By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The socio-economic crisis was one of the causes of the disintegration of centralized governments in Syria and Iraq in 2011 and the emergence of radical militants in rural areas. These militants were motivated by anger towards the urban elite, who for decades neglected rural areas. As civil wars and political instability hit Syria and Iraq, many young rural people were recruited by these groups, who were financed by regional countries or non-state actors. In 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was founded with the aim to establish an Islamic kingdom (caliphate) in the region. […] After the dissolution of ISIS in late 2019, the movement went underground, yet today it is taking advantage of the financial crisis in Syria and making a comeback. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 9, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke on the phone with the leaders of France, Iran, Georgia and Germany, as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. In a manner that resembled his outreach to various world leaders at the beginning of the Second Karabakh War (September 7–November 10, 2020), the Armenian premier warned against intensifying tensions in the region and stated his readiness for immediate talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev without preconditions. Pashinyan’s words came on the heels of several setbacks that threaten to derail Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations and may lead to another military conflict.
Both sides accuse each other of a military build-up along their shared border in preparation for an offensive. According to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, a military threat also emanates from the continued presence of Armenian troops in Karabakh, despite Yerevan’s earlier pledge to withdraw them by September 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

It seems that talks over the future of Nagorno Karabakh have reached an impasse. Azerbaijan claims there will be no Nagorno Karabakh inside Azerbaijan, and Armenians should live as ordinary Azerbaijani citizens. At the same time, those who do not want to accept this option should leave. Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh categorically reject this option, meanwhile stating that they will not leave their homeland. […] Currently, it is challenging to offer an option that may more or less satisfy both Azerbaijan and NKR. However, one thing is clear: new large-scale war in Nagorno Karabakh will make long-term peace and stability in the South Caucasus a pipe dream. Thus, all actors interested in a stable region should message Azerbaijan that a new war against Nagorno Karabakh is not the best option to move forward. Otherwise, the region will plunge into another decade of instability, destruction, and human suffering. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the sides are coming closer to the signature of a peace agreement, steps should be taken to solve the issues along the Armenia – Azerbaijan state border and the line of contact. The population of the self–proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Armenians and Azerbaijanis living along the state border have the inalienable right to live in a secure environment while external actors are moving forward with their geopolitical ambitions. In this context, a concrete measure to ease tensions can be the establishment of an incident prevention and response mechanism.

The restart of intensive Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations in May 2023 gave hope that an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement is within reach. Meetings in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Chisinau seem to have paved the way for a deal by the end of 2023. Officials from both countries started to sound more optimistic regarding the prospects of peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers will have another round of talks in Washington in the next days, and the President of the European Council Michel will host Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev in Brussels on 21 July. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As expected, Ukraine's counteroffensive against the Russian occupation forces has already begun, although it has not yet entered the decisive phase. It should be noted that the past 5 months were particularly difficult for Ukrainian soldiers - the period when Ukraine began to save forces to prepare for a large-scale counteroffensive. In recent months, Ukraine has withdrawn most of its combat-ready units from the front line, and thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have gone abroad for training. The newly formed and refreshed brigades were left intact by the military-political leadership of Ukraine and did not involve them in heavy winter battles. All this happened against the background of the winter campaign launched by Russia - the attention of the international media was mainly directed to the battle of Bakhmut, but the Russian army was attacking in 6 other directions during the same period. Outnumbered, the Ukrainian army once again exceeded expectations and ran an overall successful defensive campaign. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow and Minsk agreed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. The construction of a special warehouse is already underway and will be completed by July 1 of this year. Therefore, it can be said that Putin's blackmailing strategy has entered the next acute phase, and it is theoretically possible that such steps will sooner or later push the world toward a nuclear confrontation. It should be noted that after the dissemination of information about the placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus, the US Department of Defence issued an emergency statement. It says that "the Pentagon sees no indication that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons." On the other hand, as Vladimir Putin told the Russian government media, ten Su-25 aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons are already stationed on the territory of Belarus. In addition, according to him, Russia has given Belarus the "Iskander" missile system, which can also launch missiles equipped with a nuclear warhead. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

May 2023 will be remembered as the month of intensive negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It started from the four-day summit in Washington, where the two ministers of foreign affairs with their teams were engaged in face-to-face interactions to discuss the text of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement. Ten days later, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Brussels, revitalizing the Brussels format, which had been stalled in September 2022. As a result of the Brussels summit, the sides reiterated the mutual recognition of territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration. For the first time, they agreed to use exact numbers when describing each other’s territories. This step dispersed fears in Azerbaijan that despite signing the Prague statement in October 2022 and recognizing Azerbaijani territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration, Armenia may still avoid recognizing Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) as part of Azerbaijan, arguing that Artsakh was not part of Azerbaijan on December 21, 1991, when the Alma-Ata declaration was signed. A few days later, the Armenian Prime Minister confirmed that Armenia recognizes Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan during his speech at the summit of the Council of Europe. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations entered a more active phase after a months-long limbo with marathon discussions in Washington, an upcoming trilateral meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Moscow, and a possible Pashinyan – Aliyev summit in Chisinau on 1 June 2023, the key contested issue remains Armenia's demand for a long-term international presence in Nagorno Karabakh and the establishment of an international mechanism for Azerbaijan – Nagorno Karabakh negotiations.
In his 5 May 2023, interview with Radio Liberty, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that the rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians remained the main issue, where the sides still had divergent views. The concept of "rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians" came into centre stage in early 2022, as the Armenian government dropped its demand for autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Since Spring 2022, Armenia has avoided the terms of status and self-determination in its rhetoric on Nagorno Karabakh, instead emphasizing the necessity to protect rights and provide security for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Efficient strategic communication has become necessary in the South Caucasus as the governments of the region and outside regional and global powers vie for influence in the current highly complex geopolitical realities. One of the priorities for the Armenian government is to explain clearly to public opinion what the recently deployed EU Monitoring Mission is and is not about. Otherwise, the same disappointment that emerged towards Russia earlier will surely appear as regards the European Union also.
The ups and downs in the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations process after the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, the launch of the Russia – Ukraine war, and the complete rupture of Russia – West relations added complexity to the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus. Too many actors have contradicting interests in region – Russia, the US, the EU, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine launched in early 2022 has fundamentally changed the international security architecture that had existed for many years, but it has also caused global political and economic cataclysms. Although Russian forces made significant gains thanks to heavy artillery fire, including missile strikes on cities all over Ukraine in the first weeks of combat, Ukrainian defenders quickly rebuffed attempts by consolidating its military power, exercising diplomatic connections, and launching counterattacks at Russian positions. The failures of continuous artillery and missile strikes in the following months prompted Russia to make some changes in its military tactics. As a result, Russia was forced to seek help from its traditional allies China and Iran through unofficial channels. Although China has refrained from overtly providing military support to Russia in order not to further complicate relations with Western countries, particularly with the United States, Iran began supplying locally produced long-range attack (suicide) drones to Russia. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war has significantly changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus, increasing the role and influence of Turkey. The direct involvement of Turkey in the war and the lack of action by Russia to prevent this NATO member state from challenging the Russian zone of influence in the post-Soviet space crushed the basics of the Armenian foreign and security policy. Since the end of the first Nagorno Karabakh war in 1994, Armenian military doctrine has been based on the core belief that Russia will not allow direct Turkish involvement in a new war against Armenia. Thus, Armenia prepared itself for the war with Azerbaijan while outsourcing to Russia the deterrence of Turkey. Meanwhile, this mindset also resulted in a Russia-focused defence and security policy. Armenia was buying weapons mainly from Russia, almost all Armenian officers were studying in Russian military universities, and the structure and operating mode of the Armenian army was solely based on the Russian model. Armenia developed limited defence cooperation with other nations, including the US, Greece, and Poland, and signed its first Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO in 2005. However, these sporadic interactions did not change the basics of Russia-focused foreign and military policy. READ MORE

By Ahmad ALILI, Director, Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre, Baku
Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies, Yerevan

On 31 August 2022, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, meeting in Brussels under the auspices of European Council president Charles Michel, agreed to authorise their foreign ministers to start immediate negotiations on a peace treaty. Instead, in less than two weeks, the two sides found themselves negotiating yet another ceasefire.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are slowly emerging from a long period of conflict. Over three and a half decades, tens of thousands died in fighting; hundreds of thousands of people were displaced; tens of thousands of landmines and other unexploded ordnance contaminated huge tracts of territory, and war and enmity became the standard narrative with both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The 1st Karabakh War in the early 1990s resulted in massive loss of territory by Azerbaijan; the 2nd Karabakh War in autumn 2020 changed the reality on the ground for the second time, nearly, but not completely, restoring the status quo ante. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Nagorno Karabakh's future is the most challenging question that Armenia and Azerbaijan face as they seek to move towards the normalisation of relations between them.
Since the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war ended, Armenia and Azerbaijan have launched multi-track negotiations to sign a peace treaty. In 2021 the primary platform for negotiations was Russia, and in 2022 the EU and the US joined the club. Armenia and Azerbaijan discuss several separate but intertwined issues – the signature of the peace treaty, delimitation and demarcation of borders, restoration of communications, and the future of Nagorno Karabakh. All issues are pretty complicated, but Nagorno Karabakh's future is the most challenging question. There are different approaches how to deal with this issue. One approach argues for the inclusion of Nagorno Karabakh in the bilateral peace treaty, while according to another view, the Nagorno Karabakh issue should be separated from discussions on Armenia - Azerbaijan relations. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Despite the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine and the continuing reassurances coming from NATO that Georgia’s interests are being taken into consideration, Georgia’s NATO accession process has come to an impasse. Instead of reaching a national consensus and keeping society united, the population remains divided and polarised. The only progress that can be highlighted is the forthcoming manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles and the establishment of a Cyber Security Command.

Difficult Realities
Notwithstanding the deceptive external calm vis-à-vis ongoing skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran’s military exercises on the border with Azerbaijan, and Turkey’s ongoing operations against the PKK in Syria, Georgia remains vulnerable to any potential conflict with Russia. What is more, Georgia has no allies or partners that will come to its rescue in case of military conflict with Russia. Georgia is in a ‘grey area’ with respect to Russia, and will therefore need to rely on its own strengths and resourcefulness. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 23, 2023, the Council of the European Union agreed to establish a civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the Common Security and Defence Policy. The mission’s objective is to contribute to stability in the border areas of Armenia, build confidence on the ground, and ensure an environment conducive to normalization efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan supported by the EU. EUMA will have an initial mandate of two years, and its operational headquarters will be in Armenia. The first EU mission was deployed in Armenia in late October 2022 for two months. On December 19, 2022, the mission left Armenia, but discussions were underway for the deployment of a new, longer, and larger mission. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan has pursued a strategy based on coercive diplomacy and military blackmail in negotiations with Armenia. Azerbaijan seeks to force Armenia to accept its two primary demands – to accept that Nagorno-Karabakh as a territorial administrative unit does not exist anymore and to provide Azerbaijan with a corridor via Syunik to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. Military incursions into Armenia are one of the main tools used by Azerbaijan to push forward with its coercive strategy. As a result of multiple aggressive actions, Azerbaijan has occupied up to 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory. Russia and the CSTO provided muted reactions to Azerbaijani aggression, so Armenia decided to involve other international players to deter further attacks. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The recent war of words between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the developments of the last several weeks, have demonstrated that both sides are far from inking a peace deal, which was promised by the end of 2022. Although both states vowed to intensify joint efforts on the final peace treaty in October 2022 on the sidelines of the Prague summit, little has been done since. On the contrary, the failure to hold peace negotiations has been magnified by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s controversial statements regarding Moscow’s non-recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh, which have immensely increased the risks of renewed hostilities between Baku and Yerevan. Although Russia maintains the role of “key mediator” on the Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan now openly demonstrates its discontent over Moscow’s role in the peace process, particularly after the merely symbolic meeting in Sochi on October 3. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, I participated in multiple international and regional workshops and conferences in Europe and Russia and met with many European, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Iranian and Russian experts and politicians. These opportunities and encounters made me realize that we as Armenians must adapt to a new reality, revise our strategy (if we have one) and try to confront the dangers with the resources that we have. The possibility of a new war with Azerbaijan is very high, but proactive diplomacy and deterrence can postpone a major military clash.
I also realized a change in attitude in many Azerbaijani experts. Of course, we cannot generalize, but from their perspective, Azerbaijanis still firmly believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has been resolved, which the West and Russia do not agree on. They do not have enough leverage to force their will on Baku, as Azerbaijan is playing its energy card very well for now. Azerbaijanis have come to realize that if they enforce their will over Nagorno-Karabakh and engage in ethnic cleansing, there will be international backlash. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last three weeks have proved that Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from signing a peace agreement, at least by the end of 2022. There is a danger that Azerbaijan may interpret this as a failure of the peace process and use this as a "moral justification" to launch a new large-scale aggression. If this happens, it will push Armenia and Azerbaijan further back from any chance to reach an agreement and deepen the mutual mistrust.
In recent months Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process passed through several ups and downs. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression seemed to jeopardize the fragile achievements reached during the three Brussel summits held in April, May, and August 2022. However, immediately after the ceasefire reached on September 14, there was a new push toward reaching a peace agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in New York in late September and Geneva on October 2; Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan had a meeting with President Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington on September 27, 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 12, 2022, the White House published President Biden’s first national security strategy. The document outlines the US’ primary goals for domestic and foreign policy and its future vision for the world. US national security strategies have been published every four years since the early 2000s, laying out the incumbent administration’s policy goals and strategic priorities. The 2002 and 2006 national security strategies were focused on the war on terror and democracy promotion. The Obama administration, while emphasizing democracy promotion, started to refocus the US’ attention on the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, due to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the February 2015 national security strategy included harsh rhetoric toward Russia. In December 2017, President Donald Trump focused his national security strategy on great power competition and US rivalry with China READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan launched a new, large-scale aggression against Armenia on September 13, and the absence of tangible actions by the CSTO to stop Azerbaijan’s attacks have reinvigorated discussions in Armenia about the country’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO. This recent wave of public discontent in Armenia about the CSTO coincided with a visit to Armenia by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, which added a geopolitical component to the discussions, given the complete rupture of relations between the United States and Russia. On the very day of Azerbaijan’s aggression, Armenia officially appealed to the CSTO, based on article 4 of the treaty, asking for support, including by military means. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Last week’s aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenia should be viewed from a regional lens, as the conflict imposes a new geopolitical reality not only on Armenia, but also Iran and the wider South Caucasus.

On September 10, 2022, the Defence Minister of Azerbaijan instructed his army to maintain combat readiness to “suppress any Armenian provocations.” Not surprisingly, three days later, Baku launched a full-scale aggression on Armenia’s eastern border, concentrating on Jermuk and using special forces, Israeli and Turkish-made drones and artillery strikes against military and civilian targets. Consequently, Azerbaijan occupied strategic positions near the border, exerting pressure on Armenia’s narrow southern region. The aim of this military operation was to enter Jermuk and force the authorities of Yerevan into another “capitulation.” READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since April 2021, Iran and other signatories of the 2015 nuclear deal (commonly known as JCPoA) have been engaged in active negotiations to restore it. President Biden’s administration declared its intention to move forward in that direction almost immediately after coming to power in January 2021. Many representatives of the Obama administration, who were personally involved in the negotiations from 2013 to 2015, received new positions in the Biden administration, and their desire to restore what they achieved in 2015 was quite understandable. Besides personal motives, the two and half years of the “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran launched by President Trump did not bring any tangible results. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Almost every war, short or long, ends at the negotiation table. There are exceptions to this rule, like World War II, which ended with the capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan. However, the capitulation of one side is an unlikely scenario for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan suffered significant defeat during the first Karabakh war in the early 1990s but did not sign the capitulation. Armenia faced almost the same fate in 2020, and while Azerbaijan and some experts in Armenia argue that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement was a capitulation for Armenia, there was no formal capitulation. Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been negotiating to reach a long-lasting solution. Russia, and since mid-2021, the EU have acted as primary mediators, organizing several high-level summits and hectic behind-the-scenes actions to facilitate the process. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The “Great Game” was a political and diplomatic confrontation that existed for most of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century between the British Empire and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and Central Asia, aiming to control trade routes in India. Almost a century later, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “Game” returned, and a fierce competition arose between the Russians and the Americans and their Western allies to control the oil and gas fields and pipelines in the South Caucasus. READ MORE