Taking into account the latest media reports on the new outbreak of hostilities on the Line of Contact in Karabakh (called Artsakh in Armenian) between local Armenian forces and the Azerbaijani military, I am gravely concerned about the loss of life and the indiscriminate destruction of civilian assets. As the Founder of the European Geopolitical Forum, an organisation which embraces peaceful means of conflict resolution, and which has been actively involved in finding a reasonable, sound and long-term solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh for some ten years, I call for an immediate end to all hostilities and a swift return of the parties to the negotiation table. I am encouraged by the breaking news of a Russian-mediated ceasefire. I call for the immediate, non-conditional resumption of the internationally mediated dialogue between Baku and representatives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. I also call on the Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union to actively demand peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict and to ensure that the ceasefire is respected without any form of deviation.

Dr Marat Terterov,
Founder, European Geopolitical Forum

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the launch of the first Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war in the 1990s, the region’s status has been at the core of the conflict. This issue was the primary focus of negotiations and different settlement options put forward by the OSCE Minsk Group—package solution, phased approach, Common State, Key West, Kazan document, Lavrov plan—which all tried to find a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Artsakh. At the end of the day, Azerbaijan decided to solve this issue by military force. Azerbaijan probably came to this decision in the early 2000s, hoping it could get more by deploying military force than by any negotiated solutions. Azerbaijan was cautiously waiting for the geopolitical window of opportunity, which appeared in 2020 as a combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, elections in the U.S. and growing misperceptions of Armenia-Russia relations after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Recent geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus have once again appeared in the headlines of media and analytical centers. Experts have been questioning whether Russia is distancing itself from the region. Armenian regional experts and officials have been questioning Russia’s motives in the region, considering developments in Artsakh and the latest Azerbaijani escalation. Russia is navigating the narrow complexities of the post-2020 Artsakh War regional architecture, asserting itself as the main power broker in the region (i.e. brokering the 2020 trilateral ceasefire agreement, arranging humanitarian aid to Artsakh via the Berdzor Corridor and Aghdam, and possibly a new deal in the coming days) through compromise or political flexibility. This flexibility has caused friction in Moscow-Yerevan relations.
Many in Russia, including high officials, are suspicious of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s motives towards their country. The Armenian leader has speculated that Russia seems to be leaving the region. However, Russia still views the region as “blizhnee zarubezhe” (its “near abroad”) or its “lebensraum” (its “vital space”). From Russia’s perspective, if it leaves the South Caucasus, its only route to the Middle East would be cut off, Iran and Turkey would clash for power, and the North Caucasus would become vulnerable to instability. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 19, the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry announced it had launched an “anti-terrorist” operation against “illegal formations” in Karabakh. This move came after four Azerbaijani soldiers and two civilians were killed by land mines in the region. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan condemned the “full-scale aggression” and denounced Russian peacekeepers for “failing to do their jobs’.
The recent fighting comes as tensions had been mounting over Baku’s efforts to fully integrate Karabakh back into Azerbaijan. This measure had been stipulated in the tripartite agreement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia following the end of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020. Russian peacekeepers were stationed in the region to facilitate implementation of the measure; yet, they have done little since to constructively manage the process. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with only one goal: to finish with that republic. The Azerbaijani attack was not a surprise to anyone. At least since the beginning of 2023, Azerbaijan has stated clearly and loudly that Baku will not tolerate the status quo that emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and will do everything possible to destroy the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan was also clear that it would reach its goal quickly. Since the beginning of September 2023, as Azerbaijan started to concentrate troops along the line of contact, it was clear the military offensive would take place very soon. Armenia knew that Russia knew that, the EU and the US knew that, and Nagorno Karabakh authorities knew that. What were the positions of the sides regarding the upcoming offensive of Azerbaijan? READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow and Minsk agreed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. The construction of a special warehouse is already underway and will be completed by July 1 of this year. Therefore, it can be said that Putin's blackmailing strategy has entered the next acute phase, and it is theoretically possible that such steps will sooner or later push the world toward a nuclear confrontation. It should be noted that after the dissemination of information about the placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus, the US Department of Defence issued an emergency statement. It says that "the Pentagon sees no indication that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons." On the other hand, as Vladimir Putin told the Russian government media, ten Su-25 aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons are already stationed on the territory of Belarus. In addition, according to him, Russia has given Belarus the "Iskander" missile system, which can also launch missiles equipped with a nuclear warhead. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

May 2023 will be remembered as the month of intensive negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It started from the four-day summit in Washington, where the two ministers of foreign affairs with their teams were engaged in face-to-face interactions to discuss the text of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement. Ten days later, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Brussels, revitalizing the Brussels format, which had been stalled in September 2022. As a result of the Brussels summit, the sides reiterated the mutual recognition of territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration. For the first time, they agreed to use exact numbers when describing each other’s territories. This step dispersed fears in Azerbaijan that despite signing the Prague statement in October 2022 and recognizing Azerbaijani territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration, Armenia may still avoid recognizing Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) as part of Azerbaijan, arguing that Artsakh was not part of Azerbaijan on December 21, 1991, when the Alma-Ata declaration was signed. A few days later, the Armenian Prime Minister confirmed that Armenia recognizes Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan during his speech at the summit of the Council of Europe. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After a break of several months Armenia and Azerbaijan have now resumed their engagement in peace negotiations in earnest. After a face-to-face meeting between leaders in Munich in February, the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of foreign affairs went to Washington in early May 2023 to take part in the most intensive round of negotiations ever held since the Spring 2001 Key West summit between Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. The ministers achieved progress, opening the path for the 14 May Brussels summit involving Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev, and President of the European Union Council Charles Michel. On 19 May, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Moscow, and a trilateral Aliyev - Pashinyan - Putin summit was scheduled for 25 May. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On March 30, Azerbaijan officially inaugurated its first embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, after avoiding the move for three decades. Although the decision highlighted the importance of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, it quickly became a catalyst behind the renewed war of words between Iran and Azerbaijan. Since 2021, diplomatic relations between Tehran and Baku have steadily become embittered. Iran is primarily concerned with the decline of its influence in the South Caucasus, which has suffered since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020. As such, in an attempt by Tehran to flex its muscles and intimidate Azerbaijan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted large-scale military drills on the border with Azerbaijan in October 2022. Unlike previous years, the exercises provoked an uneasy reaction within Azerbaijan and triggered anti-Iranian sentiments throughout the country. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations entered a more active phase after a months-long limbo with marathon discussions in Washington, an upcoming trilateral meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Moscow, and a possible Pashinyan – Aliyev summit in Chisinau on 1 June 2023, the key contested issue remains Armenia's demand for a long-term international presence in Nagorno Karabakh and the establishment of an international mechanism for Azerbaijan – Nagorno Karabakh negotiations.
In his 5 May 2023, interview with Radio Liberty, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that the rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians remained the main issue, where the sides still had divergent views. The concept of "rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians" came into centre stage in early 2022, as the Armenian government dropped its demand for autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Since Spring 2022, Armenia has avoided the terms of status and self-determination in its rhetoric on Nagorno Karabakh, instead emphasizing the necessity to protect rights and provide security for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Efficient strategic communication has become necessary in the South Caucasus as the governments of the region and outside regional and global powers vie for influence in the current highly complex geopolitical realities. One of the priorities for the Armenian government is to explain clearly to public opinion what the recently deployed EU Monitoring Mission is and is not about. Otherwise, the same disappointment that emerged towards Russia earlier will surely appear as regards the European Union also.
The ups and downs in the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations process after the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, the launch of the Russia – Ukraine war, and the complete rupture of Russia – West relations added complexity to the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus. Too many actors have contradicting interests in region – Russia, the US, the EU, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran have grown rather raw recently in the wake of Baku’s inauguration of its first-ever embassy in Israel. Of course, diplomatic relations between the neighbours have steadily become more and more inflamed and embittered for several years now, with Iran concerned at the declining influence in the South Caucasus it has suffered since the second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan, urged on by Turkey, and Armenia in late 2020. And with a normalisation of diplomatic ties between Tehran and Baku unlikely in the near future, the big question remains unanswered: Is it possible that the tensions could escalate into a large-scale regional conflict?
The war of words between the two countries was aggravated in October 2022 when Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted large-scale military drills on its border with Azerbaijan. Baku opted to refrain from responding to the exercises with comments that might antagonise Tehran. However, the situation became even more explosive when, in late January, an Iranian citizen armed with a rifle burst into the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran and killed the building’s security chief and injured two of his colleagues. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine launched in early 2022 has fundamentally changed the international security architecture that had existed for many years, but it has also caused global political and economic cataclysms. Although Russian forces made significant gains thanks to heavy artillery fire, including missile strikes on cities all over Ukraine in the first weeks of combat, Ukrainian defenders quickly rebuffed attempts by consolidating its military power, exercising diplomatic connections, and launching counterattacks at Russian positions. The failures of continuous artillery and missile strikes in the following months prompted Russia to make some changes in its military tactics. As a result, Russia was forced to seek help from its traditional allies China and Iran through unofficial channels. Although China has refrained from overtly providing military support to Russia in order not to further complicate relations with Western countries, particularly with the United States, Iran began supplying locally produced long-range attack (suicide) drones to Russia. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 19, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the discussion panel regarding the South Caucasus at the Munich Security Conference. Afterward, they held a face-to-face meeting on the side-lines of the conference with the mediation of United States Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Ultimately, the parties focused on the points at the top of their respective agendas, and as a result, they failed to reach a significant agreement on many key issues, including the status of the Lachin road and future development of the Zangezur Corridor. Aliyev revealed in a later interview that he had proposed to the Armenian side the establishment of bilateral checkpoints at both ends of the Zangezur Corridor and along the Lachin road. Since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan has long sought the establishment of this desired corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province to connect the country with its Nakhchivan exclave, albeit unsuccessfully. Thus, debates over the Zangezur project, among other issues, have led to a stalemate in peace negotiations, with regional actors, such as Iran, strictly standing against the project and supporting Armenia in its opposition. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war has significantly changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus, increasing the role and influence of Turkey. The direct involvement of Turkey in the war and the lack of action by Russia to prevent this NATO member state from challenging the Russian zone of influence in the post-Soviet space crushed the basics of the Armenian foreign and security policy. Since the end of the first Nagorno Karabakh war in 1994, Armenian military doctrine has been based on the core belief that Russia will not allow direct Turkish involvement in a new war against Armenia. Thus, Armenia prepared itself for the war with Azerbaijan while outsourcing to Russia the deterrence of Turkey. Meanwhile, this mindset also resulted in a Russia-focused defence and security policy. Armenia was buying weapons mainly from Russia, almost all Armenian officers were studying in Russian military universities, and the structure and operating mode of the Armenian army was solely based on the Russian model. Armenia developed limited defence cooperation with other nations, including the US, Greece, and Poland, and signed its first Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO in 2005. However, these sporadic interactions did not change the basics of Russia-focused foreign and military policy. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

It is a paradox that two democratic Nordic countries that are willing to join NATO and become interoperable with it are kept at bay by pseudo-democratic NATO member Turkey. As long as this situation persists, Russia strategically has the last laugh. This could have been avoided if the proposed policy recommendations had been implemented by NATO some time ago.
To begin with, it is crucial to recall a preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty 1949), namely: ‘The Parties to this Treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom – founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. Obviously, these principles have been repeatedly trampled upon by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the last decade. And now, two democratic candidates for NATO membership, Finland and Sweden, have to fulfil conditions virtually imposed by the pseudo-democratic government of Turkey. This is a worrying paradox. READ MORE

By Ahmad ALILI, Director, Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre, Baku
Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies, Yerevan

On 31 August 2022, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, meeting in Brussels under the auspices of European Council president Charles Michel, agreed to authorise their foreign ministers to start immediate negotiations on a peace treaty. Instead, in less than two weeks, the two sides found themselves negotiating yet another ceasefire.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are slowly emerging from a long period of conflict. Over three and a half decades, tens of thousands died in fighting; hundreds of thousands of people were displaced; tens of thousands of landmines and other unexploded ordnance contaminated huge tracts of territory, and war and enmity became the standard narrative with both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The 1st Karabakh War in the early 1990s resulted in massive loss of territory by Azerbaijan; the 2nd Karabakh War in autumn 2020 changed the reality on the ground for the second time, nearly, but not completely, restoring the status quo ante. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Nagorno Karabakh's future is the most challenging question that Armenia and Azerbaijan face as they seek to move towards the normalisation of relations between them.
Since the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war ended, Armenia and Azerbaijan have launched multi-track negotiations to sign a peace treaty. In 2021 the primary platform for negotiations was Russia, and in 2022 the EU and the US joined the club. Armenia and Azerbaijan discuss several separate but intertwined issues – the signature of the peace treaty, delimitation and demarcation of borders, restoration of communications, and the future of Nagorno Karabakh. All issues are pretty complicated, but Nagorno Karabakh's future is the most challenging question. There are different approaches how to deal with this issue. One approach argues for the inclusion of Nagorno Karabakh in the bilateral peace treaty, while according to another view, the Nagorno Karabakh issue should be separated from discussions on Armenia - Azerbaijan relations. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The end of 2022 marked another round of confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Karabakh region with the involvement of Russian peacekeeping forces. The standoff began in early December, when the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the separatist Karabakh region denied access to Azerbaijani officials from the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources and the state-owned mining company AzerGold CJSC from carrying out on-site inspections of the Gizilbulag gold deposits and the Demirli copper-molybdenum deposits to evaluate potential risks to the environment. While Azerbaijani state officials were deprived of free movement inside the separatist portion of Karabakh by the peacekeeping mission, it fuelled skepticism in Azerbaijani and Armenian societies regarding Russia’s role in the process. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Despite the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine and the continuing reassurances coming from NATO that Georgia’s interests are being taken into consideration, Georgia’s NATO accession process has come to an impasse. Instead of reaching a national consensus and keeping society united, the population remains divided and polarised. The only progress that can be highlighted is the forthcoming manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles and the establishment of a Cyber Security Command.

Difficult Realities
Notwithstanding the deceptive external calm vis-à-vis ongoing skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran’s military exercises on the border with Azerbaijan, and Turkey’s ongoing operations against the PKK in Syria, Georgia remains vulnerable to any potential conflict with Russia. What is more, Georgia has no allies or partners that will come to its rescue in case of military conflict with Russia. Georgia is in a ‘grey area’ with respect to Russia, and will therefore need to rely on its own strengths and resourcefulness. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, the liberation of Kherson has already been assessed as a great military and an important political and psychological victory for Ukraine. Now it is possible to analyze what new opportunities this gives to the Ukrainian army and how things will develop. At the same time, the Russian forces launched a massive offensive in the Donetsk region, and are carrying out more intensive missile attacks against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine, as a result of which, first of all, the civilian population of the country is harmed and the victims are increasing more and more. With all of the above, the Russians want to somehow cover up the Kherson disaster. At the same time, it is worth noting the fact that the Russian army is insufficiently equipped and not ready for the winter war. This is the main reason why the Russians are asking for negotiations. According to them, depending on the situation on the front, the events may develop in two scenarios - the parties take the so-called winter break, or the armed forces of Ukraine develop an offensive to the south - first in the direction of Melitopol and Mariupol, and then in the direction of Crimea. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 23, 2023, the Council of the European Union agreed to establish a civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the Common Security and Defence Policy. The mission’s objective is to contribute to stability in the border areas of Armenia, build confidence on the ground, and ensure an environment conducive to normalization efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan supported by the EU. EUMA will have an initial mandate of two years, and its operational headquarters will be in Armenia. The first EU mission was deployed in Armenia in late October 2022 for two months. On December 19, 2022, the mission left Armenia, but discussions were underway for the deployment of a new, longer, and larger mission. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan has pursued a strategy based on coercive diplomacy and military blackmail in negotiations with Armenia. Azerbaijan seeks to force Armenia to accept its two primary demands – to accept that Nagorno-Karabakh as a territorial administrative unit does not exist anymore and to provide Azerbaijan with a corridor via Syunik to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. Military incursions into Armenia are one of the main tools used by Azerbaijan to push forward with its coercive strategy. As a result of multiple aggressive actions, Azerbaijan has occupied up to 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory. Russia and the CSTO provided muted reactions to Azerbaijani aggression, so Armenia decided to involve other international players to deter further attacks. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The recent war of words between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the developments of the last several weeks, have demonstrated that both sides are far from inking a peace deal, which was promised by the end of 2022. Although both states vowed to intensify joint efforts on the final peace treaty in October 2022 on the sidelines of the Prague summit, little has been done since. On the contrary, the failure to hold peace negotiations has been magnified by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s controversial statements regarding Moscow’s non-recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh, which have immensely increased the risks of renewed hostilities between Baku and Yerevan. Although Russia maintains the role of “key mediator” on the Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan now openly demonstrates its discontent over Moscow’s role in the peace process, particularly after the merely symbolic meeting in Sochi on October 3. READ MORE

An open letter signed by people from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and other countries

We, a group of people who stand for peace, from the post-Soviet space and its neighbourhood exhausted by never-ending wars and growing imperialist rivalry on our territories, are full of rage as we have observed Azerbaijan’s recent large-scale attack on Armenia. This, coupled with Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine and the renewed military clashes in border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, raises heavy concerns regarding possible future escalations not only in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict but all other conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
The recent attack on Armenia has costed hundreds of lives within two days from both sides of the conflict, caused serious destruction to civil infrastructure in Armenia, displaced thousands, and further widened the gap between the countries and their people. We raise our persistent voices against the continuing warfare. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only route connecting the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic with the outside world. The corridor is blocked by "eco–activists," who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor the copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno Karabakh. They argued that Nagorno Karabakh authorities did not meet international standards. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase – the resignation of the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor were among the new demands added. Anyone, who has at least a basic understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has followed the developments there since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, has no doubts that what has been going on in the Lachin corridor for almost a month is connected with geopolitics, rather than benign environmental concerns. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, I participated in multiple international and regional workshops and conferences in Europe and Russia and met with many European, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Iranian and Russian experts and politicians. These opportunities and encounters made me realize that we as Armenians must adapt to a new reality, revise our strategy (if we have one) and try to confront the dangers with the resources that we have. The possibility of a new war with Azerbaijan is very high, but proactive diplomacy and deterrence can postpone a major military clash.
I also realized a change in attitude in many Azerbaijani experts. Of course, we cannot generalize, but from their perspective, Azerbaijanis still firmly believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has been resolved, which the West and Russia do not agree on. They do not have enough leverage to force their will on Baku, as Azerbaijan is playing its energy card very well for now. Azerbaijanis have come to realize that if they enforce their will over Nagorno-Karabakh and engage in ethnic cleansing, there will be international backlash. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last three weeks have proved that Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from signing a peace agreement, at least by the end of 2022. There is a danger that Azerbaijan may interpret this as a failure of the peace process and use this as a "moral justification" to launch a new large-scale aggression. If this happens, it will push Armenia and Azerbaijan further back from any chance to reach an agreement and deepen the mutual mistrust.
In recent months Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process passed through several ups and downs. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression seemed to jeopardize the fragile achievements reached during the three Brussel summits held in April, May, and August 2022. However, immediately after the ceasefire reached on September 14, there was a new push toward reaching a peace agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in New York in late September and Geneva on October 2; Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan had a meeting with President Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington on September 27, 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to sideline the US and France, who with Russia had for decades co-chaired the OSCE Minsk Group, from involvement in any post-war conflict settlement arrangements. It established instead a Russian monopoly in mediating future arrangements in the region. Neither Washington nor France was involved in preparing the November 10 statement, while the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh fomented the role of Russia as the only security provider for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed another trilateral statement on January 11, 2021, focused on restoring communications. The leaders' November 26, 2021, summit aimed to promote a border delimitation and demarcation process. In late 2021, the West started taking small steps to re-insert itself in the negotiation process, with the President of the European Council organizing the first Aliyev – Pashinyan summit in Brussels. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 12, 2022, the White House published President Biden’s first national security strategy. The document outlines the US’ primary goals for domestic and foreign policy and its future vision for the world. US national security strategies have been published every four years since the early 2000s, laying out the incumbent administration’s policy goals and strategic priorities. The 2002 and 2006 national security strategies were focused on the war on terror and democracy promotion. The Obama administration, while emphasizing democracy promotion, started to refocus the US’ attention on the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, due to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the February 2015 national security strategy included harsh rhetoric toward Russia. In December 2017, President Donald Trump focused his national security strategy on great power competition and US rivalry with China READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan launched a new, large-scale aggression against Armenia on September 13, and the absence of tangible actions by the CSTO to stop Azerbaijan’s attacks have reinvigorated discussions in Armenia about the country’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO. This recent wave of public discontent in Armenia about the CSTO coincided with a visit to Armenia by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, which added a geopolitical component to the discussions, given the complete rupture of relations between the United States and Russia. On the very day of Azerbaijan’s aggression, Armenia officially appealed to the CSTO, based on article 4 of the treaty, asking for support, including by military means. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Last week’s aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenia should be viewed from a regional lens, as the conflict imposes a new geopolitical reality not only on Armenia, but also Iran and the wider South Caucasus.

On September 10, 2022, the Defence Minister of Azerbaijan instructed his army to maintain combat readiness to “suppress any Armenian provocations.” Not surprisingly, three days later, Baku launched a full-scale aggression on Armenia’s eastern border, concentrating on Jermuk and using special forces, Israeli and Turkish-made drones and artillery strikes against military and civilian targets. Consequently, Azerbaijan occupied strategic positions near the border, exerting pressure on Armenia’s narrow southern region. The aim of this military operation was to enter Jermuk and force the authorities of Yerevan into another “capitulation.” READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since April 2021, Iran and other signatories of the 2015 nuclear deal (commonly known as JCPoA) have been engaged in active negotiations to restore it. President Biden’s administration declared its intention to move forward in that direction almost immediately after coming to power in January 2021. Many representatives of the Obama administration, who were personally involved in the negotiations from 2013 to 2015, received new positions in the Biden administration, and their desire to restore what they achieved in 2015 was quite understandable. Besides personal motives, the two and half years of the “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran launched by President Trump did not bring any tangible results. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Almost every war, short or long, ends at the negotiation table. There are exceptions to this rule, like World War II, which ended with the capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan. However, the capitulation of one side is an unlikely scenario for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan suffered significant defeat during the first Karabakh war in the early 1990s but did not sign the capitulation. Armenia faced almost the same fate in 2020, and while Azerbaijan and some experts in Armenia argue that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement was a capitulation for Armenia, there was no formal capitulation. Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been negotiating to reach a long-lasting solution. Russia, and since mid-2021, the EU have acted as primary mediators, organizing several high-level summits and hectic behind-the-scenes actions to facilitate the process. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The “Great Game” was a political and diplomatic confrontation that existed for most of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century between the British Empire and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and Central Asia, aiming to control trade routes in India. Almost a century later, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “Game” returned, and a fierce competition arose between the Russians and the Americans and their Western allies to control the oil and gas fields and pipelines in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In recent months, some positive momentum was registered in Armenia-Azerbaijan talks. The sides established national commissions on border delimitation and demarcation, and after a six-months break, the trilateral Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan commission on restoration of communication resumed its work. According to Russian sources, later confirmed by the Armenian deputy prime minister, the sides achieved significant progress in the negotiations, almost reaching an agreement on the route of the highway, which will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan via the Syunik region of Armenia, as well as on modalities of border and customs control. The agreement to open the Armenia-Turkey land border for the crossing of third country citizens and launch direct air cargo trade between the two countries, achieved during the July 1 meeting of Armenia and Turkey representatives, seemed to add a more positive environment in the South Caucasus geopolitics. READ MORE