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Armenia's choice in Nagorno-Karabakh: peaceful resolution or another war with Azerbaijan?

December 7, 2011 19:00PM

George Niculescu

By George Niculescu,
EGF Affiliated Expert

In the aftermath of the failed summit hosted by the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev between his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts, held in Kazan (Russia) on 24 June 2011, with a view to agreeing on a peaceful settlement of the "frozen conflict" in Nagorno-Karabakh, it seems that the future of South Caucasus might be threatened by the specter of a new war. Although the agreement expected from the Kazan summit was politically backed by a previous US-French-Russian summit in Deauville (France) on 26 May 2011, the two conflicting parties have eventually turned it down, placing under a big question mark the whole notion of pursuing international negotiations on Karabakh. Reportedly, a senior official in the Kremlin, reflecting president's Medvedev's frustration with the outcome of the Kazan summit, had declared: "Unless Armenia and Azerbaijan display a readiness soon to solve the accumulated problems, we will consider this mediating mission over" (Kommersant, 27 June 2011).

An ambiguous declaration of president Serzh Sarksyan on 23 July 2011, at a meeting with Armenian youth, hinting to the fact that the current status of Karabakh as part of Armenia is final, and that the settling of the Western Armenian border (with Turkey) would be an issue to be solved in the future by the younger generation, might have given another powerful strike to the failing peace process. Unfortunately, but maybe not completely unexpectedly, this declaration was made just before the visit of the Turkish Prime-Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to Baku (27-28 July 2011) triggering strong anti-Armenian reactions from the Turkish prime-minister and the Azerbaijani president. The two political leaders, closing ranks among their countries, reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining the conditionality of opening the Turkish-Armenian border by significant progress in negotiations over Karabakh, thereby thwarting recent efforts by the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, to persuade Turkish leaders to act in the opposite direction.

Since the previous war with Azerbaijan, Armenia has strived to maintain the status quo in the South Caucasus, and in particular in Karabakh. It has pursued a strategy relying on countering Azerbaijan by effectively supporting Armenian Karabakh forces outside the national territory (in seven Azerbaijani districts situated between Armenian internationally recognized borders and the Armenians inhabited Karabakh), relying on Russia to counter a potential Turkish threat. Armenia has likewise aimed to cultivate Western support, on the one hand, to balance Azerbaijani strides to get closer to the West, and, on the other hand, to lock Russia in.

Major changes over the last few years deeply affected the effectiveness of this strategy: 1)Georgian war of 2008 has proven that the Western regional commitment and role are very limited; 2)Russia and Turkey have drawn closer to one another, sharing common regional interests; 3)Western (read mainly US) influence on Turkey's regional policies was  strongly eroded; 4)Azerbaijan's military power has grown exponentially fuelled by huge oil revenues, while Turkish military support to Azerbaijan cannot be ruled out either; 5)Armenian Diaspora's economic support to the homeland, on which Armenian prosperity to a large extent relies, has significantly decreased due to the ongoing global crisis. Under these circumstances, maintaining the status quo in the South Caucasus peacefully has become hardly feasible for Yerevan.

A number of factors are making the outbreak of a new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan ever likelier, including: the clear deadlock of negotiations on Karabakh after the Kazan summit; the growing Azerbaijani unrest about peacefully liberating the districts occupied by Karabakh Armenian troops; the tightening of the Turkish-Azerbaijani pressure on Armenia (potentially on Moscow too, although in different ways); the Russian president's exasperation with the irreconcilable positions of both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, and a potential interest of Russian hard liners in a military conflict around Karabakh which would be cutting the Azerbaijani pipelines crossing the South Caucasus towards Europe, boosting competing Russian energy projects; the current Western preoccupation with finding solutions to its own problems stemming from the global economic crisis, and the re-focus of its political attention to the developments in the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Arab spring.

In this new strategic context, one could not exclude either a Turkish-Russian deal on the South Caucasus, which would pay lip service to Armenian interests in Karabakh, nor the fact that Yerevan would be abandoned by the West (in fact. by the US), whose regional role in the South Caucasus is downsizing anyway.

The Armenian potential response in case either of these nightmare scenarios would turn into reality (in the context of a military effort by Azerbaijan to re-conquer its districts adjacent to Karabakh), might involve negotiating with Azerbaijan on a defensive footing or engaging in asymmetric warfare against Azerbaijan. Both options might look much less attractive for Armenia than urgently sending the right signals that it is prepared to make a credible offer to break the current deadlock of negotiations on Karabakh under the aegis of OSCE’s Minsk Group.

Siczu Li
Moderator
  • 1 Pros
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Comments 10

  • Beniamin Poghosyan
    I believe Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh Republic did its best to secure deal in Kazan, accepting the somehow harsh compromises offered by OSCE co chairs. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan pulled back in last minute, putting into the table at least 10 points to the preliminary agreed version of basic principles. As we know from three statements on Karabakh issue made by US, Russian and France Presidents, one of the basic principle is the final solution of the Karabakh legal status by legally binding will of expression of Karabakh people. But Azerbaijani president has rejected this principle in his all official statements stating that there is no way for Karabakh to be out of Azerbaijan and Karabakh should be a part of Azerbaijan thus making no sense in any legally binding will of expression. I believe Armenia and NKR had made all possible concessions and now its turn for Azerbaijan that he is really ready for peace. Otherwise, oil fueled Azerbaijan would pose a real danger not only to regional security but also to the all major energy projects which involve Caucasus Caspian region and all powers which are interested in the stability and energy security issues should make necessary steps to bring back Azerbaijan from the dangerous game of blackmailing Armenia and other interested parties of the region. August 24, 2011 19:28PM Quote Reply
  • Niculescu George
    Decision Makers
    Dear Beniamin, Thank you for your views. You are definitely making a sound point here: while handling the peace and war in NK, both Armenia and Azerbaijan may have very high responsibilities vis a vis the European energy security, i.e. by reassuring the relevant markets and other stakeholders that instability generated by a potential reopening of the military conflict would not seriously affect the oil and gas markets.
    I do not doubt that Armenia has put a lot of efforts in finding a reasonable solution to the NK conflict. However, I would very much appreciate your assessments on the major geopolitical changes affecting the Caucasus which were higlighted in the article, as well as your assessment on whether a new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is more likelier now than ever before over the last 15 years. Thanks.
    August 26, 2011 04:44AM Quote Reply
  • Beniamin Poghosyan
    Dear George. I agree with you that after 2008 the South Caucasus region has seen major geopolitical changes. In any case I would not agree that US involvement and interests in the region have been downsized. The policy of reset between Russia and US putting forward by Obama administration has helped to soothe disagreements between two sides in South Caucasus but it does not necessarily means low profile involvement of US. I believe now US does not focus its attention only on Georgia as an island of democracy but is trying to put forward more multifaceted approach and here Armenia could play vital role as a country who is a member of CSTO an simultaneously has signed two IPAPs with NATO and negotiations are underway for signing third one and who openly states its intention to deepen relations both with NATO and US. Definitely the influence of US on Turkey is much smaller now that even 10 years ago, but I believe this fact will facilitate more engagement of US in the South Caucasus and will also play supportive role in deepening of US - Armenian relations as a kind of leverage. Touching upon the issue of current phase of Russian - Turkish relations, we could not exclude the possibility of Russian - Turkish deal with strategic goal to minimize the western influence in the Caucasus - Caspian region, but in that scenario Armenia is not the only country who should be worried and try to thwart that process. August 26, 2011 05:35AM Quote Reply
  • Niculescu George
    Decision Makers
    Dear Beniamin,thank you for another thoughtful intervention into this debate. I fully respect your point of view regarding the US involvement and interests in the South Caucasus/ Black Sea region. However, you would agree that the impact of Obama Administration reset policy with Russia on current regional geopolitical changes should be further debated. One point for such a debate is whether this policy has actually yielded the expected results or it rather backfired.
    There is no doubt that the US has undertaken a "multifaceted approach" to the region, but I'd really hope that senior Armenian decision makers would not overestimate their hand in this complex game. At the same time, ignorring the European factor and its influence both in the region and on the US policy in the South Caucasus would be a serious mistake.
    Western energy interests in Azerbaijan may play in both ways, that is in favor and against Armenia. For the moment, I think it is more against Armenian interests, but this may change in the near future, pending on Armenian ability to underscore its critical role in maintaining regional energy security.
    You are perfectly right in your point on a possible Turkish-Russian deal at the expense of other players, including Armenia. However, you would probably agree that Armenia must be prepared to deal with the unknowns of such a contingency. In my opinion, it might not be absolutely impossible for the West to tacitly agree with such a Russian-Turkish deal under certain conditions.
    August 28, 2011 08:34AM Quote Reply
  • Igor Muradyan
    Very timely article, any article of the author working out of limits of the Caucasian region about regional conflicts and in general about problems of Southern caucasus is of interest. The author understands complexity of a problem, but, unfortunately, as well as all others does not see exits from the created position. And it, is valid so, problem Karabah has no political decision, unfortunately. The international community so long preferred to approve imitation of process of settlement that time reserve has been as a result settled. Already all understand, that the thesis about "territorial integrity" became more, than destructive and the factor of renewal of war. Anywhere, in one region "principle" "territorial integrity" has not resulted neither in the world, nor to settlement. I hope, the author will try to consider further other versions of the decision of the given problem. Igor Muradyan (Armenia) August 26, 2011 06:09AM Quote Reply
  • Kreutz Andrej
    Decision Makers
    It seems that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is really frozen and at least in the foreseeable future without a chance of a political solution. Two major conflicting principles of international law are involved here: the territorial integrity of the sovereign states and the national{traditionally understood as ethnic] self-determination. There is also a problem of Armenian foreign policy maneuvering between Russia which still wants to remain an independent power center, and the US led Western bloc. This is additionally complicated by the issue of a potential threat to the security of oil and gas supply through the region and the role of the Armenian diasporas in the US and the EU.Turkey cannot stop to support Azerbaijan, at least rhetorically, but I do not believe any Turkish government would be willing to seriously challenge the US superpower and even to endanger its relations with Russia.However,it is also true that as from the major power centers ‘views points, the whole conflict on Nagorno -Karabakh seems rather remote and of secondary importance, some unpredictable developments cannot be completely excluded. September 2, 2011 03:20AM Quote Reply
  • Niculescu George
    Decision Makers
    Dear professor Kreutz, Thank you for your thoughtful remarks which shed a frostier light on the "frozen conflict" in Karabakh. I would just like to ask you why do you see a problem with Armenian foreign policy maneuvering between Russia and the West while dealing with the Karabakh issue. I would argue that such a shifting policy has basically been practiced, at different times, by all countries of Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and even Georgia before Saakashvili. In addition, I would like to add to your list of potential issues which led to the current deadlock in Nagorno-Karabakh: 1) the lack of European political will to play a bolder role in the resolution of that conflict (may Polish EU presidency try to change this trend?); 2)the surprisingly lack of imagination of Turkish politicians and diplomats who instead of taking up an active role in conflict resolution chose to play the same music like their counterparts in Baku. Perhaps, both Europeans and Turks should make use of their relatively good relations with Russia to tackle the Karabakh conflict in a more effective way. For the US, one can easily understand why it chose a lower key into this game! September 4, 2011 17:32PM Quote Reply
  • Kreutz Andrej
    Decision Makers
    Dear Mr.Nicolescu,

    Thank you very much for your interest in my comments. It was not my intention to
    Criticize Armenian foreign policy. The maneuvering between the various power centers,
    Has in fact been a quite common behavior of small to middle powers.However, it is also
    A fact that such a shifting policy might cause some problems and suspiciouns, even
    though, as far as I know, Armenia has not up to now made any major political mistakes.
    Concerning the lack of European political will to play a more energetic role in the
    Resolution of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict, it is probably one more example of the
    fact that the E.U. members have different national traditions and current interests.
    Brussels’ foreign policy can thus hardly be more active or articulated.
    I do not know enough about Turkey to speak about the imagination of its politicians and
    Diplomats, but it seems to me that Ankara apparently has no major interest to push Baku
    Into a compromise with Yerevan.
    September 7, 2011 18:28PM Quote Reply
  • andrej kreutz
    Dear Mr.Nicolescu,

    Thank you very much for your interest in my comments. It was not my intention to criticize Armenian foreign policy. The maneuvering between the various power centers, has in fact been a quite common behavior of small to middle powers. However, it is also a fact that such a shifting policy might cause some problems and suspiciouns, even though, as far as I know, Armenia has not up to now made any major political mistakes. Concerning the lack of European political will to play a more energetic role in the resolution of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict, it is probably one more example of the fact that the E.U. members have different national traditions and current interests. Brussels’ foreign policy can thus hardly be more active or articulated. I do not know enough about Turkey to speak about the imagination of its politicians and diplomats, but it seems to me that Ankara apparently has no major interest to push Baku into a compromise with Yerevan.

    September 8, 2011 16:15PM Quote Reply
  • Niculescu George
    Decision Makers
    Dear professor Kreutz,Thank you very much for these useful clarifications. You might be right in your assessment that Ankara has no major interest in settling the Karabakh conflict. One could assume that this apparent lack of interest might be related to the current geopolitical games of regional energy transport. If that was true, the convergence of Turkish interests with hard liners from Moscow on that matter (and possibly on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus more broadly) would be obvious, and the emergence, at some point in the future, of a Turkish-Russian deal on the Caucasus would be even likelier. However, this Turkish geopolitical game might backfire in case of growing turbulence in the Middle East/Eastern Mediterranean focused either on Syria or on the Arab-Israeli conflict. It may just give room for manneuver to the other regional actors, while the current Turkish policy on "zero problems with neighbors" might swiftly turn into an empty shell. On the European ability to act more articulated I would just say that: in August 2008, at a time of major crisis in the South Caucasus, the European actions were rather quick and effective under the direction of the French president Sarkozi(although I admit that, judged against the medium and longer term, the European effectiveness in the overall conflict resolution in Georgia may be questionable). Do Europeans need another South Caucasus crisis in order to become more effective on conflict resolution in Karabakh? September 11, 2011 08:56AM Quote Reply

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