By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Armenia and the South Caucasus were historically parts of the former Soviet Union, and are often considered, in geopolitical terms, to be in the so-called Moscow-influenced “Russia’s near abroad”. It might be useful, however, to recognize the significant connections of the South Caucasus to the Middle East. In fact, Armenia is relatively close geographically (under 1,000 km) to each of the capital cities of Teheran (Iran), Baghdad (Iraq), and Ankara (Turkiye) and not much farther from Israel and Lebanon (under 1,300 km). In terms of international affairs and recent conflict Turkey has been a crucial military ally of Azerbaijan during the latter’s wars with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) in 2020 and 2023. A lesser-known fact is that, over the previous decade, Israel has been a major weapons’ supplier of Azerbaijan, particularly advanced drones that proved critical for Baku’s swift and decisive victory in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, and its 2023 recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh, which displaced over 100,000 civilians, virtually all of the local Armenian population. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

After the end of the Cold War, Turkish decision-makers adopted a “top-down” strategy that capitalized on the dramatic shift in international arms production. Turkey aimed to look eastward to cooperate with China and Russia as its threat perception changed. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey became a prominent Israeli arms purchaser. There were numerous factors behind this. First, Israeli weapons were a high-tech and credible alternative to NATO weapons. Second, unlike Europe and the U.S., Israeli arms purchases were not conditioned to Turkey’s domestic developments (democratization, human rights, minority rights…). Third, Israel and Turkey’s foreign policies overlapped in critical areas in the Middle East, aiming to contain Syrian and Iranian interests. Finally, deep relations with Israel were expected to be rewarded by pro-Israeli lobbying groups in the U.S. to counter the Armenian and Greek lobbies. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On June 20, during a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken called upon the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments to conclude a peace agreement “without delay” (US State Department, June 20). He stressed Washington’s willingness to support the peace process “in any way useful to the parties.” During his recent trip to the South Caucasus in late June, US Deputy Secretary of State James O’Brien reiterated these messages to the respective governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The United States views peace between the two countries in a larger geopolitical perspective, characterizing it as vital to reducing wider regional dependency on Washington’s foes. READ MORE

By Marat Terterov, PhD, Founder, and former Executive Director of the EGF

The folly of predicting Russia’s future
When undertaking the task of seeking to forecast a ‘likely scenario’ for tomorrow’s Russia, one has to start with a caveat – predicting Russia’s future and what fate awaits the country in light of its continued military excursion in Ukraine is like trying to find a needle in a haystack. In other words, it is almost impossible to predict future political developments in Russia with any real certainty. This includes any efforts to predict whether Russia will continue to remain the arch belligerent in Ukraine, or whether it will be prepared to make concessions, or to forecast what impact either (or other) of these developments in the current conflict in Ukraine will have on the Russian regime of Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

Mahinora Mirkhamidova, associate professor of the department International law and Public law disciplines of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy

Today over two-thirds of the world's countries are participants in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. Ensuring women's rights is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, goal 5 specifically aims at “Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls.” The issues of ensuring women's rights are reflected in the constitutions of almost all countries, entrenched in their legislation, and hold a significant place in national development plans and strategies. READ MORE

Avazbek Kholbekov, expert of the Development Strategy Center

Over the past five years in Uzbekistan, a number of laws have been adopted in our country to ensure the priority of private property and strengthen its legal protection.
Most importantly, based on the principle of "From Action Strategy to Development Strategy" there was adopted the "Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026", as a logical continuation of Action Strategy. In the document, turning the principles of justice and the rule of law into the most basic and necessary condition for development in the country was defined as one of the most important directions. Several necessary objectives were envisaged for this. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On January 19, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called for a new constitution in a meeting with senior officials from the Armenian Ministry of Justice. Pashinyan asserted that Armenia needs “a new constitution, not constitutional changes,” adding that the new foundational document would make the country “more competitive and viable in the new geopolitical and regional environment” (Azatutyun.am, January 19). He highlighted that the new constitution would maintain the present parliamentary system and underscored “external security” and “internationally recognized sovereign territory” as the main issues to be addressed. Mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity remains a sticking point in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If Yerevan proceeds with Pashinyan’s proposal, the new constitution will eliminate certain hurdles to signing a peace treaty with Baku. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On December 13, Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged prisoners that each side had detained at different times since the end of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020. This historic exchange was made possible thanks to a significant breakthrough between the two countries on December 7. Baku and Yerevan issued a joint statement announcing a list of confidence-building measures to normalize relations and reach a peace agreement. Azerbaijan agreed to release 32 Armenian servicemen as part of the agreement, and Armenia reciprocated by releasing two Azerbaijani soldiers. While a number of unresolved issues remain, the recent success in bilateral consultations has given new hope for a comprehensive peace agreement between the two sides. READ MORE

Interview by “Georgia Today” with Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Georgia is not ready to defend itself if Moscow decides to invade again. And this is a very big weakness, one which should have been solved years ago and remains unresolved to this day…In Georgia, they don’t bother to ask themselves difficult questions…it’s something Georgian politicians seem to be averse to – Eugene Kogan, a researcher at the Vienna Institute of International Politics, an expert on defence and security issues in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, who has been living in Georgia for the past 10 years, told RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. We spoke to him about the role of Georgia in the region, territorial integrity, Karabakh, and the new war in the Middle East. We started with the Israel-Hamas conflict. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Recent geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus have once again appeared in the headlines of media and analytical centers. Experts have been questioning whether Russia is distancing itself from the region. Armenian regional experts and officials have been questioning Russia’s motives in the region, considering developments in Artsakh and the latest Azerbaijani escalation. Russia is navigating the narrow complexities of the post-2020 Artsakh War regional architecture, asserting itself as the main power broker in the region (i.e. brokering the 2020 trilateral ceasefire agreement, arranging humanitarian aid to Artsakh via the Berdzor Corridor and Aghdam, and possibly a new deal in the coming days) through compromise or political flexibility. This flexibility has caused friction in Moscow-Yerevan relations.
Many in Russia, including high officials, are suspicious of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s motives towards their country. The Armenian leader has speculated that Russia seems to be leaving the region. However, Russia still views the region as “blizhnee zarubezhe” (its “near abroad”) or its “lebensraum” (its “vital space”). From Russia’s perspective, if it leaves the South Caucasus, its only route to the Middle East would be cut off, Iran and Turkey would clash for power, and the North Caucasus would become vulnerable to instability. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 28, the leader of the separatist regime in Karabakh signed an order to dissolve all “state” agencies and organizations by the end of 2023. This was accompanied by a mass exodus of the Armenian population from the region. According to Armenian sources, more than 100,000 Armenians have left Karabakh as of October 1. The Yerevan office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said those fleeing Karabakh have not reported maltreatment. “Nobody has shared instances of being harassed,” said Kavita Belani, the UNHCR representative in Armenia at a recent news conference. It has also been reported that some Armenians have decided not to the leave the region. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 20, Azerbaijan called for a ceasefire in the operation against armed detachments of the separatist regime in Karabakh. In a televised address to the nation, President Ilham Aliyev stated that Baku’s conditions were accepted by the separatist entity. He announced that the “representatives of the Armenian community living in Karabakh, who refused to meet our representatives several months ago, are ready to meet in the city of Yevlakh. Azerbaijan has disclosed that 192 servicemen were killed and more than 500 wounded during the 24-hour “anti-terrorist operation”. The Armenian side has reported at least 200 people killed and more than 400 wounded.
In preventing further escalation, the Armenian government chose not to militarily intervene in the clashes on September 19 and 20. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan characterized possible involvement as a threat to his country. He stated, “Armenia is not involved in military operations. I want to mention once again that Armenia does not have an army in Nagorno-Karabakh”. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with only one goal: to finish with that republic. The Azerbaijani attack was not a surprise to anyone. At least since the beginning of 2023, Azerbaijan has stated clearly and loudly that Baku will not tolerate the status quo that emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and will do everything possible to destroy the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan was also clear that it would reach its goal quickly. Since the beginning of September 2023, as Azerbaijan started to concentrate troops along the line of contact, it was clear the military offensive would take place very soon. Armenia knew that Russia knew that, the EU and the US knew that, and Nagorno Karabakh authorities knew that. What were the positions of the sides regarding the upcoming offensive of Azerbaijan? READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

One of the most important consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war is probably the fact that Russia is losing its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space, which Russia officially called the "near abroad", that is, the sphere of its geopolitical influence. In this direction, it should be noted that the role of Russia as a "mediator" and "peacemaker" in the field of various conflict resolution is weakening. An example of this is that Russia's role in mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan is weakening, and therefore in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. It is well known that in November 2020, it was Russia that presented us as the main "guarantor" for the settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh, when it seemed that Russia stopped hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh and deployed its own "peacekeeping forces". READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the humanitarian crisis deepens in the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic and tens of thousands of people have found themselves in a daily struggle to get basic food, hygiene products, and other goods, discussions are underway in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and within the international community about ways out. Azerbaijan has its vision of the situation. According to Baku, if the international community, including Armenia, recognizes Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, then no one should reject supplying goods to Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan. Many in Baku view this option as the first step towards the gradual reintegration of Nagorno Karabakh into Azerbaijan's economic and later political sphere. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After a break of several months Armenia and Azerbaijan have now resumed their engagement in peace negotiations in earnest. After a face-to-face meeting between leaders in Munich in February, the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of foreign affairs went to Washington in early May 2023 to take part in the most intensive round of negotiations ever held since the Spring 2001 Key West summit between Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. The ministers achieved progress, opening the path for the 14 May Brussels summit involving Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev, and President of the European Union Council Charles Michel. On 19 May, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Moscow, and a trilateral Aliyev - Pashinyan - Putin summit was scheduled for 25 May. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On March 30, Azerbaijan officially inaugurated its first embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, after avoiding the move for three decades. Although the decision highlighted the importance of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, it quickly became a catalyst behind the renewed war of words between Iran and Azerbaijan. Since 2021, diplomatic relations between Tehran and Baku have steadily become embittered. Iran is primarily concerned with the decline of its influence in the South Caucasus, which has suffered since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020. As such, in an attempt by Tehran to flex its muscles and intimidate Azerbaijan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted large-scale military drills on the border with Azerbaijan in October 2022. Unlike previous years, the exercises provoked an uneasy reaction within Azerbaijan and triggered anti-Iranian sentiments throughout the country. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran have grown rather raw recently in the wake of Baku’s inauguration of its first-ever embassy in Israel. Of course, diplomatic relations between the neighbours have steadily become more and more inflamed and embittered for several years now, with Iran concerned at the declining influence in the South Caucasus it has suffered since the second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan, urged on by Turkey, and Armenia in late 2020. And with a normalisation of diplomatic ties between Tehran and Baku unlikely in the near future, the big question remains unanswered: Is it possible that the tensions could escalate into a large-scale regional conflict?
The war of words between the two countries was aggravated in October 2022 when Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted large-scale military drills on its border with Azerbaijan. Baku opted to refrain from responding to the exercises with comments that might antagonise Tehran. However, the situation became even more explosive when, in late January, an Iranian citizen armed with a rifle burst into the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran and killed the building’s security chief and injured two of his colleagues. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 19, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the discussion panel regarding the South Caucasus at the Munich Security Conference. Afterward, they held a face-to-face meeting on the side-lines of the conference with the mediation of United States Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Ultimately, the parties focused on the points at the top of their respective agendas, and as a result, they failed to reach a significant agreement on many key issues, including the status of the Lachin road and future development of the Zangezur Corridor. Aliyev revealed in a later interview that he had proposed to the Armenian side the establishment of bilateral checkpoints at both ends of the Zangezur Corridor and along the Lachin road. Since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan has long sought the establishment of this desired corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province to connect the country with its Nakhchivan exclave, albeit unsuccessfully. Thus, debates over the Zangezur project, among other issues, have led to a stalemate in peace negotiations, with regional actors, such as Iran, strictly standing against the project and supporting Armenia in its opposition. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

It is a paradox that two democratic Nordic countries that are willing to join NATO and become interoperable with it are kept at bay by pseudo-democratic NATO member Turkey. As long as this situation persists, Russia strategically has the last laugh. This could have been avoided if the proposed policy recommendations had been implemented by NATO some time ago.
To begin with, it is crucial to recall a preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty 1949), namely: ‘The Parties to this Treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom – founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. Obviously, these principles have been repeatedly trampled upon by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the last decade. And now, two democratic candidates for NATO membership, Finland and Sweden, have to fulfil conditions virtually imposed by the pseudo-democratic government of Turkey. This is a worrying paradox. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The end of 2022 marked another round of confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Karabakh region with the involvement of Russian peacekeeping forces. The standoff began in early December, when the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the separatist Karabakh region denied access to Azerbaijani officials from the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources and the state-owned mining company AzerGold CJSC from carrying out on-site inspections of the Gizilbulag gold deposits and the Demirli copper-molybdenum deposits to evaluate potential risks to the environment. While Azerbaijani state officials were deprived of free movement inside the separatist portion of Karabakh by the peacekeeping mission, it fuelled skepticism in Azerbaijani and Armenian societies regarding Russia’s role in the process. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, the liberation of Kherson has already been assessed as a great military and an important political and psychological victory for Ukraine. Now it is possible to analyze what new opportunities this gives to the Ukrainian army and how things will develop. At the same time, the Russian forces launched a massive offensive in the Donetsk region, and are carrying out more intensive missile attacks against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine, as a result of which, first of all, the civilian population of the country is harmed and the victims are increasing more and more. With all of the above, the Russians want to somehow cover up the Kherson disaster. At the same time, it is worth noting the fact that the Russian army is insufficiently equipped and not ready for the winter war. This is the main reason why the Russians are asking for negotiations. According to them, depending on the situation on the front, the events may develop in two scenarios - the parties take the so-called winter break, or the armed forces of Ukraine develop an offensive to the south - first in the direction of Melitopol and Mariupol, and then in the direction of Crimea. READ MORE

An open letter signed by people from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and other countries

We, a group of people who stand for peace, from the post-Soviet space and its neighbourhood exhausted by never-ending wars and growing imperialist rivalry on our territories, are full of rage as we have observed Azerbaijan’s recent large-scale attack on Armenia. This, coupled with Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine and the renewed military clashes in border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, raises heavy concerns regarding possible future escalations not only in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict but all other conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
The recent attack on Armenia has costed hundreds of lives within two days from both sides of the conflict, caused serious destruction to civil infrastructure in Armenia, displaced thousands, and further widened the gap between the countries and their people. We raise our persistent voices against the continuing warfare. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only route connecting the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic with the outside world. The corridor is blocked by "eco–activists," who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor the copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno Karabakh. They argued that Nagorno Karabakh authorities did not meet international standards. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase – the resignation of the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor were among the new demands added. Anyone, who has at least a basic understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has followed the developments there since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, has no doubts that what has been going on in the Lachin corridor for almost a month is connected with geopolitics, rather than benign environmental concerns. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to sideline the US and France, who with Russia had for decades co-chaired the OSCE Minsk Group, from involvement in any post-war conflict settlement arrangements. It established instead a Russian monopoly in mediating future arrangements in the region. Neither Washington nor France was involved in preparing the November 10 statement, while the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh fomented the role of Russia as the only security provider for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed another trilateral statement on January 11, 2021, focused on restoring communications. The leaders' November 26, 2021, summit aimed to promote a border delimitation and demarcation process. In late 2021, the West started taking small steps to re-insert itself in the negotiation process, with the President of the European Council organizing the first Aliyev – Pashinyan summit in Brussels. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 has substantially changed the security situation around the Black Sea. The three NATO member states Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have pursued a very different and distinct policy with regard to Russia. Bulgaria, as will be further presented, remains dependent on Russian gas and oil. Despite the recent Russian decision to halt gas exports to Bulgaria over the country’s refusal to pay for supplies in roubles, Bulgaria did not buckle under pressure. Romania maintains a watchful eye after the Russian military operations along the Black Sea coast, in general, and the city of Odessa, in particular. Turkey maintains balanced relations with Russia and Ukraine. READ MORE.

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On May 12, the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia held another meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on the side-lines of the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States Ministerial summit, and with the participation of the Russian foreign minister. Although Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan characterized the meeting as another “productive interaction” between the warring parties, little progress has been made in the peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan since the 6 April meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Brussels. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On May 22, 2022, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev met in Brussels. The meeting was facilitated by the President of the European Council Charles Michel. For many observers, the May 22 trilateral meeting created a feeling of déjà vu. The same leaders were in Brussels less than two months ago. On April 6, 2022, Michel organized another meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders with the same sequence and results. Michel met separately with two leaders, then they held hours-long trilateral discussions, and late in the night, he published a statement summarizing the results. On April 6, participants discussed the same issues as on May 22 – the restoration of communications, the start of the border delimitation and demarcation process, and the launch of negotiations to sign a bilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan treaty. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The issue of the status of Nagorno Karabakh cannot be avoided in future discussions on an Armenia-Azerbaijan bilateral peace treaty. One solution is to agree to some transitional arrangement.
The April 6 Brussels meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations new momentum. The sides agreed to establish a border delimitation and demarcation commission and take steps to launch negotiations over the signature of a bilateral peace treaty. These issues were also agreed upon in principle back in November 2021, when two leaders had a meeting in Sochi facilitated by Russian President Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

There is no doubt that the ongoing Russian military action against Ukraine profoundly affects the rest of the Black Sea littoral states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Turkey. The tense standoff of recent weeks placed each of them in a difficult position between apprehension and, particularly with Turkey, a kind of peacemaker or rather mediator, which Russia now ignores completely.
Romanian Defence Minister, Vasile Dincu, said in January 2022 that “Russia, at the moment, is not a direct threat to Romania, but it is [rather] a threat to security in the [Black Sea] area”. The author disagrees with the minister’s statement since the Russian military, which is stationed on the occupied Crimean peninsula - not much more than 100 km from the Danube Delta – is a direct threat to Romania, even though Russian officials will blame the other side for posing a threat to Russia. Furthermore, the region’s three NATO member countries, namely Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, have until today been unable to create and implement a comprehensive Black Sea security strategy together with NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine to counter the challenges posed by Russia. The latter, however, successfully implemented its divide and rule policy in the region. READ MORE.

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 22, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made an paid official trip visit to Moscow to discuss and sign a new declaration on allied cooperation with Russia. The visit came just a day after President Putin's infamous decision to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk Peoples' Republic in Eastern Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s “unexpected” decision deteriorated relations with Ukraine, even more and was followed by the new round of economic sanctions imposed by the U.S and the EU.
President Aliyev's visit to Moscow triggered debates in Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively, on whether the main text of the declaration was pre-negotiated between the two leaders, or prepared amid the escalation around Ukraine. READ MORE

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Without a doubt, Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin is the greatest factor in the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine. Yet paradoxically, Putin is perhaps the best hope for peace in the South Caucasus, at least as far as Azerbaijan and Armenia are concerned. The Georgian situation is, however, another matter. But one should take one step at a time in this exceptionally dangerous and conflict-prone region.
The recent 2020 Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia was, in effect, a continuation of the bitter 1990s ethno-religious territorial war over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) that emerged between the two newly independent states in the midst of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The 1990s conflict produced thousands of casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced civilian ethnic minority refugees. It was a humanitarian catastrophe for families on both sides of the border. READ MORE

By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (Ret.), D.Sc., Professor of Political Science of the RA, RF, USA (state studies-strategic security studies), Full Member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the RF

In the wake of the 44-day war in 2020, an unprecedented escalation of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders has been launched. This was done contrary to the principles and procedure for border delimitation and demarcation recommended by the OSCE Secretariat. The unparalleled pressure on the Armenian population from Karabakh was accompanied by subsequent attempts to undermine the settlement process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship. Among the arguments substantiating claims to include Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Baku authorities refer to the Azerbaijani-language toponymy, which allegedly has a long history. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
Todd Fabacher, Co-Founder, Distrikt Foundation, Gyumri

Countries, just like people, will experience the five stages of grief after a significant loss. 2020 was a challenging year for all nations. COVID – 19 pandemic and economic downturn have negatively impacted almost everyone. It was an exceptionally difficult year for Armenia because, besides the pandemic, defeat in the war launched by Azerbaijan against the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh) Republic in autumn 2020 resulted in significant material and human losses. In the first half of 2021, Armenia grasped domestic political instability, triggering an early parliamentary election in June 2021. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Back in July, Rich Outzen published a policy paper “Deals, Drones and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection” in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy highlighting the new strategy of the Turkish Armed Forces, the development of the arms industry and how Ankara is deploying hard power in the region. According to Outzen, the integration of drones, electronic warfare, manoeuvre and precision strike employed by Turkey across technologies and domains (manned/unmanned and ground/air/naval) have been characterized as a new phase of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). An RMA is a hypothesis in military theory about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for radical military reform. An RMA occurs when new tactics, technologies and operational concepts enable dramatic increases in ineffectiveness to provide early innovators a marked advantage and force others to adopt the same methods. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The bilateral Israeli-Greek military and defence industry cooperation was not created in a vacuum, but is a by-product of the steadily deteriorating Israeli-Turkish relations which include two important events: the famous World Economic Forum incident in Davos on January 29th, 2009 and the Mavi Marmara incident on May 31st, 2010. The Davos incident was further aggravated by the Mavi Marmara incident, which left ten Turkish citizens dead after clashing with Israeli commandos as the latter boarded the ship which was trying to break the Gaza blockade. Moreover, the military component of Israeli-Turkish relations, which used to be the backbone of the relations, is still missing and is unlikely to reappear in the near future. READ MORE.

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

A joint initiative of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, known as the ‘Bucharest Nine', was launched in November 2015 and laid a foundation for foreign and security policy meetings and discussions. As the next step, the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 accelerated military-to-military cooperation. As a result, the initiative brought Romanian troops to Poland and Polish troops to Romania on a rotational basis in March 2017. In addition, their pivotal positions in the east and in the south of NATO’s reach have further increased their cooperation in a variety of defence and security programmes. READ MORE.