Armenia–Turkey Normalization Process: A Road to Nowhere?[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
Armenia and Turkey started a new phase of normalization at the end of 2021, appointing special representatives to draw up recommendations. From the beginning, Turkey stated that the process should be carried out without any preconditions. However, in the last two years Ankara has put forward various preconditions and failed to take steps agreed upon during negotiations.
Armenia–Turkey relations have always been a significant factor impacting regional geopolitics in the South Caucasus. In the period between the first and the second Nagorno-Karabakh wars, many viewed the normalization of Armenia–Turkey relations as having the power to help settle the conflict. Another significant factor influencing the process was the West’s perception that Armenia–Turkey normalization might enable Armenia to reduce its dependence on Russia, as “without fear of Turkey, Armenia will need Russia less.
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Armenia must not ignore developments in the Middle East[Over] By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”
The South Caucasus will be the epicentre of any political or economic friction between Russia and the Middle East. The region, located along the International North-South Transport Corridor, is the most feasible gateway to connect Russia to the Middle East. Russia’s increasing economic and political interaction and involvement in the Middle East will further enhance its dependency on Azerbaijan, due to its bridging location, and Turkey, its partner in addressing upheavals in the Arab region. These two factors may push Russia to pressure Armenia to agree on the implementation of article nine of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement on unblocking economic and transport communications in the region and deploying Russian border guards to control the transit road connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. By doing so, Russia assumes it would increase its leverage on the main actors in the region that will use the transit route connecting Europe to China. The main actor within this context is Turkey, which aims to use the shortest route (compared to the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route) to trade with the Central Asian republics and beyond.
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Is Azerbaijan Interested in Peace?[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region.
Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey.
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No War, No Peace in the South Caucasus[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
Since 2020, the South Caucasus has entered an active era of turbulence. The primary reason was the Azerbaijani decision to use military force to “solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” Azerbaijan started the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, launched incursions into Armenia proper in May, November 2021, and September 2022, and imposed a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022. The culmination of this strategy was the September 2023 military attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of around 105,000 Armenians and the dissolution of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
Even after the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan continues its policy of threats and pressure towards Armenia with an ever-changing shopping list of demands. Baku supports the concept of so-called “Western Azerbaijan” at the highest level. It expects an extraterritorial corridor from Armenia. It states that it will not pull away its troops from occupied Armenian territories, rejects Armenia’s offer to sign a non-aggression pact and continues to demand changes in the Armenian constitution and other laws.
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- February 24, 2024 10:16AM
What Does Azerbaijan Want? [Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
After the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of Armenians, there were some hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan received everything it could dream of just a few years ago.
After September 2023, Azerbaijan controlled the entire Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government accepted that reality with no intention to challenge it, while the international community did nothing tangible to punish Azerbaijan or create conditions to bring Armenians back. President Ilham Aliyev proved to everyone that he was not a “golden boy” who became president just because he was the son of a prominent leader – Heydar Aliyev – and lacked basic governance skills. He succeeded where his father failed, taking control over Nagorno Karabakh and raising Azerbaijani flags in Shushi and Stepanakert.
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- February 17, 2024 07:43AM
Uzbekistan is creating its own model for combating corruption[Over]
Qodir Djuraev, MP, Legislative Chamber of Oliy Majlis (national parliament) of the Republic of Uzbekistan
One of the most crucial issues in the rapidly changing world is undoubtedly corruption. The human history suggests that this phenomenon brought even the most powerful nations to the brink of collapse.
Corruption is a perilous misfortune with negative impact on the entire human race, on foundation of any state and society, economic development; it undermines rule of law and sharply weakens public confidence in government, hinders advancement of democratic institutions.
Unfortunately, this problem has not been alien Uzbekistan. Until very recently, the latter had been known as one of those countries with highest perceptions of corruption.
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Two years of war in Ukraine: What should the South Caucasus expect now?[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
In just one month, the world will mark the second anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian war. During this period, assessments on the course and possible outcomes of the war underwent significant changes several times. At the end of February 2022, almost everyone was sure that the war would end very quickly with Russia’s victory, bringing a change of government in Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced by a pro-Russian figure. Already in September 2022, after successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, expectations changed dramatically. This time, many were sure of Russia’s imminent defeat.
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Strengthening Uzbekistan's international political and economic positions in the context of chairing the Turkic States Organization[Over] Alisher Kadirov, Head of the Department of the Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies of the Republic of Uzbekistan
In November of this year, Uzbekistan's chairmanship in the Turkic States Organization (OTS) concluded. It was marked by significant achievements that played a substantial role in strengthening the country's international political and economic positions. Throughout its chairmanship, Uzbekistan actively promoted initiatives aimed at enhancing Turkic cooperation, developing trade and economic ties, and expanding mutually beneficial relations with member countries of the organization.
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Armenia must avoid becoming entangled in the ‘Russia vs West, democracy vs authoritarianism’ dilemma[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
The year 2023 marked a challenging period for Armenian-Russian relations, likely the most strenuous since Armenia gained independence. Following the 2020 Karabakh war and Azerbaijan’s incursions into Armenia’s sovereign territory, the relationship between Armenia and Russia has experienced a notable decline. Armenia openly expresses dissatisfaction with Russia’s and the CSTO’s positions, contending that Russia has not fulfilled its alliance obligations. Simultaneously, Russia harbours suspicions about Armenia’s efforts to foster relations with the European Union and the United States, perceiving a gradual geopolitical distancing.
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Ensuring women's rights is an integral part of the State gender policy in Uzbekistan[Over] Mahinora Mirkhamidova, associate professor of the department International law and Public law disciplines of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy
Today over two-thirds of the world's countries are participants in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. Ensuring women's rights is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, goal 5 specifically aims at “Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls.” The issues of ensuring women's rights are reflected in the constitutions of almost all countries, entrenched in their legislation, and hold a significant place in national development plans and strategies.
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Why It Is Important to Diversify Armenia’s Foreign Policy[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
In recent years, perhaps the most discussed topic by international scholars, experts and politicians is the gradual transformation of the post-Cold War unipolar world order. There are different opinions about the process of transformation, the timing, and the main elements of this newly emerging world order. However, almost everyone agrees on one issue: the unipolar world is gradually becoming history, and before the final formation of the new world order, the next decade will be characterized by instability, conflicts, and economic shocks. Climate change and the ever-increasing role of digital technologies, including artificial intelligence, are additional factors of instability that make it even more difficult to assess, predict and formulate policies based on geopolitical developments in the coming years.
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Strategic Abstention: The ‘Axis of Resistance’ Deliberate Inaction in Gaza[Over]
By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst
Amid the escalating Gaza war, a striking absence marks the regional conflict landscape: the non-involvement of the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ including Iran and its proxies. Nearly six weeks into the war, these forces have consistently communicated their decision to remain on the sidelines. This inaction comes into sharp focus against the backdrop of Iran’s strategy to leverage non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas in its proxy warfare. While Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, clarified their stance in a much-anticipated speech a month into the conflict, the impact of this abstention is profound. Israel, grappling with internal divisions and security vulnerabilities heightened by Hamas’s attacks, finds itself in a precarious position not seen in decades.
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The Choice in the South Caucasus Should Not Be Either Or[Over] By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku
On 15 November, during a hearing before the United States Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the future of Karabakh, James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, made a statement that stirred significant concern in Azerbaijan. While addressing the Armenia-Azerbaijan disputes and developments in the South Caucasus, he asserted, “A future that is built around the access of Russia and Iran as the main participants in the security of the region, the South Caucasus, is unstable and undesirable including both for the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. They have the opportunity to make a different decision now”. This statement comes in the wake of a series of developments indicating a shift towards a new security order in the South Caucasus.
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Location, Location, Location! Or Maybe Not![Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
It may appear that the primary obstacle to the signature of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the different views of the sides on where to resume and finalize the process. Armenia wants to do that in Western platforms, while Azerbaijan wants to return to the Russian platform, use the 3+2 format, or have direct negotiations without any mediators. In reality, the roots of the current situation are more profound than simple geopolitical choices of venue.”
The military takeover of the self–proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic by Azerbaijan has raised hopes that it may facilitate the signature of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The logic behind this thinking was clear – the future of Nagorno Karabakh, and the fate of the Armenians living were the primary obstacles on the road toward peace. As all Armenians were forced to leave the region, and NKR de facto president Samvel Shahramanyan signed a decree about the dissolution of the republic by the end of 2023, it seemed that the stage was set for quick signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty, and then a push forward in the Armenia – Turkey normalization process.
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Instead of Dissolving, Artsakh Should Have a Government in Exile[Over] By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”
On September 28, 2023, Artsakh President Samvel Shahramanyan issued a decree announcing that, in the wake of Azerbaijan’s assault on Artsakh, the authorities of Artsakh agreed to dissolve their government by the end of the year and be fully integrated into Azerbaijan.
The decree aimed: to dissolve all state institutions and organizations under their departmental subordination until January 1, 2024, and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) shall cease to exist; the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, including those outside the Republic, after the entry into force of this decree, shall familiarize themselves with the conditions of reintegration presented by the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to make an independent and individual decision on the possibility of staying in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This was perceived as the end of the Artsakh dream. However, this announcement came under the threat of force and ethnic cleansing, placing its legality in question. Moreover, most of the political and military leaders of Artsakh have been arrested by Azerbaijan, amid the passive stance of the Russian peacekeepers and the Armenian government.
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US-Turkey Relations: Biden Navigates Difficulties with Erdogan[Over] By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert
Since the inauguration of President Biden in January 2021, the US administration has kept its relationship with Turkey to a bare minimum. For the Biden administration, the issue of human rights in Turkey remains very much on the agenda while for President Erdoğan, the issue seems to be a lower priority for his administration. Such behaviour infuriates not just Biden administration officials but also members of the House and the Senate. This has resulted in the Turkish president not being invited to Washington. Perhaps the two sides can each be blamed for their current relationship; however, Erdoğan is maintaining his course and appears unbothered by the consequences. For his part, Biden is keeping his cool despite a number of divergences in interests of the US and Turkey. READ MORE
How will the destruction of NKR impact the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process?[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
Azerbaijan's destruction by force of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) is seen by some as removing one of the key obstacles in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, that will resume in the next days in Granada, Spain. Others however see the elimination of the Karabakh factor as opening the way for Azerbaijan to make even more demands on Armenia. It is challenging to assess whether peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is within reach. However, one thing is clear: the second humiliation of Armenia within three years has already triggered significant backlash among Armenians. Many are still in shock, which is why Yerevan witnessed only small protests recently. However, many Armenians are fed up with permanent losses, and there is a growing feeling that Armenia, in the long–term perspective, should become stronger to reclaim its position in the region. In the current environment, any attack of Azerbaijan against Armenia, regardless of pretexts or reasons, will only strengthen this feeling among Armenians and will be a direct path to long-term instability and conflicts in the South Caucasus.
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Turkey’s Pivot West Disrupts Relations With Russia[Over]
By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst
On July 9, Turkey freed the commanders of the well-known Ukrainian Azov regiment after months of hosting them as a part of a deal with Russia. The fighters surrendered to Russian forces after weeks of brutal siege and resistance at the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol, even after the rest of the city had fallen following Russia’s devastating and relentless assaults. Ankara’s surprise move came during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s first official visit to Turkey since the Russian invasion in February 2022 to meet his counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and discuss the possibilities of deepening their strategic partnership. Amid rhetoric on expanding the two countries’ cooperation in defense and security, Erdogan also declared, “Ukraine deserves to be a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] member”.
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Iran calls for a “Wake-Up Call” to Moscow in South Caucasus[Over] By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”
The post-November 10, 2020 geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the shift of balance of power have created not just an unfavourable situation for Armenia, but for Iran as well, which felt isolated from the region. Despite Tehran’s pro-active engagement towards the region, Iranian experts and politicians felt their legitimate concerns were being unheard in Moscow. Many even publicly criticized the Russian leadership for working against Iranian interests in the region by cooperating closely with Turkey.
On what issues have Russia and Iran diverged in the region?
Iranian expert on the South Caucasus Vali Kaleji, in his article “Russia and Iran Diverge in the South Caucasus,” argued that despite the similarities in Iran’s and Russia’s approaches towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, after November 10, 2020, the countries have diverged when it comes to the “Zangezur Corridor,” its impact on the Armenian-Iranian border and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. Moreover, after the war in Ukraine, Russia distanced itself from the developments in the region leaving Armenia alone in resisting the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli axis. This factor has created a security and strategic dilemma for Iran along its entire northwestern border.
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Russia Determined Not to Be Marginalised in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Negotiations [Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
Russian demands to include in the peace agreement the issue of rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh may allow Armenia to take a more flexible position during the upcoming negotiations and seek to create minimally acceptable conditions for Armenians living in Nagorno Karabakh.
In recent months it appeared that the US and the EU had taken the lead in pushing forward Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations. In May and June, the US organized two meetings of the foreign ministers with their respective teams to work on the text of the peace agreement, while the President of the European Council brought together President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in May and July. The Russian President organized a summit of Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in late May 2023. However, besides the public debate between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan on the 'Zangezur corridor", that meeting brought no other tangible results. Given that Russia has shifted its focus to Ukraine since February 2022, the recent increase in US and the EU engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan seemed quite natural; Russia started to lose its influence, and the West sought to use the momentum. After the Washington and Brussels meetings, there is increased talk that Armenia and Azerbaijan may sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023 due to the intensive dialogue facilitated by the West.
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Iran and Saudi Arabia in SCO: A Strategic Shift in Gulf Alliances[Over]
By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst
Despite international pressure and sanctions, Iran has leveraged its strategic alliances with Russia and China to secure membership in the SCO, providing an additional platform to mitigate isolation and strengthen ties. This development, coupled with the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia following its diplomatic normalization with Iran, signifies a strategic shift in Eurasian alliances with broader implications for global geopolitics and the balance of power.
On July 4, 2023, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders held a virtual summit focusing on multipolarity and territorial sovereignty. A significant summit highlight was Iran’s induction into the organization after months of negotiations. Iran had been keen to join the SCO despite escalating international pressure and sanctions due to its failure to finalize a new nuclear deal and its open alignment with Russia during the Ukraine invasion. Although not officially involved in the military offensive, Iran supported Russia by providing indigenously manufactured Shaheed loitering munitions known as kamikaze drones.
Iran’s support for Russia arrived at a pivotal time, considering Russia’s tactical setbacks in Ukraine. However, this assistance placed Tehran under increased strain from Western powers, significantly impacting ongoing nuclear negotiations. Despite this, the strong partnership between Moscow and Tehran facilitated Iran’s full membership in the SCO.
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The South Caucasus and Iran’s SCO Membership[Over] By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
As the Russia – West confrontation continues without any signs of an end, many experts, academicians, and politicians seek to grasp the contours of the emerging new world order. Some believe that, in the end, a new bipolar world will emerge dominated by China and the US, while Russia will be forced to choose between these states based on the outcome of the Russia – Ukraine war. If the West can impose a strategic defeat on Russia and bring about a regime change, Russia will be in the West’s camp against China. Otherwise, the Kremlin will be a junior partner of China, supplying Beijing with cheap raw materials and getting access to Chinese funds and technologies. Others argue that the future world order will be multipolar, with no fixed alliances, and several key players will pursue temporary cooperation with each other based on short-term needs. One thing is clear: the finalization of the new world order will take years and decades, and till then, instability and strategic ambiguity will be the primary features of the world.
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Escalation of Water Conflict: Iran and Afghanistan on the Brink[Over]
By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst
Rising tensions between Iran and Afghanistan, sparked by territorial and water disputes, are at a critical juncture following a border incident resulting in deaths on both sides. While armed conflict seems unlikely due to the two nations’ relative military strength and political instability, the water scarcity problem, and the possible intervention of external actors like China underscore the necessity for diplomatic dialogue.
On May 27, 2023, a volatile situation erupted along the Iran-Afghanistan border, leading to the unfortunate deaths of two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter. This incident, near a border post, drastically intensified the already burgeoning tensions between these two nations Following contentious border incidents, both sides voiced solid and bitter accusations. However, several experts have interpreted this ongoing discord’s root cause as territorial and water disputes. The issue of water scarcity has steadily morphed into a significant challenge for Iran, causing friction with its neighbours. READ MORE
Russia, INSTC and Regional Trade Interconnectivity[Over] By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”
The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 kilometre model of ship network, rail and road project, was initiated in 2000 by Russia, Iran and India to facilitate trade between India, Russia and Europe. Azerbaijan, Armenia and other countries joined the initiative in 2005. This transport corridor aims to reduce the delivery time of cargo from India to Russia and Northern Europe to the Persian Gulf and beyond. Compared to the sea route via the Suez Canal, this route’s distance shrinks by more than half, which brings the term and cost of transportation down. If the present delivery time on this route is over six weeks, it is expected to decrease to three weeks through this corridor.
In my March 2021 analysis “Armenia and India’s Vision of ‘North-South Corridor’: A Strategy or a ‘Pipe Dream?’” I warned that Armenia’s inability to play an active transit role between Russia/Europe and Iran/India will isolate the republic from regional trade. Between 2005-2018, Armenia did little to finalize the north-south strategic highway connecting its northern border to the southern border, mainly due to public corruption and carelessness.
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Israel and Azerbaijan: Trusted Friends and Reliable Partners[Over] By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert
Israeli-Azerbaijani relations are based on two main pillars: patient and cordial political relations as well as defence cooperation and arms sales. While the former reached a more intensive level this year, with the opening of an Azerbaijani embassy in Tel Aviv in late March, the latter pillar of the relationship was well developed long before, as Israel became Azerbaijan’s largest weapons supplier.
After decades of keeping a low diplomatic profile vis-à-vis Israel, in November 2022 the Azerbaijani parliament approved a bill on opening an embassy in Tel Aviv. This was a historic decision as, until then, Azerbaijan had consistently rejected Israeli overtures to send a permanent ambassador, despite the opening of an Israeli embassy in Baku in August 1993. It took almost 30 years for Azerbaijan to reciprocate since the country’s leadership did not want to alienate other Muslim-majority states or provoke the Iranian authorities, who blamed Israel for worsening relations along the Baku-Tehran axis. However, in the wake of the 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords on diplomatic normalization between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates, followed by the exchange of Israeli and Turkish ambassadors two years later, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev felt that the time was right to follow suit. READ MORE
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