By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On October 25, 2022, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused the West of pressuring Armenia to cut its traditionally close ties with Moscow to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus. Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson of the Russian FM, also warned that the West is planting anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society. Zakharova’s statement came in response to an article published in Haygagan Jamanag (a newspaper belonging to Pashinyan’s family), accusing Moscow of trying to annex Armenia and create a union state with Russia. In response to Zakharova’s comments, Vigen Khachatryan, an MP from Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party, called on his government to “revise” relations with Russia as “Moscow is not a reliable ally”.
Russian newspapers and media outlets have also been accusing Armenia of signing a secret agreement with Azerbaijan in Washington. On October 10, 2022, the Russian Telegram Channel “Siloviki” posted the “Washington proposal,” an unconfirmed document that notes Azerbaijan’s nomination of a representative to work with an Armenian counterpart designated by the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh to “discuss the rights and securities… and provide confidence regarding the protection of the Armenian minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.” This means Armenia was going to recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and push the Russian peacekeepers from the region before 2025. These accusations were refuted by the US. READ MORE

By Faridun Sattarov, PhD, DSc, University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Uzbekistan

On September 15-16 of this year, 14 heads of state are expected to attend the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which will be held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. This event will be the first face-to-face meeting of SCO leaders since 2019 and will conclude Uzbekistan’s presidency of the organization.
In addition to the leaders of the SCO member states, which include Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the summit will host the presidents of Iran, Belarus, and Mongolia as observers, as well as the heads of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan as invited guests. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Over the last year multiple formats have emerged in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, and three main external players: Russia, the EU and the US are involved in the mediation process. This may lead to some confusion. Big power rivalry may also negatively impact the process. Some co-ordinating mechanism is necessary, and a format, at least involving Russia and the EU, could also help to combine their efforts.

While the South Caucasus marked the second anniversary of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, negotiations to sign a peace agreement between Armenia – Azerbaijan have become increasingly complex. If during the first year after the war, it was Russia that almost exclusively controlled the process, now we have many actors with contradicting interests and visions. The EU entered the game first, organizing four summits between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in the period of December 2021 – August 2022, simultaneously launching a new format of negotiations between the Secretary of the Armenian security council and top foreign policy aide to President Aliyev. Russia was watching the growing EU involvement in the process, messaging its concerns about the EU's desire to take the initiative from the Kremlin. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the South Caucasus becomes increasingly involved in the great power competition, and the US-Russia confrontation impacts regional geopolitics, Iran looks for additional ways to secure its national interests. Iran’s top foreign policy priority remains the Middle East, where Tehran seeks to consolidate its power and influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. However, Iran views the South Caucasus as a significant region where Tehran should continue its presence and prevent anti-Iranian developments.
Iran is concerned with growing Azerbaijan-Israel political, economic, and military cooperation. Israel was one of the biggest weapons suppliers to Azerbaijan before, during, and after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. According to several sources and reports, Israel’s security services actively use Azerbaijan territory for their anti-Iranian activities. Azerbaijan established control over the 130 km long Nagorno Karabakh-Iran border due to the 2020 war and opened two airports there – Fizuli and Zangelan – located very close to the Azerbaijan-Iran border. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

A survey was recently conducted by the Tehran International Studies and Research Institute (TISRI) to study international security priorities and Iran’s foreign policy. The survey was conducted among 384 academic scholars in different Iranian universities (Tehran, Allameh Tabataba’i, Tabriz, Guilan, Shiraz and Razi of Kermanshah) and among researchers and experts in the Caucasus region. The survey resulted in certain proposals calling for an Iranian foreign policy shift toward the South Caucasus, identifying geopolitical risks and providing suggestions on how Iran can help in stabilizing the region. According to the study, it seems Iranian scholars, experts and analysts are concerned about the security and geopolitical risks in the post-2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war regional system in the South Caucasus. Here are the concluding results of this study. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The first face to face meeting between Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and Turkish President, Recip Tayip Erdogan, took place in Prague on 6 October, on the margins of the summit of the European Political Community. Whilst in the summer there was hope of an early breakthrough in the Armenia-Turkey normalisation, decisions agreed by the special envoys of the two countries have not been implemented. May this latest meeting stimulate normalization, or further work in the process of building confidence and trust is required?
The first week of October 2022 was marked by intensive diplomacy around the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia threw the region back to the brink of a new large-scale war. It seemed that months-long Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations facilitated by the European Council President Charles Michel were fruitless. However, despite bleak predictions, a new wave of diplomatic activity was launched immediately after the ceasefire was reached on September 14. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Tehran on July 19, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned against blocking the Armenian-Iranian border, stating, “If there is an effort to block the border between Iran and Armenia, the Islamic Republic will oppose it because this border has been a communication route for thousands of years.” After this warning, Turkish and Azerbaijani media started paying more attention to Iranian officials and launched a “war of words.” In response to media provocations and threats toward Armenia launched by Azerbaijan, Iran facilitated the appointment of a Consulate General in Syunik to redraw its “red lines” in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the world comes closer to multi-polarity, the role of such organizations as SCO will grow further. Russia and China will seek to use them as a counterbalance to western dominated international political and economic organizations, such as G7, the EU, the World Bank and IMF. In the present context of emerging great power competition, the SCO started to be viewed less as a tool to manage Russia – China relations in Central Asia, or counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan, and more as a significant grouping of non-western powers in the emerging multipolar world.
The war in Ukraine has given a new impetus to the discussions about the transformation of the global order. Experts, academicians, and politicians have been debating the potential counter-weights of the emerging post-cold war order since the global financial crisis of 2008. There were different opinions about what the new world order could be like. Among the options discussed were a new bipolar world dominated by the US-China rivalry, a multipolar world where key players – the US, China, Russia, India, EU, and perhaps others – will be in a constant fight for influence and prestige, or complete chaos with no rules and no dominant players, opening the prospect of returning humankind back to a geopolitical jungle. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since February 24, 2022, the international community's focus was concentrated entirely on the war in Ukraine and the growing Russia – West confrontation. It seemed that nothing could change the situation until the end of hostilities in Ukraine. However, on August 2 and 3, almost everyone’s attention shifted from Ukraine to Taiwan. As the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, stated her intention to visit Taiwan, up to half a million people were watching the trajectory of her plane on air flight tracking sites. The negative reaction of China, including the warning of President Xi during his conversation with President Biden that those who played with fire would be perished by it, created hype around this visit. READ MORE

By Igor MATVEEV, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies, and RIAC expert, Moscow
Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine has sparked broad and intensive debates about future modalities of the relations between Russia and Iran in Syria. Western and Israeli analysts predict an essential growth of the political, military, and economic presence of Tehran due to Moscow’s attention switching from Syria to Ukraine. This, in turn, may shift the whole dynamics of the Russian-Iranian relations on the Syrian dossier. On the contrary, despite reports of minor pull-outs from Syria along with international media leaks about transfers of military sites to Iran and Hezbollah, Russian representatives consistently reject such forecasts, referring to a “routine rotation” but “absolutely not a withdrawal” of the Russian troops. Those speculations have intensified on the eve of the trilateral meeting of the Iranian, Russian, and Turkish leaders on Syria scheduled for July 19, 2022, in the Iranian capital. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

There should be realistic expectations of what can result from ongoing discussions on the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Given the current situation in the South Caucasus, the region is far away from peace, and no one should have hopes that Armenia – Turkey normalization will solve conflicts and bring an era of peace to the region. However, in the current situation, even a contribution to regional stability is too significant an opportunity to miss.
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly changed the geopolitics of the South Caucasus and triggered new processes. Turkey’s war involvement seemed to worsen further Armenia – Turkey relations. The Armenian government imposed a ban on imports from Turkey from January 2021 due to Turkey's open and evident promotion and support for the Azerbaijani war effort. However, after the early parliamentary elections in Armenia held in June 2021, Armenian officials started to speak about the necessity to normalize relations with Turkey. These discussions ended with the assignment of a special representatives to start negotiations, and the first meeting took place on January 14, 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, discussions have been underway about the impact of the war on the evolving global order. The transformation of the world order is a very complicated and multi-layered process, and history tells us that it takes decades and is often accompanied by bloody conflicts between great powers. In the last decade, there were several prevailing predictions of the world order – a new bipolar world dominated by the US and China, a multipolar world with several equal players such as the US, China, Russia, India and the EU, and a nonpolar world characterized by constant conflicts and instability. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

There is broad consensus in the region and in the international community on the need to restore communications in the South Caucasus and on the possibility of finding mutually accepted solutions for this to be achieved. However the constant focus on the routes passing via the Syunik region and connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan has made the whole process of restoration of communications a bone of contention for both sides. The restoration of communications may still play a positive role in the establishment of good neighbourly relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, by creating conditions from which both societies can benefit. However, if the sides continue this tit-for-tat discussion around the "Zangezur corridor," blaming each other for violating previous agreements, the restoration of communications issue will only deepen the mistrust between them, he adds. Starting instead with a railway connection between Armenia and Nakhijevan via Yersakh on the other hand, requires only a further 1 km of railroad to be constructed, and will serve as a significant confidence-building measure between Armenia and Azerbaijan and will make it easier for Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree on the modalities for the restoration of other routes. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Tensions between Turkey and Iran were recently rekindled by the latter constructing a dam over transboundary waterways, namely the Aras, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers. Iran is accusing Turkey of intentionally triggering a regional drought and water shortage –– both of which have impacted Iran brutally. Ankara says Iran’s claims are a diversion.

A new round of disagreements between Iran and Turkey began when Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian criticized Turkey’s dam projects on the Aras and Tigris rivers –– the main transboundary waterways in the region –– citing the threats to water flow in the area and environmental damage to regional states in his speech before Iran’s Parliament on May 10. Abdollahian said he has called on “his Turkish counterpart at least three times over the past months to pay serious attention to the construction of dams on the Aras River.” READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In recent months, Iran has engaged in active foreign policy in the South Caucasus to push its geo-economic interests forward. Meanwhile, Western-led economic sanctions have pushed Russia to realize the significance of the North-South trade route. Iran defused and refreshed its relations with Azerbaijan and by engaging with Armenia it decreased Baku’s political pressure on Yerevan. The following analysis will highlight the recent events and the role Armenia and Azerbaijan play in Iran’s regional trade and economic interests. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Russian-Turkish relations are in large part based on the personal chemistry, affinity, and trust between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put these personal ties to the test. While President Erdoğan also maintains a close working relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Turkish-Ukrainian military ties are strong, it has become clear that Erdoğan is not willing to sacrifice relations with Putin for Zelenskyy’s sake. Moreover, Erdoğan’s efforts to mediate between the two leaders have been either rebuffed or ignored by Putin. As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, where things go from here is far from certain, but it is worth considering the range of possibilities. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

As the “frozen conflict” with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) persists, the Ukrainian crisis poses a different challenge for Azerbaijan. “Neutrality” appears to be the watchword as Baku seeks to preserve its ties with both Moscow and Kyiv. While Baku is concerned about the developing situation, it potentially stands to benefit from the trouble with its gas exports to Europe. Given Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Russia after the war on Nagorno-Karabakh and its friendly relations with Ukraine (not to mention its significant gas reserves), some may think that Baku is in a prime position to benefit from the looming energy crisis presented by the region’s unrest. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

April 2022 was marked by significant developments around the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When Russia launched a “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24, it seemed that all other post-Soviet conflicts would enter “silent mode,” as no one would care about Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. However, this was not the case, at least for Nagorno-Karabakh. On April 6, 2022, the European Union organized an Armenia–Azerbaijan summit in Brussels. President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed to form a border demarcation/delimitation commission until the end of April and take concrete steps to start peace talks. The issue of border delimitation and demarcation also was among key priorities during the November 2021 Sochi meeting facilitated by Russian President Putin. However, despite the signature of the trilateral statement, no tangible moves have been made. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The discussions about possible Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty surfaced again during the last Pashinyan – Aliyev meeting held in Brussels on April 6, 2022. At their meeting which was hosted by the European council president, Charles Michel, the two leaders agreed to instruct their foreign ministers to prepare for the start of the negotiations. On April 11, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held a phone talk and discussed the details of the upcoming process. The EU was not the only external actor pushing forward for the peace deal. Before and after the April 6 meeting in Brussels, Aliyev and Pashinyan spoke separately with Russian President Putin, who emphasized the significance of peace and reiterated Russia's willingness to support Armenia and Azerbaijan. The US Secretary of State Blinken also confirmed the US readiness to facilitate the comprehensive settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On April 6, 2022, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev held a meeting in Brussels mediated by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel. It was the second meeting in Brussels mediated by the European Union. The first took place in December 2021; on February 4, 2022, Armenian and Azerbaijan leaders held an online meeting with the participation of Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron. A week before the April 6 meeting, the EU hosted a meeting of high-level officials from Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels to advance joint efforts to find solutions to issues between both countries. The meeting between Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan and assistant to the President of Azerbaijan Hikmet Hajiyev was facilitated by the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar. As a result of the April 6 meeting, Pashinyan and Aliyev agreed to instruct their Ministers of Foreign Affairs to work on the preparation of a future peace treaty, which would address all necessary issues. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

When President Trump pulled the US out of the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, and launched his “maximum pressure campaign” against Tehran, the other signatories of the nuclear deal did not join the US and took steps to save the deal. The EU even launched a special trade mechanism – INSTEX - to facilitate non-USD and non-SWIFT transactions with Iran, while China continued to buy Iranian oil. The re-imposed US sanctions have significantly worsened the economic situation in Iran but have failed to reach the main goal – to force Tehran to change its regional policy and give up on its ballistic missile program. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Neither friend nor foe, Turkey and Russia have backed opposing sides in several regional conflicts, yet managed to avoid direct confrontation. Now the Ukraine crisis poses a serious challenge.
The war in Ukraine has become the latest test for Turkey’s regional ambitions in confronting those of Russia, in what has clearly become a “cooperative rivalry.” This is where both sides, despite their opposite views on various regional conflicts ranging from Libya to Syria to the South Caucasus, have worked to manage these conflicts without directly challenging one another.
The current crisis has raised Turkey’s concerns of being in the firing line of Russia’s hegemonic ambitions. It is important to note that Turkey and Russia are not allies, but bitter ‘frenemies.’ Despite having robust commercial, energy, diplomatic and military ties, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned back in 2016 that NATO has to act and increase its presence in the Black Sea. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

While the world’s attention is focused on the war in Ukraine, tensions are on the rise in Nagorno Karabakh. The 2020 war devastated the region economically and left Karabakh fully encircled by Azerbaijan with only one five-kilometer long corridor connecting it with Armenia. The November 10, 2020, trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia envisaged the end of hostilities, the deployment of Russian peacekeepers for the initial period of five years and fixed Azerbaijan’s territorial gains. However, the statement did not solve the core issue of the Karabakh conflict – the final status of Nagorno Karabakh. The two additional trilateral statements signed in Moscow on January 11 and November 26, 2021 did not touch the status issue and were focused on restoration of communications and the start of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially recognized the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, two self-proclaimed states controlled by pro-Russian groups in Donbas, Eastern Ukraine. The next day, Russia’s Federation Council unanimously authorized the use of military force, and Russian soldiers entered both territories. On February 24, President Putin announced a “special military operation” to “demilitarize and de-nazify” Ukraine. Minutes later, missiles struck the military infrastructure across Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv. Russia’s actions received widespread international condemnation, as many Western countries imposed new sanctions, aiming to trigger a financial crisis in Russia. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On January 19, 2022, Iranian President Dr. Ibrahim Raisi travelled to Moscow and met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in an effort to improve bilateral ties between both countries. The leaders discussed regional and international issues, among them the negotiations around Iran’s nuclear program and regional cooperation in Eurasia. However, contrary to expectations and some statements before the meeting, the visit, for now, has failed to achieve a major advance in addressing the Iranian expectations, mostly related to the signing of a strategic agreement like the one between China and Iran a year ago. Nevertheless, the visit pushed the negotiations between both sides to a higher level and facilitated Iran’s economic integration in Russian-Chinese Eurasian architecture. READ MORE