By Elkhan NURIYEV, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation

As competition over trade corridors intensifies across Eurasia, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are becoming pivotal arenas where the governance of regional connectivity is increasingly contested. In this evolving landscape, proposals emerging from the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process highlight a broader shift: connectivity is no longer just about building railways and highways — it is about regulatory alignment, operational standards, and political credibility. One such proposal is the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), formally referenced in the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement witnessed by President Donald Trump. It envisions a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory as part of a post-conflict settlement framework. While not a megaproject in financial terms, the corridor carries strategic significance. Properly structured, it could turn diplomatic normalization into economic interdependence — linking political progress to customs harmonization, transit guarantees, and private-sector participation. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 19.03.2026  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

The South Caucasus managed the geopolitical rivalries surrounding it remarkably well in 2025. Despite intensifying global competition and conflicts raging beyond its borders, the region avoided major military escalation and even made notable progress toward stability. For the first time in more than three decades, there were no deadly interstate clashes among the three South Caucasus countries. Instead, pragmatic diplomacy, economic connectivity projects, and cautious foreign policies helped prevent regional tensions from spiralling into violence. Yet only a few months later, this fragile stability is now under serious strain as the region finds itself geographically caught between two most dangerous conflicts in the world. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 19.03.2026  |  External Relations
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By Vusal GULIYEV, Leading Advisor at the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)

On February 10, railway officials from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan convened in Ashgabat to strengthen cooperation and accelerate the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor. Development of the Middle Corridor continues to gain momentum as Eurasian states seek faster, more geopolitically resilient trade routes linking Asia and Europe. The southern branch of the corridor stretches from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to the Caspian Sea, and onward via Azerbaijan and Georgia to Türkiye and European markets. This section has emerged as an increasingly important segment of the network. As regional connectivity initiatives accelerate, the southern branch is gradually becoming a key component of the evolving Eurasian transport architecture READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 19.03.2026  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s February 9–11 visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan marked a structural turning point in the South Caucasus. Unlike previous high-level engagements of the United States that generated rhetorical alignment but limited follow-through, this visit embedded the region into long-term American economic, technological, and strategic frameworks. Taking place on the heels of the latest agreement (January 14) between Washington and Yerevan on the implementation framework for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the visit served to consolidate the American influence in the region and taking it to higher levels. The consequences are unfolding along two axes: domestically, within Armenia and Azerbaijan’s political economies; and geopolitically, in the region’s recalibrating balance between the United States and Russia, with Georgia seeking entry into the new configuration. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 25.02.2026  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

China’s position on the TRIPP (Trump’s Route for International Peace and Prosperity) has been cautious and low-profile, shaped less by enthusiasm for the project itself than by Beijing’s overall policy toward the South Caucasus and the region’s geopolitical rivalries. From China’s perspective, TRIPP is not mutually exclusive with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From the U.S. perspective, however, the project carries geopolitical weight, aimed at containing or counterbalancing Russian, Iranian and Chinese influence in Eurasia.
China has evaluated TRIPP primarily through the lens of risk management, given that the route traverses border regions historically vulnerable to conflict and border tensions and lies at the intersection of regional rivalries. This helps explain why Beijing has avoided any public endorsement, opting instead for rhetorical neutrality and a wait-and-see approach — signalling that economic connectivity must be inclusive, territorial integrity respected, trade depoliticized and cooperation insulated from zero-sum geopolitical competition. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 18.02.2026  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

The unveiling of the TRIPP Implementation Framework has not only accelerated the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process but has also triggered visible reactions from regional powers whose influence over South Caucasus connectivity is being recalibrated. While the project is framed as an economic and infrastructural initiative anchored in sovereignty and reciprocity, it directly affects long-standing geopolitical balances in a key crossroads of Eurasia. Among regional actors, Russia and Iran have emerged as the most vocal critics or sceptics of TRIPP, reflecting broader concerns over diminishing leverage, U.S. involvement, and shifting regional alignments. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 26.01.2026  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On Jan. 13, 2026, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in Washington, D.C., to announce the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) Implementation Framework. The six-page document is the latest step toward implementing the commitments made at the White House on Aug. 8, 2025, aimed at establishing peace in the South Caucasus. According to the announcement, the “ultimate objective of TRIPP is to strengthen the prosperity and security of Armenia and Azerbaijan and further American commerce by expanding regional trade and connectivity, as well as creating new transit opportunities linking Central Asia and the Caspian to Europe. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 26.01.2026  |  External Relations
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By Aytaс MAHAMMADOVA, Energy Security Expert affiliated with the Caspian-Alpine Society

The South Caucasus has long occupied an ambiguous place in American foreign policy, neither central to U.S. national security nor irrelevant to it. The region has historically mattered insofar as it intersected with larger geopolitical contests: between Russia and the West, between energy producers and consumers, and between stability and fragmentation along Eurasia's inner frontier. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy codifies a shift that will sharpen this logic, moving the United States decisively away from expansive regional engagement toward selective, interest-driven involvement. While the document does not explicitly address the South Caucasus in its regional sections, its underlying principles, such as restraint, burden-sharing, transactional-ism, and rejection of transformational agendas, will fundamentally reshape Washington's engagement with the South Caucasus states. This recalibration reflects broader strategic realities: finite American resources, diminished appetite for open-ended commitments, and recognition that regional outcomes will ultimately be determined by local power dynamics rather than external patronage. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 13.01.2026  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

Armenia’s pivotal 2026 looms: a year that will test fragile peace efforts with Azerbaijan and Turkey, redefine Yerevan’s ties with the EU and Russia, and unfold amid deepening political and societal polarization.
The year 2026 could be crucial for Armenia, significantly influencing both the foreign and domestic policy trajectory of the country. Externally, the main developments to monitor are the Armenia–Azerbaijan and Armenia–Turkey normalization processes. Will the August 2025 Washington Declaration bring the restoration of all regional communications – including the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border and the signature of an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement – or will it meet the fate of previous, unsuccessful attempts to establish lasting peace and security in the South Caucasus? READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 22.12.2025  |  External Relations
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By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

Record trade and closer ties with Taipei mark New Delhi’s shift from caution to assertiveness.
In 2024, for the first time ever, bilateral trade between India and Taiwan exceeded US$10 billion. And in the past six months alone, governments and businesses in the two countries have agreed on multipledeals that bring their semiconductor, tech, artificial intelligence, and industrial sectors even closer together, along with supply chains. These new trade partnerships support Taiwan’s “New Southbound Policy” and India’s “Act East” and “Make in India” policies, with Taiwan alone investing US$4.5 billion in India since February 2024. While the surge in Taiwanese investment in Indian companies is grounded in the economic dimension of the relationship, there is another dynamic taking place. Like most countries, New Delhi does not officially recognise Taipei. Yet its compliance with the “One China principle” – the condition set by Beijing that nations must diplomatically acknowledge there is only one Chinese government and must not establish official contacts with Taiwan – has become more nuanced. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 22.12.2025  |  External Relations
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