By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In February 2021, I wrote an article “Turkey’s Pivot in Central Asia: A Calculated Risk?” and asked to what extent can Turkey push its pan-Turkic aspirations in Central Asia? If Turkey’s economic and energy relations in Central Asia continue to deepen, will it inevitably increase engagement on security issues as a means to protect them? Will Russia and China tolerate a NATO member exerting its influence near their traditional zones of influence? The developments in Kazakhstan clearly provided answers to these questions.
Long seen as the pole of stability in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has faced its most serious political crisis to date. What began as a reaction to a spike in fuel prices in the western oil-producing regions spread across the country with unprecedented calls for reform, before escalating into violence in the country’s biggest city, Almaty. The protest movement in Kazakhstan quickly escalated and turned violent as protesters seized and set alight government buildings. After failing to quell the unrest, President Kassym- Jomart Tokayev launched a “counter-terror” operation to regain control of the situation and appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for military assistance. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

2023 will be a crucial elections year in Turkey, and there is no certainty that president Erdogan and his AK Party can maintain their hold on power. The stakes are high and political turmoil will have implications way beyond Turkey itself.

The latest Russia-US and Russia-NATO tensions have entirely shifted the attention of the media and the expert community to Ukraine. Tens, if not hundreds, of papers and policy briefs are published daily, seeking to understand what Russia wants in Ukraine and whether Russia and the West will come to a diplomatic solution and avoid war. As a NATO member and Black Sea littoral state Turkey has a significant role in these calculations. What will be Turkey's reaction if war breaks out in or around Ukraine, and how will the war impact Russia - Turkey relations in other regions – the Middle East, South Caucasus, Balkans, and North Africa? READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

We need time to understand better what happened in Kazakhstan, and why". Whilst sending CSTO troops to Kazakhstan was clearly President Putin's decision to support President Tokayev in the internal fight between Kazakh local elites, the deployment has implications also for other countries participating in the mission, including Armenia.

The beginning of 2022 surprised many. While experts and pundits were busy discussing the possible outcome of the Russia – US and Russia - NATO negotiations, scheduled for early January, and seeking to predict if large-scale hostilities would break out in Ukraine, Kazakhstan imploded. This vast country with less than 20 million population, with huge reserves of oil, uranium, and other minerals and a significant geographical location connecting China with Russia and Europe, seemed to be an island of stability in the vast landmass of Eurasia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev had ruled the country since its independence, and while he stepped down in 2019, he maintained his influence and control from the position of Chairman of the Security Council. The second President of Kazakhstan, Kassym - Jomart Tokayev, a professional diplomat who started his career in the Soviet Union, seemed to be an excellent choice for Nazarbayev, enabling him to organize a smooth power transition, keep the stability of the country, and his primordial leading position. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

More than one year after the 2020 Artsakh War, the future of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations remains vague. Azerbaijan has put forward two demands: Armenia in written form should recognize Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and provide uncontrolled access to Azerbaijan to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic via the Syunik province. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has launched the strategy of coercive diplomacy and military blackmail, refusing to free all remaining Armenian POWs and advancing into Armenian territory. The release of POWs is a clearly articulated agreement fixed in the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement. However, Azerbaijan argues that Armenians still languishing in Azerbaijani jails are POWs and are not covered by that statement. Baku successfully merged the POWs’ issue with maps of mine fields, thus forcing Armenia to accept the humans versus maps bargain. READ MORE

By Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is on the eve of an important political event - the presidential elections in the country. This major political event was launched at the meeting of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which took place on July 23, 2021. Today, the election campaign is in full swing, and it is taking place in a new political atmosphere. All processes are conducted openly, transparently and in accordance with the national electoral legislation and the time frames specified therein. All five parties that have nominated their candidates are actively promoting their program ideas and platforms. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

“Co-opetition” was a term coined by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff to describe a paradoxical strategy of cooperation among competitors, enabling them to collectively achieve mutual gains. It’s a relatively new term in international relations and used occasionally in international trade. Nevertheless, I will be using co-opetition to explain the current status of Russian-Turkish relations.
In foreign policymaking and geopolitical self-perception, Russia and Turkey resemble each other in many ways. Throughout the course of events in the Middle East and South Caucasus, as the West failed to engage with regional developments to resolve conflicts, other regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Russia filled the political vacuum. Hence, the Turkish-Russian interaction in the Middle East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the military and political withdrawal of the US and the European Union’s absence from the region. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Russian resort town of Sochi was turned into the spotlight of South Caucasus geopolitics on November 26 as Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the much-anticipated trilateral meeting. The gathering was first announced by the Russian President’s Press-Secretary Dmitri Peskov to be held on November 8–12 to mark the first anniversary of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, which fixed the devastating defeat of Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war. Some Armenian media leaked news about the upcoming meeting even earlier, arguing that another document violating Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh’s vital national interests was in the works. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies,

On November 10, 2021, the South Caucasus will mark the first anniversary of the tripartite Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan statement, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war. During the last year, the experts, representatives of civil society, and journalists hotly debated the outcomes of the war and the implications of the trilateral statement. Who benefited more from the war – Russia, Turkey, or Azerbaijan? Has the Karabakh conflict been solved or thrown into the dustbin of history, or will the region face new rounds of negotiations and the possible resumption of hostilities? What is the future of Armenia – Azerbaijan and Armenia – Turkey relations? There are no easy answers to all these questions. However, one thing is clear – a year after the 2020 Karabakh war, the South Caucasus is still in the midst of geopolitical transformation, with regional powers vying for influence. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The "corridors war", currently being hotly debated among experts, pundits, and policy-making circles in the South Caucasus, is largely based on wishful thinking rather than hard facts. In reality the options are rather limited.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, the theme of competing corridors in the South Caucasus has established itself as one of the primary topics for discussion and debate among experts, pundits, and policymaking circles. Almost daily, Azerbaijan and Turkey speak about the necessity to open the so-called "Zangezur corridor," arguing that it will significantly boost the regional economy. According to Baku and Ankara, the opening of the corridor is envisaged under the terms of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, even though the document itself speaks about only one corridor – Lachin. Under the term “corridor”, Azerbaijan envisages an arrangement which will allow Azerbaijani vehicles and trains to cross the Armenia – Azerbaijan border, pass via the Syunik province of Armenia and then enter the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic (an Azerbaijani exclave), without any border, passport, and customs control implemented by the Armenian side. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Whilst Georgia has long acted as an informal home for peace building initiatives between Armenia and Azerbaijan, its recent offer of its “good offices” shows a higher level of engagement.
Ever since the end of the first Karabakh war, Georgia has become a Mecca for meetings of Armenian and Azerbaijani experts, peacebuilders, and other civil society representatives. Buzz words such as Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy in the context of the Karabakh conflict settlement process could be heard very often in hotel conference halls and board rooms in Tbilisi, Bakuriani, Telavi, and other places. Given the apparent obstacles in bringing Azerbaijani experts to Armenia and Armenians to Azerbaijan, many saw Georgia as an ideal place for serious meetings and discussions and long Caucasian-style dinners. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Like other regional powers, Russia has taken major steps to advance its geopolitical interests in the Levant. With the goals of expanding its influence and control the vast energy resources in the region. Although it only has a naval military base in Tartus (Syria) and no borders on the Mediterranean Sea, Russia has managed to exert its influence around nearby countries, including Lebanon. The perception of Lebanon as part of its Syrian stake encourages Moscow to strive to capitalize on its influence in the region after intervening in the Syrian conflict. In the last few years, Russia started playing a larger role in Lebanon following the growing civil unrest in Syria and the defeat of ISIS. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

For 30 years, Iran has adopted a cautious approach to developments in the South Caucasus, wary of the risk of encirclement. Iran's current military drills on the border with Azerbaijan are meant to send a signal that Tehran has its red lines too.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has carefully followed the developments in the South Caucasus. The strategic goal of Iran was not to allow the region to be a launchpad for the US or Israeli-initiated anti-Iranian activities. Due to the constant US pressure, Iran could not significantly increase its influence in the South Caucasus and directly compete with the US. Meanwhile, the US and Israel were not the only sources of concern for Iran. Turkey's intentions to increase its influence in the South Caucasus through the establishment of the Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership was another source of concern. READ MORE

By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (ret), Professor of RA, RF, USA (strategic security studies), Lazarev Club Board Member

On the eve of the 30th anniversary of Ukraine, on August 23, 2021, at the initiative of President of Ukraine Zelensky, the Crimean Platform summit was held with the participation of 46 states and international organizations. The establishment of the platform with the goal of its long-term functioning was announced as one of the main events in the framework of the celebration of the 30th anniversary of independence of Ukraine. According to the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky, the launch of the platform will introduce the problem of "de-occupation of the Crimea" into the international agenda on a regular political and diplomatic basis. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on September 19 that Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had requested a meeting, via a message transmitted by the Georgian prime minister. Erdogan said that “Armenia should take positive steps” if it wishes for such a meeting. Erdogan is alluding to the opening of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which he believes is a political issue that will be resolved soon, as will Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. The corridor refers to a ground transportation link that would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan through Armenia’s southern Syunik region. If we try to translate Erdogan’s diplomatic language, the Turkish president clearly states that he is ready to accept Armenian leadership’s proposal for dialogue if Armenia continues to fulfil Turkey’s demands. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia is celebrating the 30th anniversary of its independence but whilst it has all the attributes of a modern state a lot of its institutions are hollow. There is much that can be done, and if it acts reasonably, Armenia can celebrate its 50th anniversary of independence in twenty years’ time in a much more positive atmosphere.
On 21 September 2021, Armenia celebrates the 30th anniversary of its independence. For a nation with at least 3500 years of history, this may not seem a very impressive record. However, since 1045 AD Armenia has never witnessed such a long period of independent statehood in the Armenian highland. Armenia enjoyed a brief period of independence in May 1918 - December 1920, after the collapse of the Russian Empire. However, these two and half years were marked by instability, conflicts, widespread famine, and poverty.READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The possible normalisation of Armenia–Turkey relations have always been in the spotlight of the South Caucasus geopolitics. Turkey recognised Armenian independence back in 1991 but refused to establish diplomatic relations, and in April 1993 closed its border with Armenia in response to the advance of Armenian forces in the first Karabakh war. Since then, Turkey has put forward several preconditions for normalising relations with Armenia: the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Karabakh, the end to the Armenian genocide international recognition campaign, and the official recognition of Armenia–Turkey borders by independent Armenia. At the same time, Armenia–Turkey relations were a part of the broader regional geopolitics. Russia struggled to regain its influence in the South Caucasus while the US viewed the emerging Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership as a critical tool to counter Russian efforts. READ MORE

By Ryszard Czarnecki, Member of European Parliament

Uzbek Presidential elections are scheduled to be held on October 24, 2021. These will be the sixth Presidential elections that will take place in the independent country. In the previous Presidential elections held in 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev emerged as the winner. Mirziyoyev is all set to run for a second term as the long ruling Liberal Democratic party will nominate him again.
Uzbekistan’s Central Electoral Commission has invited observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Narzulla Oblomurodov, leader of Ecological Party of Uzbekistan; Bahrom Abduhalimov, head of Adolat Social Democratic Party, and Alisher Kadirov, chair of Democrat Party of Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival), are the other leaders who have been nominated to run for the President. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly impacted the regional dynamics in the South Caucasus. Experts and pundits have not come yet to a unified approach regarding the reasons and implications of the war. However, many agree that the primary beneficiaries of the war were Russia and Turkey. Kremlin has reached perhaps its main goal in Karabakh – to put Russian boots on the ground, while it has also significantly increased its military presence in Armenia. Turkey has cemented its presence in Azerbaijan as now a large part of Azerbaijani society believes that without Turkey’s overt support and involvement, Baku could not win the war. Turkey also is a part of the Joint Monitoring Centre operating in the Aghdam region of Azerbaijan, though Turkey hoped to have more military involvement in the post-war Karabakh. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia always supported the idea of restoring communications and developing economic relations with Azerbaijan as a tangible way of confidence building. However Azerbaijan has to give up its inflammatory and disruptive rhetoric about the "Zangezur Corridor", and its thinly veiled threats to take over the Syunik province from Armenia.
The 10 November 2020 tripartite statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia ended the war in Nagorno Karabakh, but evidently, did not bring peace to the region. A range of complex issues remain to be settled – the future of Nagorno Karabakh, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the security dynamics of the broader region. Given the Russian military presence in Karabakh, the region's future now mostly depends on the Kremlin, and neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has much room for manoeuvre here. The status of Karabakh will remain a topic in bilateral Russia–Azerbaijan and Russia–Armenia discussions, but Moscow will do whatever it thinks it is necessary to do. READ MORE

By Eldor Tulyakov, Executive Director, Development Strategy Center, Tashkent

In 2016, Uzbekistan's reform agenda's fresh and rather sudden trajectory focusing on political and socio-economic development brought a welcome surprise to much of the international community. Newly elected President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, rapidly initiated policies based upon the principles of pragmatism and transparency — a shift well received by foreign governments, international organizations, and citizens alike and viewed as a watershed change in a country largely closed to the outside world since independence was obtained in 1991. A new vision of what will define Uzbekistan for future generations emerged, new horizons that will bring long-sought-after potential and opportunities to its people. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

China was on everyone's lips at numerous summits and international gatherings in the last days and weeks. "China will be among the key world players throughout the 21st century; it will be the number one economic power, and all have to accept and adapt to this reality. Many are not happy with this prospect and would like to prevent it from becoming a reality, but no one has the necessary capacity to contain China, despite the fact that many want to, for the moment for doing that has passed."
While many states make efforts to eventually overcome the outcomes of the COVID 19 pandemic through a large-scale vaccination process, and seek to return to the pre-2020 life, geopolitics, somehow pushed to the corner by the disease, returns to the spotlight. Recent weeks saw a chain of global summits – G7, NATO, and the USA-Russia meeting. The world leaders discussed many topics – climate change, the restoration of the transatlantic alliance, relations with Russia. However, the most repeated word in all these gatherings was China. “Rise of China”, “China's challenge”, “assertive China”, “China-led world order”, “China hegemony in Asia” – this is perhaps not the complete list of China-related phrases. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Russia – Turkey relations are probably among the most discussed topics of Eurasian geopolitics. Experts and pundits are frantically searching for the correct terms to describe them – cooperation/competition, the marriage of convenience, and frenemies – all these words are used in endless efforts to grasp reality beneath the surface of high-level meetings and smiley handshakes of the leaders. The two countries interact in different regions – Middle East, Northern Africa, Black Sea basin, Central Asia, Western Balkans, and South Caucasus. In all these areas, they have overlapping and colliding interests, which have created a complex web of relationships. READ MORE

By Lieutenant General (Ret.) Hayk Kotanjian, D.Sc., Full Professor (Strategic Security Studies)

The dynamics of the peace and war in the region surrounding Armenia attracts the keen attention of all actors promoting their international security interests in the explosive geostrategic space of the Greater Middle East.
In this context, the resolution of the border dispute in Syunik, and the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is the focus of international attention, requires academic and expert assessment of the legality to consider the current line of contact between the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan as the starting point in the negotiations. The negotiating parties and the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair states - the Russian Federation, the United States and France - should take into account the evidence of the following internationally valid arguments. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Sunday's parliamentary elections in Armenia are hotly contested, and the electorate is actively engaged in the campaigning. But the election is likely to lead to further uncertainty and continued instability.
The official campaign for the 20 June 2021, early parliamentary elections in Armenia started on 7 June 2021. Twenty-five political entities are contesting the elections – 21 parties and four alliances (blocs). No election in the modern history of Armenia has seen such quantity and diversity of contenders. However, despite this impressive number, only a few participants have a real chance to overcome the threshold to enter Parliament – 5 percent for parties and 7 percent for alliances. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Relations with Azerbaijan will be the key foreign policy issue faced by the new government, regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Big decisions on future relations with Azerbaijan will have to be taken soon after the new Armenian government is formed after the 20 June elections.
On 10 May 2021, the Armenian Parliament did not elect a prime minister for the second time in a row. According to the Armenian constitution, Parliament was dissolved, and the President signed a decree to hold snap parliamentary elections on 20 June 2021. It is not easy to predict the precise results of the elections. However, we may assume that Armenia will not have a single-party government after the elections. READ MORE