By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

A remarkable event occurred on March 11 in Baku when Azerbaijan and Iran, after a period of turbulence in their bilateral relations, signed a new document establishing new transport and electricity supply links connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan via Iranian territory. The Minister of Urban Development of Iran, Rustam Ghasemi, signed the document from the Iranian side. The fact that Rustem Ghasemi had previously paid frequent visits to Azerbaijan to discuss potential economic cooperation with Azerbaijan indicate persistent Iranian attempts to gain at least a minimal political foothold. The signing of a major cooperation document between Baku and Tehran so soon following the heated border tensions in October 2021, surprised some observers. READ MORE

• March 23, 2022

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

If Russia successfully resists the unprecedented pressure from the West and remains one of the main poles in the emerging multipolar world, its interests lie in balancing Turkish influence in its neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. It does not imply that Russia and Turkey will stop their economic cooperation. It simply means that Russia will seek to prevent Turkish dominance over the South Caucasus.
The Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine launched on February 24, 2022, has shaken global geopolitics and geoeconomics. It completely ruined Russia – West relations and resulted in unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including cutting several Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, dubbed by economists as a "financial nuclear option". NATO member countries, including the US, UK, Germany, and several east European states, supply Ukraine with various lethal weapons while rejecting Ukraine's plea for imposing a no-fly zone, as the Russian President indicated that the Kremlin would perceive that move as a declaration of war. READ MORE

• March 8, 2022

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 22, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made an paid official trip visit to Moscow to discuss and sign a new declaration on allied cooperation with Russia. The visit came just a day after President Putin's infamous decision to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk Peoples' Republic in Eastern Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s “unexpected” decision deteriorated relations with Ukraine, even more and was followed by the new round of economic sanctions imposed by the U.S and the EU.
President Aliyev's visit to Moscow triggered debates in Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively , on whether the main text of the declaration was pre-negotiated between the two leaders, or prepared amid the escalation around Ukraine. READ MORE

• February 28, 2022

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

At the recent face-to-face meetings of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Sochi and Brussels at the end of 2021, the two leaders agreed to restore the Soviet-era Yeraskh- Julfa- Meghri- Horadiz railway connection between the two countries, which has not been in operation for three decades. However, the major expectations regarding the border delimitation/demarcation process and opening of Nakhchivan corridor remained unresolved. The last round of negotiations in Sochi was arranged in the light of deadly border skirmishes which left 13 soldiers killed on each side. While both leaders "agreed to take tangible steps for further de-escalation in the border area" the agreement on the railway connection between Baku and Yerevan was again reaffirmed during the Brussels meeting hosted by European Council President Charles Michel on December 14. READ MORE

• February 8, 2022

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 14, 2022, the special representatives of Armenia and Turkey met in Moscow to launch the normalization process between the two countries. The recent turmoil in Kazakhstan and intensive Russia – US, Russia – NATO negotiations on the future of the European security architecture have cast some shadow on the meeting, as the attention of the international media and expert and academic community was focused on more significant issues. Meanwhile, the meeting in Moscow was a remarkable event at the regional level. Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, fully aligned itself with Azerbaijan, and imposed an economic blockade on Armenia, seeking to force Yerevan to give up Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

• February 1, 2022

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In February 2021, I wrote an article “Turkey’s Pivot in Central Asia: A Calculated Risk?” and asked to what extent can Turkey push its pan-Turkic aspirations in Central Asia? If Turkey’s economic and energy relations in Central Asia continue to deepen, will it inevitably increase engagement on security issues as a means to protect them? Will Russia and China tolerate a NATO member exerting its influence near their traditional zones of influence? The developments in Kazakhstan clearly provided answers to these questions.
Long seen as the pole of stability in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has faced its most serious political crisis to date. What began as a reaction to a spike in fuel prices in the western oil-producing regions spread across the country with unprecedented calls for reform, before escalating into violence in the country’s biggest city, Almaty. The protest movement in Kazakhstan quickly escalated and turned violent as protesters seized and set alight government buildings. After failing to quell the unrest, President Kassym- Jomart Tokayev launched a “counter-terror” operation to regain control of the situation and appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for military assistance. READ MORE

• January 25, 2022

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

We need time to understand better what happened in Kazakhstan, and why". Whilst sending CSTO troops to Kazakhstan was clearly President Putin's decision to support President Tokayev in the internal fight between Kazakh local elites, the deployment has implications also for other countries participating in the mission, including Armenia.

The beginning of 2022 surprised many. While experts and pundits were busy discussing the possible outcome of the Russia – US and Russia - NATO negotiations, scheduled for early January, and seeking to predict if large-scale hostilities would break out in Ukraine, Kazakhstan imploded. This vast country with less than 20 million population, with huge reserves of oil, uranium, and other minerals and a significant geographical location connecting China with Russia and Europe, seemed to be an island of stability in the vast landmass of Eurasia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev had ruled the country since its independence, and while he stepped down in 2019, he maintained his influence and control from the position of Chairman of the Security Council. The second President of Kazakhstan, Kassym - Jomart Tokayev, a professional diplomat who started his career in the Soviet Union, seemed to be an excellent choice for Nazarbayev, enabling him to organize a smooth power transition, keep the stability of the country, and his primordial leading position. READ MORE

• January 16, 2022

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

More than one year after the 2020 Artsakh War, the future of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations remains vague. Azerbaijan has put forward two demands: Armenia in written form should recognize Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and provide uncontrolled access to Azerbaijan to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic via the Syunik province. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has launched the strategy of coercive diplomacy and military blackmail, refusing to free all remaining Armenian POWs and advancing into Armenian territory. The release of POWs is a clearly articulated agreement fixed in the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement. However, Azerbaijan argues that Armenians still languishing in Azerbaijani jails are POWs and are not covered by that statement. Baku successfully merged the POWs’ issue with maps of mine fields, thus forcing Armenia to accept the humans versus maps bargain. READ MORE

• December 18, 2021