Sailing the Unsettled South Caucasus through Troubled Waters towards Regional Integration
by George Niculescu The www gpf europe com European Geopolitical Forum EGF Dialogue November 2014 SAILING THE UNSETTLED SOUTH CAUCASUS THROUGH TROUBLED WATERS TOWARDS REGIONAL INTEGRATION By George Vlad NICULESCU Head of Research the European Geopolitical Forum Just like other parts of Eurasia1 the South fluid evolutions in the Middle East Caucasus is facing the challenge of a renewed particularly in Syria and Iraq East West geopolitical competition under the inability of the EU to exert or at least pinned by three evolving challenges2 1 a claim a bolder regional role because of its growing ideological gap between Russia and own institutional constraints and the lack the West 2 the chronic persistence of of appetite for new CSDP missions in the protracted conflicts 3 the dilemma of post aftermath of the Euro crisis Soviet states European vs Eurasian NATO s self restrained regional role being integration limited to soft security cooperation in 28 1 format driven by More specifically the South Caucasus geopolitical landscape is shaped by 1 its refocus on deterrence and defence of the territory of its Eastern members competition between Russia and the West against a resurgent Russia in the wake of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis 2 an apparent decrease of the strategic which effectively brought the European priority of the region in the wake of cooperative security era to an end unwinding the ISAF operation in growing Russian regional assertiveness Afghanistan whereby the Eurasian Economic Union Overall the geopolitical competition between EEU is increasingly used as a vehicle for Russia and the West over Ukraine may have a countering strides towards European negative impact on the South Caucasus it may integration while OSCE led conflict either turn the current de facto situation into a resolution is manipulated to create new de jure geopolitical reality or it may push geopolitical leverage over the regional the whole region into the swirl of instability states around Ukraine Two factors seem decisive for a tacit Russian Turkish partnership of this analysis convenience which is basically motivated by both parties focus on different fronts 1 Russian progress in ensuring Russia s engagement in the geopolitical geopolitical control of Ukraine may tend confrontation with the West over Ukraine to support the first option Otherwise while Turkey has been absorbed by the EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com faced with a stalemate in Ukraine However this statement came after two rounds Moscow might have to expand its of NATO enlargement 1999 and 2004 and confrontation with the West in the after the Big Bang enlargement of the European South Caucasus Union 2004 Moreover it came after the Rose 2 Turkish tacit acceptance of Russian and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine incursions in Ukraine may also favour respectively brought pro Western leaders the legalization of the status quo in the seeking NATO and EU membership for their South Caucasus while Ankara s brazen countries into top state positions In response reaction via NATO or directly may Russia suspended the implementation of the dramatically raise the risk of instability CFE Agreement from 2007 while in the in the South Caucasus summer of 2008 it fought and won the Five Day War against Georgia Afterwards Moscow Against this complex and deeply worrying recognized the independence of Abkhazia regional background where Russia and Turkey and South Ossetia The Georgian war actually re emerge as the dominant regional powers came as a Russian warning against NATO s what strategic policy changes might be 2008 Bucharest summit decision to recognize envisaged by Western decision makers to Georgia and Ukraine as aspirants for NATO consolidate their position as viable South membership Caucasus players From a methodological perspective I address those questions through Both suspension of the implementation of the the lens of the evolving challenges in Eurasia CFE Treaty and recognition of the independence of the Georgian breakaway Unsettled European Security Issues Linger republics enshrined a very clear geopolitical message from Moscow Russia was not happy The geopolitical competition between Russia with the current European security and the West became predictable after arrangements built around the OSCE President Putin stated in April 2005 Decalogue and no longer felt obliged to fulfil its commitments In 2009 then Russian President Above all we should acknowledge Dmitry Medvedev came up with a proposal to that the collapse of the Soviet Union discuss a new European Security Treaty was a major geopolitical disaster of allegedly aiming to create a common undivided the century As for the Russian space in the Euro Atlantic region to finally do nation it became a genuine drama away with the Cold War legacy To that end Tens of millions of our co citizens Medvedev suggested formalizing the principle and compatriots found themselves of indivisible security in international law as a outside Russian territory 3 legal obligation pursuant to which no nation or international organization operating in the The seeds of the new confrontation were seen Euro Atlantic region was entitled to strengthen in those words while alluding to both the goal its own security at the expense of others and the strategy of the new resurgence of nations or organizations Eventually the West Russia rejected this Russian proposal for it felt it November 2014 Page 2 of 9 EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com might have prohibited future enlargements of Russia and the West seem to have embarked on NATO and the EU another ideological competition similar in many respects with that during the Cold War In that very same year the EU launched the The difference is that Moscow is now Eastern Partnership aiming at creating supporting a sort of anti Americanism conditions for accelerating political association consisting of a mixture of state based and further economic integration of six partner nationalism and autocratic traditionalism to countries from Eurasia This EU initiative has counter Western support for democracy and been perceived by the Russians as a individual freedoms across Eurasia geopolitical process because 1 of the wide ranging consequences of what the EU thought In 2013 in Georgia which boasts Eurasia s was a purely technical norms setting process best rankings on the Freedom in the World of modernization 2 they saw it as a scale 4 displaying a Partly Free status scoring 3 competitor to Eurasian integration in the on a scale of 7 for both political and civil former Soviet space rights a presidential election widely regarded as fair and honest marked a further step In December 2013 the Ukrainian crisis started toward the consolidation of democracy after the Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit Armenia which under strong Russian political when former President Yanukovich refused in pressure gave up plans for initialling an the last minute to sign an Association Association Agreement and a DCFTA with the Agreement with the EU Following the EU and instead decided to join the Eurasian Euromaidan protests of pro Western Customs Union has kept its Partly Free status Ukrainians and the unexpected ouster of Mr and scores for political and civil rights from the Yanukovich by the Ukrainian Rada Moscow previous years 5 and 4 respectively annexed Crimea It has also agitated and Azerbaijan has kept its Not Free status because supported pro Russian insurgents in Eastern of lower political rights scores 6 on a scale of Ukraine to the outright dismay of the West 7 and its civil liberties rating which declined which responded with waves of economic and from 5 to 6 due to property rights violations political sanctions At present the area from and crack downs on opposition and civil Vancouver to Vladivostok has been hijacked society in advance of the presidential elections by a new East West geopolitical competition while powerpolitik rather than cooperative The current geopolitical competition between security seems to prevail in shaping the future Russia and the West is likely to worsen the destiny of Eurasia state of democracy in the South Caucasus in the years to come That might be the case since The Ideological Gap between Russia and the Russia s intervention in Ukraine West which amounts to acts of war openly flaunts the principles on Over the last few years many international which the post Cold War order in observers have noted a deepening gap between Europe is based posing a challenge perceptions in the West and in Russia on both to the European Union and the democracy and individual rights and freedoms November 2014 Page 3 of 9 EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com United States A winner take all posture in South Caucasus affairs the West approach undermines the prospect should probably tone down its criticism of of establishing functioning liberal undemocratic governance systems and democracies around the EU s replace it with a pragmatic defence of its periphery 5 regional economic and security interests Maintaining a minimal standard for the Moreover as a consequence of placing observance of civil rights may offer a face security and stability high on the agenda of saving solution in regard to previous ENP countries the Ukraine crisis has also commitments That would also imply seeking pushed democracy and democratization lower new regional arrangements according to on the list of their priorities 6 common interests not necessarily upon acceptance of common values For example Other factors are also likely to affect democracy enhancing the level of engagement with in the South Caucasus For example the EU s Azerbaijan may be required to consolidate prolonged economic crisis and preoccupation regional governance in the South Caucasus with its own future has dimmed its appeal as a model to many in the Eastern European A multipolar approach to broader Eurasian neighbourhood Other external influences geopolitics might be also needed since the including intolerant forms of religious activism decline of Western influence in the world could and extreme nationalism fed by the persistence weaken the parameters of the stability of the of regional protracted conflicts are global governance system in coming years increasingly shaping the policies of regional Promoting the universalism of Western values states In addition the Russian propaganda might further accelerate this negative trend It machine emphasized the misgivings of is quite likely that sharing democratic values Western societies and the pains and sacrifices a would preserve the current Western alliances country needs to make in order to join the while a more pragmatic approach to West while Russia s penetrating vivid democratic values may attract new allies and messages are ineffectively counteracted by the break potential anti Western alliances In this boring vague responses of European and vein the leverage created by Western support national governments 7 of increased Eurasian roles for Iran India and China could be also considered from this Consequently the West risks self excluding perspective itself from Eurasia as the odd boy in town if it continues to shape bilateral ties with The Resolution of Protracted Conflicts regional countries according to their level of democratic development It is increasingly The unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus obvious that in those circumstances in Abkhazia South Ossetia and Nagorno promoting liberal democratic standards for Karabakh are undermining efforts to build up political rights in the South Caucasus might effective regional cooperation and are become a liability for the West since they are generating regional instability and asymmetric heavily undermining the West s leverage to security risks Existing conflict management shape regional engagements To maintain its mechanisms have not yielded the expected November 2014 Page 4 of 9 EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com outcomes and this might have a lot to do with European security system is agreed with the the lack of regional strategic leadership To West Alternatively it may implement the offer better coordinated strategic leadership of policy of the fait accompli whereby it solves existing crisis management mechanisms the protracted conflicts on its own terms international experts have been calling on irrespective of what the OSCE and its other Russia the United States and Europe to re members are saying or doing The Russians energize conflict resolution in the Euro Atlantic have already played out this scenario in Crimea area To that end developing new means to and is attempting to do so in Eastern Ukraine strengthen diplomacy supplementing and they might be applying it in the South traditional negotiations through contributions Caucasus as well However The region i e the of the civil society and building up public Eastern Partnership area requires a security support for peaceful conflict resolution are architecture that takes the current challenges often quoted as examples into consideration and demands determined action by the West towards solutions to the Russia has become a problem for Europe since frozen conflicts 8 Therefore the West might the OSCE system has failed to accomplish its take a more pro active and imaginative role in tasks in the post Cold War era while Moscow conflict resolution in the South Caucasus For has sought to impose its own security example it may consider initiating multilateral arrangements in Europe NATO and the EU talks with the authorities from Sukhumi brought peace to former Yugoslavia in the Tskhinvali and Tbilisi on options for 1990s while the OSCE has continuously failed conditional recognition of the sovereignty and to provide effective conflict resolution in territorial integrity of Abkhazia and South Abkhazia South Ossetia Nagorno Karabakh Ossetia while more boldly proposing the use of and Transnistria Moscow has simply ignored the EU s military peace keeping assets and the OSCE Decalogue in Ukraine Crimea and capabilities for conflict resolution in the South Georgia while seeking to justify itself through Caucasus alluding to others who have arguably done the same i e NATO in Kosovo Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus might actually become a test case for developing new The chronic persistence of the protracted European security rules and mechanisms conflicts in the South Caucasus and which should integrate Russia and Turkey in a Transnistria might be also seen against the different way than since the end of the Cold backdrop of Russia s recent refusal to accept War In this vein the West should engage more OSCE rules A parallel might be drawn between actively with both Russia and Turkey on the the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and the protracted resolution of the protracted conflicts in the conflicts in the South Caucasus and South Caucasus with a view to overcoming Transnistria In all these conflicts Russia tacitly their chronic deadlock Such multilateral prevented a peaceful solution to the conflict approaches would ensure better regional while formally it played the role of strategic coordination of the existing crisis peacemaker provider of humanitarian relief management mechanisms strengthen the Moscow might continue to do so until a more regional ownership of the peace processes in favourable geopolitical configuration of the particular through developing and November 2014 Page 5 of 9 EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com implementing a joint post conflict regional international affairs specialists vision and counter the fears of some local worldwide to acknowledge the actors of Russian imposed solutions possibility that the Russian Republic under Vladimir Putin has However the way forward in meeting such a reorganized its entire foreign and goal will not be an easy ride because of domestic policy in order to pursue a Russian failure to adapt its conflict resolution single objective namely the policies to multilateral approaches in establishment of a new kind of particular in Georgia Turkish unsettled issues union comprised of former Soviet with some of the main parties to the protracted republics and headed by Russia conflicts most notably with Armenia a US itself 10 policy which attaches a relatively low priority to conflict resolution in the South Caucasus In addition experts have highlighted a blatant and the EU s institutional constraints regarding incompatibility between the Deep and its involvement in conflict management and Comprehensive Free Trade Area DCFTA resolution in its neighbourhoods and its agreements signed by a number of post Soviet inability to carry out a wider range of military states with the EU and the commitments that tasks to protect its interests and project its should be made by a member of the ECU the values 9 precursor of the EEU This incompatibility is apparently making post Soviet states face a The European vs Eurasian Integration dilemma between setting up free trade with the Dilemma of the Post Soviet States EU and joining the ECU EEU while focusing both Russia and the West on geopolitical The steps taken by Russia Belarus and competition Kazakhstan to create a Eurasian integration project have spurred suspicions in the West The South Caucasus countries have been highly about an emerging geopolitical project aiming divided in their approach to the European vs to re build the Soviet Union or the Tsarist Eurasian integration dilemma and the current Empire into a new institutional outfit geopolitical competition between Russia and Consequently a Western myth of the Eurasian the West has pushed them into making Economic Union EEU as a means to re undesired choices The first victim was Sovietize Eurasia has emerged This myth has Armenia not been supported by the realities of the Eurasian Customs Union ECU so far The announcement at the beginning of However according to most experts the September 2013 in Moscow by President Serzh project of the EEU might be evolving towards Sargsyan of Armenia s decision to join the deeper political integration Russian led Eurasian Customs Union ECU after concluding a lengthy four years Nonetheless events between the negotiation on an Association Agreement AA invasion of Georgia and the armed and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade seizure of Ukrainian territory in Agreement DCFTA with the EU took many by 2014 forced policy makers and surprise However experts on the South November 2014 Page 6 of 9 EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com Caucasus had known for years that Yerevan economy mainly fuelled by energy exports to had almost irremediably linked its security and Europe economy in particular its energy sector to Russia In fact Armenia chose to partially the negatives consequences of EEU sacrifice its independence and sovereignty for membership outweigh the the sake of keeping a convenient status quo in positives Even semi official the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh Russian analysis have acknow conflict against a strategic balance shifting in ledged this with one noting that if favour of Azerbaijan One year later on 10 Azerbaijan joins the Customs Union October 2014 at a summit held in Minsk that it is jointly with Turkey and Belarus president Sargsyan signed Armenia s this will not happen soon because accession treaty to the EEU However Yerevan of the nature of the Azerbaijani has continued to pursue European integration economy 11 12 while taking into account its new trade commitments by seeking to conclude with the However one Azerbaijani expert thought that EU an Association Agreement Light or a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Plus A stronger Russia than in the 1990s may further enhance its geopolitical While Armenia joined the EEU becoming what clout in various subtle ways so as experts call a reluctant follower of the to develop and execute problem Eurasian integration project Georgia has solving scenarios that would gratify chosen the path to European integration at the not only Russia s interests but also expense of Eurasian integration On 27 June the entire post Soviet neighbour 2014 the prime minister of Georgia Irakli hood Such a move could urge CIS Garibashvili signed an Association Agreement political leaders to accept Kremlin s AA and DCFTA with the EU thereby joining rules and eventually integrate their aside Ukraine and Moldova what the experts countries into a Eurasian Union 13 call the European integrators group Although AAs stop short of guaranteeing future Such views are obviously referring to the membership in the EU they aim to deepen the inability of the West to offer viable solutions to EU s political and economic relations with the protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus Eastern Partners and to gradually integrate specifically in the case of Nagorno Karabakh these countries with EU s Internal Market while Russia seemed able but not willing yet to manipulate both Baku and Yerevan into a Meanwhile Azerbaijan seems to have sided peaceful settlement This makes the case for with the so called rejectionists group Western pro active involvement in conflict including also Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan resolution in the South Caucasus even stronger who simply prefer to stay away from any form of regional integration seeking instead to The West should start to prepare the ground become increasingly self reliant Economic for sustaining post conflict regional economic analyses are practically unanimous in noting integration in the South Caucasus while in its that due to the structure of the Azerbaijani relationships with its Eastern partners the EU November 2014 Page 7 of 9 EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com should avoid imposing a choice between itself help the regional countries decrease the risks and Moscow and should instead highlight the face the challenges and benefit from the benefits of closer relations 14 This way it opportunities would both circumvent the dilemma of European vs Eurasian integration and would It is becoming increasingly clear that in the make a significant contribution to peaceful wake of the Ukrainian crisis the West will seek resolution of the protracted conflicts A vision to prevent Russian attempts at re Sovietizing for peace in the South Caucasus reinforced by Eastern Europe and Central Asia by an comprehensive integrated and sustainable emerging strategy of containment of Eurasian cooperation which would ultimately enable integration The defence aspects of this free movement of people goods services and strategy started to become apparent at the capital at the regional level could lead to NATO Summit in Newport in early September economic integration and the opening of closed 2014 With the reversal of Armenia s European borders To that end the EU may specifically integration efforts and its subsequent work towards developing options for integration with the EEU the South Caucasus harmonizing the European and Eurasian has become a contested area Consequently integration normative systems Turkey s guidelines for containing the Eurasian interest to maintain simultaneous Free Trade integration in the South Caucasus would be Areas with the EU and the EEU and Armenia s expected to emerge rather soon desire as a new member of the EEU to keep the door open for broader cooperation with the The main points of this paper suggest that the EU could provide further incentives for the EU focus for a new Western strategy on the South to promote regional integration in the South Caucasus should take a constructive power Caucasus Georgia and Azerbaijan may also sharing approach From this perspective the support this vision provided they would see it resolution of the protracted conflicts should as a key element eventually leading to the become a key Western priority Such an resolution of the protracted conflicts on their approach might on the one hand undo Russian territory geopolitical games in the region and on the other hand may open the door to developing Conclusion new European security rules and mechanisms in the OSCE area To that end a more pro Since the end of the Cold War the South active and imaginative role of the West should Caucasus has sailed in both turbulent and be considered for engaging both Russia and uncharted waters The regional countries have Turkey in effective conflict resolution For been highly divided on their priorities for example the West might start to prepare the regional integration The current geopolitical ground for sustaining post conflict regional competition between Russia and the West has economic integration in the South Caucasus as raised the stakes on where this region is a way to circumvent the dilemma of post Soviet heading and has added new political economic states caught in between competing European and security risks challenges and and Eurasian integration processes In order to opportunities This article has highlighted some maintain its relevance in Eurasia the West of those while suggesting ways for the West to might also need to tone down criticism of November 2014 Page 8 of 9 EGF Dialogue www gpf europe com regional players undemocratic governance often deem competition as being more systems while proposing a minimal standard attractive than cooperation since the latter for the observance of the civil rights Instead it implies partially giving in on some objectives to may pragmatically defend its regional enable compromise solutions What it is often economic and security interests through forgotten however is that the risk of losing seeking new regional arrangements according everything through competition is much higher to common interests not necessarily upon than the risk of losing something through acceptance of common values cooperation Unfortunately sometimes it takes a crisis or even a war to gauge the different To what extent the West Turkey and Russia amplitudes of those risks It is for the Western are prepared for constructive power sharing Turkish and Russian leaders to decide what rather than competition in the South Caucasus would be the best political choice not only for is unclear at this stage As history has proven their people but for the Caucasian states as so many times in the past decision makers well History will judge their choices 1 Eurasia is referred hereafter as the territory of the former Soviet Union bar the Baltic states 2 For details see G Niculescu The Evolving Challenges in Eurasia published on 05 03 2013 at http www cseea ro publicatii view brief analysis the evolving challenges in eurasia 3 V Putin Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation April 25 2005 The Kremlin Moscow from http archive kremlin ru eng speeches 2005 04 25 2031_type70029type82912_87086 shtml 4 Freedom House Freedom in the World 2014 from http www freedomhouse org report freedom world freedom world 2014 5 Michael Leigh A Strategy for Europe s Neighborhood The German Marshall Fund of the United States Europe Program Policy Brief Vol 1 No 1 September 2014 6 Alina Inayeh Daniela Schwarzer and Joerg Forbrig Regional Repercussions of the Ukraine Crisis the German Marshall Fund of the United States Europe Policy Paper No 3 2014 7 Ibidem 8 Alina Inayeh Daniela Schwarzer and Joerg Forbrig Op cit 9 Daniel Keohane Strategic Priorities for EU Defence Policy FRIDE Policy Brief February 2013 10 Frederic Starr Svante Cornell Putin s Grand Strategy The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents Central Asia Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program 2014 11 Russia Expects Azerbaijan s Accession to Eurasian Customs Union Jointly with Turkey Trend October 11 2013 http en trend az capital business 2200218 html 12 Frederic Starr Svante Cornell Op cit 13 Elkhan Nuryiev How the West Helps Putin Fulfil His CIS Strategy in Moscow Times 6 April 2014 from http www themoscowtimes com opinion article how the west helps putin fulfill his cis strategy 497604 html 14 Alina Inayeh Daniela Schwarzer and Joerg Forbrig Op cit Disclaimer The information presented in this report is believed to be correct at the time of publication Please note that the contents of the report are based on materials gathered in good faith from both primary and secondary sources the accuracy of which we are not always in a position to guarantee EGF does not accept any liability for subsequent actions taken by third parties based on any of the information provided in our reports if such information may subsequently be proven to be inaccurate Avenue Du Manoir D Anjou 8 Published by European Geopolitical Forum SPRL Brussels 1150 Belgium Copyright European Geopolitical Forum SPRL Tel 32 496 45 40 49 Director and Founder Dr Marat Terterov info gpf europe com Email Marat Terterov gpf europe com www gpf europe com www gpf europe ru| Security | The Caucasus and the Black Sea |
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