On October 8, a gas pipeline and a telecoms cable were broken in what Finnish investigators said may have been sabotage.

• October 24, 2023

Move comes after months of back-and-forth with western countries over new additions to alliance amid war in Ukraine.

• October 24, 2023

Kremlin backs US President Joe Biden’s call for a new order but says any new system should not revolve around the US.

• October 24, 2023

From Glasgow to London to Barcelona, many Jewish protesters take on abuse to join pro-Palestinian rallies.

• October 24, 2023

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

In a nutshell, friendly relations between Georgia and Turkey are not a deterrent against potential Russian aggression against Georgia. Russia can always impose a blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coast by using its naval assets in Sevastopol, Crimea and Ochamchire in occupied Abkhazia, thereby effectively ‘strangling’ the nascent Georgian Coast Guard. However, despite being somewhat politically marginalised by the West, Turkey remains a crucial partner for Georgia.
Georgian–Turkish relations are in essence cordial but not equal. Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, is viewed as a junior partner in the relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For Georgia, Turkey represents an important partner in the volatile South Caucasus region. At the same time, enjoying friendly relations with Georgia as a transit country for oil, gas and cargo trains from Azerbaijan to Turkey, known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, is important for Turkey. Moreover, cargo transferred by road from Russia and Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey is a basic necessity. Bilateral relations are mainly focused on the economy and, occasionally, the Turkish military donates or sells military equipment to the Georgian Defence Forces (GDF). READ MORE

• October 19, 2023

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with one clear goal – to destroy it. It was a logical continuation of Azerbaijan’s decades-long policy, including the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and the blockade of the Lachin (Berdzor) corridor imposed in December 2022. After 24 hours of intensive fighting, the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic surrendered. A few days later, the large exodus of the Armenian population started, and by the end of September 2023, less than 100 Armenians were left in Nagorno Karabakh. On September 28, the president of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic signed a decree to dissolve the Republic by the end of 2023.
The reaction in Armenia to these events was somewhat surprising. The government made it clear that Armenia would not intervene to prevent the destruction of Nagorno Karabakh. Most Armenians went to social media, lamenting the lack of actions by Russia, the EU, and the US. Many were genuinely surprised that for Russia and the collective West, geopolitical or economic interests had more value than the fate of 100,000 Armenians who lived in Nagorno Karabakh for the last several millennia. READ MORE

• October 19, 2023

Ruling conservative nationalist party is pitted against an opposition that accuses the government of eroding democracy.

• October 16, 2023

Poland should see official election results from Monday but exit polls suggest an end to eight years of nationalist rule.

• October 16, 2023