By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

At the beginning of March 2023, the Parliament of Georgia discussed and supported by the first hearing (with 76 votes) two draft laws regarding the “agents of foreign influence”. The discussion took place against the background of fierce protests both inside and outside the Parliament building. The bills were submitted by the political party “People’s Power”, which is a satellite of the Georgian Dream ruling party. Initially, the draft law “On transparency of foreign influence” was registered in the Parliament. To “ensure transparency”, the new law required the registration of non-entrepreneurial (non-commercial) legal entities and media means which received more than 20% of their income from abroad as “agents of foreign influence”. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Armenians in Lebanon are a deeply institutionalized and politicized community. Given its transnational nature, the community is affected by international, regional, and local developments. For this reason, the political parties and the community leadership analyse local events and position themselves in the Lebanese political space based on local, regional, and sometimes pan-Armenian calculations or interests. Hence the community, like other transnational ethno-religious groups, absorbs from its surroundings and reacts accordingly to preserve itself from security threats. […] This policy brief will also raise a few recommendations regarding new strategies and the need to adopt a vision for the future of the community amid the wave of uncertainties surrounding Lebanon. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On February 6, 2023, two earthquakes with magnitudes 7.8 and 7.5—the deadliest in Turkey’s history—hit the Syrian-Turkish border. At least 45,000 people died in Turkey. Another 6,000 lives were lost in Syria. The fallout of the catastrophic earthquake came as President Erdogan faces his toughest re-election campaign yet. Despite speculation that Erdogan may postpone the elections, he declared that presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on the agreed-upon date, May 14 of this year.
Turkey is a central power in the Middle East. After the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, its influence increased in the South Caucasus. Thus, any political shift will have an impact on the political landscape of the region. The Turkish President is known for exploiting crises; how he will be able to manage this current crisis and use it to his advantage is still questionable. This article will analyse the impact of the earthquake on Turkey’s domestic politics amid the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections as Turkey prepares to celebrate the centennial of its foundation as a republic in October 2023. READ MORE

By Nuray Alekberli, Researcher, Strategic Studies Consulting Company, Baku

In August 2022, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia have signed an "Agreement amongst three countries on preliminary information exchange for the facilitation of transit customs procedures within the framework of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway project" (az.trend.az, 19 August). This agreement aimed at simplifying customs procedures and accelerating border crossing procedures within the framework of the BTK railway project through organizing an electronic exchange of initial information about goods (report.az, 18 August 2022). Therefore, somehow it plays the role of a new breath from a technical point of view to remove obstacles and speed up trade and economic relations between Asian markets and Europe. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

For the last weeks Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations on a peaceful normalisation of relations appeared stalled. The stand-off with Azerbaijani activists on the Lachin Corridor continues to hinder progress. The US initiative to organize a Pashinyan – Aliyev meeting at the latest Munich Security Conference was "a step in the right direction". It gave a new breath of life to the negotiation process, and efforts are underway to revive the Brussels format and organize the fifth Pashinyan – Aliyev meeting in Brussels with the participation of the President of the European Council, Charles Michel.
After the brief momentum in Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations in late September - early October 2022, the peace process seemed to stall. Assessing what went wrong after the 6 October 2022 Prague meeting is challenging. However, the Sochi summit held on 31 October and the meeting between foreign ministers held in Washington on 7 November did not add optimism to the future of the negotiation process. […]
Nevertheless, Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to work on the draft of the peace treaty, exchanging suggestions and ideas, and Yerevan sent its version of the final document to Azerbaijan and the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair states in mid-February. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The COVID–19 and the war in Ukraine have triggered the disruption of global supply chains forcing states to look for alternative transport routes to conduct trade and other economic activities. As one of the rising stars of the global economy, which just passed the UK to become the fifth largest economy in the world, India has looked for ways to expand its connections within Greater Eurasia even before the Pandemic and the Ukraine war. Given the increasing volume of cargo passing through the Suez channel, and the 2021 incident that blocked that waterway, India's primary task is establishing new routes to circumvent Suez while reaching Europe. In September 2000, India, Russia, and Iran declared their intention to establish an International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to connect India with Russia and Northern Europe via Iran. Several other countries joined the project later, and currently, three routes are being discussed as a part of that corridor. The western route will pass via Iran and Azerbaijan, Trans-Caspian route will connect the Caspian Sea ports of Russia and Iran, and the Eastern Route will pass via Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan has closed the Lachin corridor since December 12, 2022. There are different interpretations of why Azerbaijan did it, and why Baku continues the blockade despite calls from the international community to change its course. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, and the West, in one way or another, all suffer from the blockade. Ultimately, it is up to the Azerbaijani leadership to decide to re-open the road.
Azerbaijan has closed the Lachin corridor since December 12, 2022. Azerbaijani official rhetoric rejects the very existence of a blockade, sometimes claiming that the road is open for humanitarian cargo, and sometimes saying that it was the Russian troops that closed the corridor. The official line from Azerbaijan is the narrative that those blocking the corridor are "independent eco-activists exercising their civil rights to protest." However, the situation is apparent to anyone with a basic understanding of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict – Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The defeat in the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war shocked Armenia and Armenians all around the world. It ruined many perceptions deeply entrenched in political elites, expert and academic communities, and broader society: including that the Armenian army was the strongest in the South Caucasus, that Russia would not allow Turkey's involvement in Azerbaijan's war against Armenia, and that the West would not allow authoritarian Azerbaijan and Turkey to attack democratic Armenia. All these assumptions were crushed within 44 days, leaving Armenia facing a much harsher geopolitical reality. Despite this terrible outcome, many in Armenia believed that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement would foment a new status quo. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On November 11, a summit of the leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) convened in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. This major gathering came amid the OTS’s re-emerging significance as a key regional organization and a critical platform for rapprochement between the Central Asia and Caucasus regions. The official Samarkand Declaration, which was signed as a final accord by the attendees, paves the way for a comprehensive partnership format among the OTS member states. The Samarkand meeting represented the major political gathering for the Turkic nations in 2022, and it will further facilitate dialogue and regional interconnectivity between the OTS member states—independent of Russian and Western influence. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The war in Ukraine brought Russia – West relations to the lowest point since the early Cold war years of the 1950s. Discussions about the emergence of Cold War 2.0 were prevalent among experts and the academic community well before February 24, 2022. The starting point was perhaps President Putin's famous 2007 Munich security conference speech. However, the current confusion in global geopolitics is quite different from the original Cold War. In the second part of the 20th century, the world was bipolar, as the US and Soviet Union were fighting each other. Many countries sought to avoid this confrontation through membership in the Non–aligned movement, but it never became a third pole. Now the situation is much more complicated. As the US and Russia are facing each other in a new rendition of a Cold War, the world is far from being bipolar. It may eventually end with a new bipolar system, but Russia will not be among the top two players. If bipolarity ever returns, the US and China will be the building blocks of that system. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 6, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Prague on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit. This was the first meeting between Armenian and Turkish leaders since the failure of “football diplomacy” in 2008-2009. This meeting may play a positive role in fostering Armenia-Turkey normalization. Meanwhile, Armenia needs a better understanding of Turkey’s regional strategy in the South Caucasus and of the role that Turkey attaches to its relations with Armenia in that framework.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s strategic goal in the South Caucasus has been to dominate the region. Turkish regional dominance is only possible at the expense of Russia’s leading position, which puts Turkey and Russia at strategic loggerheads in the region. Neither the recent warming of relations between Ankara and Moscow, nor initiatives like the establishment of the Astana format for Syria or the 3+2 format for the South Caucasus, have changed the fundamental parameters of the Russia-Turkey rivalry in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s chairmanship in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has fallen on a dynamic period, fraught with various events and trends – the period of the «historical rift», when one era comes to an end and another begins – thus far unpredictable and unknown.
The modern system of international cooperation, based on the universal principles and norms, begins to falter. One of the main reasons for this is a deep crisis of trust at the global level, which, in turn, provokes a geopolitical confrontation and the risk of reviving the bloc thinking stereotypes. This process of mutual alienation complicates the return of the world economy to its former course of development and the restoration of global supply chains. READ MORE

By Faridun Sattarov, PhD, DSc, University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Uzbekistan

On September 15-16 of this year, 14 heads of state are expected to attend the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which will be held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. This event will be the first face-to-face meeting of SCO leaders since 2019 and will conclude Uzbekistan’s presidency of the organization.
In addition to the leaders of the SCO member states, which include Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the summit will host the presidents of Iran, Belarus, and Mongolia as observers, as well as the heads of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan as invited guests. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Over the last year multiple formats have emerged in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, and three main external players: Russia, the EU and the US are involved in the mediation process. This may lead to some confusion. Big power rivalry may also negatively impact the process. Some co-ordinating mechanism is necessary, and a format, at least involving Russia and the EU, could also help to combine their efforts.

While the South Caucasus marked the second anniversary of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, negotiations to sign a peace agreement between Armenia – Azerbaijan have become increasingly complex. If during the first year after the war, it was Russia that almost exclusively controlled the process, now we have many actors with contradicting interests and visions. The EU entered the game first, organizing four summits between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in the period of December 2021 – August 2022, simultaneously launching a new format of negotiations between the Secretary of the Armenian security council and top foreign policy aide to President Aliyev. Russia was watching the growing EU involvement in the process, messaging its concerns about the EU's desire to take the initiative from the Kremlin. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

A survey was recently conducted by the Tehran International Studies and Research Institute (TISRI) to study international security priorities and Iran’s foreign policy. The survey was conducted among 384 academic scholars in different Iranian universities (Tehran, Allameh Tabataba’i, Tabriz, Guilan, Shiraz and Razi of Kermanshah) and among researchers and experts in the Caucasus region. The survey resulted in certain proposals calling for an Iranian foreign policy shift toward the South Caucasus, identifying geopolitical risks and providing suggestions on how Iran can help in stabilizing the region. According to the study, it seems Iranian scholars, experts and analysts are concerned about the security and geopolitical risks in the post-2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war regional system in the South Caucasus. Here are the concluding results of this study. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Sweden and Finland have long followed a policy of military neutrality so as not to incur Russia’s wrath. However, the unprovoked Russian war against Ukraine has changed the attitude of these countries. Both Sweden and Finland announced their wish to join the North Atlantic Alliance in mid-May. Then, out of the blue, came obstruction from Turkey with the claim that both countries were financing terror and supporting Kurdish “terrorist” groups that Turkey has been trying to eliminate for the last 40 years or so. One of the major handicaps of the North Atlantic Treaty was and still is the omission of information about a NATO country blocking the participation of non-NATO states in NATO activities or the joining of new NATO members into the Alliance. Admission of new NATO members requires the unanimous consent of all members and the subsequent ratification of protocols by their respective parliaments. READ MORE.

By Ayaz MUSEYIBOV, Adjunct lecturer at Azerbaijan Technical University

In the wake of the recent global geopolitical challenges including the war in Europe, instability in Afghanistan, and many other rapid global changes, Central Asian countries diversify and expand their economic, strategic, and political relations. As Azerbaijan is emerging as a new energy and logistic hub in Euro-Asian value chains, economic relations with Azerbaijan are crucial in regional logistics and energy spheres. Therefore, on April 20th and June 21st, 2022, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed the declarations of strategic partnerships with Azerbaijan, respectively. Thereafter, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed cooperation documents with Azerbaijan covering various directions. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

During my academic visit to New Delhi in February 2020, I met with Indian politicians and scholars and discussed opportunities for upgrading Armenian-Indian relations. While back then the idea of arms trade was still immature, I raised the issue of defence cooperation between the two countries. Through honest discussions about the Armenian cause, I came to a conclusion, which I summarized in a November 2020 article for the Armenian Weekly. Despite today’s tumultuous climate in Armenia, it’s reassuring to learn that this 2020 recommendation has materialized, and bilateral ties are taking military and strategic dimensions. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

With the unprovoked military intervention in Ukraine, Russia has been isolated economically and politically due to the Western-imposed sanctions. But while the sanctions banned Russia from trading with the Western states, particularly in the energy field, some nations still prefer to maintain trade relations with Moscow. Countries like Iran, China and India are seeking to strengthen trade turnover by pushing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project for a better connection via a multimodal transport network that spans rail, road, and sea. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The visit of Nancy Pelosi to Armenia created quite a lot of hype, since some saw in it the prospects for national salvation. But the visit's "democracy vs authoritarianism agenda" is risky for Armenia. Armenia should send clear signals to Russia and Iran that it has no intention to join the “democracy vs. authoritarianism fight” and will never allow anyone to use its territory for anti-Iranian or anti-Russian activities.

On September 17, 2022, Nancy Pelosi, the US House of Representatives speaker, arrived in Armenia for a three–day visit. She was the highest-ranking US official to visit Armenia since the country got its independence in 1991. The visit was agreed upon weeks, if not months in advance, but it took place only a few days after Azerbaijan had launched a new aggression against Armenia on September 13, 2022. The ceasefire was reached in late September 14 through the active mediation efforts of Russia, the US, and other external players. However, these hostilities overshadowed the visit. READ MORE

Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group on confidence-building measures

The Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group on confidence-building measures in support of lasting peace in the South Caucasus has published its report in which it proposes 30 short, medium and long term measures in support of ongoing efforts to establish peace in the region. On Wednesday, 6 April, members of the Working Group, presented their report to the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, and other EU officials at a special briefing in Brussels. In their report, published on the eve of the meeting between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the president of the European Union in Brussels on 6 April, the group says that "all the ingredients for peace exist in the South Caucasus. All the ingredients for war exist too. What is in front of us is a choice". The group says that the proposed measures are a building block in the quest for peace but if the ideas being proposed are implemented the objective of building a peaceful, secure and prosperous South Caucasus will be much closer to being achieved. It was now necessary that all concerned should put effort into turning the thirty measures being proposed in the report into tangible action.
The work of the Joint Liaison Group was co-ordinated and facilitated by LINKS Europe - an independent foundation based in The Hague, The Netherlands - in the framework of the European Union's EU4Peace initiative. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Tehran on July 19, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned against blocking the Armenian-Iranian border, stating, “If there is an effort to block the border between Iran and Armenia, the Islamic Republic will oppose it because this border has been a communication route for thousands of years.” After this warning, Turkish and Azerbaijani media started paying more attention to Iranian officials and launched a “war of words.” In response to media provocations and threats toward Armenia launched by Azerbaijan, Iran facilitated the appointment of a Consulate General in Syunik to redraw its “red lines” in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the world comes closer to multi-polarity, the role of such organizations as SCO will grow further. Russia and China will seek to use them as a counterbalance to western dominated international political and economic organizations, such as G7, the EU, the World Bank and IMF. In the present context of emerging great power competition, the SCO started to be viewed less as a tool to manage Russia – China relations in Central Asia, or counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan, and more as a significant grouping of non-western powers in the emerging multipolar world.
The war in Ukraine has given a new impetus to the discussions about the transformation of the global order. Experts, academicians, and politicians have been debating the potential counter-weights of the emerging post-cold war order since the global financial crisis of 2008. There were different opinions about what the new world order could be like. Among the options discussed were a new bipolar world dominated by the US-China rivalry, a multipolar world where key players – the US, China, Russia, India, EU, and perhaps others – will be in a constant fight for influence and prestige, or complete chaos with no rules and no dominant players, opening the prospect of returning humankind back to a geopolitical jungle. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Even though Israel and Turkey normalised relations in June 2016 following the May 2010 Mavi Marmara Flotilla incident when Israeli soldiers killed ten people on board a Turkish vessel and the subsequent diplomatic rupture, Ankara’s support of the Hamas movement situated in the Gaza Strip continues to undermine bilateral relations.
The establishment of an official office in Istanbul in 2012 and its members are perceived as a thorn in the eye by the Israeli Government. Tel Aviv would like Erdoğan to close the Hamas office and expel its members from Turkey; however, this Israeli wish is not going to be granted any time soon since Erdoğan’s words do not translate into deeds. The signature of the Abraham Accords highlighted two divergent trends in the region: Turkey’s continued isolation and Israel’s strengthened position. This resulted in Erdoğan’s intention to improve relations with Israel. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On August 5, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a four-hour meeting in Russia to discuss bilateral ties and regional issues. The Sochi summit comes after Ankara scored a diplomatic victory by helping broker a grain deal between Turkey, Ukraine and Russia that has eased global food crisis fears and growing concerns of possible Turkish military escalation against the Kurds in Northern Syria. What implication will the summit have on the region? READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since February 24, 2022, the international community's focus was concentrated entirely on the war in Ukraine and the growing Russia – West confrontation. It seemed that nothing could change the situation until the end of hostilities in Ukraine. However, on August 2 and 3, almost everyone’s attention shifted from Ukraine to Taiwan. As the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, stated her intention to visit Taiwan, up to half a million people were watching the trajectory of her plane on air flight tracking sites. The negative reaction of China, including the warning of President Xi during his conversation with President Biden that those who played with fire would be perished by it, created hype around this visit. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In the last 10 days, the most discussed issue amongst Armenian media, experts and political circles was the statement of Iran’s Supreme Leader during his meetings with the Russian and Turkish presidents held in Tehran. The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey gathered together to discuss the future of Syria in the Astana format amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine and complete rupture of Russia-West relations. Few could imagine that the Supreme Leader would mention Armenia and, in particular, the Armenia-Iran border during the summit. However, the Iranian message was clear: Iran will not tolerate the closure of the Armenia-Iran border. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The election of Joe Biden as president in November 2020 raised hopes among the international community that the United States will restore the nuclear deal signed in 2015. Many architects of the deal returned to positions in the White House and State Department. The other signatories of the deal, including the three EU states, China and Russia, were ready to contribute to the restoration of the deal. Conventional wisdom said that Iran should be interested in restoring the deal, too. The economic downturn triggered by the re-imposition of the US sanctions created significant challenges for the Iranian government. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, discussions have been underway about the impact of the war on the evolving global order. The transformation of the world order is a very complicated and multi-layered process, and history tells us that it takes decades and is often accompanied by bloody conflicts between great powers. In the last decade, there were several prevailing predictions of the world order – a new bipolar world dominated by the US and China, a multipolar world with several equal players such as the US, China, Russia, India and the EU, and a nonpolar world characterized by constant conflicts and instability. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

There is broad consensus in the region and in the international community on the need to restore communications in the South Caucasus and on the possibility of finding mutually accepted solutions for this to be achieved. However the constant focus on the routes passing via the Syunik region and connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan has made the whole process of restoration of communications a bone of contention for both sides. The restoration of communications may still play a positive role in the establishment of good neighbourly relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, by creating conditions from which both societies can benefit. However, if the sides continue this tit-for-tat discussion around the "Zangezur corridor," blaming each other for violating previous agreements, the restoration of communications issue will only deepen the mistrust between them, he adds. Starting instead with a railway connection between Armenia and Nakhijevan via Yersakh on the other hand, requires only a further 1 km of railroad to be constructed, and will serve as a significant confidence-building measure between Armenia and Azerbaijan and will make it easier for Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree on the modalities for the restoration of other routes. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Tensions between Turkey and Iran were recently rekindled by the latter constructing a dam over transboundary waterways, namely the Aras, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers. Iran is accusing Turkey of intentionally triggering a regional drought and water shortage –– both of which have impacted Iran brutally. Ankara says Iran’s claims are a diversion.

A new round of disagreements between Iran and Turkey began when Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian criticized Turkey’s dam projects on the Aras and Tigris rivers –– the main transboundary waterways in the region –– citing the threats to water flow in the area and environmental damage to regional states in his speech before Iran’s Parliament on May 10. Abdollahian said he has called on “his Turkish counterpart at least three times over the past months to pay serious attention to the construction of dams on the Aras River.” READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In recent months, Iran has engaged in active foreign policy in the South Caucasus to push its geo-economic interests forward. Meanwhile, Western-led economic sanctions have pushed Russia to realize the significance of the North-South trade route. Iran defused and refreshed its relations with Azerbaijan and by engaging with Armenia it decreased Baku’s political pressure on Yerevan. The following analysis will highlight the recent events and the role Armenia and Azerbaijan play in Iran’s regional trade and economic interests. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Russian-Turkish relations are in large part based on the personal chemistry, affinity, and trust between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put these personal ties to the test. While President Erdoğan also maintains a close working relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Turkish-Ukrainian military ties are strong, it has become clear that Erdoğan is not willing to sacrifice relations with Putin for Zelenskyy’s sake. Moreover, Erdoğan’s efforts to mediate between the two leaders have been either rebuffed or ignored by Putin. As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, where things go from here is far from certain, but it is worth considering the range of possibilities. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

As the “frozen conflict” with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) persists, the Ukrainian crisis poses a different challenge for Azerbaijan. “Neutrality” appears to be the watchword as Baku seeks to preserve its ties with both Moscow and Kyiv. While Baku is concerned about the developing situation, it potentially stands to benefit from the trouble with its gas exports to Europe. Given Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Russia after the war on Nagorno-Karabakh and its friendly relations with Ukraine (not to mention its significant gas reserves), some may think that Baku is in a prime position to benefit from the looming energy crisis presented by the region’s unrest. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia–Turkey normalization process was officially launched on January 14, 2022 when special representatives – the Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Ruben Rubinyan and Ambassador Serdar Kılıç – met in Moscow. The groundwork for this meeting began in mid-2021, when the Armenian government proposed the idea of peace in the South Caucasus and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia’s catastrophic defeat in the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to put aside one of the main obstacles to launching the Armenia–Turkey normalization process. The 2008-2009 “football diplomacy” failed mainly due to Turkey’s precondition to Armenia to return “occupied lands” to Azerbaijan. By signing the November 10, 2020 statement, the Armenian government accepted the loss of seven regions outside the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR), as well as 30-percent of territories of NKAR itself. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

April 2022 was marked by significant developments around the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When Russia launched a “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24, it seemed that all other post-Soviet conflicts would enter “silent mode,” as no one would care about Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. However, this was not the case, at least for Nagorno-Karabakh. On April 6, 2022, the European Union organized an Armenia–Azerbaijan summit in Brussels. President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed to form a border demarcation/delimitation commission until the end of April and take concrete steps to start peace talks. The issue of border delimitation and demarcation also was among key priorities during the November 2021 Sochi meeting facilitated by Russian President Putin. However, despite the signature of the trilateral statement, no tangible moves have been made. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On April 6, 2022, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev held a meeting in Brussels mediated by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel. It was the second meeting in Brussels mediated by the European Union. The first took place in December 2021; on February 4, 2022, Armenian and Azerbaijan leaders held an online meeting with the participation of Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron. A week before the April 6 meeting, the EU hosted a meeting of high-level officials from Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels to advance joint efforts to find solutions to issues between both countries. The meeting between Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan and assistant to the President of Azerbaijan Hikmet Hajiyev was facilitated by the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar. As a result of the April 6 meeting, Pashinyan and Aliyev agreed to instruct their Ministers of Foreign Affairs to work on the preparation of a future peace treaty, which would address all necessary issues. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

A remarkable event occurred on March 11 in Baku when Azerbaijan and Iran, after a period of turbulence in their bilateral relations, signed a new document establishing new transport and electricity supply links connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan via Iranian territory. The Minister of Urban Development of Iran, Rustam Ghasemi, signed the document from the Iranian side. The fact that Rustem Ghasemi had previously paid frequent visits to Azerbaijan to discuss potential economic cooperation with Azerbaijan indicate persistent Iranian attempts to gain at least a minimal political foothold. The signing of a major cooperation document between Baku and Tehran so soon following the heated border tensions in October 2021, surprised some observers. READ MORE