By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since 2020, the South Caucasus has entered an active era of turbulence. The primary reason was the Azerbaijani decision to use military force to “solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” Azerbaijan started the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, launched incursions into Armenia proper in May, November 2021, and September 2022, and imposed a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022. The culmination of this strategy was the September 2023 military attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of around 105,000 Armenians and the dissolution of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
Even after the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan continues its policy of threats and pressure towards Armenia with an ever-changing shopping list of demands. Baku supports the concept of so-called “Western Azerbaijan” at the highest level. It expects an extraterritorial corridor from Armenia. It states that it will not pull away its troops from occupied Armenian territories, rejects Armenia’s offer to sign a non-aggression pact and continues to demand changes in the Armenian constitution and other laws. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of Armenians, there were some hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan received everything it could dream of just a few years ago.
After September 2023, Azerbaijan controlled the entire Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government accepted that reality with no intention to challenge it, while the international community did nothing tangible to punish Azerbaijan or create conditions to bring Armenians back. President Ilham Aliyev proved to everyone that he was not a “golden boy” who became president just because he was the son of a prominent leader – Heydar Aliyev – and lacked basic governance skills. He succeeded where his father failed, taking control over Nagorno Karabakh and raising Azerbaijani flags in Shushi and Stepanakert. READ MORE

Obid Khakimov, director of the Center for Economic Research and Reforms under the Administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan

The dynamic growth of the population of Uzbekistan requires at least high outstripping economic growth rates in order to adequately meet the growing needs and improve the standard of living of people. But this requires new, more balanced and verified approaches to ensure timely achievement of the set goals.
And these new approaches to economic policy were clearly manifested in the decisions taken at the important meetings held at the beginning of the year under the chairmanship of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev on the situation in the economy and the tasks assigned to the economic divisions for 2024. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In just one month, the world will mark the second anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian war. During this period, assessments on the course and possible outcomes of the war underwent significant changes several times. At the end of February 2022, almost everyone was sure that the war would end very quickly with Russia’s victory, bringing a change of government in Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced by a pro-Russian figure. Already in September 2022, after successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, expectations changed dramatically. This time, many were sure of Russia’s imminent defeat. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In recent years, perhaps the most discussed topic by international scholars, experts and politicians is the gradual transformation of the post-Cold War unipolar world order. There are different opinions about the process of transformation, the timing, and the main elements of this newly emerging world order. However, almost everyone agrees on one issue: the unipolar world is gradually becoming history, and before the final formation of the new world order, the next decade will be characterized by instability, conflicts, and economic shocks. Climate change and the ever-increasing role of digital technologies, including artificial intelligence, are additional factors of instability that make it even more difficult to assess, predict and formulate policies based on geopolitical developments in the coming years. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched an “anti-terrorist operation” in the Karabakh region against armed separatist forces. The operation followed three years of largely unproductive peace talks between Armenian and Azerbaijan following the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The clashes ended in a ceasefire after only one day due to the separatist regime’s limited military-technical capacity in resisting the well-equipped Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Baku’s allies were quick to applaud the move. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during a joint news conference with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, declared, “It is a matter of pride that the operation was successfully completed in a short period of time, with utmost sensitivity to the rights of civilians”. Turkey has traditionally been a staunch ally of Azerbaijan, and the recent military operation to reclaim Karabakh plays into Ankara’s regional interests, especially regarding the future development and opening of the Zangezur Corridor. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

EU-Azerbaijan relations are important for both sides, and the Brussels format of the Armenia-Azerbaijani peace talks, are likewise important to reach negotiated solutions over the remaining unresolved questions between Baku and Yerevan. The reactivation of the Brussels format and the revitalization of the constructive role of the EU in the South Caucasus should happen sooner rather than later. A balanced approach by the EU and its leading member states vis-à-vis the countries of the region is of utmost necessity towards this end.
On 25 October, Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, announced that the scheduled meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with the mediation of the European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels [known as the Brussels format of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks] had been postponed due to scheduling problems. Previously, another EU-brokered summit between these two leaders from the South Caucasus, originally planned to take place on the sidelines of the European Political Community gathering on 5 October, was cancelled by the Azerbaijani side. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On October 4, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev cancelled a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that was meant to take place at the European Political Community summit in Granada, Spain, on October 5. The Granada summit was a long-awaited occasion in the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks, particularly against the backdrop of the collapse of the separatist regime in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. Baku has instead voiced its support for more regionally centric negotiating formats for solving disputes in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On September 28, 2023, Artsakh President Samvel Shahramanyan issued a decree announcing that, in the wake of Azerbaijan’s assault on Artsakh, the authorities of Artsakh agreed to dissolve their government by the end of the year and be fully integrated into Azerbaijan.
The decree aimed: to dissolve all state institutions and organizations under their departmental subordination until January 1, 2024, and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) shall cease to exist; the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, including those outside the Republic, after the entry into force of this decree, shall familiarize themselves with the conditions of reintegration presented by the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to make an independent and individual decision on the possibility of staying in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This was perceived as the end of the Artsakh dream. However, this announcement came under the threat of force and ethnic cleansing, placing its legality in question. Moreover, most of the political and military leaders of Artsakh have been arrested by Azerbaijan, amid the passive stance of the Russian peacekeepers and the Armenian government. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

In a nutshell, friendly relations between Georgia and Turkey are not a deterrent against potential Russian aggression against Georgia. Russia can always impose a blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coast by using its naval assets in Sevastopol, Crimea and Ochamchire in occupied Abkhazia, thereby effectively ‘strangling’ the nascent Georgian Coast Guard. However, despite being somewhat politically marginalised by the West, Turkey remains a crucial partner for Georgia.
Georgian–Turkish relations are in essence cordial but not equal. Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, is viewed as a junior partner in the relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For Georgia, Turkey represents an important partner in the volatile South Caucasus region. At the same time, enjoying friendly relations with Georgia as a transit country for oil, gas and cargo trains from Azerbaijan to Turkey, known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, is important for Turkey. Moreover, cargo transferred by road from Russia and Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey is a basic necessity. Bilateral relations are mainly focused on the economy and, occasionally, the Turkish military donates or sells military equipment to the Georgian Defence Forces (GDF). READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Since the inauguration of President Biden in January 2021, the US administration has kept its relationship with Turkey to a bare minimum. For the Biden administration, the issue of human rights in Turkey remains very much on the agenda while for President Erdoğan, the issue seems to be a lower priority for his administration. Such behaviour infuriates not just Biden administration officials but also members of the House and the Senate. This has resulted in the Turkish president not being invited to Washington. Perhaps the two sides can each be blamed for their current relationship; however, Erdoğan is maintaining his course and appears unbothered by the consequences. For his part, Biden is keeping his cool despite a number of divergences in interests of the US and Turkey. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On July 9, Turkey freed the commanders of the well-known Ukrainian Azov regiment after months of hosting them as a part of a deal with Russia. The fighters surrendered to Russian forces after weeks of brutal siege and resistance at the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol, even after the rest of the city had fallen following Russia’s devastating and relentless assaults. Ankara’s surprise move came during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s first official visit to Turkey since the Russian invasion in February 2022 to meet his counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and discuss the possibilities of deepening their strategic partnership. Amid rhetoric on expanding the two countries’ cooperation in defense and security, Erdogan also declared, “Ukraine deserves to be a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] member”. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The post-November 10, 2020 geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the shift of balance of power have created not just an unfavourable situation for Armenia, but for Iran as well, which felt isolated from the region. Despite Tehran’s pro-active engagement towards the region, Iranian experts and politicians felt their legitimate concerns were being unheard in Moscow. Many even publicly criticized the Russian leadership for working against Iranian interests in the region by cooperating closely with Turkey.
On what issues have Russia and Iran diverged in the region?
Iranian expert on the South Caucasus Vali Kaleji, in his article “Russia and Iran Diverge in the South Caucasus,” argued that despite the similarities in Iran’s and Russia’s approaches towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, after November 10, 2020, the countries have diverged when it comes to the “Zangezur Corridor,” its impact on the Armenian-Iranian border and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. Moreover, after the war in Ukraine, Russia distanced itself from the developments in the region leaving Armenia alone in resisting the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli axis. This factor has created a security and strategic dilemma for Iran along its entire northwestern border. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia and Azerbaijan come closer to signing an agreement by the end of 2023, and competition grows between Russia and the West to lead the process and take the prize of the main pacifier, other regional actors take steps to clarify their positions. In this context, Iran stands out as one of the primary buffers against the growing role of the West in the South Caucasus.
Being engaged with the US in continuing negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear deal in full or at least partly, Iran is simultaneously concerned by the US efforts to reduce Russian influence in the South Caucasus. This is not because Iran loves or trusts Russia but because Iran understands the dangers of being encircled by the US, including from the north. Moreover, for Iran, US influence does not mean US military bases or US direct investments. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Despite international pressure and sanctions, Iran has leveraged its strategic alliances with Russia and China to secure membership in the SCO, providing an additional platform to mitigate isolation and strengthen ties. This development, coupled with the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia following its diplomatic normalization with Iran, signifies a strategic shift in Eurasian alliances with broader implications for global geopolitics and the balance of power.
On July 4, 2023, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders held a virtual summit focusing on multipolarity and territorial sovereignty. A significant summit highlight was Iran’s induction into the organization after months of negotiations. Iran had been keen to join the SCO despite escalating international pressure and sanctions due to its failure to finalize a new nuclear deal and its open alignment with Russia during the Ukraine invasion. Although not officially involved in the military offensive, Iran supported Russia by providing indigenously manufactured Shaheed loitering munitions known as kamikaze drones.
Iran’s support for Russia arrived at a pivotal time, considering Russia’s tactical setbacks in Ukraine. However, this assistance placed Tehran under increased strain from Western powers, significantly impacting ongoing nuclear negotiations. Despite this, the strong partnership between Moscow and Tehran facilitated Iran’s full membership in the SCO. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

I had the opportunity to participate in a program organized by the “Friends for Leadership” to attend the 2023 Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum. Thousands of delegates mostly from Latin America, Africa, and Asia attended the forum alongside heads of state, diplomats, and businessmen. Interestingly, the UAE had the “special guest” status and anyone could feel its cultural, economic, and political presence in the forum. Delegates were anxious to be informed of the details of the new agreements signed between Russia and other countries, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s remarks and attend dozens of sessions and panels related to the BRICS, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), International North-South Transport Corridor, and North-South trade. I had the opportunity to closely identify Russia’s post-Ukraine war foreign policy priorities, its geo-economic interests in the Middle East, and the challenges of the emerging multipolar world system. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Rising tensions between Iran and Afghanistan, sparked by territorial and water disputes, are at a critical juncture following a border incident resulting in deaths on both sides. While armed conflict seems unlikely due to the two nations’ relative military strength and political instability, the water scarcity problem, and the possible intervention of external actors like China underscore the necessity for diplomatic dialogue.
On May 27, 2023, a volatile situation erupted along the Iran-Afghanistan border, leading to the unfortunate deaths of two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter. This incident, near a border post, drastically intensified the already burgeoning tensions between these two nations Following contentious border incidents, both sides voiced solid and bitter accusations. However, several experts have interpreted this ongoing discord’s root cause as territorial and water disputes. The issue of water scarcity has steadily morphed into a significant challenge for Iran, causing friction with its neighbours. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 kilometre model of ship network, rail and road project, was initiated in 2000 by Russia, Iran and India to facilitate trade between India, Russia and Europe. Azerbaijan, Armenia and other countries joined the initiative in 2005. This transport corridor aims to reduce the delivery time of cargo from India to Russia and Northern Europe to the Persian Gulf and beyond. Compared to the sea route via the Suez Canal, this route’s distance shrinks by more than half, which brings the term and cost of transportation down. If the present delivery time on this route is over six weeks, it is expected to decrease to three weeks through this corridor.
In my March 2021 analysis “Armenia and India’s Vision of ‘North-South Corridor’: A Strategy or a ‘Pipe Dream?’” I warned that Armenia’s inability to play an active transit role between Russia/Europe and Iran/India will isolate the republic from regional trade. Between 2005-2018, Armenia did little to finalize the north-south strategic highway connecting its northern border to the southern border, mainly due to public corruption and carelessness. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey were perhaps the most anticipated political events of 2023. There was a feeling among politicians, experts, and academicians that the 21-year rule of Erdogan may end. Given the transition of the global order, the Russia–West confrontation, and the prominent role of Turkey in shaping the balance of power in multiple regions stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, the foreign policy choices of Turkey are of utmost importance for all global actors.

Erdogan’s efforts to pull Turkey out from its usual role of junior partner of the US and transform the country into an independent regional player has significantly deteriorated Turkey – West relations. The US support to Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria, the purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, the suspicions in Turkey about potential American involvement in the July 2016 botched military coup attempt, rejection of Turkey’s request to extradite Fethullah Gülen, and Turkey’s reluctance to agree to the NATO membership of Sweden and Finland, brought US–Turkey relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Turkey’s position on the Russia – Ukraine war also did not fully satisfy the Americans. Turkey supports Ukraine economically and militarily, but Turkey rejects calls to decrease its economic relationship with Russia, while playing a crucial role simultaneously in organizing exports to Russia. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe.
Energy has long been the core element of Azerbaijan's pragmatic foreign policy, and recently it gained more impetus as European nations sought additional energy suppliers to replace Russian fossil fuel exports. Although the EU’s leading member countries are able to compensate for energy shortages by using energy reserves, employing alternative energy sources and importing additional gas volumes from alternative suppliers, the less developed Balkan states are struggling to adapt to the energy deficit. Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Israeli-Azerbaijani relations are based on two main pillars: patient and cordial political relations as well as defence cooperation and arms sales. While the former reached a more intensive level this year, with the opening of an Azerbaijani embassy in Tel Aviv in late March, the latter pillar of the relationship was well developed long before, as Israel became Azerbaijan’s largest weapons supplier.
After decades of keeping a low diplomatic profile vis-à-vis Israel, in November 2022 the Azerbaijani parliament approved a bill on opening an embassy in Tel Aviv. This was a historic decision as, until then, Azerbaijan had consistently rejected Israeli overtures to send a permanent ambassador, despite the opening of an Israeli embassy in Baku in August 1993. It took almost 30 years for Azerbaijan to reciprocate since the country’s leadership did not want to alienate other Muslim-majority states or provoke the Iranian authorities, who blamed Israel for worsening relations along the Baku-Tehran axis. However, in the wake of the 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords on diplomatic normalization between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates, followed by the exchange of Israeli and Turkish ambassadors two years later, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev felt that the time was right to follow suit. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

2023 marks the centennial of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk proclaimed the establishment of the republic and the abolishment of the Caliphate that ruled Ottoman Turks for six centuries. For decades, the Kemalists and military-backed governments ruled Türkiye with a secular iron hand. It wasn’t until 2002, when the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power that Kemalists’ monopoly on power was challenged, ending decades of unstable coalition governments. AKP’s early years were relatively peaceful, as the country experienced fast economic growth and continued openness to the West. However, as the authorities began facing domestic and regional challenges, illiberal democracy started to consolidate itself in Türkiye. In 2013, protests erupted in opposition to building a shopping mall in Istanbul’s Gezi Park. The government violently cracked down on the movement and began limiting civil liberties and curtailing press freedoms. Moreover, a failed coup attempt in 2016 consolidated authoritarianism in the country. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center of Boğaziçi University

Located at a key geopolitical and geo-economic point in the Silk Road region, Azerbaijan has been a main initiator in the development of technologically advanced and economically viable trans-border logistics and transit services. This is largely due to Baku’s embrace of a wide spectrum of digitalization and innovation initiatives within the broad-based connectivity framework of the Middle Corridor Initiative (MCI) and other similar such projects. This IDD analytical policy brief will examine various aspects of this important topic as it relates to MCI.
Seizing new opportunities in the digital era whilst developing better measures to boost the digital economy and trade with embedded innovation and emerging technologies has become one of Azerbaijan’s top priorities in the past few years. In the wake of significant government-backed digital transformation efforts, special attention is now being placed on enhancing the variety of logistics services on offer, building cutting-edge infrastructure, and upgrading domestic communication systems. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Georgia borders Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey. It remains a transit hub for oil and gas pipelines originating in Azerbaijan and a road hub for goods coming from Iran via Armenia to the European Union (EU), from Armenia and travelling to Russia, and from Turkey and travelling to Russia and Azerbaijan. As a result, changes that are taking place in the Caucasus due to the Russian war against Ukraine are directly affecting Georgia. Russia as a gatekeeper in the South Caucasus is less able to defend its interests in the region and that results in the ongoing skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iranian military exercises on the border with Azerbaijan, and reciprocal Azerbaijani-Turkish exercises. Thus far, Georgia has kept itself out of the conflict and has even tried to play the role of mediator in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but to no avail, since Georgia is not considered a powerful enough conflict mediator. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

At the beginning of March 2023, the Parliament of Georgia discussed and supported by the first hearing (with 76 votes) two draft laws regarding the “agents of foreign influence”. The discussion took place against the background of fierce protests both inside and outside the Parliament building. The bills were submitted by the political party “People’s Power”, which is a satellite of the Georgian Dream ruling party. Initially, the draft law “On transparency of foreign influence” was registered in the Parliament. To “ensure transparency”, the new law required the registration of non-entrepreneurial (non-commercial) legal entities and media means which received more than 20% of their income from abroad as “agents of foreign influence”. READ MORE