By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Neither Russia nor China are interested in complete decoupling from the West, and both would like to maintain cooperative relations with the EU while fighting back against US pressure. In this context a Russia – China alliance against the 'Collective West" and the establishment of a new “iron curtain” completely separating them from Europe is possibly the worst outcome for Beijing and Moscow.
The end of the "unipolar moment" and the painful process of the emergence of the new world order ushered in a stand-off between Russia and the West around the transformation of the post-cold war European security architecture. On the surface, Russia and the West are arguing about the future of the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine, but the fate of Kyiv is only the tip of the iceberg. The real fight is about the future of European security architecture in a multi-polar, more unstable, and conflict-prone global order. READ MORE

Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Amid heightened tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, the issue of Georgia’s path to NATO membership is once again in the spotlight. While Tbilisi has made real progress in its military reform efforts, the major hurdle is political, not military, in nature and until the Alliance can achieve consensus, the future of Georgia’s relationship with NATO will remain uncertain. In March 2019, then-Georgian Defence Minister Levan Izoria heralded a new era in military reform: “In the past we trained our soldiers for external deployment, but the new emphasis is now on self-defence” — or rather territorial defence, a process that began to be addressed by U.S.-based military advisers in July 2016. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 14, 2022, the special representatives of Armenia and Turkey met in Moscow to launch the normalization process between the two countries. The recent turmoil in Kazakhstan and intensive Russia – US, Russia – NATO negotiations on the future of the European security architecture have cast some shadow on the meeting, as the attention of the international media and expert and academic community was focused on more significant issues. Meanwhile, the meeting in Moscow was a remarkable event at the regional level. Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, fully aligned itself with Azerbaijan, and imposed an economic blockade on Armenia, seeking to force Yerevan to give up Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On October 6, 2021, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov met his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Moscow to discuss regional security and economic cooperation, and to address important concerns regarding the crisis in the South Caucasus. During the joint press conference, Lavrov repeatedly highlighted the idea of a “3+3 cooperation format” including the three South Caucasus states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – plus their three large neighbours, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, to focus on unlocking economic and transport communications in the region. The first meeting within the format took place in Moscow on December 2021; however, Georgia refused to take part. Moreover, recent tensions in the region between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijan and Iran suggest that the proposed format will not generate visible positive outcomes. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

We need time to understand better what happened in Kazakhstan, and why". Whilst sending CSTO troops to Kazakhstan was clearly President Putin's decision to support President Tokayev in the internal fight between Kazakh local elites, the deployment has implications also for other countries participating in the mission, including Armenia.

The beginning of 2022 surprised many. While experts and pundits were busy discussing the possible outcome of the Russia – US and Russia - NATO negotiations, scheduled for early January, and seeking to predict if large-scale hostilities would break out in Ukraine, Kazakhstan imploded. This vast country with less than 20 million population, with huge reserves of oil, uranium, and other minerals and a significant geographical location connecting China with Russia and Europe, seemed to be an island of stability in the vast landmass of Eurasia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev had ruled the country since its independence, and while he stepped down in 2019, he maintained his influence and control from the position of Chairman of the Security Council. The second President of Kazakhstan, Kassym - Jomart Tokayev, a professional diplomat who started his career in the Soviet Union, seemed to be an excellent choice for Nazarbayev, enabling him to organize a smooth power transition, keep the stability of the country, and his primordial leading position. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

More than one year after the 2020 Artsakh War, the future of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations remains vague. Azerbaijan has put forward two demands: Armenia in written form should recognize Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and provide uncontrolled access to Azerbaijan to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic via the Syunik province. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has launched the strategy of coercive diplomacy and military blackmail, refusing to free all remaining Armenian POWs and advancing into Armenian territory. The release of POWs is a clearly articulated agreement fixed in the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement. However, Azerbaijan argues that Armenians still languishing in Azerbaijani jails are POWs and are not covered by that statement. Baku successfully merged the POWs’ issue with maps of mine fields, thus forcing Armenia to accept the humans versus maps bargain. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Regardless of the intentions of the US and the future trajectory of the new world order transformation, the democracy vs. authoritarianism vision puts small states located between Russia and Europe in a complicated situation.
As the "Unipolar Moment" started to fade away after the 2008 world financial crisis, political elites, the expert community, and academicians in the different capitals of the world launched discussions and debates about the future of the world order. There was no lack of catchy terms – post-American world, multi-polar world, no polar world, polycentric world, the rise of others – which all have one common feature; there will be many players active on the geopolitical chessboard of the globe, and the US will not be able to impose its vision on all of them. The US political establishment coined its term for the emerging world order – great power competition – which is the prevailing theme in all strategic level documents published by the Trump and Biden administrations. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

“Co-opetition” was a term coined by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff to describe a paradoxical strategy of cooperation among competitors, enabling them to collectively achieve mutual gains. It’s a relatively new term in international relations and used occasionally in international trade. Nevertheless, I will be using co-opetition to explain the current status of Russian-Turkish relations.
In foreign policymaking and geopolitical self-perception, Russia and Turkey resemble each other in many ways. Throughout the course of events in the Middle East and South Caucasus, as the West failed to engage with regional developments to resolve conflicts, other regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Russia filled the political vacuum. Hence, the Turkish-Russian interaction in the Middle East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the military and political withdrawal of the US and the European Union’s absence from the region. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has patiently and cautiously followed developments in the South Caucasus. Tehran’s main strategic objective has been to prevent US-Israeli penetration in the region, and it has viewed the Russian political and military presence in the region, particularly in Armenia, as a buffer zone against Western and even Turkish expansionist activities. When Turkey started to follow an independent foreign policy and came to terms with sharing power in the region with Russia, Iranian policymakers thought that Turkey—by cooperating with Russia—would reduce western influence in the region and give up its Pan-Turkic and neo-Ottoman claims. However, Iran was mistaken. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies,

On November 10, 2021, the South Caucasus will mark the first anniversary of the tripartite Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan statement, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war. During the last year, the experts, representatives of civil society, and journalists hotly debated the outcomes of the war and the implications of the trilateral statement. Who benefited more from the war – Russia, Turkey, or Azerbaijan? Has the Karabakh conflict been solved or thrown into the dustbin of history, or will the region face new rounds of negotiations and the possible resumption of hostilities? What is the future of Armenia – Azerbaijan and Armenia – Turkey relations? There are no easy answers to all these questions. However, one thing is clear – a year after the 2020 Karabakh war, the South Caucasus is still in the midst of geopolitical transformation, with regional powers vying for influence. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The "corridors war", currently being hotly debated among experts, pundits, and policy-making circles in the South Caucasus, is largely based on wishful thinking rather than hard facts. In reality the options are rather limited.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, the theme of competing corridors in the South Caucasus has established itself as one of the primary topics for discussion and debate among experts, pundits, and policymaking circles. Almost daily, Azerbaijan and Turkey speak about the necessity to open the so-called "Zangezur corridor," arguing that it will significantly boost the regional economy. According to Baku and Ankara, the opening of the corridor is envisaged under the terms of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, even though the document itself speaks about only one corridor – Lachin. Under the term “corridor”, Azerbaijan envisages an arrangement which will allow Azerbaijani vehicles and trains to cross the Armenia – Azerbaijan border, pass via the Syunik province of Armenia and then enter the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic (an Azerbaijani exclave), without any border, passport, and customs control implemented by the Armenian side. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Like other regional powers, Russia has taken major steps to advance its geopolitical interests in the Levant. With the goals of expanding its influence and control the vast energy resources in the region. Although it only has a naval military base in Tartus (Syria) and no borders on the Mediterranean Sea, Russia has managed to exert its influence around nearby countries, including Lebanon. The perception of Lebanon as part of its Syrian stake encourages Moscow to strive to capitalize on its influence in the region after intervening in the Syrian conflict. In the last few years, Russia started playing a larger role in Lebanon following the growing civil unrest in Syria and the defeat of ISIS. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

For 30 years, Iran has adopted a cautious approach to developments in the South Caucasus, wary of the risk of encirclement. Iran's current military drills on the border with Azerbaijan are meant to send a signal that Tehran has its red lines too.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has carefully followed the developments in the South Caucasus. The strategic goal of Iran was not to allow the region to be a launchpad for the US or Israeli-initiated anti-Iranian activities. Due to the constant US pressure, Iran could not significantly increase its influence in the South Caucasus and directly compete with the US. Meanwhile, the US and Israel were not the only sources of concern for Iran. Turkey's intentions to increase its influence in the South Caucasus through the establishment of the Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership was another source of concern. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly impacted the regional dynamics in the South Caucasus. Experts and pundits have not come yet to a unified approach regarding the reasons and implications of the war. However, many agree that the primary beneficiaries of the war were Russia and Turkey. Kremlin has reached perhaps its main goal in Karabakh – to put Russian boots on the ground, while it has also significantly increased its military presence in Armenia. Turkey has cemented its presence in Azerbaijan as now a large part of Azerbaijani society believes that without Turkey’s overt support and involvement, Baku could not win the war. Turkey also is a part of the Joint Monitoring Centre operating in the Aghdam region of Azerbaijan, though Turkey hoped to have more military involvement in the post-war Karabakh. READ MORE

By Lilit Galstyan, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Political Studies, Yerevan

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have ushered in hopes of humanity's happy and harmonious future. The ideas such as "End of history" became very popular both within academic circles and with policymakers. There was a widespread belief that the entire planet would live under liberal democracy, and inter-state conflicts will become bad memories from history. However, the beginning of the XXI century crushed these hopes. Russia - West relations started to deteriorate after the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, while the 2014 Crimean crisis brought bilateral relations to the lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the astonishing Chinese economic growth and the emergence of the multi-million middle class did not bring about political changes in China. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia always supported the idea of restoring communications and developing economic relations with Azerbaijan as a tangible way of confidence building. However Azerbaijan has to give up its inflammatory and disruptive rhetoric about the "Zangezur Corridor", and its thinly veiled threats to take over the Syunik province from Armenia.
The 10 November 2020 tripartite statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia ended the war in Nagorno Karabakh, but evidently, did not bring peace to the region. A range of complex issues remain to be settled – the future of Nagorno Karabakh, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the security dynamics of the broader region. Given the Russian military presence in Karabakh, the region's future now mostly depends on the Kremlin, and neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has much room for manoeuvre here. The status of Karabakh will remain a topic in bilateral Russia–Azerbaijan and Russia–Armenia discussions, but Moscow will do whatever it thinks it is necessary to do. READ MORE

By Eldor Tulyakov, Executive Director, Development Strategy Center, Tashkent

In 2016, Uzbekistan's reform agenda's fresh and rather sudden trajectory focusing on political and socio-economic development brought a welcome surprise to much of the international community. Newly elected President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, rapidly initiated policies based upon the principles of pragmatism and transparency — a shift well received by foreign governments, international organizations, and citizens alike and viewed as a watershed change in a country largely closed to the outside world since independence was obtained in 1991. A new vision of what will define Uzbekistan for future generations emerged, new horizons that will bring long-sought-after potential and opportunities to its people. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Sunday's parliamentary elections in Armenia are hotly contested, and the electorate is actively engaged in the campaigning. But the election is likely to lead to further uncertainty and continued instability.
The official campaign for the 20 June 2021, early parliamentary elections in Armenia started on 7 June 2021. Twenty-five political entities are contesting the elections – 21 parties and four alliances (blocs). No election in the modern history of Armenia has seen such quantity and diversity of contenders. However, despite this impressive number, only a few participants have a real chance to overcome the threshold to enter Parliament – 5 percent for parties and 7 percent for alliances. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Relations with Azerbaijan will be the key foreign policy issue faced by the new government, regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Big decisions on future relations with Azerbaijan will have to be taken soon after the new Armenian government is formed after the 20 June elections.
On 10 May 2021, the Armenian Parliament did not elect a prime minister for the second time in a row. According to the Armenian constitution, Parliament was dissolved, and the President signed a decree to hold snap parliamentary elections on 20 June 2021. It is not easy to predict the precise results of the elections. However, we may assume that Armenia will not have a single-party government after the elections. READ MORE

By Armen Grigoryan, Vice-president, Yerevan-based Centre for Policy Studies

After last year’s war, hopes that the 2018 revolution will fulfil its promise are fading – but it’s not too late for change.
“A stellar performance in one year is no guarantee of future success,” declared The Economist after Armenia held free and fair elections three years ago. The qualified praise was not without cause. It was always likely that Armenia’s attempts at democratic consolidation would be difficult, particularly because of the need for some unpopular reforms. Prior to the December 2018 parliamentary elections, observers noted that civic demobilisation – the influx of non-profit sector professionals to the government and their ensuing unwillingness to criticise it – could potentially undermine political pluralism, enable re-emergent authoritarianism, or foster the rise of right-wing populism. READ MORE

By Lieutenant General (R) Hayk Kotanjian, D.Sc, Full Professor (Strategic Security Studies)

Dear Colleagues, I have the honour to draw your attention to the deliberate steps taken by the Baku authorities to undermine the international community's confidence in Russia's mediation mission in the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and in the South Caucasus region. Another irrefutable evidence of this, among many facts, is the provocation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the violation of the Republic of Armenia’s state border regime, which defiantly followed right after the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Azerbaijan on May 10-11, 2021 and his departure from Baku. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

A joint initiative of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, known as the ‘Bucharest Nine', was launched in November 2015 and laid a foundation for foreign and security policy meetings and discussions. As the next step, the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 accelerated military-to-military cooperation. As a result, the initiative brought Romanian troops to Poland and Polish troops to Romania on a rotational basis in March 2017. In addition, their pivotal positions in the east and in the south of NATO’s reach have further increased their cooperation in a variety of defence and security programmes. READ MORE.

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The relationship between Russia and Turkey is an unequal one. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not like playing second fiddle in the Russian-Turkish orchestra, conducted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, at every twist and turn, Putin holds more leverage over Erdogan than the other way around.
Putin will cooperate with Turkey as long as it suits Russian interests. He would quickly end the relationship if Turkey were to turn against him and tried to return to the Western fold from which it has drifted away ever since the failed coup on 15 July 2016. Erdoğan is aware of this and, as a result, is leading Turkey ever deeper into the Russian fold since the European Union, the United States and NATO all remain suspicious of him and his administration’s goals and are simply unwilling to assist him in his various military activities in Libya, Syria and, most recently, in the South Caucasus. READ MORE.

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The EU is neither willing nor capable of countering Russia or Turkey in Armenia and Azerbaijan and will not make efforts to decrease Russian influence in Armenia and the unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
EU-Armenia relations entered a new phase in 2009 when the EU launched its Eastern Partnership Initiative. Armenia successfully negotiated an Association Agreement with the EU and was going to sign it in autumn 2013. The growing tensions between Russia and the West forced Armenia to cancel the signature, not to ruin relations with its strategic ally. Armenia and the EU started a new round of negotiations in late 2014, culminating with the signature of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in November 2017. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Energy cooperation has been a key aspect of growing bilateral cooperation between China and the Arab states of the Gulf region for the past several years. Since 1996, China has become a net importer of crude oil and, as the second‑largest energy consumer in the world after the United States, is now the third‑largest importer of oil after the United States and Japan. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that China is eying a deep and strategic partnership with the states of a region that sits on top of the world’s largest proven crude oil and natural gas reserves. READ MORE