By Elkhan NURIYEV, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Berlin

As the war in Ukraine drags on for yet another year, a hard truth is becoming even harder to ignore: Military victory may no longer be a realistic objective for Kyiv — no matter how many billions the West sends, or how many Russian soldiers die. This isn’t a popular outlook in Washington or Brussels, where the assumption persists that enough aid and resolve will eventually break Moscow. But despite Ukraine’s extraordinary resilience and the West’s deep pockets, that outcome is looking increasingly unlikely. Rather, the war is hardening into a grinding stalemate — one that threatens to exhaust Ukraine, fracture Western unity and empower the very regime it was meant to weaken. The question Western policymakers must now confront is not whether Ukraine deserves support, but whether the current strategy is helping it win, or simply helping it survive long enough to lose more slowly. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

The June 2025 12-day Iran–Israel War and US military strikes targeting Iranian nuclear sites created shock waves in the Middle East and beyond. Iran and Israel exchanged strikes twice in 2024, but these were limited and mostly symbolic operations. While the war did not solve critical issues between Iran and Israel, and there is a possibility of another escalation, it demonstrated the volatile nature of Middle Eastern geopolitics, shaped by evolving balance of power. Armenia is a neighbour of Iran, and this fact alone is enough to mean that Armenia will be affected by any Iran–Israel confrontation. However, there are other factors that can amplify the implications for Armenia of a potential long-term war against Iran. READ MORE

Karine Javakova,
Head of the Department of State and Legal Disciplines and Ensuring Human Rights of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor

Uzbekistan has created a solid legal framework to ensure freedom of speech and information, as well as the development of the media, improvement of the legal basis for the activities and protection of the professional rights of journalists. Considering that the liberalization of the information sphere and its development are priority tasks in the construction of the New Uzbekistan, after the constitutional reform, the articles devoted to these rights were significantly expanded. Thus, Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan notes that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, speech and belief. Everyone has the right to seek, receive and disseminate any information. The state creates conditions for ensuring access to the global information network Internet. Restrictions on the right to search for, receive and disseminate information are allowed only in accordance with the law and only to the extent necessary to protect the constitutional order, public health, public morality, the rights and freedoms of others, ensure public safety and public order, and prevent the disclosure of state secrets or other secrets protected by law. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On July 31, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien reaffirmed Washington’s plans to establish a land trade route through Azerbaijan and Armenia. He stated that this route aims to offer Central Asian countries an alternative and reduce their reliance on Russia and China for access to global markets. In addition to his earlier remarks, O’Brien pointed out that part of this strategy is aimed to “create conditions” for Armenia to “distance itself from Russia”. According to him, Armenia is “almost completely dependent” on Russia for its economy and energy. Therefore, the United States supports Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s bold steps in his diversification efforts. Armenia’s re-posturing is representative of a geopolitical shift occurring throughout the wider region as the three states of the South Caucasus move further away from Russian influence. READ MORE

The Central Election Commission held a meeting and a series of events today, July 26th. The primary agenda item was the preparation and high-level accomplishment of the upcoming elections for the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies in full compliance with the Constitution and laws.
According to Article 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, elections for the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies are scheduled to take place on the first Sunday of the third ten-day period of October in the year their term expires. Considering that the term of the deputies of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies ends in 2024, the elections will be held on October 27th of this year, and the election campaign will begin on July 26th, as decided by the Central Election Commission. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On January 28, 2024, masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul, killing one person. Shortly afterward, the Islamic State, through its official Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility. Turkish police detained 47 people, most Central Asian nationals. The incident shed light on the growing presence in Turkey of a Central Asian offshoot of the Islamic State group known as ISIS-K for Khorasan, once a large portion of the Persian Empire now divided among Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states. The January 28 assault was the group’s first successful attack in Turkey since January 1, 2017, when jihadists invaded an Istanbul nightclub, killing 39 people and wounding nearly 80.
Since then, Turkish security forces have launched mass counter-operations against ISIS suspects in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The operations appear to have deterred deadly terrorist attacks in large urban and border areas and to have depleted the militants’ financial resources. With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K suspended overseas activities to focus more on Afghanistan and try to undermine the Taliban, which resumed control over the country after the Americans left. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

The geopolitics of the South Caucasus is as unpredictable as ever. Even as recently as the beginning of April, few, if any, would have imagined that Russia may withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan anytime soon. Many observers were even sceptical about the possibility of their withdrawal in November 2025 – the date which was stipulated in the November 2020 trilateral statement as the potential but not fixed date for the ending of the peacekeeping mission of Russia. This skepticism was grounded in the understanding that for Russia, Karabakh holds paramount importance in the broader context of the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s March 18 visit to Voskepar and Kiranc villages in the Tavush region, discussions and debates have been underway in Armenia on the situation along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border in that region. The visit took place after the statement of the office of Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, demanding the immediate return of “four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages’” located in Tavush along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border to Azerbaijan which were in principle covered in the demarcation and delimitation negotiations. During his meetings with villagers, the Armenian prime minister stated that “the process of delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan was entering the practical stage.” Despite acknowledging that there were no agreements on maps and principles of the process and that Azerbaijan would not leave the Armenian territories currently under its control, the prime minister argued for withdrawing from those villages to avoid a new war. After these meetings, some representatives of the Armenian leadership, including the speaker of the National Assembly, started to state that those territories were not part of Armenia and should be returned to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

Qodir Djuraev, MP, Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan

The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on "Central Asia in the face of environmental challenges: strengthening regional solidarity for the sake of sustainable development and prosperity".
The resolution initiated and proposed by Uzbekistan and unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly highlights the pressing environmental challenges faced in Central Asia. This region, known for its diverse ecosystems and natural resources, has been grappling with various environmental issues that require immediate attention and joint collaborative efforts. The resolution serves as a significant step towards addressing these challenges and fostering sustainable development in the region. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 9, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke on the phone with the leaders of France, Iran, Georgia and Germany, as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. In a manner that resembled his outreach to various world leaders at the beginning of the Second Karabakh War (September 7–November 10, 2020), the Armenian premier warned against intensifying tensions in the region and stated his readiness for immediate talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev without preconditions. Pashinyan’s words came on the heels of several setbacks that threaten to derail Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations and may lead to another military conflict.
Both sides accuse each other of a military build-up along their shared border in preparation for an offensive. According to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, a military threat also emanates from the continued presence of Armenian troops in Karabakh, despite Yerevan’s earlier pledge to withdraw them by September 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After a break of several months Armenia and Azerbaijan have now resumed their engagement in peace negotiations in earnest. After a face-to-face meeting between leaders in Munich in February, the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of foreign affairs went to Washington in early May 2023 to take part in the most intensive round of negotiations ever held since the Spring 2001 Key West summit between Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. The ministers achieved progress, opening the path for the 14 May Brussels summit involving Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev, and President of the European Union Council Charles Michel. On 19 May, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Moscow, and a trilateral Aliyev - Pashinyan - Putin summit was scheduled for 25 May. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Efficient strategic communication has become necessary in the South Caucasus as the governments of the region and outside regional and global powers vie for influence in the current highly complex geopolitical realities. One of the priorities for the Armenian government is to explain clearly to public opinion what the recently deployed EU Monitoring Mission is and is not about. Otherwise, the same disappointment that emerged towards Russia earlier will surely appear as regards the European Union also.
The ups and downs in the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations process after the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, the launch of the Russia – Ukraine war, and the complete rupture of Russia – West relations added complexity to the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus. Too many actors have contradicting interests in region – Russia, the US, the EU, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran have grown rather raw recently in the wake of Baku’s inauguration of its first-ever embassy in Israel. Of course, diplomatic relations between the neighbours have steadily become more and more inflamed and embittered for several years now, with Iran concerned at the declining influence in the South Caucasus it has suffered since the second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan, urged on by Turkey, and Armenia in late 2020. And with a normalisation of diplomatic ties between Tehran and Baku unlikely in the near future, the big question remains unanswered: Is it possible that the tensions could escalate into a large-scale regional conflict?
The war of words between the two countries was aggravated in October 2022 when Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted large-scale military drills on its border with Azerbaijan. Baku opted to refrain from responding to the exercises with comments that might antagonise Tehran. However, the situation became even more explosive when, in late January, an Iranian citizen armed with a rifle burst into the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran and killed the building’s security chief and injured two of his colleagues. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

It is a paradox that two democratic Nordic countries that are willing to join NATO and become interoperable with it are kept at bay by pseudo-democratic NATO member Turkey. As long as this situation persists, Russia strategically has the last laugh. This could have been avoided if the proposed policy recommendations had been implemented by NATO some time ago.
To begin with, it is crucial to recall a preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty 1949), namely: ‘The Parties to this Treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom – founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. Obviously, these principles have been repeatedly trampled upon by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the last decade. And now, two democratic candidates for NATO membership, Finland and Sweden, have to fulfil conditions virtually imposed by the pseudo-democratic government of Turkey. This is a worrying paradox. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, the liberation of Kherson has already been assessed as a great military and an important political and psychological victory for Ukraine. Now it is possible to analyze what new opportunities this gives to the Ukrainian army and how things will develop. At the same time, the Russian forces launched a massive offensive in the Donetsk region, and are carrying out more intensive missile attacks against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine, as a result of which, first of all, the civilian population of the country is harmed and the victims are increasing more and more. With all of the above, the Russians want to somehow cover up the Kherson disaster. At the same time, it is worth noting the fact that the Russian army is insufficiently equipped and not ready for the winter war. This is the main reason why the Russians are asking for negotiations. According to them, depending on the situation on the front, the events may develop in two scenarios - the parties take the so-called winter break, or the armed forces of Ukraine develop an offensive to the south - first in the direction of Melitopol and Mariupol, and then in the direction of Crimea. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 23, 2023, the Council of the European Union agreed to establish a civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the Common Security and Defence Policy. The mission’s objective is to contribute to stability in the border areas of Armenia, build confidence on the ground, and ensure an environment conducive to normalization efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan supported by the EU. EUMA will have an initial mandate of two years, and its operational headquarters will be in Armenia. The first EU mission was deployed in Armenia in late October 2022 for two months. On December 19, 2022, the mission left Armenia, but discussions were underway for the deployment of a new, longer, and larger mission. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only route connecting the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic with the outside world. The corridor is blocked by "eco–activists," who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor the copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno Karabakh. They argued that Nagorno Karabakh authorities did not meet international standards. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase – the resignation of the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor were among the new demands added. Anyone, who has at least a basic understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has followed the developments there since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, has no doubts that what has been going on in the Lachin corridor for almost a month is connected with geopolitics, rather than benign environmental concerns. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, I participated in multiple international and regional workshops and conferences in Europe and Russia and met with many European, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Iranian and Russian experts and politicians. These opportunities and encounters made me realize that we as Armenians must adapt to a new reality, revise our strategy (if we have one) and try to confront the dangers with the resources that we have. The possibility of a new war with Azerbaijan is very high, but proactive diplomacy and deterrence can postpone a major military clash.
I also realized a change in attitude in many Azerbaijani experts. Of course, we cannot generalize, but from their perspective, Azerbaijanis still firmly believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has been resolved, which the West and Russia do not agree on. They do not have enough leverage to force their will on Baku, as Azerbaijan is playing its energy card very well for now. Azerbaijanis have come to realize that if they enforce their will over Nagorno-Karabakh and engage in ethnic cleansing, there will be international backlash. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last three weeks have proved that Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from signing a peace agreement, at least by the end of 2022. There is a danger that Azerbaijan may interpret this as a failure of the peace process and use this as a "moral justification" to launch a new large-scale aggression. If this happens, it will push Armenia and Azerbaijan further back from any chance to reach an agreement and deepen the mutual mistrust.
In recent months Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process passed through several ups and downs. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression seemed to jeopardize the fragile achievements reached during the three Brussel summits held in April, May, and August 2022. However, immediately after the ceasefire reached on September 14, there was a new push toward reaching a peace agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in New York in late September and Geneva on October 2; Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan had a meeting with President Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington on September 27, 2022. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Last week’s aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenia should be viewed from a regional lens, as the conflict imposes a new geopolitical reality not only on Armenia, but also Iran and the wider South Caucasus.

On September 10, 2022, the Defence Minister of Azerbaijan instructed his army to maintain combat readiness to “suppress any Armenian provocations.” Not surprisingly, three days later, Baku launched a full-scale aggression on Armenia’s eastern border, concentrating on Jermuk and using special forces, Israeli and Turkish-made drones and artillery strikes against military and civilian targets. Consequently, Azerbaijan occupied strategic positions near the border, exerting pressure on Armenia’s narrow southern region. The aim of this military operation was to enter Jermuk and force the authorities of Yerevan into another “capitulation.” READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In recent months, some positive momentum was registered in Armenia-Azerbaijan talks. The sides established national commissions on border delimitation and demarcation, and after a six-months break, the trilateral Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan commission on restoration of communication resumed its work. According to Russian sources, later confirmed by the Armenian deputy prime minister, the sides achieved significant progress in the negotiations, almost reaching an agreement on the route of the highway, which will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan via the Syunik region of Armenia, as well as on modalities of border and customs control. The agreement to open the Armenia-Turkey land border for the crossing of third country citizens and launch direct air cargo trade between the two countries, achieved during the July 1 meeting of Armenia and Turkey representatives, seemed to add a more positive environment in the South Caucasus geopolitics. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 has substantially changed the security situation around the Black Sea. The three NATO member states Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have pursued a very different and distinct policy with regard to Russia. Bulgaria, as will be further presented, remains dependent on Russian gas and oil. Despite the recent Russian decision to halt gas exports to Bulgaria over the country’s refusal to pay for supplies in roubles, Bulgaria did not buckle under pressure. Romania maintains a watchful eye after the Russian military operations along the Black Sea coast, in general, and the city of Odessa, in particular. Turkey maintains balanced relations with Russia and Ukraine. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia and Azerbaijan come closer to launching bilateral negotiations over the normalisation of relations, many issues wait for a solution. Currently, the hottest debates are underway regarding the future status of Nagorno Karabakh and the legal modalities of the transit for Armenian and Azerbaijani goods passing each other territories. The war in Ukraine and the complete collapse of Russia – West relations added geopolitical components to the equilibrium. Do we have EU – Russia competition over the mediation process? Are there any disagreements between Brussels and Moscow on promoting lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus? All these issues are worthy of being discussed and debated. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

There is no doubt that the ongoing Russian military action against Ukraine profoundly affects the rest of the Black Sea littoral states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Turkey. The tense standoff of recent weeks placed each of them in a difficult position between apprehension and, particularly with Turkey, a kind of peacemaker or rather mediator, which Russia now ignores completely.
Romanian Defence Minister, Vasile Dincu, said in January 2022 that “Russia, at the moment, is not a direct threat to Romania, but it is [rather] a threat to security in the [Black Sea] area”. The author disagrees with the minister’s statement since the Russian military, which is stationed on the occupied Crimean peninsula - not much more than 100 km from the Danube Delta – is a direct threat to Romania, even though Russian officials will blame the other side for posing a threat to Russia. Furthermore, the region’s three NATO member countries, namely Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, have until today been unable to create and implement a comprehensive Black Sea security strategy together with NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine to counter the challenges posed by Russia. The latter, however, successfully implemented its divide and rule policy in the region. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As large-scale hostilities continue in Ukraine, politicians, geopolitical experts and international media outlets seek to assess the outcomes and implications of the conflict. When Russia launched its “special military operation” on February 24, the widespread assumption was that Russia planned a blitzkrieg to take major Ukrainian cities within days or maximum weeks. The narrative changed as the first week of hostilities passed with no significant Russian successes. Experts and commentators started to claim that the Russian plan failed due to miscalculations and stiff resistance of the Ukrainians. According to these assessments, Russian President Vladimir Putin was misinformed by his advisors and generals, who promised him that many Ukrainians would meet Russian troops with flowers and that the “special military operation” would be an “easy evening walk.” According to this narrative, facing a different reality, at the beginning of March 2022, Putin started to look for ways out of the mess hastily and end the war. READ MORE

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Without a doubt, Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin is the greatest factor in the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine. Yet paradoxically, Putin is perhaps the best hope for peace in the South Caucasus, at least as far as Azerbaijan and Armenia are concerned. The Georgian situation is, however, another matter. But one should take one step at a time in this exceptionally dangerous and conflict-prone region.
The recent 2020 Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia was, in effect, a continuation of the bitter 1990s ethno-religious territorial war over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) that emerged between the two newly independent states in the midst of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The 1990s conflict produced thousands of casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced civilian ethnic minority refugees. It was a humanitarian catastrophe for families on both sides of the border. READ MORE

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Armenia is at yet another critical time. The war losses were substantial and impacted greatly. Violent Azerbaijani-Armenian border incidents continue, with property damage, military personnel injuries and deaths. The risks ahead are significant. Accordingly, it is crucial to assess the geopolitical situation that confronts Armenia, commencing first with key problems and challenges and then exploring some opportunities.
Amongst the pressing issues is the fact that demographically Armenia has far less manpower than Azerbaijan, even if women were conscripted too. Armenia’s population has been declining significantly due to outmigration and this pattern has been accelerating after the recent Karabakh war and various phases of the Covid pandemic. An army historically based on conscription needs to address its critical declining population base. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The bilateral Israeli-Greek military and defence industry cooperation was not created in a vacuum, but is a by-product of the steadily deteriorating Israeli-Turkish relations which include two important events: the famous World Economic Forum incident in Davos on January 29th, 2009 and the Mavi Marmara incident on May 31st, 2010. The Davos incident was further aggravated by the Mavi Marmara incident, which left ten Turkish citizens dead after clashing with Israeli commandos as the latter boarded the ship which was trying to break the Gaza blockade. Moreover, the military component of Israeli-Turkish relations, which used to be the backbone of the relations, is still missing and is unlikely to reappear in the near future. READ MORE.

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

A joint initiative of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, known as the ‘Bucharest Nine', was launched in November 2015 and laid a foundation for foreign and security policy meetings and discussions. As the next step, the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 accelerated military-to-military cooperation. As a result, the initiative brought Romanian troops to Poland and Polish troops to Romania on a rotational basis in March 2017. In addition, their pivotal positions in the east and in the south of NATO’s reach have further increased their cooperation in a variety of defence and security programmes. READ MORE.

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Azerbaijani military incursion into Armenian territory may have significant geopolitical implications. The muted reaction of the CSTO and Russia triggered another wave of anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia.
On 12 May 2021, news coming from the Syunik region shocked Armenian society. Several hundred Azerbaijani soldiers had crossed the Armenian border and penetrated up to 3.5 km into Armenian territory near the "Black Lake". The Armenian government did not confirm this immediately, however, late in the evening on the same day, Armenia’s Security Council convened in an extraordinary session, and the prime minister declared that Azerbaijani Armed forces had entered Armenian territory. READ MORE

Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the Kingdom of Belgium

On June 22, 2020, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, signed a Decree on Approval of the National Strategy of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Human Rights. Much has been said about Uzbekistan’s efforts to reform and modernize multiple aspects of society and economy since Mirziyoyev became president in 2016. Human rights are a core area of national reform, in this respect. It should be noted from the outset that discussions around this subject in Uzbekistan during the early years of the country’s independence have not always focused on the most celebrated factors. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Still recovering from the war, it is not yet clear what Armenia's strategy is for Nagorno Karabakh. Without a coherent and consistent policy from the Armenian government, Armenia may lose what it retains of the enclave.
Almost four and half months after the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia has not yet recovered. Society is grappling with lingering questions about the reasons for the staggering defeat. The fate of the remaining Armenian prisoners of war in Azerbaijan, whose POW status Azerbaijan refuses to accept, is a top priority. The ongoing de facto border demarcation process in the Syunik region, and looming demarcations in other regions, have put additional stress on society. The current political crisis and upcoming June 20, 2021, snap parliamentary elections do not help restore stability. Different political forces actively discuss possible changes in the electoral code, and even the possibility of making some amendments to the Constitution before the elections. However, apart from the daily ups and downs of politics, Armenia faces a bigger task: that of clarifying its stance on fundamental issues regarding the new status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the end of the second Karabakh war in November 2020, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and international pundits have published many opinions and assessments focusing on the war, its causes and consequences, and the decisive victory of Azerbaijan. The strategic blunders of the Pashinyan government, the Russia – Turkey deal, and the aloofness of the US, are among the hotly debated issues about what contributed to the launch of the war, and the capitulation of Armenia. Some experts seek to forecast the distant future (5-10 years). They argue that Armenia will accept its defeat, will forget about territories taken by Azerbaijan during the war, and will seek to get material benefits through establishing economic cooperation with Baku and Ankara. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale attack along the whole line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. This was the third flare-up in Karabakh conflict in recent four years. In April 2016, Azerbaijan again launched an attack on Karabakh, however, hostilities were stopped after four days as a result of active Russian mediation efforts without any significant changes on the ground. In July 2020, clashes broke out along the northern part of Armenia – Azerbaijan international border. However, the September 2020 attack has few in common with both April 2016 four day war and July 2020 border skirmishes. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The July 2020 escalation along Armenia – Azerbaijan international border and following events have again put Armenia – Russia – Azerbaijan – Turkey relations in the spotlight of media and expert community. In recent years there was a wide spread perception that Azerbaijan has been making efforts to improve its relations with Russia, while Armenia – Russia relations entered an unchartered waters after the 2018 “Velvet revolution”. The large scale purchases of Russian modern weaponry by Azerbaijan were the main driver of improving bilateral relations. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

A managed process of co-operation and competition continues to characterise Turkish-Russian relations, and in the future this may also extend to the South Caucasus.
Russia-Turkey relations have experienced significant ups and downs in recent years: The warming of relations at the beginning of the 2010s; the crisis after the November 2015 shooting of a Russian military jet; the new phase of partnership from late 2016 to 2019; the new crisis as a result of direct military clashes in Syrian Idlib in January-February 2020 and Turkish support of the Government of National Accord in Libya; and another phase of normalisation after the March 5 agreement on Idlib was reached by the two presidents. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Executive Director, Political Science Association of Armenia

On December 4, 2019, Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held their last meeting for this year on the margins of the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Bratislava. According to Armenian and Azerbaijani sources, the current stage of negotiations, the necessity of ceasefire consolidation and the implementation of confidence-building measures were among the key topics of discussion. The Foreign Minister of Armenia highlighted the modest achievement reached within the framework of the agreement on preparing the populations for peace, through the implementation of an exchange program for media representatives from Armenia, Artsakh and Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Ahmad Alili, Head of Research, Caucasus Policy Analysis Center, Baku

In the real world, we do not have dragons, faceless men, red woman, white walkers or resurrection from the dead. Yet, the public policy challenges facing advisers in the famous Game of Thrones (GoT) TV show mirror those that political advisors to real governments face. We draw parallels to the real world in the way the show's decision-makers and advisers face the same limitations of time, resources and information bias. READ MORE