By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan was a watershed moment in the conflict. Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory by force, defying decades-long widespread perception among OSCE Co-chair countries and other actors that the conflict had no military solution. Many expected that the demise of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would pave the way for the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement, thus bringing long-awaited stability to the region. However, it appeared that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was only one part of the bigger puzzle of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. After September 2023, Azerbaijan brought back the narrative of a corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, despite the fact that there was no Lachin corridor anymore connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh and started to highlight the necessity to change the Armenian constitution and other laws READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 27.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia and Turkey started a new phase of normalization at the end of 2021, appointing special representatives to draw up recommendations. From the beginning, Turkey stated that the process should be carried out without any preconditions. However, in the last two years Ankara has put forward various preconditions and failed to take steps agreed upon during negotiations.
Armenia–Turkey relations have always been a significant factor impacting regional geopolitics in the South Caucasus. In the period between the first and the second Nagorno-Karabakh wars, many viewed the normalization of Armenia–Turkey relations as having the power to help settle the conflict. Another significant factor influencing the process was the West’s perception that Armenia–Turkey normalization might enable Armenia to reduce its dependence on Russia, as “without fear of Turkey, Armenia will need Russia less. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 20.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Amid increasing tensions between Russia and Armenia, and Azerbaijan’s growing pressure on Armenia to annex new border villages, the first week of March was characterized by intensive official Armenian- Iranian meetings. What is the nature of these meetings? Is there any coincidence with the timing? And what can Iran do to defuse tensions between Yerevan and Moscow?
On March 6, 2024, a delegation headed by Armenia’s Defence Minister Suren Papikyan visited Iran and met with Iranian officials. In Papikyan’s meeting with his Iranian counterpart Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, the Iranian minister reaffirmed his country’s position supporting Armenia’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty over its entire territory and opposing a change in internationally recognized borders in the region. He also expressed support for direct negotiations between Yerevan and Baku that aim “to bring peace and security to the region.” However, Ashtiani warned that the pursuit of security from outside the region would backfire and create instability, adding “The architecture of regional security must be formed in the region itself, otherwise it will become a battlefield for major powers.” READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 20.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

Following the recent presidential elections, Azerbaijan turned its focus to the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and its role in connecting the Turkic world, indicating that Baku does not intend to align with the West or Russia. The expansion of defence cooperation within the OTS signifies a pivotal shift in regional dynamics, with member states increasingly prioritizing mutual security and strategic alignment as well as shaping a common foreign policy agenda. The integration of Turkish defence industry companies in other member states’ defence infrastructure underscores the benefits of OTS cooperation and how the organization is emerging as a formidable force in Eurasia.
On February 14, during his inauguration speech at parliament, the re-elected President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, outlined the country’s foreign policy priorities within the framework of regional integration projects (See EDM, February 22). He designated the Organization of the Turkic States (OTS) as the primary focus for his new term, dismissing alternative organizations without explicitly naming them (Azertag, February 14). “This is the main international organization for us because it is our family. We have no other family. Our family is the Turkic world”, he stated about the OTS. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 12.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The South Caucasus will be the epicentre of any political or economic friction between Russia and the Middle East. The region, located along the International North-South Transport Corridor, is the most feasible gateway to connect Russia to the Middle East. Russia’s increasing economic and political interaction and involvement in the Middle East will further enhance its dependency on Azerbaijan, due to its bridging location, and Turkey, its partner in addressing upheavals in the Arab region. These two factors may push Russia to pressure Armenia to agree on the implementation of article nine of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement on unblocking economic and transport communications in the region and deploying Russian border guards to control the transit road connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. By doing so, Russia assumes it would increase its leverage on the main actors in the region that will use the transit route connecting Europe to China. The main actor within this context is Turkey, which aims to use the shortest route (compared to the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route) to trade with the Central Asian republics and beyond. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 12.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

This AIES Focus discusses the four major foreign actors in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan within the time frame of the last 12 to 18 months. While Russia and Turkey are active and directly involved, China and India are implicitly but not explicitly involved in the conflict. As a result, the author tries to present and highlight the divergent and convergent perspectives of the foreign actors in the conflict. One of the major focal points of the conflict relates to what the Azerbaijani call the Zangezur corridor, and the Armenians perceive as a bone of contention. What is perhaps not least important to emphasise is that for Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, the corridor has a crucial role in the transportation link between Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Turkic States. As for Armenia and Iran, its neighbouring country, the establishment of such a corridor is perceived as an existential threat. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 05.03.2024  |  External Relations
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The delegation of Uzbekistan took part at the High-level Segment of the 55th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council

The delegation of Uzbekistan led by the First Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis, Director of the National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) Akmal Saidov took part at the High-level Segment of the 55th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
According to the NCHR, during the speech of the delegation of Uzbekistan, it was noted that our country is consistently implementing its policy in the field of human rights, an example of which, in particular, is the updated Constitution of the country adopted during a national referendum in 2023. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 01.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

Over the past two years, since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policies have drawn varying interpretations from experts and political observers. The delicate balancing act pursued by Baku between competing global powers while safeguarding the country’s national interests and restoring its territorial integrity has appeared as an intriguing case for the studies of international relations. Amidst the evolving dynamics of regional geopolitics, Azerbaijan’s recent engagements with Western counterparts underscore its unwavering commitment to maintaining robust relations with the West. Despite the complexities of navigating relations with neighbouring powers, Azerbaijan remains steadfast in its pursuit of multilateral or, as better known in the Azerbaijani discourse, balanced approach in foreign policy.
Many experts are still debating how the Azerbaijani government succeeded to dismantle the separatist regime in Karabakh without provoking a clash with Russia, widely known to be the major protector of this regime. In November 2023, during an international conference in a European city attended by the author of this article, Armenian experts critiqued the collaboration between Azerbaijan and the Western powers (i.e., the EU and United States) in September 2023 to dismantle to the separatist regime, aiming to diminish Russia's influence in the South Caucasus. Interestingly, some of these experts now suggest that Baku has aligned with Moscow to penalize Armenia’s pro-Western government. This situation underscores the complexity of Azerbaijan's foreign policy, often susceptible to misinterpretation. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 24.02.2024  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Ever since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, every meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders has been portrayed as raising significant expectations of some breakthrough. In 2021, all looked to Russia, where Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev met twice in January and November. Starting from 2022, the geography of hope for a breakthrough moved to Brussels, where Pashinyan and Aliyev met in April, May, and August. Even the large-scale Azerbaijani incursion into Armenia in September 2022, less than two weeks after the August 31 trilateral summit in Brussels, did not appear to diminish the hopes that every meeting may bring Armenia and Azerbaijan closer to peace. In late September 2022, experts and policy officials started to speak about possibly signing a peace deal by the end of 2022. Even the absence of a peace agreement and the start of the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in December 2022 did not shake the belief in some magic after each Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation encounter. In the first half of 2023, the center of gravity of expectations shifted towards Washington DC as Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held two rounds of negotiations in May and June. Even the disregard by Azerbaijan towards the measures of International Court of Justice on the blockade, the establishment of block post on the Lachin corridor in April, and the complete cut of Nagorno–Karabakh from the world in June 2023 somehow did not significantly decrease the hopes that Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations would bring results soon. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 24.02.2024  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since 2020, the South Caucasus has entered an active era of turbulence. The primary reason was the Azerbaijani decision to use military force to “solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” Azerbaijan started the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, launched incursions into Armenia proper in May, November 2021, and September 2022, and imposed a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022. The culmination of this strategy was the September 2023 military attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of around 105,000 Armenians and the dissolution of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
Even after the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan continues its policy of threats and pressure towards Armenia with an ever-changing shopping list of demands. Baku supports the concept of so-called “Western Azerbaijan” at the highest level. It expects an extraterritorial corridor from Armenia. It states that it will not pull away its troops from occupied Armenian territories, rejects Armenia’s offer to sign a non-aggression pact and continues to demand changes in the Armenian constitution and other laws. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 17.02.2024  |  External Relations
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