By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with one clear goal – to destroy it. It was a logical continuation of Azerbaijan’s decades-long policy, including the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and the blockade of the Lachin (Berdzor) corridor imposed in December 2022. After 24 hours of intensive fighting, the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic surrendered. A few days later, the large exodus of the Armenian population started, and by the end of September 2023, less than 100 Armenians were left in Nagorno Karabakh. On September 28, the president of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic signed a decree to dissolve the Republic by the end of 2023.
The reaction in Armenia to these events was somewhat surprising. The government made it clear that Armenia would not intervene to prevent the destruction of Nagorno Karabakh. Most Armenians went to social media, lamenting the lack of actions by Russia, the EU, and the US. Many were genuinely surprised that for Russia and the collective West, geopolitical or economic interests had more value than the fate of 100,000 Armenians who lived in Nagorno Karabakh for the last several millennia. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 19.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The lightning offensive of Azerbaijan against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic launched on September 19 has significantly changed the regional security architecture, which emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. Within 24 hours, Azerbaijan forced the unrecognized Republic to surrender, followed by the forced displacement of the entire Armenian population. As of early October 2023, around 102000 Armenians entered Armenia from Nagorno Karabakh, while, according to various estimates, from 15 to several hundred Armenians remained in the area. This new status quo raises many questions regarding the future of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the area, the prospects of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty, and the fate of Armenians from Karabakh, including such issues as the right of return and property compensation READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 11.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan's destruction by force of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) is seen by some as removing one of the key obstacles in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, that will resume in the next days in Granada, Spain. Others however see the elimination of the Karabakh factor as opening the way for Azerbaijan to make even more demands on Armenia. It is challenging to assess whether peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is within reach. However, one thing is clear: the second humiliation of Armenia within three years has already triggered significant backlash among Armenians. Many are still in shock, which is why Yerevan witnessed only small protests recently. However, many Armenians are fed up with permanent losses, and there is a growing feeling that Armenia, in the long–term perspective, should become stronger to reclaim its position in the region. In the current environment, any attack of Azerbaijan against Armenia, regardless of pretexts or reasons, will only strengthen this feeling among Armenians and will be a direct path to long-term instability and conflicts in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 04.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched an “anti-terrorist operation” in the Karabakh region against armed separatist forces. The operation followed three years of largely unproductive peace talks between Armenian and Azerbaijan following the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The clashes ended in a ceasefire after only one day due to the separatist regime’s limited military-technical capacity in resisting the well-equipped Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Baku’s allies were quick to applaud the move. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during a joint news conference with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, declared, “It is a matter of pride that the operation was successfully completed in a short period of time, with utmost sensitivity to the rights of civilians”. Turkey has traditionally been a staunch ally of Azerbaijan, and the recent military operation to reclaim Karabakh plays into Ankara’s regional interests, especially regarding the future development and opening of the Zangezur Corridor. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 04.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

BRICS is an acronym for the top five emerging (except Russia) economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The first four were originally grouped as “BRIC” (or “BRIC”) in 2001, and South Africa joined in 2010. BRICS was created to draw attention to investment opportunities and was not an official intergovernmental organization. Since 2009, they have increasingly evolved into a more cohesive geopolitical bloc, with governments meeting annually at official summits and coordinating multilateral policies. On July 24, 2022, China hosted the 14th BRICS summit and in August 2023, the summit was held in South Africa.
BRICS is considered the main rival of the G7 bloc of advanced economies, having announced competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Facility, the BRICS payment system, and the BRICS reserve currency. Since 2022, the group has been looking to expand membership and several developing countries have expressed interest in joining. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 15.09.2023  |  External Relations
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On July 9, Turkey freed the commanders of the well-known Ukrainian Azov regiment after months of hosting them as a part of a deal with Russia. The fighters surrendered to Russian forces after weeks of brutal siege and resistance at the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol, even after the rest of the city had fallen following Russia’s devastating and relentless assaults. Ankara’s surprise move came during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s first official visit to Turkey since the Russian invasion in February 2022 to meet his counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and discuss the possibilities of deepening their strategic partnership. Amid rhetoric on expanding the two countries’ cooperation in defense and security, Erdogan also declared, “Ukraine deserves to be a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] member”. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 04.08.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia and Azerbaijan come closer to signing an agreement by the end of 2023, and competition grows between Russia and the West to lead the process and take the prize of the main pacifier, other regional actors take steps to clarify their positions. In this context, Iran stands out as one of the primary buffers against the growing role of the West in the South Caucasus.
Being engaged with the US in continuing negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear deal in full or at least partly, Iran is simultaneously concerned by the US efforts to reduce Russian influence in the South Caucasus. This is not because Iran loves or trusts Russia but because Iran understands the dangers of being encircled by the US, including from the north. Moreover, for Iran, US influence does not mean US military bases or US direct investments. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 04.08.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Russian demands to include in the peace agreement the issue of rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh may allow Armenia to take a more flexible position during the upcoming negotiations and seek to create minimally acceptable conditions for Armenians living in Nagorno Karabakh.
In recent months it appeared that the US and the EU had taken the lead in pushing forward Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations. In May and June, the US organized two meetings of the foreign ministers with their respective teams to work on the text of the peace agreement, while the President of the European Council brought together President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in May and July. The Russian President organized a summit of Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in late May 2023. However, besides the public debate between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan on the 'Zangezur corridor", that meeting brought no other tangible results. Given that Russia has shifted its focus to Ukraine since February 2022, the recent increase in US and the EU engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan seemed quite natural; Russia started to lose its influence, and the West sought to use the momentum. After the Washington and Brussels meetings, there is increased talk that Armenia and Azerbaijan may sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023 due to the intensive dialogue facilitated by the West. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 28.07.2023  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The post-November 10, 2020 geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the shift of balance of power have created not just an unfavourable situation for Armenia, but for Iran as well, which felt isolated from the region. Despite Tehran’s pro-active engagement towards the region, Iranian experts and politicians felt their legitimate concerns were being unheard in Moscow. Many even publicly criticized the Russian leadership for working against Iranian interests in the region by cooperating closely with Turkey.
On what issues have Russia and Iran diverged in the region?
Iranian expert on the South Caucasus Vali Kaleji, in his article “Russia and Iran Diverge in the South Caucasus,” argued that despite the similarities in Iran’s and Russia’s approaches towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, after November 10, 2020, the countries have diverged when it comes to the “Zangezur Corridor,” its impact on the Armenian-Iranian border and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. Moreover, after the war in Ukraine, Russia distanced itself from the developments in the region leaving Armenia alone in resisting the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli axis. This factor has created a security and strategic dilemma for Iran along its entire northwestern border. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 28.07.2023  |  External Relations
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Despite international pressure and sanctions, Iran has leveraged its strategic alliances with Russia and China to secure membership in the SCO, providing an additional platform to mitigate isolation and strengthen ties. This development, coupled with the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia following its diplomatic normalization with Iran, signifies a strategic shift in Eurasian alliances with broader implications for global geopolitics and the balance of power.
On July 4, 2023, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders held a virtual summit focusing on multipolarity and territorial sovereignty. A significant summit highlight was Iran’s induction into the organization after months of negotiations. Iran had been keen to join the SCO despite escalating international pressure and sanctions due to its failure to finalize a new nuclear deal and its open alignment with Russia during the Ukraine invasion. Although not officially involved in the military offensive, Iran supported Russia by providing indigenously manufactured Shaheed loitering munitions known as kamikaze drones.
Iran’s support for Russia arrived at a pivotal time, considering Russia’s tactical setbacks in Ukraine. However, this assistance placed Tehran under increased strain from Western powers, significantly impacting ongoing nuclear negotiations. Despite this, the strong partnership between Moscow and Tehran facilitated Iran’s full membership in the SCO. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 28.07.2023  |  External Relations
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