A new regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean? [Over]October 14, 2011 08:47AM Turkey's choice between strategic partnership and competition with the West By George Niculescu, EGF Affiliated Expert
What sort of regional power might Turkey actually be? In light of the discussion with Turkish experts during the roundtable above, it might look like: an over-assertive power seeking to fill in, what it perceives to be, a regional power vacuum; a player manifesting increased proclivity towards unilateralism exacerbated by cooperation with controversial actors like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood; a gloomy partner of the European Union seeking to change the current status as hopeless candidate to EU membership into a more influential role as strategic partner; an actor insensitive to Western strides to solve the Cyprus issue which had blocked progress on its own way to European integration, and had created the current deadlock in NATO-EU relations. However, this is not a Turkey which its Western Allies and friends would like to see. One cannot stop Ankara playing a more prominent regional role, not only in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also in the Caspian-Black Sea area and in Central Asia. However, Ankara should not take for granted the current internal political stability while EU membership-inspired democratic reforms leading to peaceful solutions for effectively dealing with domestic diversity would be slowed down or completely shut down. Authoritarian solutions may work in the Russian Federation or in China, but it is doubtful that, for example, it would bridge the Kurdish gap in Turkey. Neither should Ankara take for granted Turkish economic growth, fuelling the last 10 years of prosperity, while putting EU membership on a second footing. Many Turks, including in leading positions, are forgetting that the EU is a security blanket for Turkey against possible hard times which might be laying ahead, as well as the importance of Turkey's EU candidate status for stimulating foreign investment even from non-EU countries (like China or India). Turkish government should also remember that making steady progress on solving the Cyprus issue would equate with removing a huge hurdle in the run-up to membership of the EU, which is essential to Turkish aspirations for regional leadership. And finally, but not least important, Turkey should carefully assess its own strengths and weaknesses, its perceptions on the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union and the United States, as well as on who needs more the other in its relationship with the West, and figure out whether it wouldn't actually gain more from a revitalized strategic partnership with its traditional Allies in the West than from starting a hopeless competition with them, possibly from within new regional alliances.
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On 27 June 2011, a roundtable discussion in Brussels enabled an interesting debate on the future of Turkish domestic and foreign policy. While internal debate on how to deal with internal political, ethnic and religious diversity, and on the future of Turkish democracy in the third term of the AKP government is stronger than ever, Turkey might be emerging as a new regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean. This would be the outcome of a number of factors, including: internal political stability reinforced by the June 12th elections; continued economic growth since 2002, under two AKP governments; the recent sweeping changes in the Arab world, and Turkey's potential ability to play a regional model role; and the indecisive response of the European Union and the United States to the challenges stemming from the Arab Spring. To that end, Ankara might start to adjust its relations with the key regional players (i.e. Egypt, Israel, Iran, US and the EU).
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On another strand of thinking, I wonder whether Turkey should also have a bolder role in solving the conflicts in Georgia. This might indeed put under strain Turkish relations with Russia in case Ankara would try to act in line with the Western policy. So far, Turkey preferred to pay lip service to the resolution of the Georgian conflicts, which is just another proof that, in the South Caucasus, Ankara is not playing from the same sheet as its Western partners (from NATO and EU). If this might be a natural policy for an emerging regional power, there is a serious risk that ignoring conflicts in its neighborhood may eventually backfire against a standing regional power. In my views, Turkey would gain more from playing a mediator role between the West and Russia in Georgia than from paying lip service to that issue. Could anybody have an insight into the current Turkish policy in Georgia and into whether or not it would be advisable to have it changing in the near to medium te
rm? July 10, 2011 06:02AM
Best regards!
Dorin Dobre
ROU MOND July 7, 2011 11:57AM
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The Turkish political system has produced a long-standing reality. Few other countries can point to such continuity of leadership. I think it is useful to consider Turkey in a broader geopolitical context. It sits next to one of the most important waterways in the world, the Bosporus, connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. That alone made Ataturk’s desire for an inward Turkey not playing great power games difficult to attain. Given that it is part of the Caucasus, shares a border with Iran, borders the Arab world and is part of Europe, Turkey inevitably becomes part of other countries’ plans.
Fr om the American point of view, a close U.S.-Turkish relationship always came to be considered normal. But this was no longer the case after 2001, when the United States faced a new enemy, the radical Islamism. After 2001, this alliance stopped being without a cost. When in 2003 the United States wanted to send a division into northern Iraq from southern Turkey, the Turks blocked the move. The United States realized that it could not take Turkish support for granted. The Turks, on the other hand, decided that the United States was taking actions that were not in their best interests. The relationship was not broken, but it did become strained. Thus, the Turks, not wanting to participate in the Iraq war, created a split with the United States.
In the same time, the European rejection (due to the fear of immigration) of Turkish membership in the European Union, has generated a split with Europe.
On the other hand, as long as the Islamic world began to move in a more religious direction, it was inevitable that Turkey would experience the strains and pressures of the rest of the Muslim world.
The two major wars in the Muslim world being fought by the United States were not proceeding satisfactorily, and while the main goal had been reached — there were no further attacks on the United States — the effort to maintain or create non-Islamic regimes in the region was not succeeding. Now the United States is withdrawing from the region, leaving behind instability and an increasingly powerful and self-confident Turkey.
In the end, the economic and military strength of Turkey had to transform it into a major regional force. By default, with the American withdrawal, Turkey has become the major power in the region on several counts.
The foundation of Turkey’s relationship with Israel, had more to do with hostility toward pro-Soviet Arab governments than anything else. When a Turkish aid flotilla, sailed to Gaza, was intercepted by the Israelis in 2010, the Turkish view was that it was the minimum step Turkey could take as a leading Muslim state. The Israeli view was that Turkey was simply supporting radical Islamists.
By no means has Turkey emerged as a mature almighty regional power. Its handling of events in Syria and other countries — consisting mostly of rhetoric — shows that it is has yet to assume a position to influence, let alone manage, events on its periphery. For example, it will be most interesting to watch how specifically will be Turkish reaction towards Greek imminent default, considering their ancient rivalry.
We are now at a point wh ere the old foundation has weakened and a new one is proving difficult to construct. July 7, 2011 16:31PM
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In my opinion, it is little likely that Turkey will officially announce the end of its candidature at EU membership. However, in fact, I'm afraid that Turkish efforts to EU membership will make little, if any, progress in the coming years. Officially, the issue of Cyprus might be the main reason for that. But in reality there are many factors at play (including those highlighted by you, as well as the geopolitical factor mentioned above), which could impact on the future Turkish approach to EU membership.
July 10, 2011 10:10AM
If we change the title question to "How the regional powers will withdraw from the EM?" then we can easily reach to an appropriate answer. For instance, SOMACESCU Olimpiu says "Now the United States is withdrawing from the region, leaving behind instability and an increasingly powerful and self-confident Turkey".
Turkiye is gradually becoming more self-confident. It is playing the economy game as it should be. If everything were to go as it was, I would attempt to do more q&a. But, there is now a fatal question above all questions yet to be answered. Wh ere the global financial crisis (GFC) is heading to? If GFC makes major powers withdraw from the EM, then Turkiye would fill it up!
As a conclusion, Turkiye is at the moment becoming self-confident but not self-conducting. Which way she will explode will be decided by how the GFC will behave. July 14, 2011 16:47PM
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Mete Gundogan is a well known economist in Turkey who has advised a number of the country's top politicians, and is currently the Vice-Rector of Bartin University, east of Istanbul near the Black Sea
these are very useful comments - but can you elaborate a little by what you mean when you say:
1/ Turkey is about to explode
2/ Turkey is becoming more self-confident but not self conducting July 14, 2011 17:32PM
Turkiye is about to explode in terms of economy. Ten years of stability and open market operations gave some sort of confidence to everyone; leadership, entrepreneurs, managers, peoples etc. They seemed to be ready to fill any vacuum in. So this will affect Country’s international politics.
Amid all self-confidentiality, Turkiye is not undertaking her projects in the EM. She assumes age-old balances. Basically NATO axis. But I think, time has come to take initiative and put some projects including Russia and central Asian forces as well. July 15, 2011 10:51AM
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Concerning the role of Turkey’ one needs to keep in mind the existing gap between the rhetoric and posturing and the real politics on the ground. Willing to be seen as a respected Islamic power, Turkey cannot as strictly follow American-Israeli policy in the region as some other countries do which have no intimate links with the region.However, I do not believe that the Turkish leaders would be ready to go as far as to
Seriously endanger the delicate relations of their nation with the only existing superpower and its close allies. In fact,Turkeyis now being presented as the democratic model for the rebelling Arab masses to follow and it is one of the main cradles of the new “Calvinist Islam “which is open to the capitalist development. July 15, 2011 18:07PM
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1. Treating Turkey without Turkey seems to me a sort of academic problem and unfortunately it is happening much too often - the recent discussion in Chatham House is one of disappointing examples.
It is not generally problem of Mr. Niculescu's contribution, however, statement "this is not a Turkey which its Western Allies and friends would like to see" lets me wondering why should Turkey care? We might not buying Turkish mantras, and cerainly not hte way theY are presented, but it is for sure they have little reasons to put some confidence e.g. to EU. What incentives for reforms when it is clear that, at least, two or three member states are staunchly against its membership? What incentives on Cyprus in thsi context? Before starting to discuss Turkey let's look into Turkey first and not to juggle with wise judgments and recommendations about international politics.
2. Yes, Turkey of these days. When I first came to Turkey, it was October 1996; two weeks after that the Susurluk "accident" happened. I can understand the snapshot dealing with Turkey and I do not pretend Turkey is fully democratic country. Not at all. The argument is simple - Turkey has dramatically changed since the end of 1990s, it is quickly modernising itself and slowly, very slowly getting rid off mentality of the militgary regime history which cost country more people dead than Chile or Argentinec military junta regimes, probably both counted together. Change of mentality is slow and difficult but it is changing.
3. Yes, I "love" argument by people from the social elite which actually helped the military regime to exist - "Turkey is maybe more democratic but with that also more conservative". Of course, if we want (do we want?) Turkey to become a more democratic country, then we must accept full-fledged political existence of remainng 90% of population, which is "socially conservative". Because only by engaging them they can be politically, economically and socially led to, e.g. more tolerance to other ways of living. A task for the former elite. Unfortunately, I doubt it wants it to take.
4. Turkey has many political flaws, one of them are some aspects of its foreign policy. Without discussing overconfidence (yes, that is true) combined with lack of real influence, let's mention principles. I do think that the principle of having "zero problems" with neighbours is laudable, sound and deserves appreciation rather than postpubertal sneers. The reason why is again historical context. Whatever we may think about DAvutoglu's day-to-day politics, he deserves a lot of credit for this idea that makes Turkey to get rid off with the century old cliches it has been surrounded by enemies only. What is even more important, it is not only about foreing policy but also, if not more, about domestic one! Being from a former communist country, feeling of foreing danger generated by our own government and its media little helpers was one of the fundamental ways how government kept people at bay - via feeling they are jeopardized by vicious enemies and only the governemnt, and in
Turkey case the ARMY, can save them. It was one of the ways how to hang on the power.
5. Yes, Turkey, it seems at least, sometimes does not understand, or does not want to understand, that its foreign politics actions are understood in a different way than they expect. This is one of the main misunderstandings for which, however, Turkey is not the only guilty part. Still, Turkish foreign policy makers (except fot President Gül, I think) are so Turkey-centered that they do not, sometimes at least, grasp gravity of their moves ending up in outside perception formulations like in the !oriental drift" or in the following, a bit Orientalistic, comment: "Turkey should carefully assess its own strengths and weaknesses, its perceptions on the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union and the United States, as well as on who needs more the other in its relationship with the West, and figure out whether it wouldn't actually gain more from a revitalized strategic partnership with its traditional Allies in the West than from starting a hopeless competition with them
, possibly from within new regional alliances." There is no competition, man. I cannot imagine a Turkish politician (except maybe for Mr. Erbakan but even he could be influenced) who would exhange its NATO-membership influence for a third rate comradeship with Ahmadinejad or the likes! Please!!! Turkey does assume "age-old balances" (NATO at least), but certainly not in age-old way.
6. Just a minor comment about "explosion" (or implosion?) of Turkey in ecnomic terms. Well, it has been predicted for ages and the only time it happened was under Ecevit's government 2000-2001. Since then the macroieconomis imballances were always pointed at but date Turkey has mananged. Just wondering what this catastrophe mongering should signify.
July 16, 2011 19:25PM
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Agenda (published on the Internet): “There are US officials for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me. This could fundamentally affect the US view of NATO’s utility”. He went on and said: “The kind of emotional and historical attitude American leaders have had with this alliance [i.e. NATO] for over 65 years is ageing out. This process of “ageing out” will mean future decisions and choices are going to be made more in relation to what’s in the best interest of the US”. (lord Palmerston would have most likely agreed with this perspective). This doesn’t mean that the US is likely to abandon NATO anytime soon. But it doesn’t exclude that it might do so some time in the future. Then, why should one deny so categorically that Turkey _might_ (still not saying that it will) make such a step in the future. On the other hand, you are wondering why Turkey would care about the views of its Western friends and Allies. In my view, on
e should always care about that, unless one does not deem the West as friends or Allies anymore. If that was so, Turkey would be just a step away of abandoning its Allies and friends. I bet this wouldn’t be happening anytime soon, but I would not put my hand in fire for it either. Respectfully yours, George. July 17, 2011 11:43AM
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inst spirit of solidarity and consensus, such as Turkey's position on Rasmussen's election, France's return to the Alliance, missile shield, etc. I think the very same behaviors also gave way to arguments/ speculations that Turkey might consider leaving the Alliance. Here, I believe there is a problematic interpretation of the recent Turkish actions inside NATO. For Turkey, I don't think the issue is one of either/or, i.e., membership or not. Rather, it is more of a "how" question; i.e., as Turkey seeks to have a greater say in the formation of joint positions inside the Alliance, how will it conduct itself? Granted, being inside the Alliance does not mean absence of any competition - or, one does not need to leave the Alliance to start a competition with others. What seems clear to me is that to have its voice heart in the Alliance, Turkey is less restrained to enter into competition with other Allies when necessary. I think this was the underlying reason behind Turkey's q
uarrels in recent years, placing it on the spotlight. But as Turkey's position on the transfer of the Libya mission to NATO shows, membership to NATO or acting alongside with the West provides Turkey with a very useful instrument to gain some leverage over the Eastern Mediterranean affairs, and NATO will remain as a key component of its security and defense policies.
Regards,
Saban July 17, 2011 22:41PM