By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, security events have dramatically accelerated Israel’s aggression on Lebanon. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah, a paramilitary political party in Lebanon (also known as the Islamic Resistance) backed by Iran, opened a front against Israel to assist Hamas in its conflict with Israel following its “al-Aqsa Storm” operation. The Lebanese front remained “managed” as Israel and Hezbollah engaged in limited clashes. This equation changed starting on September 17, 2024. Along with its fight against Hamas and the destruction of Gaza, Israel shifted its focus to Hezbollah and started bombing Lebanon, destroying the party’s infrastructure in southern Beirut, South Lebanon and Beqaa near the border with Syria. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Armenia and the South Caucasus were historically parts of the former Soviet Union, and are often considered, in geopolitical terms, to be in the so-called Moscow-influenced “Russia’s near abroad”. It might be useful, however, to recognize the significant connections of the South Caucasus to the Middle East. In fact, Armenia is relatively close geographically (under 1,000 km) to each of the capital cities of Teheran (Iran), Baghdad (Iraq), and Ankara (Turkiye) and not much farther from Israel and Lebanon (under 1,300 km). In terms of international affairs and recent conflict Turkey has been a crucial military ally of Azerbaijan during the latter’s wars with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) in 2020 and 2023. A lesser-known fact is that, over the previous decade, Israel has been a major weapons’ supplier of Azerbaijan, particularly advanced drones that proved critical for Baku’s swift and decisive victory in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, and its 2023 recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh, which displaced over 100,000 civilians, virtually all of the local Armenian population. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

After the end of the Cold War, Turkish decision-makers adopted a “top-down” strategy that capitalized on the dramatic shift in international arms production. Turkey aimed to look eastward to cooperate with China and Russia as its threat perception changed. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey became a prominent Israeli arms purchaser. There were numerous factors behind this. First, Israeli weapons were a high-tech and credible alternative to NATO weapons. Second, unlike Europe and the U.S., Israeli arms purchases were not conditioned to Turkey’s domestic developments (democratization, human rights, minority rights…). Third, Israel and Turkey’s foreign policies overlapped in critical areas in the Middle East, aiming to contain Syrian and Iranian interests. Finally, deep relations with Israel were expected to be rewarded by pro-Israeli lobbying groups in the U.S. to counter the Armenian and Greek lobbies. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On June 20, during a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken called upon the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments to conclude a peace agreement “without delay” (US State Department, June 20). He stressed Washington’s willingness to support the peace process “in any way useful to the parties.” During his recent trip to the South Caucasus in late June, US Deputy Secretary of State James O’Brien reiterated these messages to the respective governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The United States views peace between the two countries in a larger geopolitical perspective, characterizing it as vital to reducing wider regional dependency on Washington’s foes. READ MORE

By Marat Terterov, PhD, Founder, and former Executive Director of the EGF

The folly of predicting Russia’s future
When undertaking the task of seeking to forecast a ‘likely scenario’ for tomorrow’s Russia, one has to start with a caveat – predicting Russia’s future and what fate awaits the country in light of its continued military excursion in Ukraine is like trying to find a needle in a haystack. In other words, it is almost impossible to predict future political developments in Russia with any real certainty. This includes any efforts to predict whether Russia will continue to remain the arch belligerent in Ukraine, or whether it will be prepared to make concessions, or to forecast what impact either (or other) of these developments in the current conflict in Ukraine will have on the Russian regime of Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

The geopolitics of the South Caucasus is as unpredictable as ever. Even as recently as the beginning of April, few, if any, would have imagined that Russia may withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan anytime soon. Many observers were even sceptical about the possibility of their withdrawal in November 2025 – the date which was stipulated in the November 2020 trilateral statement as the potential but not fixed date for the ending of the peacekeeping mission of Russia. This skepticism was grounded in the understanding that for Russia, Karabakh holds paramount importance in the broader context of the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region.
Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. READ MORE

Mahinora Mirkhamidova, associate professor of the department International law and Public law disciplines of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy

Today over two-thirds of the world's countries are participants in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. Ensuring women's rights is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, goal 5 specifically aims at “Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls.” The issues of ensuring women's rights are reflected in the constitutions of almost all countries, entrenched in their legislation, and hold a significant place in national development plans and strategies. READ MORE

Qodir Djuraev, MP, Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan

The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on "Central Asia in the face of environmental challenges: strengthening regional solidarity for the sake of sustainable development and prosperity".
The resolution initiated and proposed by Uzbekistan and unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly highlights the pressing environmental challenges faced in Central Asia. This region, known for its diverse ecosystems and natural resources, has been grappling with various environmental issues that require immediate attention and joint collaborative efforts. The resolution serves as a significant step towards addressing these challenges and fostering sustainable development in the region. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On January 19, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called for a new constitution in a meeting with senior officials from the Armenian Ministry of Justice. Pashinyan asserted that Armenia needs “a new constitution, not constitutional changes,” adding that the new foundational document would make the country “more competitive and viable in the new geopolitical and regional environment” (Azatutyun.am, January 19). He highlighted that the new constitution would maintain the present parliamentary system and underscored “external security” and “internationally recognized sovereign territory” as the main issues to be addressed. Mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity remains a sticking point in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If Yerevan proceeds with Pashinyan’s proposal, the new constitution will eliminate certain hurdles to signing a peace treaty with Baku. READ MORE

Farangiz Avazbekova, Chief inspector of the Agency for the Development of Public Service under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Law

The social and political activity of women and their participation in public administration bodies in the process of making important decisions are crucial for the development of the country. Sociological research has shown that women’s high efficiency, rapid and persistent decision-making, responsiveness to job completion, and prompt provision of executive discipline allow them to perform their duties effectively in the civil service. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On January 8, US Senior Adviser on Caucasus Negotiations Louis Bono visited Yerevan, engaging in discussions with local officials regarding the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. The Armenian side reported that one of the issues discussed during this visit was the organization of a meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in Washington. Unlike his previous visits to the region, this trip omitted a visit to Baku, suggesting that it either wasn’t planned, which is unlikely, or that the Azerbaijani side was not open to receiving him. Recent developments between Baku and Yerevan, along with the evolving dynamics of mediator involvement, indicate that Azerbaijan has grown more cautious and sceptical about the role of third parties in the Armenia-Azerbaijan process. As a result, Azerbaijan has advocated for bilateral meetings between the two countries. Baku’s position is primarily related with the potential geopolitical fallout of the upcoming peace deal with Yerevan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In the late months of 2022 and 2023 there were intensive discussions about the possible signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement. Both international mediators and facilitators, as well as representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan were making statements that a peace agreement signature is within reach. As we enter 2024, discussions are underway about the potential signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan agreement in 2024. The December 7, 2023, bilateral statement on the release of Prisoners of War and Armenia’s support of the Azerbaijani bid to host the COP29 in Baku gave more impetus to these hopes. Some believe that the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 made this perspective more realistic, especially as the Armenian government agreed not to include anything on Nagorno Karabakh in the peace agreement. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On December 13, Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged prisoners that each side had detained at different times since the end of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020. This historic exchange was made possible thanks to a significant breakthrough between the two countries on December 7. Baku and Yerevan issued a joint statement announcing a list of confidence-building measures to normalize relations and reach a peace agreement. Azerbaijan agreed to release 32 Armenian servicemen as part of the agreement, and Armenia reciprocated by releasing two Azerbaijani soldiers. While a number of unresolved issues remain, the recent success in bilateral consultations has given new hope for a comprehensive peace agreement between the two sides. READ MORE

Taking into account the latest media reports on the new outbreak of hostilities on the Line of Contact in Karabakh (called Artsakh in Armenian) between local Armenian forces and the Azerbaijani military, I am gravely concerned about the loss of life and the indiscriminate destruction of civilian assets. As the Founder of the European Geopolitical Forum, an organisation which embraces peaceful means of conflict resolution, and which has been actively involved in finding a reasonable, sound and long-term solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh for some ten years, I call for an immediate end to all hostilities and a swift return of the parties to the negotiation table. I am encouraged by the breaking news of a Russian-mediated ceasefire. I call for the immediate, non-conditional resumption of the internationally mediated dialogue between Baku and representatives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. I also call on the Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union to actively demand peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict and to ensure that the ceasefire is respected without any form of deviation.

Dr Marat Terterov,
Founder, European Geopolitical Forum

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the launch of the first Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war in the 1990s, the region’s status has been at the core of the conflict. This issue was the primary focus of negotiations and different settlement options put forward by the OSCE Minsk Group—package solution, phased approach, Common State, Key West, Kazan document, Lavrov plan—which all tried to find a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Artsakh. At the end of the day, Azerbaijan decided to solve this issue by military force. Azerbaijan probably came to this decision in the early 2000s, hoping it could get more by deploying military force than by any negotiated solutions. Azerbaijan was cautiously waiting for the geopolitical window of opportunity, which appeared in 2020 as a combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, elections in the U.S. and growing misperceptions of Armenia-Russia relations after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Recent geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus have once again appeared in the headlines of media and analytical centers. Experts have been questioning whether Russia is distancing itself from the region. Armenian regional experts and officials have been questioning Russia’s motives in the region, considering developments in Artsakh and the latest Azerbaijani escalation. Russia is navigating the narrow complexities of the post-2020 Artsakh War regional architecture, asserting itself as the main power broker in the region (i.e. brokering the 2020 trilateral ceasefire agreement, arranging humanitarian aid to Artsakh via the Berdzor Corridor and Aghdam, and possibly a new deal in the coming days) through compromise or political flexibility. This flexibility has caused friction in Moscow-Yerevan relations.
Many in Russia, including high officials, are suspicious of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s motives towards their country. The Armenian leader has speculated that Russia seems to be leaving the region. However, Russia still views the region as “blizhnee zarubezhe” (its “near abroad”) or its “lebensraum” (its “vital space”). From Russia’s perspective, if it leaves the South Caucasus, its only route to the Middle East would be cut off, Iran and Turkey would clash for power, and the North Caucasus would become vulnerable to instability. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 19, the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry announced it had launched an “anti-terrorist” operation against “illegal formations” in Karabakh. This move came after four Azerbaijani soldiers and two civilians were killed by land mines in the region. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan condemned the “full-scale aggression” and denounced Russian peacekeepers for “failing to do their jobs’.
The recent fighting comes as tensions had been mounting over Baku’s efforts to fully integrate Karabakh back into Azerbaijan. This measure had been stipulated in the tripartite agreement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia following the end of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020. Russian peacekeepers were stationed in the region to facilitate implementation of the measure; yet, they have done little since to constructively manage the process. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with only one goal: to finish with that republic. The Azerbaijani attack was not a surprise to anyone. At least since the beginning of 2023, Azerbaijan has stated clearly and loudly that Baku will not tolerate the status quo that emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and will do everything possible to destroy the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan was also clear that it would reach its goal quickly. Since the beginning of September 2023, as Azerbaijan started to concentrate troops along the line of contact, it was clear the military offensive would take place very soon. Armenia knew that Russia knew that, the EU and the US knew that, and Nagorno Karabakh authorities knew that. What were the positions of the sides regarding the upcoming offensive of Azerbaijan? READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow and Minsk agreed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. The construction of a special warehouse is already underway and will be completed by July 1 of this year. Therefore, it can be said that Putin's blackmailing strategy has entered the next acute phase, and it is theoretically possible that such steps will sooner or later push the world toward a nuclear confrontation. It should be noted that after the dissemination of information about the placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus, the US Department of Defence issued an emergency statement. It says that "the Pentagon sees no indication that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons." On the other hand, as Vladimir Putin told the Russian government media, ten Su-25 aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons are already stationed on the territory of Belarus. In addition, according to him, Russia has given Belarus the "Iskander" missile system, which can also launch missiles equipped with a nuclear warhead. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

May 2023 will be remembered as the month of intensive negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It started from the four-day summit in Washington, where the two ministers of foreign affairs with their teams were engaged in face-to-face interactions to discuss the text of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement. Ten days later, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Brussels, revitalizing the Brussels format, which had been stalled in September 2022. As a result of the Brussels summit, the sides reiterated the mutual recognition of territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration. For the first time, they agreed to use exact numbers when describing each other’s territories. This step dispersed fears in Azerbaijan that despite signing the Prague statement in October 2022 and recognizing Azerbaijani territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration, Armenia may still avoid recognizing Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) as part of Azerbaijan, arguing that Artsakh was not part of Azerbaijan on December 21, 1991, when the Alma-Ata declaration was signed. A few days later, the Armenian Prime Minister confirmed that Armenia recognizes Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan during his speech at the summit of the Council of Europe. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After a break of several months Armenia and Azerbaijan have now resumed their engagement in peace negotiations in earnest. After a face-to-face meeting between leaders in Munich in February, the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of foreign affairs went to Washington in early May 2023 to take part in the most intensive round of negotiations ever held since the Spring 2001 Key West summit between Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. The ministers achieved progress, opening the path for the 14 May Brussels summit involving Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev, and President of the European Union Council Charles Michel. On 19 May, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Moscow, and a trilateral Aliyev - Pashinyan - Putin summit was scheduled for 25 May. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On March 30, Azerbaijan officially inaugurated its first embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, after avoiding the move for three decades. Although the decision highlighted the importance of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, it quickly became a catalyst behind the renewed war of words between Iran and Azerbaijan. Since 2021, diplomatic relations between Tehran and Baku have steadily become embittered. Iran is primarily concerned with the decline of its influence in the South Caucasus, which has suffered since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020. As such, in an attempt by Tehran to flex its muscles and intimidate Azerbaijan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted large-scale military drills on the border with Azerbaijan in October 2022. Unlike previous years, the exercises provoked an uneasy reaction within Azerbaijan and triggered anti-Iranian sentiments throughout the country. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations entered a more active phase after a months-long limbo with marathon discussions in Washington, an upcoming trilateral meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Moscow, and a possible Pashinyan – Aliyev summit in Chisinau on 1 June 2023, the key contested issue remains Armenia's demand for a long-term international presence in Nagorno Karabakh and the establishment of an international mechanism for Azerbaijan – Nagorno Karabakh negotiations.
In his 5 May 2023, interview with Radio Liberty, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that the rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians remained the main issue, where the sides still had divergent views. The concept of "rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians" came into centre stage in early 2022, as the Armenian government dropped its demand for autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Since Spring 2022, Armenia has avoided the terms of status and self-determination in its rhetoric on Nagorno Karabakh, instead emphasizing the necessity to protect rights and provide security for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Efficient strategic communication has become necessary in the South Caucasus as the governments of the region and outside regional and global powers vie for influence in the current highly complex geopolitical realities. One of the priorities for the Armenian government is to explain clearly to public opinion what the recently deployed EU Monitoring Mission is and is not about. Otherwise, the same disappointment that emerged towards Russia earlier will surely appear as regards the European Union also.
The ups and downs in the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations process after the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, the launch of the Russia – Ukraine war, and the complete rupture of Russia – West relations added complexity to the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus. Too many actors have contradicting interests in region – Russia, the US, the EU, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. READ MORE