By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (Ret.), D.Sc., Professor of Political Science of the RA, RF, USA (state studies-strategic security studies), Full Member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the RF

In the wake of the 44-day war in 2020, an unprecedented escalation of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders has been launched. This was done contrary to the principles and procedure for border delimitation and demarcation recommended by the OSCE Secretariat. The unparalleled pressure on the Armenian population from Karabakh was accompanied by subsequent attempts to undermine the settlement process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship. Among the arguments substantiating claims to include Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Baku authorities refer to the Azerbaijani-language toponymy, which allegedly has a long history. READ MORE

by Dr Jack Sharples (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and EGF Associate Researcher)
Mike Fulwood (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies)
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We analyse the drivers behind ongoing price rally and offer an outlook for the coming winter. On the global LNG market, unexpected outages meant that growth in supply simply did not keep pace with the increase in demand. Given its role as the ‘balancing market’, European LNG imports declined. This combined with declines in European production and pipeline imports to open a supply gap that could only be met by withdrawals from storage. We conclude that with gas markets noticeably tighter, the ongoing price rally is driven by fundamentals, with an added ‘fear premium’ that the forthcoming winter could be as cold as that in 2020/21. If that proves to be the case, the current price levels will persist, and even rise, while a milder winter could see the market turn slightly more bearish. READ MORE.

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

In the period immediately after the 44-day Karabakh war, Baku-Tehran relations remained on the level of pragmatic co-operation, until the new conservative political establishment ascended to power in Iran. Since then, Tehran’s rhetoric against Azerbaijan has shifted from that of “partnership” to open threats that explicitly neglect the partnership atmosphere. Relations between Baku and Tehran have always been unstable, particularly at the beginning of the 2000s. However, they rekindled when both countries became engaged in regional infrastructure and transit projects. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

For 30 years, Iran has adopted a cautious approach to developments in the South Caucasus, wary of the risk of encirclement. Iran's current military drills on the border with Azerbaijan are meant to send a signal that Tehran has its red lines too.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has carefully followed the developments in the South Caucasus. The strategic goal of Iran was not to allow the region to be a launchpad for the US or Israeli-initiated anti-Iranian activities. Due to the constant US pressure, Iran could not significantly increase its influence in the South Caucasus and directly compete with the US. Meanwhile, the US and Israel were not the only sources of concern for Iran. Turkey's intentions to increase its influence in the South Caucasus through the establishment of the Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership was another source of concern. READ MORE

By Eldor TULYAKOV, Executive Director, Development Strategy Centre
Furkat YUNUSOV, Head of Department, Development Strategy Centre

Four years ago, Uzbekistan launched reforms critical to the development of its economic sphere. Based on the Strategy of Actions, the document responsible for outlining the priorities for the country’s growth for the period of 2017-2021, as a metric we have arrived at initial finding, with several indicators demonstrating progress, most notably the areas of public administration, social and civic institutions, mass-media, economic advances, among others. The past four years have evidenced precise results and demonstrated more advanced methods to take these priority areas forward. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Like other regional powers, Russia has taken major steps to advance its geopolitical interests in the Levant. With the goals of expanding its influence and control the vast energy resources in the region. Although it only has a naval military base in Tartus (Syria) and no borders on the Mediterranean Sea, Russia has managed to exert its influence around nearby countries, including Lebanon. The perception of Lebanon as part of its Syrian stake encourages Moscow to strive to capitalize on its influence in the region after intervening in the Syrian conflict. In the last few years, Russia started playing a larger role in Lebanon following the growing civil unrest in Syria and the defeat of ISIS. READ MORE