By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On a diplomatic level, Turkey tried to launch “Astana style” diplomatic measures to address Nagorno-Karabakh. However, given the fact that the conflict was taking place in the post-Soviet space, Russia failed to see much incentive in engaging in a bilateral track with Turkey in the form of a new “Astana style” process where Turkey and Russia were going to be equal partners, addressing a conflict in Russia’s “backyard”.
The year 2022 witnessed intensified dialogues between top Syrian and Turkish officials. These kicked off with an August meeting in Damascus between Ali Mamlouk, the Head of the National Security Bureau of the Ba’ath Party and a Special Security Advisor to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Hakan Fidan, the Head of Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT). They concluded with a tripartite December meeting in Moscow, where Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu hosted his Syrian and Turkish colleagues Ali Mahmoud Abbas and Hulusi Akar (remarkably, Ali Mamlouk and Hakan Fidan were also present). Those meetings prompted world media and political experts to speculate about an “unthinkable” Syrian-Turkish rapprochement becoming “thinkable”. READ MORE

By Ambassador Dilyor KHAKIMOV, Ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Belgium

Over the past year, under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has embarked upon a national dialogue. Input, feedback, and affirmations from tens of thousands of Uzbek citizens have guided the drafting of a revised Constitution. In recent days, a flurry of activity has occurred that may soon make this draft official and usher in a fresh era for our country as we build a “New Uzbekistan.” Last week, the draft Constitution was considered in the Legislative Chamber and was approved for submission to a referendum on April 30. Then, on Monday, March 13, the Constitutional Court of Uzbekistan ruled that the decision by the Legislative Chamber to hold a referendum was in constitutional compliance. Finally, the Senate, just yesterday, March 14, confirmed this decision and approved the draft for submission to a constitutional referendum that will take place on April 30. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On December 12, under the pretext of environmentalism, dozens of Azerbaijani state-backed “eco-activists” blocked the only land corridor in the Stepanakert-Shushi section connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. As anticipated, the “environmental” slogans were soon politicized, and political demands were raised by enforcing a blockade. A humanitarian disaster was created for the 120,000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. The real question is why Azerbaijan went for such a provocation and at what risk? Hence, in this article, I will shed light on the current crisis based on my meetings with Azerbaijani experts (keeping their identities anonymous) on the sidelines of several international conferences and online interviews I have conducted to analyze the Azerbaijani perspective and highlight the threats, arguing that the current humanitarian crisis is much deeper than the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it is related with the “battle of corridors” and beyond. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The devastating earthquakes of 7.8 and 7.5 magnitudes struck southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. As of February 12, the death toll passed 30,000, while the number of wounded reached almost 100,000. More than 12,000 buildings were destroyed, and large-scale rescue operations are underway. Besides the immense human tragedy, the earthquake will have domestic and foreign policy implications for Turkey. The country faces crucial presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for May 14. After the earthquake, discussions started about possibly postponing the elections, given the scale of destruction.
Turkey’s authorities have declared a three-month emergency in provinces affected by the earthquake. Many wonder about the possibility of pursuing an election campaign in the current circumstances. According to Turkey’s constitution, elections should occur by June 18, 2023. Only the start of a war gives authorities a legal option to postpone elections for one year. However, some experts argue that the government may apply to the Constitutional court asking for a one-year postponement claiming that the current emergency equals the launch of military activities. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center of Boğaziçi University

The Russo‑Ukrainian war has affected global container traffic flows more profoundly than any other recent crisis. A series of West‑led sanctions and export restrictions imposed on Moscow has forced logistics companies to avoid shipping consignments via Russia’s Northern Corridor. At the same time, the disruption of operations through the Trans‑Siberian transit line has opened up new avenues for wide‑ranging cooperation along the emerging Trans‑Eurasian transport and trade corridors. The current geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe gives an additional impetus to what countries like Türkiye officially call the Trans‑Caspian East‑West‑Middle Corridor Initiative as well as to a set of containerized rail freight transport networks that traverse Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Anatolia whilst circumventing Russian territory. This alternative multimodal cross‑regional path—widely known as the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)— could help ease current logistics woes and begin a new chapter in terms of interconnectivity across the Euro‑Asian transportation networks, as global freight flows struggle to pick up speed in the wake of heavy economic sanctions on Kremlin. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On October 25, 2022, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused the West of pressuring Armenia to cut its traditionally close ties with Moscow to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus. Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson of the Russian FM, also warned that the West is planting anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society. Zakharova’s statement came in response to an article published in Haygagan Jamanag (a newspaper belonging to Pashinyan’s family), accusing Moscow of trying to annex Armenia and create a union state with Russia. In response to Zakharova’s comments, Vigen Khachatryan, an MP from Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party, called on his government to “revise” relations with Russia as “Moscow is not a reliable ally”.
Russian newspapers and media outlets have also been accusing Armenia of signing a secret agreement with Azerbaijan in Washington. On October 10, 2022, the Russian Telegram Channel “Siloviki” posted the “Washington proposal,” an unconfirmed document that notes Azerbaijan’s nomination of a representative to work with an Armenian counterpart designated by the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh to “discuss the rights and securities… and provide confidence regarding the protection of the Armenian minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.” This means Armenia was going to recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and push the Russian peacekeepers from the region before 2025. These accusations were refuted by the US. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the South Caucasus becomes increasingly involved in the great power competition, and the US-Russia confrontation impacts regional geopolitics, Iran looks for additional ways to secure its national interests. Iran’s top foreign policy priority remains the Middle East, where Tehran seeks to consolidate its power and influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. However, Iran views the South Caucasus as a significant region where Tehran should continue its presence and prevent anti-Iranian developments.
Iran is concerned with growing Azerbaijan-Israel political, economic, and military cooperation. Israel was one of the biggest weapons suppliers to Azerbaijan before, during, and after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. According to several sources and reports, Israel’s security services actively use Azerbaijan territory for their anti-Iranian activities. Azerbaijan established control over the 130 km long Nagorno Karabakh-Iran border due to the 2020 war and opened two airports there – Fizuli and Zangelan – located very close to the Azerbaijan-Iran border. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The first face to face meeting between Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and Turkish President, Recip Tayip Erdogan, took place in Prague on 6 October, on the margins of the summit of the European Political Community. Whilst in the summer there was hope of an early breakthrough in the Armenia-Turkey normalisation, decisions agreed by the special envoys of the two countries have not been implemented. May this latest meeting stimulate normalization, or further work in the process of building confidence and trust is required?
The first week of October 2022 was marked by intensive diplomacy around the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia threw the region back to the brink of a new large-scale war. It seemed that months-long Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations facilitated by the European Council President Charles Michel were fruitless. However, despite bleak predictions, a new wave of diplomatic activity was launched immediately after the ceasefire was reached on September 14. READ MORE

By Igor MATVEEV, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies, and RIAC expert, Moscow
Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine has sparked broad and intensive debates about future modalities of the relations between Russia and Iran in Syria. Western and Israeli analysts predict an essential growth of the political, military, and economic presence of Tehran due to Moscow’s attention switching from Syria to Ukraine. This, in turn, may shift the whole dynamics of the Russian-Iranian relations on the Syrian dossier. On the contrary, despite reports of minor pull-outs from Syria along with international media leaks about transfers of military sites to Iran and Hezbollah, Russian representatives consistently reject such forecasts, referring to a “routine rotation” but “absolutely not a withdrawal” of the Russian troops. Those speculations have intensified on the eve of the trilateral meeting of the Iranian, Russian, and Turkish leaders on Syria scheduled for July 19, 2022, in the Iranian capital. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

There should be realistic expectations of what can result from ongoing discussions on the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Given the current situation in the South Caucasus, the region is far away from peace, and no one should have hopes that Armenia – Turkey normalization will solve conflicts and bring an era of peace to the region. However, in the current situation, even a contribution to regional stability is too significant an opportunity to miss.
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly changed the geopolitics of the South Caucasus and triggered new processes. Turkey’s war involvement seemed to worsen further Armenia – Turkey relations. The Armenian government imposed a ban on imports from Turkey from January 2021 due to Turkey's open and evident promotion and support for the Azerbaijani war effort. However, after the early parliamentary elections in Armenia held in June 2021, Armenian officials started to speak about the necessity to normalize relations with Turkey. These discussions ended with the assignment of a special representatives to start negotiations, and the first meeting took place on January 14, 2022. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Despite Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s adherence to the ideology of pan-Turkism, the former-Soviet republic has long managed to successfully balance its relations between Russia, Turkey, and the west. However, the ‘frozen conflict’ with Armenia over disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, and the on-going conflict in Ukraine, have recently tested the limits of this balancing act. In January 2022, as Russia’s military build-up on Ukraine’s border was in full swing, Aliyev visited his counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv and reaffirmed Baku’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Then, the following month – just two days before Russia announced its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine – Aliyev was in Moscow signing a treaty of alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The discussions about possible Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty surfaced again during the last Pashinyan – Aliyev meeting held in Brussels on April 6, 2022. At their meeting which was hosted by the European council president, Charles Michel, the two leaders agreed to instruct their foreign ministers to prepare for the start of the negotiations. On April 11, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held a phone talk and discussed the details of the upcoming process. The EU was not the only external actor pushing forward for the peace deal. Before and after the April 6 meeting in Brussels, Aliyev and Pashinyan spoke separately with Russian President Putin, who emphasized the significance of peace and reiterated Russia's willingness to support Armenia and Azerbaijan. The US Secretary of State Blinken also confirmed the US readiness to facilitate the comprehensive settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Coming to power after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Lukashenko had ruled Belarus in a highly autocratic fashion for almost three decades, while seeking to navigate his country within Moscow’s sphere of influence. However, the aging leader’s arbitrary rule began to teeter and he faced a major challenge in the election of 2020. When skewed and rigged election results were announced, hundreds of thousands of voters of Belarus peacefully protested their strong objections.
The West echoed moral support to the mass of citizens voicing democratic demands on the streets, but provided little material assistance. Somewhat optimistically and naively, the West trusted that the unarmed people would peacefully prevail over the coercive might of the internal and external dictators in Minsk and Moscow. Putin, by contrast, sensing a vulnerable and weakened regime, provided his fellow authoritarian colleague with external assistance to forcefully crush the peaceful demonstrators. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

If Russia successfully resists the unprecedented pressure from the West and remains one of the main poles in the emerging multipolar world, its interests lie in balancing Turkish influence in its neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. It does not imply that Russia and Turkey will stop their economic cooperation. It simply means that Russia will seek to prevent Turkish dominance over the South Caucasus.
The Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine launched on February 24, 2022, has shaken global geopolitics and geoeconomics. It completely ruined Russia – West relations and resulted in unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including cutting several Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, dubbed by economists as a "financial nuclear option". NATO member countries, including the US, UK, Germany, and several east European states, supply Ukraine with various lethal weapons while rejecting Ukraine's plea for imposing a no-fly zone, as the Russian President indicated that the Kremlin would perceive that move as a declaration of war. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Regardless of the intentions of the US and the future trajectory of the new world order transformation, the democracy vs. authoritarianism vision puts small states located between Russia and Europe in a complicated situation.
As the "Unipolar Moment" started to fade away after the 2008 world financial crisis, political elites, the expert community, and academicians in the different capitals of the world launched discussions and debates about the future of the world order. There was no lack of catchy terms – post-American world, multi-polar world, no polar world, polycentric world, the rise of others – which all have one common feature; there will be many players active on the geopolitical chessboard of the globe, and the US will not be able to impose its vision on all of them. The US political establishment coined its term for the emerging world order – great power competition – which is the prevailing theme in all strategic level documents published by the Trump and Biden administrations. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

“Co-opetition” was a term coined by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff to describe a paradoxical strategy of cooperation among competitors, enabling them to collectively achieve mutual gains. It’s a relatively new term in international relations and used occasionally in international trade. Nevertheless, I will be using co-opetition to explain the current status of Russian-Turkish relations.
In foreign policymaking and geopolitical self-perception, Russia and Turkey resemble each other in many ways. Throughout the course of events in the Middle East and South Caucasus, as the West failed to engage with regional developments to resolve conflicts, other regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Russia filled the political vacuum. Hence, the Turkish-Russian interaction in the Middle East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the military and political withdrawal of the US and the European Union’s absence from the region. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has patiently and cautiously followed developments in the South Caucasus. Tehran’s main strategic objective has been to prevent US-Israeli penetration in the region, and it has viewed the Russian political and military presence in the region, particularly in Armenia, as a buffer zone against Western and even Turkish expansionist activities. When Turkey started to follow an independent foreign policy and came to terms with sharing power in the region with Russia, Iranian policymakers thought that Turkey—by cooperating with Russia—would reduce western influence in the region and give up its Pan-Turkic and neo-Ottoman claims. However, Iran was mistaken. READ MORE

Hayk Kotanjian, Lieutenant General (ret), Professor of RA, RF, USA (strategic security studies), Lazarev Club Board Member

The strategic emphasis of the 4th session of the Lazarev Club has been imperatively demanded by the need to find and pursue new ways to prevent the loss of the Armenian national statehood. The end-product of those efforts should be built upon the coincidence of the strategic interests of security and sustainable development of our two fraternal peoples and allied states - Russia and Armenia. The existential importance of brainstorming on the problem of life and death of the state, as well as its innovative development, was exacerbated by the challenge of the upcoming formation of new authorities following the results of the early parliamentary elections. READ MORE

By Lilit Galstyan, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Political Studies, Yerevan

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have ushered in hopes of humanity's happy and harmonious future. The ideas such as "End of history" became very popular both within academic circles and with policymakers. There was a widespread belief that the entire planet would live under liberal democracy, and inter-state conflicts will become bad memories from history. However, the beginning of the XXI century crushed these hopes. Russia - West relations started to deteriorate after the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, while the 2014 Crimean crisis brought bilateral relations to the lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the astonishing Chinese economic growth and the emergence of the multi-million middle class did not bring about political changes in China. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The EU has thrown Armenia an economic lifeline, but Yerevan has a stark choice ahead: either to use its economic resources to modernise its military and ensure that the Armenian population left in Karabakh is protected, or to create conditions for the Armenians in Karabakh to gradually settle in Armenia.
The EU has always perceived the South Caucasus as a neighbouring area between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The South Caucasus was never part of the EU's vital interests, but the Europeans were not indifferent to the region's fate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with South Caucasus Republics, and later included the region into the European Neighbourhood policy. The next phase in EU-South Caucasus relations was the launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative and the inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into the program. READ MORE

By Armen Grigoryan, Vice-president, Yerevan-based Centre for Policy Studies

After last year’s war, hopes that the 2018 revolution will fulfil its promise are fading – but it’s not too late for change.
“A stellar performance in one year is no guarantee of future success,” declared The Economist after Armenia held free and fair elections three years ago. The qualified praise was not without cause. It was always likely that Armenia’s attempts at democratic consolidation would be difficult, particularly because of the need for some unpopular reforms. Prior to the December 2018 parliamentary elections, observers noted that civic demobilisation – the influx of non-profit sector professionals to the government and their ensuing unwillingness to criticise it – could potentially undermine political pluralism, enable re-emergent authoritarianism, or foster the rise of right-wing populism. READ MORE

By Lieutenant General (R) Hayk Kotanjian, D.Sc, Full Professor (Strategic Security Studies)

Dear Colleagues, I have the honour to draw your attention to the deliberate steps taken by the Baku authorities to undermine the international community's confidence in Russia's mediation mission in the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and in the South Caucasus region. Another irrefutable evidence of this, among many facts, is the provocation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the violation of the Republic of Armenia’s state border regime, which defiantly followed right after the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Azerbaijan on May 10-11, 2021 and his departure from Baku. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

A joint initiative of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, known as the ‘Bucharest Nine', was launched in November 2015 and laid a foundation for foreign and security policy meetings and discussions. As the next step, the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 accelerated military-to-military cooperation. As a result, the initiative brought Romanian troops to Poland and Polish troops to Romania on a rotational basis in March 2017. In addition, their pivotal positions in the east and in the south of NATO’s reach have further increased their cooperation in a variety of defence and security programmes. READ MORE.

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The relationship between Russia and Turkey is an unequal one. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not like playing second fiddle in the Russian-Turkish orchestra, conducted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, at every twist and turn, Putin holds more leverage over Erdogan than the other way around.
Putin will cooperate with Turkey as long as it suits Russian interests. He would quickly end the relationship if Turkey were to turn against him and tried to return to the Western fold from which it has drifted away ever since the failed coup on 15 July 2016. Erdoğan is aware of this and, as a result, is leading Turkey ever deeper into the Russian fold since the European Union, the United States and NATO all remain suspicious of him and his administration’s goals and are simply unwilling to assist him in his various military activities in Libya, Syria and, most recently, in the South Caucasus. READ MORE.

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Alliances are being formed between Armenian political parties ahead of the 20 June parliamentary elections. Whilst they all claim to want to oust current prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, they are all also busy competing against each other. Despite this, the next Armenian government is likely to be a coalition government.
As Armenia approaches the snap parliamentary elections scheduled for 20 June 2021, the political parties are making final arrangements to form alliances and clarify their positions. The incumbent Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan will participate in the elections with his “Civic Contract” party. The second and the third Presidents of Armenia – Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan have also clarified their positions. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The EU is neither willing nor capable of countering Russia or Turkey in Armenia and Azerbaijan and will not make efforts to decrease Russian influence in Armenia and the unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
EU-Armenia relations entered a new phase in 2009 when the EU launched its Eastern Partnership Initiative. Armenia successfully negotiated an Association Agreement with the EU and was going to sign it in autumn 2013. The growing tensions between Russia and the West forced Armenia to cancel the signature, not to ruin relations with its strategic ally. Armenia and the EU started a new round of negotiations in late 2014, culminating with the signature of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in November 2017. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Karabakh war has dramatically changed the geopolitical status quo in the South Caucasus. Discussions have been underway in Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora about the reasons for the catastrophe and those responsible. Most probably, military defeat will be a key topic during the upcoming June 2021 snap parliamentary elections. The thorough analyses of what happened before, during, and after the war are mandatory tasks to be fulfilled. However, the key for Armenia now to elaborate a new policy towards the Karabakh conflict, taking into account the war results. The most significant issue here is to develop a realistic policy based on accurate calculations, Armenia’s resources, and the interests of external players; otherwise, Armenia may face another catastrophe. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Energy cooperation has been a key aspect of growing bilateral cooperation between China and the Arab states of the Gulf region for the past several years. Since 1996, China has become a net importer of crude oil and, as the second‑largest energy consumer in the world after the United States, is now the third‑largest importer of oil after the United States and Japan. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that China is eying a deep and strategic partnership with the states of a region that sits on top of the world’s largest proven crude oil and natural gas reserves. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia is actively preparing for the 20 June 2021 snap parliamentary elections. Political parties are making their final calculations regarding the format of their participation. The main battle will probably occur between the incumbent prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and the second president of Armenia, Robert Kocharyan. The latter has already confirmed that he will lead an alliance of two or three parties. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the “Motherland” party, established by the former director of the National Security Service, Artur Vanetsyan, and the new “Rebirth Armenia” party established by the former governor of the Syunik region, Vahe Hakobyan, which unites several mayors from the Syunik, may create an electoral bloc under the leadership of Robert Kocharyan. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

US-Turkey relations have a history of challenges in general but with the ascent of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2001, the challenges reached their peak with the failed coup of 15 July 2016 that Erdogan blamed on the US-based cleric, Fethullah Gulen.
By becoming the first elected executive President of Turkey, Erdoğan has also transformed Turkey from a secular, democratic and reliable Western allied regime guarding NATO’s South-Eastern flank to an Islamic, nationalist and autocratic regime. Erdoğan’s policy is undermining the foundation of US-Turkey relations. This article outlines three cases that highlight the undermining of this relationship: S-400 vs. F-35; Halkbank; the Turkish citizens working at the US Consulate General becoming targets of politically-motivated legal charges. READ MORE.

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

President Erdogan’s initiative for a 3 + 3 regional co-operation format in the South Caucasus offers the possibility of opening up the region through an extensive network of land corridors. Not everyone has welcomed the initiative, but the prospect of turning a fragile region into a beacon of stability after a long period of instability and violence is a worthy aspiration.
The second Karabakh war has shifted the geopolitical and geo-economic realities in the South Caucasus region, particularly heightening the possibility of competition over the region’s transport corridors. The Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement signed on 10 November brings with it the possibility of opening a number of transit routes, which have been closed for almost 30 years. In the aftermath of the Armenian forces' devastating defeat in the 44-day war, the idea of regional co-operation becomes increasingly important. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Former president Robert Kocharyan has emerged as the strongest challenger to prime minister Nikol Pashinyan in Armenian’s forthcoming parliamentary elections. However, most voters are simply motivated by their hate of one or the other.
Armenia is looking forward to the snap parliamentary elections scheduled for June 20, 2021. According to the preliminary agreement between the ruling "My step" faction and the two parliamentary opposition parties, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan will resign at the end of April, beginning of May; Parliament will not elect a new prime minister twice; and will thereafter be automatically dissolved as provided for by the Armenian constitution. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia appears heading for snap parliamentary elections on 20 June, but hopes that the poll may resolve the current gridlock in the Armenian political arena may be premature. For Armenia, things may get worse before they get better.
A tense political crisis has been ongoing in Armenia since immediately after the signing of the 10 November, 2020, trilateral statement on Nagorno Karabakh. That same night, angry protestors stormed the building of the Government and the Parliament, and the National Assembly's Speaker was physically attacked, resulting in him spending a month in the hospital. However, these actions did not lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. He took refuge in a Ministry of Defence bunker for a week, and there was no organised opposition that could take power while the Prime Minister was absent from the political scene. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The recent normalisation deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan signify substantial changes in the Middle East. The new agreements were signed following substantive negotiations on several security-related issues, including Iran and Turkey’s growing influence. However, unlike their Arab counterparts, both Ankara and Tehran denounced the Abraham Accords, labelling them as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and a “dagger in the back of Muslims. Nevertheless, media reports in December 2020 revealed that Turkey and Israel had established a secret channel for negotiations to prepare a roadmap to further bilateral relations. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Iranian hardliners are mostly rational political actors who are not ready to sacrifice Iran's security, and their own power, for the sake of ideological animosity towards the US or Israel. Therefore, even if a hardliner won next June’s presidential election in Iran compromise with the US on the nuclear file would be not only possible, but probable. This would be in the interest of both the US and Iran, as well as the entire Middle East region.
Relations with Iran are among the top priorities for the Biden administration. Since President Trump withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal and imposed new sanctions in May 2018, Washington and Tehran have been on a collision course. Iran's decision to start to break some of the deal’s requirements in May 2019, and the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, added fuel to bilateral animosity. READ MORE

By Anna Ohanyan, PhD, non-resident senior scholar in the Russia and Eurasia Program of Carnegie

Reeling from a military defeat in a war with Turkey-backed Azerbaijan, can Armenia’s hard-won democracy withstand domestic political turmoil?
The recent agreement to cease hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh has created a new status quo in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan has recovered territories it lost in the 1990s when the conflict over the enclave first erupted, in the shadow of the Soviet collapse. A new modus vivendi between Russia and Turkey is shaping regional geopolitics. Once shaky authoritarian rule in Azerbaijan is now more deeply entrenched. It can also count on the support of Turkey, another increasingly authoritarian player in the neighbourhood. This stronger and deeper authoritarian presence in the region will place significant stress on nascent democracies in Georgia and Armenia for years to come. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Relations with Russia were always a cornerstone for Armenian foreign policy. Since Armenia has regained its independence in 1991, Russia has been its essential political and military ally. Several reasons were behind such a choice – geopolitics, history, significant Armenian community in Russia. The Russian military base and border troops have been deployed in Armenia, and Yerevan joined Collective Security Treaty Organization and Eurasian Economic Union. Meanwhile, in the last 10-15 years, a discourse about Armenia’s dangerous overdependence on Russia was prevalent in Armenian and Western experts’ circles. Many perceived Armenia as a client state of Russia and called for changes. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

US-Turkey relations have passed through significant transformations in the last decade. President Obama started by seeking to build a "model partnership" with Turkey during his first term in office, but later he confronted Turkey over the growing authoritarianism of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The US decision to choose the Syrian Kurds as the main ally in their fight against ISIS in Syria triggered significant resentment from Turkey. Ankara perceives the Kurdish YPG fighters as a Syrian branch of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which was identified as a terrorist organisation by both the US and Turkey. Ankara repeatedly warned the US "not to use terrorists to fight other terrorists". READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Established in 2009, the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership is based on four core pillars: Defense and Security Cooperation; Economic, Trade and Energy Cooperation; Strengthening Democracy; and Increasing People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges. As part of these two countries’ defence and security cooperation, the US provides financial support to the Georgian military, support for Georgia’s territorial defence and sovereignty, and, ultimately, for Georgia’s procurement of US defensive weapons. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

2020 was disastrous for Armenian foreign policy. The defeat in the 2020 Karabakh war which resulted in the November 10 capitulation has sent shock waves across Armenia and Diaspora. Within only 44 days Armenia lost what it gained during the 1992 – 1994 first Karabakh war. Significantly reduced Nagorno Karabakh was effectively turned into a Russian protectorate and its current status can be compared with Karabakh status in 1989 when the Soviet Union put Karabakh under the direct Kremlin control through the establishment of the Special Committee led by Mr. Arkadi Volski. Now approximately 3000 square kilometres of territory with some 100,000 Armenians there is again de facto governed by the Kremlin, while the head of the Russian peacekeeping mission LtG Muradov had assumed the role of Volski. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The four years of President Trump’s rule will most probably remain in the history of the United States as years of unprecedented turmoil. It started from Presidential executive orders to ban visas for several countries, continued with the tumultuous Russian investigation and impeachment process, almost permanent skirmishes with the key US allies, and ended up with an attack on the Capitol, suspension of the incumbent US President’s Twitter, Facebook and Instagram accounts, and the prospects of the second impeachment in the last days of the current administration. These extraordinary developments may force many to conclude that President Biden will make significant policy shifts in all major domestic and external issues. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia-Russia relations have been the cornerstone of Armenian foreign policy since Armenia’s independence in September 1991. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union Armenia found itself in a multi-dimensional crisis – the war in Karabakh, a blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and steep economic decline. In those circumstances, Armenia had no alternative but to forge a strategic alliance with Russia. Thus, Yerevan signed the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992, Russian border troops were deployed along the Armenia–Turkey and Armenia–Iran borders, and in 1995 Russia took over the former Soviet military base in Gyumri. READ MORE

By Nika Chitadze, PhD, Professor at the International University of the Black Sea, Tbilisi

As it is well known from recent media reports, a new political crisis has emerged in Georgia after the October 31, 2020 parliamentary elections. The main reason for this crisis is the fact that the opposition parties have claimed that the Central Election Commission and the ruling party “Georgian Dream” have falsified the election results and have usurped the power. The National Democratic Institute and the American Republican Institute have expressed their critical views in this regard. A relatively soft position was stated by the OSCE Office for Democracy and Human Rights and the Council of Europe. READ MORE