By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Neither Russia nor China are interested in complete decoupling from the West, and both would like to maintain cooperative relations with the EU while fighting back against US pressure. In this context a Russia – China alliance against the 'Collective West" and the establishment of a new “iron curtain” completely separating them from Europe is possibly the worst outcome for Beijing and Moscow.
The end of the "unipolar moment" and the painful process of the emergence of the new world order ushered in a stand-off between Russia and the West around the transformation of the post-cold war European security architecture. On the surface, Russia and the West are arguing about the future of the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine, but the fate of Kyiv is only the tip of the iceberg. The real fight is about the future of European security architecture in a multi-polar, more unstable, and conflict-prone global order. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On October 6, 2021, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov met his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Moscow to discuss regional security and economic cooperation, and to address important concerns regarding the crisis in the South Caucasus. During the joint press conference, Lavrov repeatedly highlighted the idea of a “3+3 cooperation format” including the three South Caucasus states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – plus their three large neighbours, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, to focus on unlocking economic and transport communications in the region. The first meeting within the format took place in Moscow on December 2021; however, Georgia refused to take part. Moreover, recent tensions in the region between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijan and Iran suggest that the proposed format will not generate visible positive outcomes. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In February 2021, I wrote an article “Turkey’s Pivot in Central Asia: A Calculated Risk?” and asked to what extent can Turkey push its pan-Turkic aspirations in Central Asia? If Turkey’s economic and energy relations in Central Asia continue to deepen, will it inevitably increase engagement on security issues as a means to protect them? Will Russia and China tolerate a NATO member exerting its influence near their traditional zones of influence? The developments in Kazakhstan clearly provided answers to these questions.
Long seen as the pole of stability in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has faced its most serious political crisis to date. What began as a reaction to a spike in fuel prices in the western oil-producing regions spread across the country with unprecedented calls for reform, before escalating into violence in the country’s biggest city, Almaty. The protest movement in Kazakhstan quickly escalated and turned violent as protesters seized and set alight government buildings. After failing to quell the unrest, President Kassym- Jomart Tokayev launched a “counter-terror” operation to regain control of the situation and appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for military assistance. READ MORE

By Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is on the eve of an important political event - the presidential elections in the country. This major political event was launched at the meeting of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which took place on July 23, 2021. Today, the election campaign is in full swing, and it is taking place in a new political atmosphere. All processes are conducted openly, transparently and in accordance with the national electoral legislation and the time frames specified therein. All five parties that have nominated their candidates are actively promoting their program ideas and platforms. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Regardless of the intentions of the US and the future trajectory of the new world order transformation, the democracy vs. authoritarianism vision puts small states located between Russia and Europe in a complicated situation.
As the "Unipolar Moment" started to fade away after the 2008 world financial crisis, political elites, the expert community, and academicians in the different capitals of the world launched discussions and debates about the future of the world order. There was no lack of catchy terms – post-American world, multi-polar world, no polar world, polycentric world, the rise of others – which all have one common feature; there will be many players active on the geopolitical chessboard of the globe, and the US will not be able to impose its vision on all of them. The US political establishment coined its term for the emerging world order – great power competition – which is the prevailing theme in all strategic level documents published by the Trump and Biden administrations. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Russian resort town of Sochi was turned into the spotlight of South Caucasus geopolitics on November 26 as Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the much-anticipated trilateral meeting. The gathering was first announced by the Russian President’s Press-Secretary Dmitri Peskov to be held on November 8–12 to mark the first anniversary of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, which fixed the devastating defeat of Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war. Some Armenian media leaked news about the upcoming meeting even earlier, arguing that another document violating Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh’s vital national interests was in the works. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has patiently and cautiously followed developments in the South Caucasus. Tehran’s main strategic objective has been to prevent US-Israeli penetration in the region, and it has viewed the Russian political and military presence in the region, particularly in Armenia, as a buffer zone against Western and even Turkish expansionist activities. When Turkey started to follow an independent foreign policy and came to terms with sharing power in the region with Russia, Iranian policymakers thought that Turkey—by cooperating with Russia—would reduce western influence in the region and give up its Pan-Turkic and neo-Ottoman claims. However, Iran was mistaken. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on September 19 that Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had requested a meeting, via a message transmitted by the Georgian prime minister. Erdogan said that “Armenia should take positive steps” if it wishes for such a meeting. Erdogan is alluding to the opening of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which he believes is a political issue that will be resolved soon, as will Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. The corridor refers to a ground transportation link that would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan through Armenia’s southern Syunik region. If we try to translate Erdogan’s diplomatic language, the Turkish president clearly states that he is ready to accept Armenian leadership’s proposal for dialogue if Armenia continues to fulfil Turkey’s demands. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia always supported the idea of restoring communications and developing economic relations with Azerbaijan as a tangible way of confidence building. However Azerbaijan has to give up its inflammatory and disruptive rhetoric about the "Zangezur Corridor", and its thinly veiled threats to take over the Syunik province from Armenia.
The 10 November 2020 tripartite statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia ended the war in Nagorno Karabakh, but evidently, did not bring peace to the region. A range of complex issues remain to be settled – the future of Nagorno Karabakh, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the security dynamics of the broader region. Given the Russian military presence in Karabakh, the region's future now mostly depends on the Kremlin, and neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has much room for manoeuvre here. The status of Karabakh will remain a topic in bilateral Russia–Azerbaijan and Russia–Armenia discussions, but Moscow will do whatever it thinks it is necessary to do. READ MORE

By Eldor Tulyakov, Executive Director, Development Strategy Center, Tashkent

In 2016, Uzbekistan's reform agenda's fresh and rather sudden trajectory focusing on political and socio-economic development brought a welcome surprise to much of the international community. Newly elected President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, rapidly initiated policies based upon the principles of pragmatism and transparency — a shift well received by foreign governments, international organizations, and citizens alike and viewed as a watershed change in a country largely closed to the outside world since independence was obtained in 1991. A new vision of what will define Uzbekistan for future generations emerged, new horizons that will bring long-sought-after potential and opportunities to its people. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

China was on everyone's lips at numerous summits and international gatherings in the last days and weeks. "China will be among the key world players throughout the 21st century; it will be the number one economic power, and all have to accept and adapt to this reality. Many are not happy with this prospect and would like to prevent it from becoming a reality, but no one has the necessary capacity to contain China, despite the fact that many want to, for the moment for doing that has passed."
While many states make efforts to eventually overcome the outcomes of the COVID 19 pandemic through a large-scale vaccination process, and seek to return to the pre-2020 life, geopolitics, somehow pushed to the corner by the disease, returns to the spotlight. Recent weeks saw a chain of global summits – G7, NATO, and the USA-Russia meeting. The world leaders discussed many topics – climate change, the restoration of the transatlantic alliance, relations with Russia. However, the most repeated word in all these gatherings was China. “Rise of China”, “China's challenge”, “assertive China”, “China-led world order”, “China hegemony in Asia” – this is perhaps not the complete list of China-related phrases. READ MORE

By Lieutenant General (Ret.) Hayk Kotanjian, D.Sc., Full Professor (Strategic Security Studies)

The dynamics of the peace and war in the region surrounding Armenia attracts the keen attention of all actors promoting their international security interests in the explosive geostrategic space of the Greater Middle East.
In this context, the resolution of the border dispute in Syunik, and the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is the focus of international attention, requires academic and expert assessment of the legality to consider the current line of contact between the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan as the starting point in the negotiations. The negotiating parties and the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair states - the Russian Federation, the United States and France - should take into account the evidence of the following internationally valid arguments. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Sunday's parliamentary elections in Armenia are hotly contested, and the electorate is actively engaged in the campaigning. But the election is likely to lead to further uncertainty and continued instability.
The official campaign for the 20 June 2021, early parliamentary elections in Armenia started on 7 June 2021. Twenty-five political entities are contesting the elections – 21 parties and four alliances (blocs). No election in the modern history of Armenia has seen such quantity and diversity of contenders. However, despite this impressive number, only a few participants have a real chance to overcome the threshold to enter Parliament – 5 percent for parties and 7 percent for alliances. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Relations with Azerbaijan will be the key foreign policy issue faced by the new government, regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Big decisions on future relations with Azerbaijan will have to be taken soon after the new Armenian government is formed after the 20 June elections.
On 10 May 2021, the Armenian Parliament did not elect a prime minister for the second time in a row. According to the Armenian constitution, Parliament was dissolved, and the President signed a decree to hold snap parliamentary elections on 20 June 2021. It is not easy to predict the precise results of the elections. However, we may assume that Armenia will not have a single-party government after the elections. READ MORE

By Armen Grigoryan, Vice-president, Yerevan-based Centre for Policy Studies

After last year’s war, hopes that the 2018 revolution will fulfil its promise are fading – but it’s not too late for change.
“A stellar performance in one year is no guarantee of future success,” declared The Economist after Armenia held free and fair elections three years ago. The qualified praise was not without cause. It was always likely that Armenia’s attempts at democratic consolidation would be difficult, particularly because of the need for some unpopular reforms. Prior to the December 2018 parliamentary elections, observers noted that civic demobilisation – the influx of non-profit sector professionals to the government and their ensuing unwillingness to criticise it – could potentially undermine political pluralism, enable re-emergent authoritarianism, or foster the rise of right-wing populism. READ MORE

By Lieutenant General (R) Hayk Kotanjian, D.Sc, Full Professor (Strategic Security Studies)

Dear Colleagues, I have the honour to draw your attention to the deliberate steps taken by the Baku authorities to undermine the international community's confidence in Russia's mediation mission in the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and in the South Caucasus region. Another irrefutable evidence of this, among many facts, is the provocation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the violation of the Republic of Armenia’s state border regime, which defiantly followed right after the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Azerbaijan on May 10-11, 2021 and his departure from Baku. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

A joint initiative of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, known as the ‘Bucharest Nine', was launched in November 2015 and laid a foundation for foreign and security policy meetings and discussions. As the next step, the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 accelerated military-to-military cooperation. As a result, the initiative brought Romanian troops to Poland and Polish troops to Romania on a rotational basis in March 2017. In addition, their pivotal positions in the east and in the south of NATO’s reach have further increased their cooperation in a variety of defence and security programmes. READ MORE.

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Karabakh war has dramatically changed the geopolitical status quo in the South Caucasus. Discussions have been underway in Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora about the reasons for the catastrophe and those responsible. Most probably, military defeat will be a key topic during the upcoming June 2021 snap parliamentary elections. The thorough analyses of what happened before, during, and after the war are mandatory tasks to be fulfilled. However, the key for Armenia now to elaborate a new policy towards the Karabakh conflict, taking into account the war results. The most significant issue here is to develop a realistic policy based on accurate calculations, Armenia’s resources, and the interests of external players; otherwise, Armenia may face another catastrophe. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

President Erdogan’s initiative for a 3 + 3 regional co-operation format in the South Caucasus offers the possibility of opening up the region through an extensive network of land corridors. Not everyone has welcomed the initiative, but the prospect of turning a fragile region into a beacon of stability after a long period of instability and violence is a worthy aspiration.
The second Karabakh war has shifted the geopolitical and geo-economic realities in the South Caucasus region, particularly heightening the possibility of competition over the region’s transport corridors. The Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement signed on 10 November brings with it the possibility of opening a number of transit routes, which have been closed for almost 30 years. In the aftermath of the Armenian forces' devastating defeat in the 44-day war, the idea of regional co-operation becomes increasingly important. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The four years of President Trump’s rule will most probably remain in the history of the United States as years of unprecedented turmoil. It started from Presidential executive orders to ban visas for several countries, continued with the tumultuous Russian investigation and impeachment process, almost permanent skirmishes with the key US allies, and ended up with an attack on the Capitol, suspension of the incumbent US President’s Twitter, Facebook and Instagram accounts, and the prospects of the second impeachment in the last days of the current administration. These extraordinary developments may force many to conclude that President Biden will make significant policy shifts in all major domestic and external issues. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia-Russia relations have been the cornerstone of Armenian foreign policy since Armenia’s independence in September 1991. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union Armenia found itself in a multi-dimensional crisis – the war in Karabakh, a blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and steep economic decline. In those circumstances, Armenia had no alternative but to forge a strategic alliance with Russia. Thus, Yerevan signed the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992, Russian border troops were deployed along the Armenia–Turkey and Armenia–Iran borders, and in 1995 Russia took over the former Soviet military base in Gyumri. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Despite being firmly anchored in the Russian sphere of influence, Armenia has been quite successful in developing partner relations with the EU and NATO. In the early 1990s, Armenia joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program, and since 2005 bilateral relations have been developing within Individual Partnership Actions Plans. NATO played a key role in developing Armenia's peacekeeping potential and supported defence reforms, including defence education. Armenian peacekeepers participated in NATO-led operations in Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan; Armenian troops took part in several NATO-led drills; and each year a "NATO Week" was held in Yerevan. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia all gained something as a result of the second Karabakh war, while Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh lost almost everything.
The second Karabakh war ended with catastrophic results for Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The trilateral statement signed by Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani leaders on November 10 was a clear capitulation of the Armenian sides. During the 26 long years of negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, several settlement plans have been elaborated and offered to the conflict sides […]. However, none of them were as disastrous for Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as the trilateral statement of November 10, 2020. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

While Russia is certainly viewed by Beijing as a reliable economic and trade partner with its oil, gas and arms exports to China, the Chinese do certainly not overemphasise this relationship. Instead, China sees Russia as a waning power with its vast territories, supported by armed forces and nuclear weapons, while at the same time prone to endemic corruption and unable to pursue meaningful economic, political and social reforms. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 31, 2020, Parliamentary elections took place in Georgia. Since 2012 Georgian politics is often perceived as a two-men show - billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili and former President Mikhail Saakashvili. In 2012, Mr. Ivanishvili made a surprisingly successful bid to win Parliamentary elections and ousted President Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) party from power. Saakashvili left Georgia in 2013 after the end of his second Presidential term and entered Ukrainian politics becoming the governor of the Odesa region. […] Meanwhile, several criminal investigations were opened against him in Georgia, and a court sentenced him in absentia to several years of imprisonment. Mr. Ivanishvili left the Prime Minister's position in late 2013, but continued to de facto govern Georgia through the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party. READ MORE