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Turkey’s European Path: A Fact Finding Tool Box

August 17, 2011 21:06PM

By Deniz Altinbas,
Assistant Professor, Ahi Evran University, Turkey,
EGF Affiliated Expert

A History of Turkey’s European Aspirations in Brief

Contrary to conventional opinion, Turkey’s interest in being part of the Western world did not start with its application to the European Economic Community (EEC). In fact, Turkey’s European orientation, diminishing as it is at present, began with the Rescript of Gulhane of 1839 (Tanzimat Fermani) and the Reform Edict of 1856 (Islahat Fermani). Among many other reasons, the major aim of the 19^th century effort was the building of a Western model of state and society in wake of the declining power of the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottomans realized their world power had been eclipsed by Europeans, the Ottoman state initiated a project of modernization and Westernization which commenced Turkey’s European courtship.

The first step in becoming a “European state” was the Paris Congress and Treaty in 1856. Geopolitically, Turkey functioned as a bridge between Europe and Asia. After World War I and the anti-Western and anti-imperial Turkish War of Independence, Turkey was kept outside Europe as “remnants of the sick man.” But the Cold War period brought Turkey to the Western world once again chiefly as a NATO outpost. Thus, Turkey’s 20^th century situation made rapprochement towards Europe both convenient and appealing. 

In 1959 the Menderes government applied for associate membership in the EEC with largely political reasons, namely to guarantee a secure position for Turkey in the West. Turkey’s membership in international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and NATO were proof of Turkey’s desire to feel secure. However, the state’s main objective was to avoid remaining outside a European integration process, particularly one which Greece pursued in parallel. Turkey applied just two weeks after the Greek application which was too hasty and unprepared. Thus, the Ankara Agreement was delayed and signed four years later in 1963, which made the then government feel that a Turkish place in Europe was guaranteed.

Then came the Additional Protocol in 1973, application for full membership in 1987, completion of Customs Union in 1995, acceptance of Turkey as a candidate in 1999 and the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005.

Since 2005, 13 out of 33 negotiation chapters have been opened.[1] One chapter has been provisionally closed.[2] Eight chapters will not be opened until Turkey fully implements the Additional Protocol and Association Agreement related to Turkey’s restrictions regarding Cyprus.[3] This decision has also become a benchmark for the provisional closure of all chapters. France blocks five chapters arguing that their opening would make full Turkish membership inevitable.[4] Furthermore, from time to time Germany, Austria and particularly Greek Cyprus veto or threaten to veto the blocking of some chapters.

When it is considered that eight chapters were blocked by the European Commission, five by France, and several others by Greek Cypriots, few remain to be negotiated. In this case, it is not surprising that the negotiation process is too slow. The effective blockage of the chapters creates a situation which is quite far from promising.

EU Membership Negotiations

Negotiations started in 2005 after the AKP, the Justice and Development Party, gained power. The AKP arose as a conservative party with powerful Islamic references, a defense of a liberal market economy, and close relations with the Western world, especially the EU. Its roots, however, are in the tradition of the anti-Western National View Movement prompting initial AKP opposition to European Union (EU) membership[5]. This change in AKP’s attitude has been one of the top debates in the Turkish agenda.

For some, EU accession is not the end but only the means for the AKP to reach its political goals. Because some goals are mostly radical and illegal, there is a need for a democratic and free atmosphere. Prime Minister Erdogan’s words such as “we should respect people’s choices even if they prefer a totalitarian regime” or “democracy is not a goal but a tool” are commonly evaluated as proof of his anti-democratic, intolerant and sultan-like tendencies. But for others, on the contrary, Erdogan adequately eschewed the AKP’s previous National View, leaving behind anti-democratic, anti-secular, and anti-Western attitudes and adapted himself very well to the European line.

The Politics and Influence of the AKP

It can be said that Turkish-EU relations have become AKP-EU relations under AKP rule. It is also an opportunity for reformist circles in the EU to impose certain policies on Turkey.  Interestingly, the European Commission’s progress reports abstain from mentioning violations of democracy, human rights, freedom of media, press, expression, women, and others which are direct consequences of AKP administration.  

To some, the AKP has a positive image as a guarantor of political and economic stability, democracy, freedom and multiculturalism. For others, the party represents a post-Islamist, neo-liberal, new-right stand against Enlightenment and it is very often blamed for using freedoms only to further its own interests.  There are several examples of misleading assumptions promulgated by AKP political maneuvering. 

First, it seems as if the AKP achieved political stability by receiving the majority of the vote and avoiding the need for a potentially unstable coalition government. However, Turkish society became polarized with nationalists vs. Kurds, Islamists vs. Kemalist-Republicans.  Consequently, social instability threatened to undermine political stability.

Another misleading appearance is the promotion of consensus among state institutions which is also parallel to political stability. This is quite normal in light of the AKP’s efforts to establish a cadre of public offices – particularly the most critical – who will not dare to depart from party line.

What the AKP achieved in economic terms has been, in essence, economic growth, inflation, interest rates, privatization, exports and foreign investments. On the other hand, the party has not been able to overcome Turkey’s public deficits, high real interest rates, unemployment; and increased bankruptcies in the private sector. 

Arguably the main success of the AKP has been radical changes it has overseen in Turkish foreign policy. The EU has lost importance as Turkey’s primary foreign policy topic, while a Middle East agenda has been elevated to the forefront (of Turkish foreign policy). Perhaps international public opinion and the EU’s seeming reluctance to negotiate Turkey’s accession would have similarly impacted negatively on other governments, but this shift has essentially been driven by the AKP’s Islamic elements. The new Turkish foreign policy has lofty goals such as regional power and more global visions of its political leadership, giving a fresh impetus to the country.

However, this new regional landscape displeased Israel and led to the deterioration of traditionally friendly relations. Moreover, this shift introduced an anti-Semitic atmosphere previously alien to Turkish society.

The AKP’s Domestic Challenges

The main challenge to the AKP has been its attempted legalization of the terrorist organization PKK under the guise of political participation. The PKK is said to be responsible for the loss of 42,000 lives which has created unrest, provoked nationalists and antagonized ethnic groups. Following the arrest of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, very few terrorist incidents have been reported. The AKP’s recent rapprochement aiming to shift the party from violence to politics, however, prompted a sharp rise in attacks.   

Although there are many ethnic, religious and sociological minorities who are in need of governmental assistance, the AKP focused primarily on addressing ethnic minorities which provoked unrest between them.

The “political headscarf”[6], first seen in Turkey at the end of the 1980s with the rise of fundamentalism, is another challenge the AKP promised to overcome, although the party has yet to deliver in this area. The political headscarf is an issue dividing the population between fundamental/anti-Kemalist/anti-Republican/anti-secularists from everyone else at a time when AKP rule enabled more and more people to define religion as a source of their identities.

Perhaps the most serious challenge for the AKP is the so called Ergenekon conspiracy, a dynamic coup plot involving several tangential legal levels. Many people suspected of membership in an organization planning a coup are currently detained without charges due to lack of evidence. The entire judicial process has violated legal procedures such as arrest, the collection of evidence and interrogation. Ergenekon becomes extremely doubtful when it is considered that the prisoners being charged as part of the conspiracy are predominantly opponents of the AKP and hold republican ideology. However, for some, Ergenekon is a successful attempt to paralyse the potential coup plotters and cleanse the state from anti-democratic activists although the existence of such an organization, although this is yet to be proven.

Europe’s Discouragement

After five years of negotiations, the Turkish approach towards the EU is changing in a negative way as a result of several factors such as the illegal visa application for Turkish citizens. The EU values and legislatively mandates the free movement of goods, services, and people. Many argue, however, that it cannot absorb the potential influx of migrants resulting from Turkish membership.  As a result, the EU has imposed a unique visa application and Turkey may regress after making such substantial gains.   

Similarly, Turkey’s involvement in the Customs Union should have granted it the right to advertise, market and sell its products for a just competition.  To that end, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that visa requirements cannot be imposed on Turkish citizens entering EU territory to provide services. Additionally, the Ankara Agreement gives settlement and work permits to Turkish citizens who want to establish business or invest in any EU member country. In reality, however, EU member states have long ignored these terms. The EU even eased visa restrictions for states not yet at the negotiation phase and plans to ease them for others which are not even EU candidates.

Another problem is Turkey’s disadvantage when non-member states sign free trade agreements with the EU. Under the current agreement, third parties will be able to enter the Turkish market but Turkish businesses will not have the same right. Countries such as Mexico or Algeria are not willing to agree to sign the same agreements with Turkey.

The seeming EU double standards toward Turkey are reflected further in the case of Cyprus.  The EU promised to remove the isolations following a “yes” vote by Turkish Cypriots in the referendum of the Annan Plan. Unfortunately, upon a Turkish “yes” and a Greek “no” vote, the EU continued both Turkey’s isolation and the solution of Cyprus problem, a precondition for continued negotiations. Meanwhile, Greece was accepted into the EU. The implications of this precondition and Greek membership are that the EU dramatically reduced Greece’s responsibility for Cypriot resolution while placing unfavorable burden on Turkey.  As a result, Turkey continues to pursue solutions and insists on UN and not EU intervention. 

Final Message: 

From our perspective, Turkey’s rapidly diminishing interest in EU membership is the result of several EU policies.  The EU has failed to keep a number of promises and neglected to obey certain legal obligations, its member states have supported the terrorist PKK organization, and instead of membership, have instead offered Ankara a sub-standard privileged partnership which is devoid of any legal status.[7] Combined with the perpetual doubt and ambiguity surrounding potential Turkish membership and the negotiation process, all of these factors have discouraged Turkey in its Western tilt and assisted its dramatic shifts in foreign policy. Recent years have seen Turkish support for the EU have dwindled from 75% to 36%.  The membership conversation continues…in Europe but not in Turkey. 

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