Türkiye’s Policy in the South Caucasus: Navigating Normalization Efforts Amid Ankara’s “Azerbaijan First” Policy
By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and ensuing geopolitical developments revealed the paradoxes behind Türkiye’s motivations in the South Caucasus. This report examines the main directions of Türkiye’s foreign policy in the region, building on insights from desktop research, 18 interviews, and other convening opportunities.
Key findings:
- The importance of the South Caucasus for Türkiye is underestimated. The region has strong significance for Ankara from both a geopolitical and geoeconomic perspective.
- Türkiye’s policy in the South Caucasus is, and will likely remain, based on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan and can be articulated as an “Azerbaijan first” policy.
- Azerbaijan–Türkiye ties consist of heavy interdependencies in many fields, from political to social and economic, rather than a “big brother/small brother” dynamic. If land access from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan—and then directly to Türkiye—via Armenia’s Syunik region is established, Türkiye may lose any incentive to continue normalization and open borders with Armenia.
- Türkiye sees Russia as “an unavoidable evil” that will remain a constant factor in South Caucasus geopolitics, and Ankara aims to manage its relationship with Moscow, establish a Russia–Türkiye condominium, and substantially limit the presence and influence of the US, the EU, and NATO in the region. READ MORE
| External Relations | The Caucasus and the Black Sea
