 24, 2022, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia intensified. This was caused by the invasion of Russia on the territory of Ukraine.

Russia started preparing for this war in 2021. This is confirmed by the fact that Russia has slowly started supplying its military equipment to the borders of Ukraine. This fact was not hidden from world organizations or leaders, because there were quite a lot of photos and video materials related to the fact that Russia was showing readiness for military confrontation. By December 2021, in addition to military equipment, Russian soldiers appeared at the borders of Ukraine, the number of which was more than 100,000 (Chitadze, 2023).

Of course, there was an expectation that Russia would invade directly by 2022. The Russian side stated that they were just on a peaceful mission in the mentioned territory. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia announced his demand, according to which the US and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) should stop any kind of military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The main goal of this request was to prevent Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO in the future.

Of course, NATO and the USA did not agree to these demands and even imposed appropriate economic sanctions on Russia. Unfortunately, this was not a deterrent for the Russian Federation, and Russia still sent its troops to the territory of Ukraine.

On February 24, Vladimir Putin (President of Russia) started full-scale pressure on the territory of Ukraine. He ordered his soldiers to attack Ukraine using land, sea, and air forces. This battle is still going on in the territory of Ukraine, and Ukraine receives humanitarian aid and assistance from world organizations as support.

The European Union, like other world organizations, also condemns the actions that Russia has carried out on the territory of Ukraine. 141 of the 193 countries represented at the UN special session supported the fact that Russia's action is unacceptable and that Russia should immediately stop all the actions it is illegally carrying out on the territory of another country (European Council, 2022).

The United States has issued escalating sanctions on the financial assets of Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, removed Russian banks from the global financial messaging system SWIFT and banned imports of American oil and natural gas. The US continues to provide military assistance to Ukraine. After Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addressed Congress on March 16, Biden announced an additional \$800 million in military aid. Just after the Russian invasion, Biden also ordered the deployment of 7,000 American troops to Germany (Chitadze, 2023).

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Direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine continued, and Russia announced in late March 2022 that it would reduce military activity near Kyiv and Chernihiv. Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to fight a Ukrainian counteroffensive in and around major Ukrainian cities, although the initial Russian offensive has slowed. Several Russian long-range missile strikes have caused significant damage to Ukraine's military assets, urban settlements, and communications. Transport infrastructure. Hospitals and residential complexes also become the main epicenter of the bombing. Russian military forces have been destroying everything they come across on the territory of Ukraine for more than a month. They destroy material possessions and kill all people who "cross" their path, regardless of gender or age.

Given the current state of the war, it is still unclear how the conflict will end. Despite this, the fact that Russian soldiers destroy virtually everything they encounter on the way remains a proven fact. An example of this is the destroyed cities, which especially show traces of war. For example Bucha and Mariupol (Kirby, 2022).

### **EU Sanctions Against Russia From 2014 to Date**

Sanctions have become a modern method of "engaging" in war in the modern world. The European Union has adopted a total of five packages of sanctions against Russia. Each sanction aims to gradually weaken the Kremlin's capabilities. And these skills, of course, include the monetary resources that the Kremlin uses to finance the war.

The measures developed in this regard are diverse and include individual and economic sanctions, restrictions on the media, diplomatic measures, as well as the restriction of economic relations with the non-state controlled territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions. It should be noted that Belarus shares Russia's position in the mentioned war and is considered one of its allies. That is why the European Union has targeted sanctions not only on Russia but also on Belarus in response to its participation in the war on the Russian side (European Council, 2022).

### **Individual Sanctions**

Individual sanctions generally include asset freezes and travel restrictions. In this regard, the European Union imposed sanctions on a total of 1,091 individuals and up to 80 entities. This is completely related to the fact that they participated not only in the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine but also in the violation of the sovereignty and independence of the mentioned country. There is a list that includes the data of all the persons or entities against which the EU has developed sanctions. At the top of the list, of course, are Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov.

Also to Russian Duma, National Security Council, high-ranking, businessmen and oligarchs. These sanctions against Russia were initially implemented in March of the same year during the 2014 war. Russia's invasion of Ukraine caused the extension of these sanctions until September 15, 2022 (European Council, 2022).

Economic sanctions:

The European Union also started imposing economic sanctions against Russia in 2014. These kinds of sanctions were first established in July and September 2014, in March 2015 it was planned to equalize the sanctions with the full implementation of the Minsk Agreement, however, due to the failure of the mentioned "plan", the extension of the sanctions was postponed until the middle of 2016. The Minsk Agreement was signed in 2014 and this agreement includes a package of measures:

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- Ceasefire between the parties
- Removal of heavy weapons from the front line
- Release of prisoners of war
- Constitutional reform of Ukraine
- Granting self-government to individual territories of Donbass
- Restoration of state border control.

However, the agreement was not fully implemented. Therefore, this was not the first time when the European Union had to extend the sanctions against Russia. Currently, the sanctions are extended until July 31, 2022.

Financial sanctions are much more “destructive” for Russia, as they directly affect banks and companies. What is most important is that the sanctions apply not only to Russia but also to Belarus. As relevant transactions with the central banks of these two countries are prohibited, the restrictions on the SWIFT system and the supply of euro-dominant banknotes also apply to both countries. However, the financial sector is more severely restricted in Russia. Because it also prohibits any kind of financing or even investment in Russia (European Council, 2022). Similarly tightening the financial sector will bring the most negative results to Russia again and again.

Sanctions have also been developed to ban coal imports from Russia, new investments in the Russian energy sector, and the export of oil refining sector goods and technologies to Russia. The long list of sanctions does not end there, as it also covers transport-related sanctions. This includes the closure of EU airspace not only for Russian-owned but also Russian-registered aircraft, the closure of EU ports for Russian ships, the ban of Russian and Belarusian road transport operators from entering the EU, and, of course, the ban on the export of aviation, marine and space industry goods and technologies to Russia.

In terms of trade, much more important reforms were also carried out. More specifically, the export of dual-use goods and technological items to the territory of Russia was prohibited. Ban on the arms trade, import of iron, steel, wood, cement, seafood, and alcoholic beverages from Russia to the EU, and a ban on the export of luxury goods to Russia are also included in the list of restrictions.

It is worth noting the fact that the Nord Stream project has been an important issue for European countries for a long time. Especially for Germany, because with this means it was possible to activate new pipelines that would ensure the supply of oil from the territory of Russia to Europe with the help of a new means. However, due to the current events, the German government itself rejected this project. Countries gradually realized that as a result of foreign trade with Russia, they can come under the control of this state easily. That is why their strategy has been significantly changed and includes a kind of distancing from Russia and finding new partners from whom they can get oil or gas. Germany is currently facing this challenge, and the country needs to resolve the current issue by the end of 2022 (European Council, 2022).

Sanctions to the media:

The imposition of sanctions against the media was caused by the 2022 war. Sputnik and Russia Today are the media outlets affected by the said sanctions. Their broadcasting activities were restricted for an indefinite period, that is until they continue to cover aggressive statements toward Ukraine. In addition, these broadcasts contribute to the coverage of disinformation facts by the Russian Federation and thereby contribute to the manipulation of citizens with statements made against the European Union and its member states. It is a well-known fact that Sputnik and Russia Today are television stations that

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are completely controlled by the Russian Federation, and therefore it is not at all excluded that such manipulative statements may be broadcast by this type of television.

Diplomatic measures:

The development of diplomatic measures started back in 2014. During this period, the summit between the European Union and Russia was canceled and the EU member states decided not to hold similar bilateral summits with Russia. In the same year, a meeting of the Big Seven was held in Brussels, which Russia did not attend. However, later on, holding similar types of meetings developed into a regular mode.

The countries of the European Union jointly decide to gradually remove Russia from all major and major organizations and associations. An example of this is that they did not allow Russia to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Energy Agency. And in 2022, by a joint decision, Russian diplomats and other Russian officials will no longer benefit from the visa advantage that existed before. These restrictions apply to citizens with authority in Russia, not ordinary civilians or natural persons (European Council, 2022).

The above is a small list of sanctions that the EU has developed from time to time to “fight” against Russia. The goal of this struggle is to limit all connections with the outside world, and countries, of course, are increasingly supporting the initiative of imposing similar sanctions. The European Union is obliged to follow the norms of foreign policy and security and to promote that the rights of the citizens of Ukraine, as a member of the neighborhood policy, are protected in one way or another.

### **The Reflection of Sanctions Against Russia on the EU Economy**

Russian aggression in Ukraine was followed by retaliatory political and economic decisions from the West, which was reflected in ten packages of sanctions of an unprecedented scale. The concerted actions of the partners dealt a heavy blow to the aggressor country, affecting almost all its sectors, critical industries, and financial institutions. However, due to the scale of globalization of the economy, even the West itself could not avoid severe consequences. On the one hand, the current difficult economic situation is caused by the war itself, because Russia and Ukraine are the largest players in global trade and occupy the leading positions in the world in the production of such basic consumer products as wheat, grain, oil, and others, not to mention energy resources and technological components. On the other hand, the situation is aggravated by sanctions, which in turn have damaged supply chains and increased consumer prices. All this is happening against the background when the global economy has not yet recovered from the shocks of the pandemic, and the processes of its recovery have been observed since the beginning of this year. However, Moscow’s war against Europe’s territorially largest country turned economic forecasts and plans upside down. There is no doubt that the retaliatory sanctions of aggression from the West have the greatest political significance and are aimed at exhausting the war machine of the authoritarian regime in Moscow. Even though the countries imposing the restrictions themselves suffer from this, these steps were necessary so that after Ukraine, other European countries would not become victims of aggression.

More than 400 days have passed since the beginning of the war, and the world economic landscape has also changed significantly, which even pushed countries to make extreme decisions. High inflation, disruptions in production and supply chains, low economic growth, if not recession in some cases – these are just a few of the problems many countries have faced. In the case of Europe, the situation is further complicated by its high dependence on Russian energy resources, especially against the background of a long and cold winter ahead. The European Union is the third largest economy in the world after the

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United States of America and China. Thus, the challenges it faces have a chain reaction and spread to many countries. In the context of supporting Ukraine, together with the USA and Great Britain, on the one hand, it was the main initiator and implementer of the restrictions that created tangible problems for the Moscow regime, and on the other hand, it plays a major role in sheltering refugees and helping Ukraine with financial or military weapons. It is interesting to consider the difficulties faced by the European Union states, what steps they have taken to deal with the mentioned problems and what are their economic growth forecasts.

#### **Inflation**

Inflation is one of the primary and noteworthy challenges of the European Union because the increase in the general level of prices directly affects the purchasing power of the population, their general socio-economic well-being, and their quality of life. Against the backdrop of the problems caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, prices in the European Union have increased significantly. For example, according to Eurostat data, in August of this year, the annual inflation rate reached 9.1%, which is much higher than the current expectation (Eurostat, 2022). For comparison, in the same period last year, the annual rate of inflation was 3%. The prices of basic consumer products, as well as alcohol, tobacco, household items, and cars, have increased, the cost of which, compared to last year, has increased by 5-7%. According to the statements of the European leaders, the main driver of the high inflation in the EU countries is the increase in the prices of energy resources, which amounted to about 38% (Eurostat, 2022). This, of course, has a major impact on the smooth functioning of manufacturing sectors and, in turn, hurts trade and supply chains. With the approach of winter, European experts are forecasting a further increase in the prices of energy resources and food products. The main question is: how severe will the consequences be and how long will this process last for European states (Ward Glenton, 2022)? In August, the lowest inflation among EU countries was in France, which amounted to 6.6%, and the highest - was in Estonia, 25.2%, Latvia - 21.4%, and Lithuania - 21.1% (Eurostat, 2022).

Europe's political leaders fear that the highest inflation in decades, which is already nearing double digits, will rise further, which will have the effect of reducing household savings and hampering investment and other active economic activities. Ultimately, everything affects the population of Europe negatively and has a direct impact on their quality of life. The European Central Bank also updated the inflation forecasts. According to their assumption, inflation will be 5.5% in 2023, and 2.3% in 2024, thus returning to the annual rate of 2021 (Rate Inflation, 2022). To deal with high inflation and take into account the potential risks, the European Union countries implement various types of aid programs. Their goal is both to alleviate the increased consumer prices for the population and to help the private sector to pay less to the state and have more financial resources for both domestic consumption and reinvestment. Such stimulus programs include monetary assistance to the population, pension increases, partial tax write-offs or deferral programs for businesses, tax rate reductions, unemployment assistance, etc. To the extent that similar types of allowances may be a short-term relief for the population, it is so bad for the state, because this amount is deducted from the state budget for various priority directions, which should ensure the long-term stability, development, and economic growth of the country.

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### **Monetary Policy**

The European Central Bank (ECB) has significantly tightened monetary policy due to high inflation and the lowest value of the euro against the US dollar in the last 20 years. On September 8 of this year, the Governing Committee of the European Central Bank increased the refinancing rate by 75 basis points to 0.75%, compared to the previous rate of 0% (ECB, 2022). This decision affected 19 countries of the Eurozone and it aims to reduce inflation to the target of 2% in the medium term. Probably, in the short term, this step would have had a positive effect on the exchange rate of the euro, if not for the decision of the American Federal Reserve System (FED) to tighten the monetary policy as well. At the meeting on September 21 of this year, the FED's steering committee supported the increase of the refinancing rate by 75 points, as a result of which the main rate reached 3.25% (Shatakishvili, 2022). This has negatively affected the value of the euro, which in turn is one of the causes of high inflation in Europe. It is expected that at the next meetings of the committees, both the American and the European financial authorities will make even stricter decisions. However, experts say the ECB's decisions are overdue and they will need several more months to match the Fed's rate of growth. In general, the refinancing rate is one of the main mechanisms of inflation control, although it, in turn, hurts the healthy functioning of the economy and contributes to its slowdown. Given the global economic difficulties and risks, the European Central Bank has to maintain a difficult balance between controlling rising inflation and maintaining economic growth. The rate of refinancing is the main determinant of the interest rate of loans issued by commercial banks. However, in free markets, such as the Eurozone, it is also affected by credit supply and demand. In other words, how much both individuals and the business sector can afford to spend and invest? If, for example, these individuals want to invest, but find it difficult to get enough cash from banking institutions, this will lead to an increase in the interest rate, which means that borrowing money will become more expensive. When the European Central Bank increases the monetary policy rate, it increases the interest rate on both loans issued by commercial banks and interest on deposits. Thus, taking into account the annual benefits, saving and saving money becomes a priority for the population, and the demand for bank money decreases. As a result, the overall demand for various types of products and services decreases and, accordingly, the price, as well as less active trade and the flow of national currency out of the country. It is clear that only a strict monetary policy cannot eliminate the problems and cannot confront the external factors causing inflation, although it can bring inflationary expectations under control, which is one of the most important levers of its management.

### **Economic Growth**

There are different expectations about the economic growth forecasts of the EU states, which changed along with the course of the Russia-Ukraine war and the retaliatory sanctions imposed by the West. The fact is that at the current stage, the European Union is facing both high inflation and challenges such as disruption of supply chains, restrictions in obtaining components necessary for production, transport and logistics delays, energy resources, population and private sector subsidy needs, and others. All this has a major impact on the healthy functioning and productivity of European economies, which directly affects the gross domestic product. The general uncertainty and the impulsive actions of the Moscow regime make the situation even worse and less predictable. Rising energy prices, falling consumer spending, and declining business activity across Europe are putting their economies under the greatest stress and raising the risks of a potential recession. Despite the current difficulties, the EU economy grew by 0.6% in the

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second quarter of this year compared to the previous quarter, and by 4% compared to the same period last year (ECB, 2022). At the current stage, this process will probably be hindered to some extent by the tightened monetary policy and the approach of winter. The economic growth forecasts of the European Union cause differences of opinion. The European Central Bank does not share the opinion about the possible recession of the economy. According to them, although the latest data indicate a slowdown in the economic growth of the Eurozone and stagnation is expected, both in the last quarter of this year and in the first quarter of next year, in their opinion, this process will not turn into a recession. According to their forecast, in 2022, the economy of the Eurozone will grow by 3.1%, next year - by 0.9%, and in 2024, the growth will reach 1.9%. Commercial banks and financial institutions have different forecasts regarding economic growth. For example, the German “Deutsche Bank” predicts a 2.2% decline in the EU economy in 2023 (Kollmeyer, 2022).

Despite the existing difficulties, the labor market is at the height of demand and makes its contribution to the implementation of economic activities. According to Eurostat data, a record-low unemployment rate of 6.6% was recorded in the Eurozone in July of this year, while the unemployment rate was 7.7% in the same period last year (Eurostat, 2022). As for industrial production, according to Eurostat data, production in the European Union in June increased by 0.6% compared to May, and by 2.4% compared to the same period last year. However, production fell by 1.6% in July compared to the previous month (Eurostat, 2022). It seems that Europe has more problems ahead in terms of production. According to the publication “Bloomberg”, the German car manufacturing company “Volkswagen” is thinking about transferring its production to Eastern Europe, citing limited access to natural gas as the reason. In addition, several sources write that for a similar reason metal producing and processing companies in European countries are also facing severe problems (Desai, 2022). Consequently, companies may face even more tangible problems in terms of production in the coming months.

### **Energy**

With the continuation of Russian aggression and the approach of winter, Europe’s energy future is becoming an increasingly urgent issue. This is caused, on the one hand, by Europe’s high dependence on Russian natural gas, on the other hand, by the long process of finding alternative suppliers, and also by Moscow’s artificially created barriers to gas supply to Europe. Seven packages of Western sanctions have failed to target Russian natural gas, while curbs have hit energy resources such as crude oil and coal. It is a fact that Europe had a hard time giving up Russian gas, although Russia itself started creating problems in this regard and using this resource as a tool for blackmail. Thus, the European Union faces significant energy challenges, which increases both the risks of economic recession in European countries and calls into question the ambitions of the region regarding climate change. As a result of Russian aggression, in response to the sanctions imposed by the West, in March-July of this year, the Kremlin significantly reduced gas supplies to European countries and even completely stopped some of them. It is a fact that natural gas is the most important weapon of political and economic influence for Moscow. In the background, when Europe received 40% of its gas supply from Russia, it is clear that its reduction and the subsequent blockade were a huge blow for it, which caused both production delays and significant inflation. According to the calculations of German analysts, the increase in the overall level of prices may even exceed 10%. The largest gas pipeline for transporting Russian gas in Europe is “Northern Stream 1”, which supplies gas to Germany, Austria, France, and Italy. Already last year, the Russian state company “Gazprom” began to reduce the supply of natural gas to Europe. Along with the

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imposition of sanctions on an unprecedented scale, this process took on a more radical character. As a result, Moscow reduced the load of the mentioned gas pipeline from 40% to 20% in July (Meredith, 2022). Thus, “North Stream 1” transported about 33 million cubic meters of gas per day, while last year this figure reached 220 million cubic meters per day (Steitz, Escritt, 2022). The Kremlin explained this decision by the necessity of technical works and the lack of technical components, although this argument was unconvincing for European leaders. The limited amount of natural gas from “Gazprom” was immediately followed by the decision of the EU member states to reduce their gas consumption by 15% (Schmitz, 2022).

This step may be perceived by Europe as a signal that it will not fall under Russian pressure<sup>10</sup> and is not going to withdraw sanctions and stop helping Ukraine with military weapons in exchange for replenishing its reserves. As far as is known, most of the EU countries have already filled 80% of their gas reserves. Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands have the largest amount of natural gas reserves, and the smallest - Latvia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. To increase the supply of Russian gas to Europe, a project worth 11 billion dollars was built - “Northern Stream 2”, which started working in test mode at the end of last year. This project was opposed by both the United States of America and most of the EU countries. According to them, the mentioned gas pipeline would allow Moscow to have even more political and economic influence on Europe. In Ukraine, on the second day of the Russian aggression, Germany, the main supporter of the project, stopped its certification process. On September 26 of this year, the operator of “North Stream 2” reported that the pressure in the pipeline dropped from 105 to 7 bar, and this was probably a gas leak in the Baltic Sea (Lawson, 2022). As it became known, shortly before the start of the war, 300 million cubic meters of gas were loaded into the pipeline, although it was not officially put into operation. The next day, a similar case was recorded on “North Stream 1”. EU leaders see Russia’s signature in this process and accuse it of sabotage. The European Union is actively working to overcome the crisis. Also, negotiations are ongoing with individual countries regarding the increase of natural gas supply. In addition, European countries sign agreements on the purchase of gas for domestic consumption with various states. One of the main alternatives is liquefied natural gas, which is transported by tankers. In this regard, the leading country is the United States of America, which in recent years increased the export of liquefied gas to Europe 3 times. Germany has started to arrange appropriate infrastructure and build storage terminals. Also, Europe has invested 155 billion US dollars in the development of renewable energy sources, although tangible results are not expected from them in the short term. At the current stage, the most sensible step on the part of the European Union is to save energy. Some analysts estimate that a 15% energy saving, along with other alternatives, could be enough to get through the winter, although this process is not easy to achieve. In this regard, several countries have already started making efforts. For example, in Berlin, the German president’s palace is no longer lit at night, and during the summer, in the city of Hanover, the hot water is turned off in sports halls and swimming pools, municipalities take various measures to cope with the 11 winter cold, including finding alternative means of heating (Dezem, Wilkes, Delfs, 2022).

In addition, leading countries are trying to use coal-fired power plants instead of gas. To deal with energy problems, European countries are actively implementing population and business assistance programs. For example, Germany has announced that it will help the Russian gas-importing state company “Uniper” with 15 billion euros so that consumers do not have to increase their fees. In addition, it plans to temporarily remove state taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel to make public transportation more affordable and accessible for citizens. France’s parliament on Aug. 3 passed a 20 billion-euro inflation relief package, boosting pensions and allowing companies to pay employees bonuses that will be



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exempt from mandatory state taxes. According to them, these decisions are aimed at strengthening the purchasing power of households. On August 4, the Italian government approved an aid package worth 17 billion euros. It aims to reduce electricity and gas bills. This amount is in addition to the €35 billion already spent since January, which was allocated to mitigate the impact of electricity, gas, and petrol costs (Euronews, 2022). With the start of the war and the use of global restrictions, Europe hoped that natural gas would be an inviolable resource for Russia because, under the conditions of the operation of the most severe sanctions, it would be one of the main sources of income for it, from which the financial resources received, on the one hand, should be used in the war., and on the other hand - in creating an imitation of the normal functioning of the economy. In addition, they hoped to quickly find alternative suppliers, which unfortunately did not happen, and this process took a lot of time and resources. Even though Russia practically tried to nip in the bud Europe's desire to fill up its reserves and face the winter without too many problems, the fact is that Europe more or less managed to achieve this goal. In this regard, one of the interesting questions is where Moscow gets the gas intended for Europe and where it gets the necessary finances for the war. First of all, it should be noted that the price of natural gas has increased by about 60%. According to approximate calculations, only in the first 3 months after the start of the war, the Kremlin regime received approximately 95 billion US dollars from the sale of gas and oil. In addition, it has partners in the form of India, China, Africa, and the Persian Gulf countries, which are ready to buy Russian energy resources, especially when Russia offers them a discount (Shatakishvili, 2022).

## **CONCLUSION**

Along with the continuation of Russian aggression, economic indicators, and corresponding forecasts change practically every week. Even the recent information about the announcement of partial mobilization in Russia raises certain expectations, which directly affect the financial markets and the general economic situation of the countries. It is a fact that the member states of the European Union have faced the greatest difficulties and have to react immediately to each issue in the background of the impulsive decisions of the authoritarian regime. Despite the current challenges, Europe has the resources to overcome any difficulties and to act as much as possible against the factors that cause its financial problems. In this regard, for example, there is noticeable progress in terms of diversification of energy resources, where alternative suppliers have already appeared. However, this process is not going so fast and thus, it cannot give tangible results to the European countries in the short term. In the wake of the current difficulties, the EU is helping Ukraine not only with military and financial resources but is also ready to fully engage in the process of its recovery. It is in their direct interest that millions of refugees return safely to their homeland. The global pandemic of 2020 has put the world economy in a difficult situation, and the current war between Russia and Ukraine has given rise to the mentioned problems anew. Despite the difficult situation, the economic indicators are still hopeful, and even in the case of a slight recession in the European economy, there is an expectation of a quick recovery. First of all, the biggest problem is inflation, which is affected by many factors. Europe's leaders appeal more to energy resources and accuse Russia of creating artificial difficulties. Along with the growth of inflation, the monetary policy tightens, which in itself causes the economy to slow down. On the other hand, Russia, facing the most severe economic challenges, is ready to strike Europe hard, in the form of a gas blockade, even if it leads to the loss of additional financial resources for it, and the fact is that this process is in

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an active phase. It can be said that the European Union is well aware of the danger that increases with the approach of winter. Also, it has to give up Russian gas at any cost - it simply has no other choice. The fact is that, unfortunately, Europe does not have many alternatives for action other than to reduce consumption, actively negotiate with potential suppliers and look for alternative sources of gas. In the case of more radical decisions from Russia, which is highly probable, Europe will likely face a more crisis period, the only question is - how severe? And all this will depend on the steps taken before winter and their effectiveness. An example of this may have been the recent reports of the “North Streams” gas pipeline leaks, for which Russia is blamed. According to analysts’ statements, even if a political agreement is reached, these pipelines will not be able to provide gas transportation during this year’s winter. The reason for this is the serious damage to some of their sections, and the gas leakage may even last for weeks. As it became known, the European Union is preparing the eighth package of sanctions against Russia, which was presented by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on September 28 of this year. According to him, this is related to the so-called temporary occupation of the territories of Ukraine. Referendums and Russia’s war crimes. The new sanctions include a ban on the import of certain products from Russia, which means the country will lose 7 billion euros in annual revenue. In addition, he proposes to ban the export of certain types of goods to Russia from the European Union, including additional aviation equipment, electronic components, and chemicals. It also proposes to expand the list of individual sanctions and impose additional restrictions on those who try to circumvent the sanctions (European Commission, 2022). Despite the complicated socio-economic situation, let’s hope that Europe will pass the winter without further problems and will start the process of economic recovery and recovery with the victory of Ukraine.

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## Chapter 15

# Analyzing the Impact of Geopolitical Implications of Gas Dependency on the European Union and Russia Due to the Ukrainian Conflict

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### **ABSTRACT**

*The European Union (hereinafter EU) has grown more reliant on Russian gas in recent decades. Multiple geopolitical disputes in Ukraine simultaneously affected gas relations and placed the country's independence under stress. This chapter aimed to examine the connection between reliance and geopolitical conflicts. This fascinating relationship was given a fresh perspective by examining it in the context of the interdependency and asymmetry theories. A unique case study, an abductive research method, was used to approach this challenge. As a result, the geopolitical problems in Ukraine are utilized to explain how reliance and conflict relate to one another. The primary factors examined were trade, reliance, and sanctions. According to the analysis, there is a significant connection between an actor's economic and political goals and how they affect reliance. It can be concluded that there is a connection between the geopolitical unrest in Ukraine and the EU's reliance on Russian gas.*

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## *Impact of Gas Dependency on the EU, Russia Due to Ukrainian Conflict*

### **INTRODUCTION**

The European Union's (EU) energy policy has recently undergone numerous modifications. The new priority is to lessen reliance. It was previously impossible to adopt a different approach in this area, but with the deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia, everything became possible. Due to its two aspects, energy is an intriguing topic in international relations. It serves as both a geopolitical tool and an essential commodity. Energy is another difficult topic, particularly gas. This commodity is essential to our economies, yet its supply poses serious challenges on a global scale. Geopolitically speaking, the world appears to be a real chess game where national security and interest are set against external threats and reliance. The liberal market perspective emphasizes the business game of supply and demand, which also applies to energy (Scharpf, 2010, p. 222). In this situation, the corporations who fulfill contracts to serve states' domestic demand are in charge. As a result, the supply and demand principles should govern the interaction between Europe and Russia in the energy sector. By importing a third of its current gas usage from Russia, not just Europe exposes itself to risk in this situation. In that light, Russia would also be putting itself at risk by growing financially dependent on Europe, its largest market. Due to reciprocal dependence, an interruption in the gas supply is not immediately obvious from that liberal market standpoint. Energy politics has long engaged in a rhetorical struggle between the geopolitical and free market axes.

To defend European unity, the EU appears to position itself as the guardian of Eastern European nations. They also suggest a second Cold War between two fronts in their geopolitical reasoning (Nycz, 2021, p. 21). This appears to be supported by the Russian reinforcements at the Ukrainian border and the aggressive rhetoric used to portray NATO and the EU as divided and threatening. At the same time, we observe notable changes since the Cold War. It's interesting to note that a similar energy relations issue centered on the Urengoy gas pipeline happened in 1981–1982. While at the time, the heads of government in Western Europe formed a unified bloc opposing US sanctions, geopolitical considerations did not favor them (Stern, 1982, p. 22). But this happened amid the Cold War, at least ten years before the EU was founded.

### **BACKGROUND**

Provide The date is Thursday, February 24, 2022. Russia and Belarus are both entry points for Russian armed forces into Ukraine. It is the beginning of a geopolitical confrontation that will cause numerous casualties. In response, the Western world, especially the EU, acts against Russia, the war's aggressor. Around the same time as this response from the west, fresh thought was given to commerce relations between the two fronts. Even during times of tension in their relationship, the EU and Russia continue to trade in energy, namely oil and gas (Siddi, 2020, p. 5). The EU has grown more reliant on Russian goods, yet historically crises and wars have not frequently impacted trade. Because the EU lacks significant energy resources, it depends on natural gas imported from third-party partners. It mostly imports natural gas from nations outside the European Union, with Russia accounting for most of these imports. The EU member states buy 41.1% of their natural gas from Russia (Eurostat, 2019). Natural gas exports from Russia, one of the top exporters of this energy source globally, account for 13% of that country's GDP (Osipov et al., 2018, p. 227). The major routes for import into Europe are through Belarus, Ukraine, and the already-existing Nord-Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea (figure 2, appendix). The recently completed

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Nord-Stream 2 pipeline (NS2) is awaiting German authorities' permission. Similar to its predecessor, the Nord Stream 1 pipeline (NS1), this pipeline links Germany and Russia.

Regarding trade and diplomatic ties, the EU's attitude toward Russia has significantly shifted since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. This is especially seen in how people have reacted to Russia's actions. Different sanctions were imposed, for instance, in the circumstances surrounding the annexation of Crimea and, most recently, the conflict in Ukraine. The EU penalized Russia for the incident since it did not accept that it occurred. Here, the issue frequently boils down to diplomatic backlash. Russia is likely to implement counter-sanctions if the EU utilizes this remedy. From both sides, the sanctions frequently consist of placing import bans, freezing the accounts of powerful individuals, and exchanging general threats (Veebel & Markus, 2015, p. 166). Often, it stays that way, and neither side of the fight has suffered any obvious economic harm. The real issue arises when one of the actors begins to obstruct infrastructure, which impacts both sides' economies. 2014 brought bitter clarity to this. To the chagrin of the Russian government in Moscow, Ukraine opted to permit gas to flow freely to the west following the invasion of Crimea. As a result, the gas supply from Russia to Ukraine was cut off in October of that same year. The European nations connected to that gas conduit and Ukraine were impacted by this (Stulberg, 2015, p. 115). This response pushes the entire relationship into uncharted, uncharted waters because it makes the energy infrastructure, particularly gas, a geopolitical weapon that can be used to destabilize an entire nation. Eastern and Western European nations are exposed. As previously said, the EU is reevaluating its stance on the trading relationship with its dependence. The EU must be less impacted by the results if Russia undertakes a counter-offensive, such as cutting off the gas, to utilize sanctions as a tool for political pressure. Sanctions sever this connection, which may result in lower gas imports. Here, the reliance on Russia is problematic. Therefore, the dependence on gas, the problematic relationship caused by sanctions, and the trade connections between Russia and the EU are interconnected. Consequently, there is an odd connection between geopolitical conflict and energy dependence. The goal of this chapter is to analyze this link.

### **MAIN FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER**

In addition to the ongoing conflict, Ukraine has seen other conflicts in the past. In the east of Ukraine, close to the Russian border, there have been tensions since 2014 that have even escalated into an armed confrontation (Economist, 2022). That year, Russia acquired Crimea, a peninsula in Ukraine that is still a contentious region today (Malyarenko & Wolff, 2018, p. 192). At the end of 2021, when Russia began to amass soldiers on the border between Belarus and Ukraine, Western Europe and NATO allies became concerned about the situation (see figure 3, appendix). This finally led to the all-out conflict we are familiar with today. In response to the conflict, the EU implemented a significant package of sanctions (European Council, 2022), and NATO sent troops to its Eastern border in Poland and Hungary (Economist, 2022). The relationship between the EU and Russia has been strained as a result. Both diplomatically and financially.

Regarding natural gas, the EU's reliance on Russia does not change. Thus, the question of whether this conflict affects dependency is raised. A case chapter will be used to narrow the investigation of this link further because it is too broad to do so in a single research. The gas crises in Ukraine in 2008 and 2009, as well as the 2014 takeover of Crimea, will be the main topics of the study. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine will not be considered within the analytical framework, partly because it is a novel scenario

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that has not yet been fully explored. By using the example of the Ukrainian issue, it is hoped to analyze the interrelationship between these three factors and gain a better understanding of them. Therefore, it will first need to analyze and contextualize the commercial relationship between the EU and Russia. Second, it will examine the degree to which the EU and Russia depend on one another for gas. The research's final goal is to examine the impact of punishments on those connections. The geopolitical situation in Ukraine will be one of the three elements, and all three are examined from three different perspectives.

The following research question can be determined from the problem, research gap, and objective.

#### **How did the geopolitical disputes over Ukraine affect the EU's and Russia's reliance on gas?**

Three sub-questions have been created to support the purpose and research question mentioned above;

1. How is business between Russia and the EU regarding gas trading through NS2 conducted?
2. What dangers and vulnerabilities are associated with the EU's dependence on Russia for natural gas imports?
3. How does the imposition of sanctions affect the dependence between the EU and Russia?

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

In conjunction with the geopolitics of Russia, the EU, and Ukraine, this section will look at certain aspects of recent dependency literature. This section is separated into numerous significant components to organize the literature. These are the various interpretations and discussions around the study; these will serve as the foundation for the concepts covered later in the case study. The EU's commercial relations with Russia, the EU's reliance on gas, the idea of sanctions, and the interaction of geopolitics and resources will all be discussion topics. The case chapter will delve deeper into these subjects. Thus, this literature overview will only present the current debates and visions.

### **Trade**

The NS2 gas pipeline was selected as a direct approximation of a particular relation since the literature on gas relations is enormous and challenging to summarize. The trade links between the EU and Russia through NS2 will be the main topic of this section. The how and what questions will therefore be used to examine the business operations of these actors. One specific feature of NS2 that has been the research subject in this field is that it allows for greater energy efficiency (Beegle-Levin, 2018, p. 45). Better gas infrastructure will be made available by the project. According to researchers, the pipeline's development will reduce the EU's reliance on other nations, such as Belarus and Ukraine, through which pipelines now pass (Fischer, 2016, p. 2). The EU also relies on Russian gas. Therefore, this allows for direct producer-to-consumer delivery (Beegle-Levin, 2018, p. 28). Despite their interconnectedness, there are clear divisions between politics and economic ties. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel has frequently stated that doing business is about "simply doing business," not politics (Fischer, 2016, p. 2). The differences in member states' business dealings with Russia are very clear, as evidenced by the discussion surrounding the EU and Russia. Some academics contend that, in contrast to the rest of Europe, Russia views Germany as a friendly economic partner and a "bridge to the east" regarding trade (Rahr, 2007, p. 138). Germany also pushed for new gas infrastructure the longest with the former Soviet Union, even though many other European nations opposed it out of concern for a dependency



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issue. Finally, the literature reveals that, in addition to using gas trade as a political pressure tool, Russia does so from an economic point of view, according to Mikulska (Mikulska, 2020, p. 415). Present your perspective on the issues, controversies, problems, etc., as they relate to theme and arguments supporting your position. Compare and contrast what has been or is currently being done relating to the chapter's specific topic and the book's main theme.

### **Dependency**

This leads to the following discussion, adding significant depth to the narrative. That mostly centers on the idea of dependency. According to the vast bulk of the research, NS2 would make Europe even more reliant on Russian gas (Loskot-Strachota, 2016, p. 1). Certainly, it will rely more heavily on Russia's primary supply, Gazprom (Fischer, 2016, p. 3). Energy security has been the main topic of discussion. It is claimed that if the principle of reliance is not properly upheld, the energy supply could be in danger (Yafimava, 2015, p. 6). Even though there are other options, the energy distribution for gas is currently heavily centered on importing natural gas from Russia. Due to this, the EU could have a distribution issue (Mikulska, 2020, p. 410). As was the case in Ukraine in 2008, 2009, and 2014, it has already been demonstrated that Gazprom and Russia may easily turn off the gas totally (Fischer, 2016, p. 3). This is referred to as the "gas wars" in modern literature (Pigliucci, 2016; Stulberg, 2015). One could argue that Gazprom utilizes the monopoly to charge customers differently, especially when contrasted to Western European nations and Russia's neighboring nations. For instance, Ukraine pays more for the same amount of natural gas (Goldthau, 2016, p. 27). This point is crucial when examining political aspects centered on energy dependence.

### **Sanctions**

This cycle also includes a discussion of the rules for punishing state actors. The research covers this idea since it sheds light on international relations. It is crucial to include penalty concepts, especially in trade and dependent ties. This connection also exists with Russia, the EU, and Ukraine. In international relations (IR), sanctions have long been a key tool for applying pressure on nations to meet a particular objective. Another significant finding from the research is that sanctions have two significant consequences. First, it is said that the EU has less sway while sanctions are in place, especially in other policy areas where sanctions are not specifically mentioned (Early, 2015, p. 145). Second, in theory, penalties may make nations less willing to negotiate or work together in the future. The sanctions impact long-term bilateral partnerships. This impacts all sectors of policy (Dreyer & Nicu Popescu, 2014, p. 3). Therefore, a major issue in the literature is the harm partnerships may cause and the capacity for new ones (Bond et al., 2015). The significance and function of norm enforcement in EU sanctions are also emphasized in the literature. As a result, the idea of NPE is accurately captured here. However, there is a difference of opinion on how NPE affects sanctions and if the EU is consistent in implementing sanctions of a normative nature (Brummer, 2009; Manners, 2002, p. 246). The effectiveness and usefulness of sanctions will not be discussed during the literature review, even though this is a hot topic in the present research on sanctions.

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### **Geopolitics and Resources**

The discussion of geopolitics and resources is the last topic pertinent to this issue. “Politics, especially international relations, as influenced by geographical circumstances” is the definition of geopolitics (Stevenson, 2010). The following three themes are all included in raw materials’ geopolitics, giving them an overall dimension. Several factors are important in the literature while addressing this subject. The first is the issue of infrastructure management. The interaction between state and non-state actors is meant by this (mainly companies). According to several academics, there is considerable overlap in the non-state side’s power and interests regarding gas (Ademmer et al., 2016, p. 9; Casier, 2016, p. 765). It is obvious that non-state actors also impact state geopolitics because the interests are so linked. The power politics discussion provides additional evidence of this. This second component focuses on the fundamentals of energy policy among state actors.

Here, a liberal-driven EU strategy can be separated from Russia’s more geopolitical power-oriented approach (Siddi, 2018, p. 1553). This second component somewhat refutes the first argument about the common interests of businesses and governments. Power is a valid state actor argument, demonstrating that nations have control over their policies. The last intriguing aspect of the literature is that a geopolitical approach to energy is emerging, with a focus on reducing dependence on other parties, and this approach is coming from the EU as well (Ademmer et al., 2016, p. 3, Siddi, 2018, p. 1557–1558). As can be seen, there are four main aspects of gas dependency highlighted. Here, it’s important to emphasize that further research is being done on the subject. There are decisions made in this review regarding the various scholars used. The greatest possible summary of the literature in this field has been attempted to present. The case chapter will present additional material that expands on the previously cited literature.

### **RESEARCH GAP**

Numerous case studies have been done to analyze the energy connections between the EU and Russia in addition to the literature. A number of them were examined to see whether there was any overlap with other case studies. These were selected based on the topics most relevant to this chapter. What became apparent was that these are more one-sided and center primarily on trade, interdependency, and energy security (Stegen, 2011; Torres et al., 2009). To inspire future research, this chapter attempts to connect these many components. Four components of recent literature on gas dependency were provided to conclude. Trade and reliance are closely related, according to extensive studies. Although they are closely related, the dependency debate and the notion of penalties have not been thoroughly studied. This presents a chance for this study. Additionally, while most of the chapter focuses on the situation in Ukraine between 2014 and 2015, this research also considers earlier conflicts, like the gas disputes of 2008 and 2009. Additionally, a geopolitical confrontation has rarely properly linked the factors mentioned above. This gap is filled by the chapter conducted for this article, which links those components to offer a precise analysis of the current dynamics between the various NS2 participating nations. Last but not least, it should be noted that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine (2022) was not covered in the literature review. Since the topic is evolving quickly, adequate research has not yet been done to add to the review. Nevertheless, the importance of this contradiction should be highlighted for the chapter and future publications.

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### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The complex interdependence theory, which Keohane and Nye first formulated, and the asymmetry theory were chosen for this application. There is a mutual dependency between states, which is what the introduction and the literature review have made evident, which is the case with the Ukraine issue making the relationship between Russia and the EU evident. Here, the ideas have the potential to offer a more thorough explanation.

#### **Complex Interdependence Theory**

To provide an acceptable framework for understanding the politics of interdependence, the notion of complex interdependence aims to explain the increasing complexity of global politics and international relations (Keohane & Nye, 1973). This chapter also argues that by 2014, international relations in the region had reached a state of complex interdependence, with these characteristics becoming more and more apparent in the Eastern European region. According to the notion of complex interdependence, nations are not the only actors in international politics; other actors also participate. International politics mostly consists of conflict and co-operation. Neoliberal institutionalism is a philosophy that can be compared to this idea. This idea concurs that co-operation varies by problem and period and that international politics is not a constant state of war (Rana, 2015, p. 293). From these two ideas, the theory deduces that states' interdependence prevents them from resorting to war as a last resort to settle their disputes. Given the uncertainty surrounding war, most nations have allowed security concerns to rule their interactions. (Keohane & Nye, 1973, p. 158). Thus, according to scholars Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, expanding interstate co-operation should be possible by decreasing the use of armed force as a tool of politics and increasing interdependence on the economy and in other areas (R. Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973, p. 159). Complex interdependence allows for the possibility of close relationships with mutual influence. However, due to the majority of the impacts of force and military being expensive and unreliable, the force is no longer seen as an appropriate tool to attain other goals, such as economic and environmental well-being, which are growing more crucial (R. Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973, p. 159). Keohane and Nye also highlighted a crucial distinction between interdependence and dependency using the idea of interdependence. Additionally, it has interconnected political and economic resources. Because this interdependence connects both actors, there is an interaction between them (R. Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973, p. 159–161). The situation in Ukraine serves as an illustration of the complexity of world politics, particularly when conflicts are involved. Different reactions are proposed, and some consider it a turning moment in modern times (Holsti, 1978, p. 514).

#### **Asymmetry Theory**

The asymmetry theory is based on the interaction between states and extends the complex interdependence theory. The ability gap between two states is a common concept of an unbalanced bilateral relationship. Even a small difference like this might be felt. Since most states are in asymmetrical relationships, it must be acknowledged that this theory provides insight into bilateral relationships and how they manifest (Womack, 2015, p. 7). This first element is built on soft power and diplomatic relationships. There are two so-called “powers” in an asymmetrical bilateral relationship: a larger one (country A) and one that is smaller (country B). In theory, when country A considers country B, the relationship is stable.

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This shows clear (diplomatic) communication between the two nations. This clarifies expectations and potential points of contention. Both nations must develop a stable solution to their relationship once these issues become obvious. Stability is essential to maintain the connection in a certain state of mind (Womack, 2015, p. 13).

Regarding the capability aspect, it differs. In this case, one country is larger than the other; the difference may be slight or significant. A territorial, military, population, or resource disparity could account for the variance. A healthy relationship has distinct territorial boundaries, acknowledges the partner's demographics, and exchanges resources such that nation B is not overly reliant on country A (Womack, 2015, p. 13). The topic of autonomy is brought up by dependence. To speak of a stable relationship, both nations must acknowledge the autonomy and authority of the particular state. There shouldn't be any disputes with sovereign authority. Each state acknowledges the other's state and territory (Womack, 2015, p. 14). An obvious inquiry is what happens to the connection when these components are out of balance. Then, we may generally talk about two nations being at war. This could result in a full-scale conflict or the severing of diplomatic ties without any dialogue. It often relies on the current problem's circumstances (Womack, 2016, p. 15).

## **METHODOLOGY**

The research questions in this chapter will be investigated using a qualitative research method. When conducting qualitative research (**Ontological and epistemological accountability + Abductive research**), human and textual sources are used, and the environment is kept as natural as possible (Bryman, 2016, p. 380). This research methodology is appropriate for studying political and global situations as this chapter intends. A qualitative research approach is best when analyzing the relationship between Europe and Russia regarding commerce and war. There is a particular explanation behind this. Numerical data can only be used to analyze a relationship between numerous entities, in this case, countries, in a limited manner (Johnson et al., 2015, p. 61).

## **CASE STUDY**

States' interdependence is a complicated dynamic that calls for discussion of several subjects. A case chapter is the most effective strategy for doing this because it is descriptive and exploratory, as stated in the methodologies. A case chapter can illuminate the underlying dimensions and make a theoretical connection (Bennett, 2012, p. 21). We must first consider the situation to conduct the analysis. The case will therefore be described in this chapter. There will be three stages to this. The Nord-Stream 2 pipeline, relations between the EU and Russia, and the Ukraine conflict are all included in this.

### **Nord-Stream 2**

As already established, the NS2 project has long been a source of political and economic concern for Europe and Russia. It is possible to better grasp the trade links between Russia and the EU through NS2. Since NS2 is more than just a pipeline, the case needs to go further into this. The project has since been put on indefinite hold, but this has no bearing on how we proceed with this case study. The project can

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*Table 1. Table of volumes by import route (Dudley et al., 2019)*

Import route and volume of natural gas from Russia to EU (2015)			
Corridor Country or pipeline	Total capacity (bcm)	Volume to EU (bcm)	Current market Share (%)
Ukraine	159,5	40	31
Belarus	33	31,5	25
NS2	55*	55*	-
NS1	55	55	43

potentially increase the flow of natural gas from Russia via the Baltic Sea twofold. The 1,224 km pipeline between the Russian Vyborg and Lubmin in northern Germany will be built parallel to the already-existing Nord Stream (1). The gas can subsequently be delivered to different nations on the continent of Europe. Since 2015, the building of the pipeline has involved numerous European governments and businesses. The consortium owned by Russia’s Gazprom includes the four largest European investors. (BBC, 2022)

The table provides information on the current gas flow and corridors from Russia to Europe together with figure 1. It is significant to highlight that NS2’s 55 billion dollars will be diverted away from the Ukrainian corridor. Because more gas will be sent directly to the EU without the influence of other countries (corridors) as a result of this change in flow, Russia will have a stronger grip on the gas flow to Europe. There are several additional features of the new pipeline worth noting. First, there is a lot of contention inside Europe about whether the pipeline should have been constructed and whether it should still be opened. This is due to several factors. First, Poland and other Eastern European member states criticized the initiative. An increase in gas imports from Russia would horrifyingly increase the dependence and vulnerability of Europe. Given the numerous occasions Eastern European nations were shut off from Russian gas in 2008 and 2009, this stance is not surprising (J. Stern et al., 2009, p. 12-14). Normal delivery of this gas is through a pipeline that passes into Ukraine (see figure 2, appendix). All gas shipments to Ukraine, including its connection to the continent’s primary gas system, were inadvertently stopped in January 2009.

Following the conclusion of a 10-year deal on supply and gas corridors, this ran from January 7 to January 20, 2019. Because reserves could absorb it, a two-week cutoff did not result in no gas being available in Europe, but it did cause “cold houses” in Ukraine (J. Stern et al., 2009, p. 19). A significant occasion that influenced future gas relations. This history of interruptions to the gas supply supports the geopolitical viewpoint. Energy is viewed as an instrument for foreign policy. The European Parliament’s decision to use the Nord Stream 2 project as a weapon in the Navalny scandal is a recent example, although in reverse (Caşin & Kisacik, 2021, p. 241). It attempted to pressure Russia by threatening to postpone and cancel the pipeline’s inauguration. Aleksey Navalny, a prominent member of the Russian opposition, was the focus of this investigation. He had been injected with the nerve toxin Novichok in August 2019. It is generally accepted that the Russian security service was responsible for this (Mikhelidze, 202, p. 6). The current situation of the EU-Russia relationship is described in detail in Nord-stream 2. This relationship is intriguing overall because of its pre-existing history. This relationship should also be considered to introduce the case chapter more effectively.

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### **EU And Russia Relations**

For the sake of this article, we will only focus on the pertinent issues connected to the primary subject, including the themes of gas supplies and reliance, given how complex and dynamic the relationship between Europe and Russia is. Political and commerce relations might be categorized under this. The first oil and gas exports from the then-SU to Europe started in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, more infrastructure was constructed, and numerous nations began importing gas and oil from the SU. Under the Reagan administration, this transaction was viewed with tremendous mistrust on the other side of the Atlantic (Siddi, 2020, p. 5-6). After all, the exchange occurred during political unrest during the Cold War. After the end of the cold war, this pattern persisted, and more gas contracts were negotiated. As a result, Europe became more dependent on Russian gas (Belyi, 2015, p. 94-96). Thus, the overall gas reliance rate increased to around 65% in 2014, with 35% of that percentage being of Russian descent (Eurostat, 2019). The trade-in fossil fuels were frequently untouched by diplomatic unrest or ambiguity surrounding Russia's objectives regarding international security. This is noteworthy considering how heavily reliant on Russian energy supplies the European continent was.

The second factor relates to the political ties between Russia and the EU. The political situation throughout the past few decades was not always stable, as inferred from the previous section. Three phases can be identified if we follow the same timeframe as in the preceding section. The first is the Cold War era. Before 1989, there were few diplomatic ties between the EU and the then-SU because of chilly relations and American pressure (Mason, 2002, p. 6). Due in part to the long-lasting nature of the tension, there weren't many conflicts. When President Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union (SU) in the 1980s, he ushered in several profound changes that formed the cornerstone of current relations with Russia. More: Paraphrased, paraphrased, paraphrased, paraphrased (Mason, 2002, p. 65).

Following the fall of the SU, the EC reached its first agreement in Eastern Europe in 1989, tying the two fronts together through political ties. This period is distinguished by relatively positive political ties and the absence of significant incidents. Around 2001 is when the current strained relationships began. Since 2000, there have been numerous problems in the tense relationship between Russia and the EU. Because Putin assumed office during this time, it might also be referred to as the Putin era (Medvedev, 2008, p. 218). The uneasy relationship develops due to Putin's first-ever critical inquiries concerning the conditions of the partnership. This is due to two factors. The first explanation is mostly related to the exclusion of Russians from Europe. The EU has recently expanded into Eastern Europe, bringing it extremely near to Russia, but there are also harsher entry requirements being implemented for Russians who wish to visit the EU (Medvedev, 2008, p. 219–222). The “Russian identity problem” is exacerbated by this isolation. In other words, as one of the few nations in Europe that is not ‘European,’ Russia is growing further distant from Europe. To put it another way, that is not considered Europe. Second, Russian lawmakers believe they have little to no control over the accords reached with the EU. Putin claims that the EU has a Eurocentric perspective and ignores Russia's potential conflicting interests in these agreements in favor of its own (Morozov, 2015, p. 40).

### **Ukraine Situation**

It is crucial to remember that more than just one specific incident is being discussed when analyzing the Ukraine crisis. As previously said, some incidents led to the case and ultimately to the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The three sequential events described in this chapter are connected. There

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is a brief historical introduction but no in-depth discussion of how these events came about. We'll focus on the gas leaks from 2008–2009, the annexation of Crimea, and the border conflict with Russia in 2021–2022 because the situation calls for these three. The 2009 gas shutdown is the first significant event that should be mentioned. Gas wasn't delivered to Ukraine from January 1 to January 14 (Stulberg, 2015, p. 111-113). Since Ukraine is a transit nation, as was already mentioned, the rest of Europe also experienced a supply issue. The crisis began in the final weeks of 2008 when there was a disagreement over the supply agreement between the Ukrainian gas business and the Russian Gazprom. As no agreement was reached, Russia ordered the complete shutdown of the gas supply at the Russian-Ukrainian border on January 1. (Stulberg, 2015, p. 113). Because it was the middle of winter and many people lacked heat, the facade was huge. This is not the only factor that makes the war noteworthy. Europe experienced issues as a result of the temporary suspension of the supply. This suggests a major supply can be interrupted by a (geo)political conflict. The danger here is dependence.

A few years later, the conflict in Crimea put more pressure on relations between Ukraine, Russia, and the EU. It is a small peninsula that is connected to Ukraine. Following a referendum in which the Crimean people picked Russia as their new country, Crimea was occupied by Russian soldiers in 2014. (Bebler, 2015, p. 35-37). Western nations and Ukraine disputed this, arguing that the referendum was rigged by Russia and lacked legitimacy. Several factors must be considered in the Russian occupation of Crimea. It is important not to undervalue the influence of cultural, historical, and linguistic factors (Bebler, 2015, p. 38). As a result, the annexation should not be seen as signaling an impending expansion of Russia's power in Europe. It is unnecessary for other Baltic and Eastern European nations to worry about a Russian invasion, and they should modify their aggressive strategies accordingly. The nationalist and illegitimate coup d'état challenged the rights of the Russian-speaking peoples, and the Crimean people dreaded its repercussions (Bebler, 2015, p. 40). The Crimeans cleverly took advantage of Kyiv's lack of legal authority to stage a referendum that they believed equally valid. Let's jump ahead to December 2021. A new fight is about to start. Beginning in Russia and Belarus, Russian forces assemble on the Ukrainian border (Hunter, 2022, p. 20-21). Observable evidence is that Gas and oil prices in Western nations are beginning to increase due to these tensions. These trends are also having a detrimental impact on stock exchanges. Russia also has a strategic interest there due to Russian separatists controlling Ukraine's eastern areas since 2014 (Bebler, 2015, p. 40). Fossil fuel supplies may be affected by this, and if the west responds with sanctions, it may lead to conflict. Even though this dispute cannot be used to conclude, it is vital to note. In part because it is a current event that is still evolving at the time of this investigation. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship with Ukraine is also a new element. Strategically located between Europe and Russia, the nation is significant only to NATO and European foreign policy. Since 2017, the EU Association Treaty with Ukraine has been in effect, and the EU supports Ukraine economically (Van Der Loo et al., 2014, p. 1-3). The fact that NS2 will cause Ukraine to lose a significant amount of transit income is a key reason why both Americans and Europeans oppose the pipeline. Additionally, the Russian military's reinforcing its boundaries with the nation wins the geopolitical argument.

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### **ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES**

The case chapter analysis is divided into three significant elements. The case chapter will center on these sections, with each element leading to a different question, as stated in the introduction and methodologies. After analyzing each sub-question, the next chapter will connect and contextualize them.

#### **Trade**

**Sub-Question 1-** How is business between Russia and the EU regarding gas trading through NS2 conducted?

This analysis section will examine how this geopolitical war impacts trade ties concerning gas imports. The history of the connection between Russia and the EU was briefly discussed in the case introduction; this section will focus more on the commerce aspect.

#### **Different Approaches in Gas Trading**

The aim to gain control over the discovery and exploitation of energy resources dominates Russia's gas strategy. Russia's foreign policy is to maintain dominance over its neighborhood. As a result, it is putting pressure on the Commonwealth of Independent Republics (CIS), primarily composed of former Soviet Union (SU) states. This includes nations like Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia. It excludes Ukraine and all EU nations. Europe saw instability at the start of the century due to that strain (Gonchar et al., 2009, p. 14). This unrest is primarily focused on the EU's domestic gas market and the influence Russia has on it, as well as the relationship between Russia and the CIS, due to the regional nature of the gas trade. Because it relies on Russia for gas, the EU gets uneasy. As 2020 approaches, the following is a trend to note (paraphrasing): The difference needed to be made up. Thus, imports were necessary. Although there are alternative suppliers like Algeria and alternate modes of transportation like liquefied natural gas (LNG), pipelines from Russia will supply most of Europe's import requirements. Therefore, Europe gains from dependable Russian supplies and must concentrate its energy strategy on ensuring ample gas volumes at a fair price. The varied (energy) policy starting points contribute to European challenges. The growth of the internal market and the advantages of trade liberalization give the EU its existence (Scharpf, 2010, p. 211). For instance, in the European Union, the internal energy market is governed by the law that separates production and transmission activities (Green, 2008, p. 16).

#### **Decisions In NS2**

This chapter must go back to September 2005 to examine the scenario before the Ukraine wars. Then German Chancellor Schröder and Russian President Putin signed a letter of intent. According to this agreement, a new gas pipeline connecting the European mainland and the Siberian gas fields, or Nord Stream 2, must be constructed (Lang & Westphal, 2017, p. 13). Many European nations had high hopes for this new pipeline. The EU nations were still amidst the internal market's expansion phase and the Union's acceptance of additional nations. A new relationship with Russia fit well with the liberal strain of thought at the time. Face to First, the distributor's dependability. Suspicions regarding this reliability surfaced, in part, among the countries of Eastern and Central Europe after the connections to Ukraine were shut down in 2008–2009. They see Gazprom as a strategic tool the Russian government could



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employ (Goldthau, 2016, p. 9). They did quarrel here as the EU grew more reliant on a single distributor, Gazprom, whose main shareholder was the Russian government (Bros et al., 2017, p. 18). Western European nations criticized Russia's actions more after the Crimean conflict. These nations started to understand that Putin was exploiting gas to act illiberally and threaten the EU's unity (Lang & Westphal, 2017, p. 26). Second, there was increased investment in a comprehensive strategy to lessen reliance on gas. A few months after the takeover of Crimea, then-Commission President Juncker founded the Energy Union. Its goal was to establish a unified energy strategy, partly because the EU lacked relevant competencies in this area (Lang & Westphal, 2017, p. 8–10). This resulted in more centralized management of Europe's gas infrastructure.

### **Effect On Future Gas Trading; The Energy Union**

The founding of the Energy Union vividly shows this shift in how energy is exchanged regarding dependency. It also demonstrates how it will impact third-party trade in the future. There are two things in this picture. First, the issue of energy security is brought to light. In addition to offering a greener method of producing energy, the Energy Union also aims to reduce reliance on energy imports from outside the EU. This is accomplished by increasing self-generation and distribution within and between Member States. This will essentially stop the long-standing practice of enabling Member States to pursue their policies for energy import (Knodt et al., 2020, p. 787). Since the EU lacks jurisdiction in this area, it directs policy in a way that leaves member states with few options (Knodt et al., 2020, p. 788). Second, change is also discernible from a strategic perspective, building on the earlier point about strategic autonomy. There is a concern since Russia appears to be able to utilize gas to further its political goals (Van de Graaf & Colgan, 2017, p. 61).

### **Import Statistics**

It may be helpful to look at the change in import quantities from Russia better to understand this shift in philosophy regarding gas imports. Gas imports should decline logically as the European Energy Union gains strategic autonomy over energy and becomes the focus of increasing attention. After all, the purpose of the energy union is to reduce reliance on outside sources of energy. The real pattern, in this case, is intriguing because it deviates from original assumptions. This data makes it obvious that gas imports fell in 2014. However, following 2014, absolute imports grew even more than they had in 2013. The first decline was brought about by a reduction in Russian gas consumption by 18 EU members. President of the Commission Juncker's effort played a role in this to some extent. This is, therefore, a direct result of the shift in perspective about the strategic independence of gas. These Member States see lessening dependency as a positive step. However, the increase in the statistic indicates that 14 member states began to purchase more Russian gas in 2015. More specifically, the Netherlands and Germany activated the buy more button (Zheng, 2021, p. 829).

### **Connection to Theory**

It may be argued from the analysis of gas trade connections done above that the EU-Russia relationship is best suited to a complex state of interdependence. This consists of two parts. First, it involves more actors than just states; other non-state actors are also engaged. In other words, a multiple-channel

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relationship, as Keohane and Nye also mention (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 26). The two actors have an official and casual friendship. Businesses like Gazprom are heavily involved in the gas industry. The formulation of this issue's policies. The second component is the lack of hierarchy among the many policy topics (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 25).

Gas trade is an important national interest and international policy issue. The blending of local and foreign affairs demonstrates that the actors depend on one another for reasons other than straightforward trade. This is because energy, particularly gas, has important societal implications. Because it constitutes the basis of human existence—warmth, and food—it is a vital component of society (Bentham, 2014, p. 90). There is an intricate web of interconnectedness and unequal business relationships. Two factors also imply this. An asymmetrical relationship has reciprocal but distinct commitments on each side, which is the first crucial component (Womack, 2015, p. 39-40). For instance, the EU depends on Russia when it purchases gas (which is evident from the analysis). As a result, Russia receives payment from it for the gas, which helps the latter country's economy. However, in that regard, Russia possesses asymmetrical energy capabilities. In this case, the EU is the reliant party. It must be noted, nevertheless, that this analysis only pertains to a trading arrangement with gas. It might not apply to other commodities. The placement of the two actors, the second component, is likewise crucial in this case (Womack, 2015, p. 41).

## **Dependency**

**Sub-question 2-** What dangers and vulnerabilities are associated with the EU's dependence on Russia for natural gas imports?

The dependency issue that was briefly covered in the previous section and introduced in the introduction will be further addressed in this area of the analysis. Areas used for producing oil and gas are dispersed unevenly throughout the planet. The biggest reserves are located in places that are unstable politically or economically (Valenza, 2018). The North Sea's gas reserves are already at their maximum level, leaving the EU behind in producing fossil fuels. As a result, the European Union lacks the infrastructure and natural resources to satisfy all of its natural gas-related energy needs.

## **Vulnerabilities**

The Union's and Crimea crises between Ukraine and Russia amply demonstrated the European Union's energy vulnerability. The fundamental cause is that there isn't a single European viewpoint on dealing with Russia's energy needs. However, the bilateral ties between Member States continue to be strong, which enables Russia to implement a successful "divide and rule" strategy. According to (Gonchar et al., 2009) study, the gas crisis showed six areas where the EU was vulnerable. These vulnerabilities will be used as a guide as we examine the nature and effects of dependent on the EU. The EU's incapacity to combat an energy supplier who uses commercial means to further political aims is its first weakness (Gonchar et al., 2009, p. 39). Although the gas conflict in Ukraine in 2008 and 2009 began as a business disagreement, it soon became evident that a political solution was necessary. Because of the direct gas connection that the European continent has with Russia through Ukraine, in particular from the EU. The EU, however, hardly had any impact on the issue. Energy back then also lacked Union capability (Bros et al., 2017, p. 23). The absence of energy agreements between the EU and Russia contributes to the lack of influence. The current agreements are still those that Gazprom signs with energy corporations from the various Member States (Bros et al., 2017, p. 16). A second weakness is that Russia has not signed

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an official international energy agreement, which means that the EU and the rest of the world have no legal say in the gas flow to Europe.

Additionally, Russia has not yet joined the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (IEC, 2019), which shields them from being held accountable for events like the gas crisis in Ukraine on a global scale (Gonchar et al., 2009, p. 40). The Union consequently hopes that Russia will ratify the ECT as soon as feasible. However, the Russian government is not as enthusiastic about this, as certain ECT norms would weaken Russia's strong position in the energy sector (A. Belyi, 2021, p. 367).

Third, the disparate energy priorities of the EU's member states may challenge the unity of Europe as a whole (Gonchar et al., 2009, p. 40). There were notable disparities between the Member States in Western and Eastern Europe, despite the EU's attempts to foster togetherness during the gas conflict by calling for a swift restoration of the gas supply (Zhiznin & Timokhov, 2019, p. 37). The fourth argument is that Russian energy businesses have different relationships with energy corporations from European Member States (Gonchar et al., 2009, p. 40-41). Italian, French, and German businesses work closely with Russian Gazprom. Because of this, it is not difficult for Russia to successfully exploit the internal struggle in Europe and obtain support for Russian projects (Sziklai et al., 2020, p. 1-3). The EU's sixth weakness is the lack of a common gas market with uniform prices (Gonchar & Martyniuk, 2009, p. 41-42). Within the Union, there is a tremendous disparity due to the stark variations in gas prices between the Member States. Natural gas prices are not approached uniformly (Sziklai et al., 2020, p. 1). The EU's sixth and last weakness is the lack of a trans-European gas network (Gonchar et al., 2009, p. 43). Currently, the Union's pipeline infrastructure mostly travels east to west (Figure 2, appendix). The EU heavily depends on Russian gas because there are no gas networks connecting the various European Member States. Furthermore, there is limited co-operation among the major European gas groups (mostly German and French). Larger member states continue to defend their energy markets and oppose connecting their gas networks (Gonchar et al., 2009, p. 43)

### **Risks**

First, the energy-producing nations have a big impact on the European Union, especially when they start to forge powerful alliances like the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Nations (OPEC). The EU might be required to pay the nations that export exorbitant energy prices to ensure its energy supply. The fundamental tenet is that monopolists produce less and charge more than they would in a competitive market (A. V. Belyi, 2015, p. 26). The monopoly will continue, and the monopolist will continue to have the authority to unilaterally raise prices as long as energy markets are closed to other providers, and market mechanisms are not fully functional as they would be in a liberal market. As an illustration, the Biden administration has already named OPEC as one of the parties responsible for the increasing price of gasoline in 2021 (Yeatman, 2021). Aside from the previously mentioned higher energy prices, since the power only rests with the producing countries, this may also lead to an unstable energy supply. This may result in arbitrary decisions, leaving the EU with no choice but to make lengthy agreements with its main energy trading partners. These erratic supplies are frequently the outcome of the producer nation's geopolitical strategy.

Additionally, this may result in significant economic harm and potential societal unrest (Ademmer et al., 2016, p. 2-4). Therefore, relying solely on a major gas provider like Gazprom may have hazards. When choosing to stop supplying energy sources, this provider has the power to set its price unilaterally, decide how much of its energy source is available for export, and harm the overall economy of the

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importing nation (Siddi, 2018, p. 1558). The final issue worth mentioning is the result of energy dependence: nations with large energy reserves receive preferential treatment internationally. These nations can get away with many practices against Western values if they continue to deliver energy, violating human rights (Hunter, 2022, p. 19).

#### After The Gas Crisis

Due to the vulnerabilities and threats, the EU's reliance on Russian gas creates a difficult situation. It is helpful to consider them in light of the gas crisis of 2008–2009. One can draw two opposing conclusions from this. First off, the overall effect had a negative influence on the Union's overall energy security. This demonstrates that Russia took advantage of the Union's weakness—its extensive reliance on a single supplier (Rodríguez Fernández et al., 2020, p. 5). Due to this political issue of dependence and the gas's location, the EU could not move to another supplier, which led to a significant economic issue. It also became evident that poor infrastructure did not cause the changeover. This suggests that the EU nations implement reform to safeguard energy security. Removing vulnerabilities and lowering risks will do this. However, this was not the case after the gas crisis of 2008 and 2009. The intended outcome of policies implemented in several EU nations was not achieved (Rodríguez Fernández et al., 2020, p. 6-8). Additionally, the EU did not propose any new measures, and no effort was made to centralize energy policy. The hazards and vulnerabilities that came with them persisted as a result.

#### Connection to Theory

First, we swiftly direct our arrows on the energy security issue, particularly in light of its vulnerabilities and threats. The misuse of an unequal relationship is primarily where the connection to the theory is seen in this case. It has been stated previously that the EU is a more independent actor than Russia regarding gas relations. Nye and Keohane point out immediately that the less dependent actor can benefit from the connection (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 160). This is also evident in how Russia views the EU, where control is essential. Second, it is intriguing that this authority is situated one step below military power rather than alongside it. Political channels are used to exercise power regarding reliance and gas security. In Russia, the organizations managing and distributing gas also have access to this authority.

Multiple influencing channels are employed in this situation as well. However, there is less of an effort on the part of the parties to provide stability in this situation. There is a greater propensity for conflict than balance among EU Member States and between the EU and Russia. However, as seen from the theoretical framework, this is also understandable because Keohane and Nye discuss equality in the predominance of co-operation and conflict (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 161). This connection is poisonous and prone to escalation because it is feasible to switch back and forth between the two fairly rapidly. The theory of asymmetry also sheds light on dependency issues. Whether the relationship is symmetrical or asymmetrical concerning the dependence on gas is the key question within this framework. Who is more advantageous in an unbalanced relationship, furthermore? Russia represents a considerable portion of each other's economies as the EU's third-largest energy trading partner and Russia's most significant trading partner, respectively. Some authors see these facts as the reason the EU holds the most sway, while others predict that this asymmetrical relationship will favor Russia. The second instance presents the energy crisis as the primary defense. Russia might employ energy as a military tool. It has two choices in this regard: either to attempt and persuade Europe that they are a trustworthy provider or to lessen the

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perceived threat of energy as a weapon. In addition, as was already established, Russia benefits from the locatedness argument. However, it is remarkable that while having different gas policy sensibilities in the case of Russia and the EU, both parties acknowledge and support one another’s autonomy.

**Sanctions**

A discussion of the sanctions campaign between Russia and the EU will be presented in this section. This happened following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Eastern Ukraine and the takeover of Crimea. As a result, that aspect of the extensive conflict in Ukraine is examined, and the sub-question is addressed. The impact of the sanctions on the relationship between Russia and the EU will be highlighted in this section.

**Crimea Situation**

The sanctions against Russia are the EU’s and the US’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014. This incident significantly altered the world’s political landscape and, in some’s opinions, even signaled the start of a new Cold War. The US and EU came together to support their partner Ukraine, stating unequivocally that they would not permit Putin to annex and subsequently destabilize the Ukrainian mainland (Hunter, 2022, p. 16–17). They claimed that it was an obvious instance of breaking international law. The European Union established its sanctions policy, which includes broad and specific trade, financial, travel, and visa limitations and the freezing of assets (EU council, 2022). Sanctions were imposed in stages, first on a diplomatic and, subsequently, an economic level. They are connected to two distinct causes directly. The west strongly denounced Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which led to the first round of sanctions. The destruction of flight MH17 and the Russian destabilization of eastern Ukraine precipitated the second (Stulberg, 2015, p. 113). The EU decided to severely sanction Russia for that assault on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

*Table 2. Table with different tiers of sanctions issued by the European Council (EU council, 2022)*

Sanction packages of the EU against Russia set out in tiers	
Type of sanctions	Include following measures
Tier 1	Diplomatic sanctions against a total of 132 people. These individuals where put on a visa ban list of the EU and include people directly associated with the annexation of Crimea and the illegal referendum of the peninsula and those who support Russian decision-makers on the subject of Crimea.
Tier 2	Assets freezes of the previously mentioned individuals and 28 companies were added to the list of these asset freezes.
Tier 3	Economic sanctions against the Russian Federation. After the shot down of flight MH17 above the Eastern part of Ukraine, which was believed to be caused by Russian defense to air missiles. Economic measures included: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Monetary sanctions involved a ban on lending to Russian state banks.</li> <li>2. A ban on weapon exports, arms embargo.</li> <li>3. Measures involving oil trade and items used for drilling.</li> <li>4. A ban on dual usage goods and heavy machinery.</li> </ol>

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It should be recalled that the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) initially acted as an intermediary in reaction to Russia's seizure of Crimea and continued destabilization of Ukraine before sanctions were put in place (Havlik, 2014, p. 2). Peaceful conversations were emphasized due to the importance of Ukraine and Russia as partners. Without such talks, the EU would support Ukraine and impose restrictive measures, like sanctions, on Russia. The EU felt obligated to take action when the two countries could not reach an agreement through dialogue (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2015, p. 31). As was already mentioned, Russia launched an effort against the sanctions. This adhered to the two-phase principle as well. Diplomatic steps were implemented first. This involved removing diplomats from the countries and severing diplomatic ties. Economic sanctions were subsequently enacted after President Putin issued a proclamation. It included a restriction on importing food from the EU (Odendahl et al., 2015, p. 4).

#### **Effect of Sanctions**

Although the sanctions played a role in the global recession, it is incorrect to claim that they were the sole cause of it (Havlik, 2014, p. 8-12). For the energy industry, it is more difficult. First, more oil businesses are impacted by the Western sanctions, while the gas industry (including Gazprom) is mostly unscathed. The financial restrictions do, however, harm businesses in the gas industry, and Gazprombank is included on the sanctions list (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2015, p. 83-84). Additionally, the sanctions directly affect dual-use technology (technology that can be used for civil and military purposes), making it nearly impossible to create projects that are challenging to explore, like those in the Arctic region. Russia lacks the expertise and understanding necessary to create these technologies (Odendahl et al., 2015, p. 4-5).

#### **Consequences for the Relationship Between EU and Russia**

The specific effect of reciprocal penalties on the two sides' bilateral economic ties is difficult to ascertain. After all, the sanctions coincided with a drop in oil prices, an increase in the flight of capital out of Russia, and a sharp loss in the rouble's value, from which it has only lately recovered. Sanctions have a small impact on Russia's deteriorating economic situation, but they have real ramifications for doing business there. Mutual commerce fell by 10.6% in 2014 compared to 2013 (Jones & Whitworth, 2014, p. 24-26). Many of the EU-Russia relations were even more difficult when Ukraine chose not to sign the association agreement with Europe, the populace flocked to Maidan Square, and Yanukovich resigned. Following the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea, this situation became impossible. The relationship's many issues began with this relationship's dangerously egotistical emphasis.

Based on conflicting perceptions of principles and standards, both parties promptly ended the precarious relationship. Even Germany and France suddenly began to see Russia as a rival rather than an ally. Following Russia's response to the downing of Flight MH17, the last breach between Berlin and Moscow developed (Stulberg, 2015, p. 113). There are many subtle aspects to this—the climax of ten years of deteriorating ties in Ukraine. The crisis was an extremely precarious status quo before 2014. There has never been a stable security alliance between the EU and Russia, and there has always been rivalry (Siddi, 2020, p. 5). As a result, this catastrophe came as a complete surprise and was rarely anticipated. Ukraine was never just another nation in the shared neighborhood, though. Given its strategic importance to Russia, it could not be lightly given to the EU. Significant occurrences include the implementation of sanctions and the suspension of diplomatic talks. Sanctions are extremely difficult to implement since

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the European Union is naturally more normative (Brummer, 2009, p. 192). For instance, to impose and prolong them, the Council must always vote unanimously.

As a result, these actions may hurt the European economy. Given the many fault lines that have previously resulted in uneven Russian policy, this development concerning sanctions is surprising. Putin's inner circle and the energy business are not targeted, though. In their interactions with Moscow, Member States will continue to rely mostly on bilateral measures (Early, 2015, p. 78). Some claim that sanctions' effects on relations between Europe and Russia are only marginally affected. They claim that globalization and the rise of new markets are to blame for this. This "easily" opens up new markets for Russia and EU member states, who can then look for suppliers who aren't directly participating in the conflict (Jones & Whitworth, 2014, p. 26-27). The Baltic Governments and other former Soviet states are now less dependent on Moscow due to their participation in the European Union. Both considerations lessen the impact of a "cold trade war" on international commerce. Although it is not insignificant, the potential impact of a "cold trade war" is lower and shows that it is not as significant as is commonly thought (Odendahl et al., 2015, p. 2).

### **Division**

The political divide between the West and Russia can explain the evolution of the sanctions. Over time, cracks have appeared in the European Union. The disparities among EU members were not, however, quite wide at the beginning of the penalties. The vast majority of nations united in punishing Russia, the primary perpetrator. Of course, other people and organizations adopt a more pro-Russian stance, whether due to political conviction, philosophical beliefs, or purely economic considerations (Jones & Whitworth, 2014, p. 23). However, after more than two years, many people started to experience the financial effects of sanctions and embargoes. By the end of 2014, there was already a lot of skepticism regarding the sanctions, and more and more nations and areas began to voice their opposition (Jones & Whitworth, 2014). On May 20, 2016, it was disclosed that the sanctions would be automatically extended without a vote (EU council, 2022). On the one hand, it makes sense that the EU would not want to ruin its reputation over a voting dispute, especially because the penalties have already been strained to the breaking point. On the other side, this pivotal moment can result in the restart of talks with Russia. This can lead to new contracts that are advantageous to both sides.

### **Connection to Theory**

First and foremost, the emphasis on economic measures rather than military action allows this research to speak of a complex interconnectedness. Although it may seem obvious, this is not always the case. Despite the fragility of state interdependence, maintaining a balance is necessary because both actors depend on one another (Keohane & Nye, 1973, p. 160). Sanctions are a way to make this happen. A shared interest is required to maintain the relationship healthy to maintain this equilibrium. Even while it is off balance, the EU views sanctions as correcting the imbalance. Sanctions may also imply a lack of hierarchy (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973, p. 161) because both national and international (diplomatic) levels of government take action, especially when actions are taken to restrict food trade and freeze bank accounts. By doing this, one immediately harms that nation's social fabric. It is also very evident that there is an unequal relationship. Russia values Europe substantially more than the other way around. This is shown in how both sanctions are proportionate. EU has greater room for economic sanctions

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than Russia. Especially if energy is excluded, the EU is less dependent on Russia because it relies on European imports. No one can dispute that the EU economy is significantly larger than Russia's, even considering this factor. As a result, the EU is in a stronger position and has more power and influence in the economic partnership. This outcome is consistent with the (Kratochvíl & Tichý, 2013) interpretation of the literature on relationships in economics. In discussions about economic issues in Europe, the energy market is not brought up.

This industry is exempt from the sanctions, as was already mentioned. Europe's influence over Russia and vice versa is diminished by removing the country's most significant economic sector. The idea of NPE also sheds light on behavior that is sanctioned. Within the EU framework, two normative power components are evident. The first is when the EU imposes its values on Russia—especially concerning its conduct in Ukraine. Sanctions are used to 'demand' from another actor a different way of thinking or course of action. This is based on norms that the EU sees as normal. Normative authority does not imply that the EU's activities are justified. Indeed, there are many different interpretations of what is "right" or "wrong" (Veebel, 2021, p. 270). It is solely a method for the EU to apply its internal and external standards and ideals to its foreign policy. But the EU also perceives a threat in Russia's behavior and is obligated to call for change. This is the archetypal illustration of an EU normative mindset. The interaction between the first two theories is the second component. According to academics, the EU's use of its normative power creates an asymmetrical scenario. It establishes a framework based on demands by the EU rather than on a consensus. In anticipation of a course correction (Veebel, 2021, p. 271). Additionally, normative formulations consider the aspect of a complex reciprocal dependence on the spillover from one policy area to another. Sanctions are applied here with an emphasis on affecting several policy areas. This does not, however, consider preserving a balance between the actors.

## **DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Several topics will be the main topic of the conversation. An outline of the study's key findings will be given first. The results will then be placed in perspective, and alternates will be described. The third point will be devoted to the study's implications and include discussing the literature analysis and comparing the ideas. The study's shortcomings will be discussed, followed by suggestions for future research.

### **Key Findings**

The analysis began with the issue of the gas crisis in Ukraine and Crimea and its potential effects on the EU's reliance on Russian natural gas. This raises the possibility of deriving the question of how geopolitical conflicts affect energy dependence. The assessments were divided into these three central themes because trade, dependence, and sanctions are intertwined. Three sub-questions, each addressing a component of the chapter question, were developed to provide a systematic response. A case chapter on the two distinct crises in Ukraine was used for the analyses. The findings show that a geopolitical war alters trade policy, particularly when two parties are involved who have distinct trading ideologies. The analyses also revealed the weaknesses and potential dangers of relying on a single third-party state. It also showed that, following the gas crisis of 2008 and 2009, not much was done to alter this dependence. Finally, the chapter found that sanctions had a greater impact on the diplomatic and political relationship between the EU and Russia than on trade relations. As a result, there is still a reciprocal state of



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interdependence. The findings also provide credence to the complex interdependence and asymmetry idea. The assessments include a wide range of topics that are directly related, including spillover effects into domestic and regional politics, the precarious balance between co-operation and crisis, and the use of commodities for these purposes.

### **Understanding The Analyses**

The analysis was divided into three themes, as stated in the methodology. It is time to link the findings and search for emerging trends. The major concern is whether the three minor components impact the total reliance on gas. If the components are examined individually, they are as follows: The geopolitical struggle in Crimea has altered the EU's mentality toward reliance, which has implications for how the trade relationship has developed. The vulnerability and risk analysis conducted in the section titled "dependence" shows that this did not, in the end, minimize the dependency. Even after the 2008 and 2009 gas crises, a tiny shift is noticeable but rapidly undone. This is complemented by the section on "sanctions," which demonstrates how sanctions alter and materially worsen the relationship. People now view trading with Russia differently as a result. This did not affect genuine reliance, though. This pattern of a shift in belief but not ultimate behavior is discernible throughout the three themes.

These findings somewhat match what was anticipated by the study. It was anticipated that the geopolitical tensions in Ukraine would deteriorate Russia's relationship with the EU. The sanctions would partly have an impact on trade relations. In addition, it was reasonable to anticipate the risks that emerged during the dependency analysis. However, the little policy adjustment to lessen dependence did not go as planned. The investigation showed considerable social and economic repercussions from the geopolitical wars, particularly those in 2008 and 2009. Thoughts had changed, but all that changed was the EU's ambitions to package energy more tightly and make it a shared responsibility within the framework of the energy union. We can revisit the literature review at the beginning of this chapter to put these findings into perspective. This analysis has already demonstrated that neglecting a dependence on a third nation can have negative effects and that a crisis can arise fast due to a company's strong position inside the Russian system (Mikulska, 2020; Yafimava, 2015). This view is supported by the analysis, which provides additional insights. The theory can be examined to have a clearer understanding of the findings of the analysis. Russia and the EU are interdependent in a complex manner. This helps to understand why people's responses to energy dependence are paradoxical. A crisis could result from letting go of the connection since it is so powerful.

Additionally, an asymmetrical relationship can be shown in which both players attempt to maintain harmony in various contexts. However, a catastrophe might develop very fast in this situation. Additionally, Russia, in particular, leverages its status as a major energy producer to pressure the EU into taking a position. The analysis shows that the Member States of the Union are taking steps to increase reliance. It was anticipated that member states would respond to a crisis by reducing their reliance. Analysis revealed that the exact opposite occurred. Following the gas and Crimean crises, reliance on Russia grew. One argument for this is that a new trajectory may be influenced by the close cultural, political, and economic links between Germany and Russia. The geographic component of natural gas and the recent relative dependability of distributors are other factors. The Union's member states came to a conclusion that wouldn't hurt their economies. To provide a clear answer to this, more chapters are necessary. The nature of the research makes it challenging to establish alternative interpretations. The one case chapter looks at the topic "only" through the lens of one geopolitical battle. Multiple cases and numerous variables must

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be considered to offer multiple or alternative interpretations for the results given above. Other factors, such as media and political changes, may also influence dependency. This can only be determined by additional research considering new variables and circumstances.

### **Implications**

The research's ramifications can be seen throughout several new geopolitical science fields. The findings of this chapter do, in fact, advance knowledge in the field of energy dependency studies. A stronger relationship may be formed between the three themes and what specifically affects reliance when a geopolitical crisis occurs. This chapter adds to the body of knowledge already available in this field. Furthermore, by using the case chapter of Ukraine, it is possible to explore recent and present conflicts in greater detail. Additionally, this research adds to the body of knowledge on the numerous sub-themes, including commerce, reliance, and sanctions. These can be better explained in the context of the situation.

Using this case study, the ideas can also be verified. Although the theories have been around for a while, it has been demonstrated that they are still relevant today. They have demonstrated that many countries' behavior and processes may be described and understood through complex interconnectedness and asymmetry. The understanding of gas dependence has increased due to this research, and there are possible lessons to be learned. The decisions made in the area of energy policy are primarily responsible for this. The recommendation that follows, for instance, is to give energy diversification more consideration. Use numerous energy suppliers and distributors. Strategic autonomy has also been identified as a sensible path of action by this research. Energy affects everyone who lives and works, after all. Consequently, a reliable supply is crucial. Therefore, all spheres of society must comprehend this issue.

### **Admission of Limitations**

Even the best research has limitations, just like this chapter does. Here, the key points of emphasis are the research's breadth and the case study's N-value. First, the scope is constrained because decisions were made on the chapter variables. Trade, dependency, and sanctions provide only a limited picture of how geopolitical conflicts affect gas dependency. This restriction does not, however, affect the study's main conclusion. The idea was to use a geopolitical conflict as an example to link these three components. As a result, the findings can effectively respond to the chapter question. The N-value is a restriction to start with. This results from the decision to focus on the Ukraine situation as a single case study. The results' capacity to be generalized is thus constrained. To do this, it would be beneficial to look more closely at several geopolitical wars and the actors involved. But rather than generalizing, the research intended to investigate the factors relating to a specific geopolitical crisis. Finally, it should be noted that the case analysis did not cover the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It would have made sense, given its impact on the dependency problem, among other things. It was excluded because, as stated in the methodologies, it is a developing conflict that needs more consideration and time to tackle. On the other hand, it can be stated that the current instance already offers enough understanding of the issue. As a result, it does not impact the outcomes in that sense.

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### **Recommendations For Additional Study**

This leads to recommendations for further study. These additions can be inferred from the implications and restrictions mentioned above. Two suggestions are pertinent. The conflict in Ukraine is the first. It was already mentioned in passing in the section before this one. It became abundantly obvious during this investigation that the conflict greatly impacted the EU's reliance on gas. The players adopt a more assertive position, and extensive punishments severely restrict relations. Even a complete ban on Russian raw materials is being discussed. Research is required to analyze this conflict's impact and derive conclusions from it. This chapter could act as an "introduction" to that. Second, it is suggested that additional factors be used to obtain a complete picture of how geopolitical conflicts affect energy dependence. For instance, since the media effectively controls public discourse, its role might be further studied. Additionally, the internal political aspect has not yet undergone a thorough analysis. Here, one may consider how power can alter as an ideology changes. What impact does this have on the problem of dependency?

### **CONCLUSION**

The initial query in this chapter was whether the geopolitical situation in Ukraine impacted the EU's reliance on Russian gas. Through the use of a case chapter that examined how geopolitical conflict affects energy reliance, this was looked into. By examining the factors of commerce, reliance, and sanctions, it can be seen that the Ukraine situation truly impacted the EU's reliance on gas. The findings demonstrate that decisions were taken that influenced the dependency on gas during the gas wars of 2008 and 2009, as well as the situation surrounding Crimea. Contrary to expectations, the data reveals that the EU became more dependent over that time. The initial issue centered on the fact that there was a connection between the variables commerce, reliance, and sanctions. The analysis's inclusion of the link offers a portion of the solution to this issue and advances the understanding of gas dependency in general. There is a need for further understanding of this sort of conflict and its impact on the social sphere, particularly given the current state of the world and the complex conflict in Ukraine. This research has helped with that and has advanced the IR science field. By analyzing the issue of gas dependency utilizing three separate variables, the methodology was novel. This raised interesting questions. The decisions made by actors and how they affected the development of dependency were particularly fascinating. Additionally, as was already indicated, the shift in reliance was striking. This gives a framework that fits the situation well in the current geopolitical connection between the EU and Russia, along with a complicated condition of mutual dependency and an asymmetric relationship. Both views shed light on the case well, but this case also ushered in a new age.

The research's findings cannot be applied generally to the circumstance. However, they did offer a critical perspective on the interaction of political and economic interests and their impact on dependency. However, it must be acknowledged that while a single case chapter is instructive, it only provides a scant overview of the circumstances. Therefore, it is advised to do multiple case research that compares various geopolitical conflicts that may impact a particular energy dependency for a bigger study. This is what is anticipated to happen. In the debate, specific suggestions for additional research have already been presented. It should be noted that the introduction of the Energy Union marks the beginning of an intriguing trend. The way the EU handles this will be crucial because this Union will continue to impact

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gas reliance. Therefore, future studies must examine these developments in more detail and their connection to geopolitical events. The framework for this research can be found in the conflict in Ukraine.

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## *Impact of Gas Dependency on the EU, Russia Due to Ukrainian Conflict*

### **KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**Asymmetry theory:** The asymmetry theory is based on the interaction between states and extends the complex interdependence theory. The ability gap between two states is a common concept of an unbalanced bilateral relationship. Even a small difference like this might be felt.

**Complex Interdependence theory:** According to the notion of complex interdependence, nations are not the only actors in international politics; other actors also participate. International politics mostly consists of conflict and co-operation.

**European Union:** It's a political and economic union of 27 member states that are located primarily in Europe.

**Natural Gas Dependency:** Gas dependency in the context of this chapter means energy dependency where the countries are dependent primarily or secondarily on natural gas.

**Russia-Ukraine Conflict:** On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, which escalated into a major Russia-Ukrainian war that originally started in 2014.

**Trade Sanctions:** These are certain commercial or financial penalties issued by one or more states on a state or a group due to certain diplomatic discrepancies.

### Impact of Gas Dependency on the EU, Russia Due to Ukrainian Conflict

## APPENDIX

Figure 1. Gas pipeline system Europe  
(Economist, 2022)



The Economist

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Figure 2. Ukraine crisis 202  
(Al Jazeera, 2022)



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