By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Coming to power after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Lukashenko had ruled Belarus in a highly autocratic fashion for almost three decades, while seeking to navigate his country within Moscow’s sphere of influence. However, the aging leader’s arbitrary rule began to teeter and he faced a major challenge in the election of 2020. When skewed and rigged election results were announced, hundreds of thousands of voters of Belarus peacefully protested their strong objections.
The West echoed moral support to the mass of citizens voicing democratic demands on the streets, but provided little material assistance. Somewhat optimistically and naively, the West trusted that the unarmed people would peacefully prevail over the coercive might of the internal and external dictators in Minsk and Moscow. Putin, by contrast, sensing a vulnerable and weakened regime, provided his fellow authoritarian colleague with external assistance to forcefully crush the peaceful demonstrators. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 17.03.2022  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

While the world’s attention is focused on the war in Ukraine, tensions are on the rise in Nagorno Karabakh. The 2020 war devastated the region economically and left Karabakh fully encircled by Azerbaijan with only one five-kilometer long corridor connecting it with Armenia. The November 10, 2020, trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia envisaged the end of hostilities, the deployment of Russian peacekeepers for the initial period of five years and fixed Azerbaijan’s territorial gains. However, the statement did not solve the core issue of the Karabakh conflict – the final status of Nagorno Karabakh. The two additional trilateral statements signed in Moscow on January 11 and November 26, 2021 did not touch the status issue and were focused on restoration of communications and the start of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 17.03.2022  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

If Russia successfully resists the unprecedented pressure from the West and remains one of the main poles in the emerging multipolar world, its interests lie in balancing Turkish influence in its neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. It does not imply that Russia and Turkey will stop their economic cooperation. It simply means that Russia will seek to prevent Turkish dominance over the South Caucasus.
The Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine launched on February 24, 2022, has shaken global geopolitics and geoeconomics. It completely ruined Russia – West relations and resulted in unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including cutting several Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, dubbed by economists as a "financial nuclear option". NATO member countries, including the US, UK, Germany, and several east European states, supply Ukraine with various lethal weapons while rejecting Ukraine's plea for imposing a no-fly zone, as the Russian President indicated that the Kremlin would perceive that move as a declaration of war. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 08.03.2022  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and agreements with these two entities on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. On February 22, President Putin stated that Russia recognized these states within territories envisaged by their constitutions, which cover entire territories of former Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of Ukraine, while the de facto Republics control only 30 percent of the oblasts' territories. On early morning February 24, President Putin declared the launch of special military operation in Ukraine. He stated that Russian goal is the demilitarization of Ukraine and added that Russia has no intention to occupy Ukrainian territories. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 28.02.2022  |  External Relations
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 22, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made an paid official trip visit to Moscow to discuss and sign a new declaration on allied cooperation with Russia. The visit came just a day after President Putin's infamous decision to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk Peoples' Republic in Eastern Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s “unexpected” decision deteriorated relations with Ukraine, even more and was followed by the new round of economic sanctions imposed by the U.S and the EU.
President Aliyev's visit to Moscow triggered debates in Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively , on whether the main text of the declaration was pre-negotiated between the two leaders, or prepared amid the escalation around Ukraine. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 28.02.2022  |  Security
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By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Divide and conquer is a well-known historic aphorism for ambitious imperial states. Divide and control is a corollary. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Moscow’s geo-political and foreign policy has opted on a number of occasions to initiate or accentuate the splitting away of small fragments from somewhat weak newly independent states. In so doing, Moscow could more effectively re-assert some control over its historic ‘near abroad’ and re-extend its sphere of influence over parts of the former Soviet Union. Amongst the examples are: Transnistria splintering from Moldova in 1991, South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia in the early 1990s, and Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukraine in 2014. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 28.02.2022  |  External Relations
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By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Moscow and Beijing are likely to discover that their initial joy over the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may be premature. Afghanistan under the Taliban remains divided, insecure and uncertain about its current and future path. Without stability and security, neither Beijing nor Moscow will provide economic assistance while the international community will continue to shun Afghanistan.
Russia’s Presidential Envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, noted that “The Taliban were easier to negotiate with than the old “puppet government” of the exiled President Ashraf Ghani.” The latter was seen by, and from Moscow, as a puppet of the West and contacts that Russia maintained with Hamid Karzai’s successor were either downgraded or revised. At the same time, contacts between Russia and the Taliban only increased. With the West’s departure, Moscow is seizing up the opportunity indirectly to recognise the authority of the Taliban, which it officially designated as a terrorist organisation back in 2003 though without burning its bridges with the militant group. READ MORE.

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 22.02.2022  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Economic cooperation in the South Caucasus may bring lasting stability if vital interests are taken into account.
Regional economic cooperation in the South Caucasus has always been the focus of international organizations and external powers as a tangible way to stabilize the region and pave the way for conflict settlement. After the end of the first Karabakh war in 1994, in close cooperation with Turkey and under strong US support, Azerbaijan launched several regional infrastructure projects—oil and gas pipelines and railways connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey via Georgia. Azerbaijan and Turkey excluded Armenia from these projects and imposed an economic blockade, viewing this exclusion as a tool to force Armenia to give up Nagorno Karabakh. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 22.02.2022  |  External Relations
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Since its emergence in the 1980s, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has been a significant source of concern to the state of Turkey. With the escalation of conflict between the Turkish state and the ethnic Kurdish community in the 1990s, the level of violence explicitly increased, and the civilian death toll rose to its highest point. Though the PKK could not ensure absolute authority in large, predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast, it gradually shifted to a new strategy —urban violence— to undermine the Turkish state's authority in Kurdish regions.
According to theories of violent resistance, violence is the only practical and productive tool of mass mobilisation of ethnic insurgencies against political systems. In the case of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, many scholars argue that Turkey's policy of ethnic nationalism has had a decisive role in shaping Kurdish ethnic nationalism throughout these years. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 22.02.2022  |  Security
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On January 19, 2022, Iranian President Dr. Ibrahim Raisi travelled to Moscow and met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in an effort to improve bilateral ties between both countries. The leaders discussed regional and international issues, among them the negotiations around Iran’s nuclear program and regional cooperation in Eurasia. However, contrary to expectations and some statements before the meeting, the visit, for now, has failed to achieve a major advance in addressing the Iranian expectations, mostly related to the signing of a strategic agreement like the one between China and Iran a year ago. Nevertheless, the visit pushed the negotiations between both sides to a higher level and facilitated Iran’s economic integration in Russian-Chinese Eurasian architecture. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Published on EGF: 08.02.2022  |  External Relations
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