By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

When President Trump pulled the US out of the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, and launched his “maximum pressure campaign” against Tehran, the other signatories of the nuclear deal did not join the US and took steps to save the deal. The EU even launched a special trade mechanism – INSTEX - to facilitate non-USD and non-SWIFT transactions with Iran, while China continued to buy Iranian oil. The re-imposed US sanctions have significantly worsened the economic situation in Iran but have failed to reach the main goal – to force Tehran to change its regional policy and give up on its ballistic missile program. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Coming to power after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Lukashenko had ruled Belarus in a highly autocratic fashion for almost three decades, while seeking to navigate his country within Moscow’s sphere of influence. However, the aging leader’s arbitrary rule began to teeter and he faced a major challenge in the election of 2020. When skewed and rigged election results were announced, hundreds of thousands of voters of Belarus peacefully protested their strong objections.
The West echoed moral support to the mass of citizens voicing democratic demands on the streets, but provided little material assistance. Somewhat optimistically and naively, the West trusted that the unarmed people would peacefully prevail over the coercive might of the internal and external dictators in Minsk and Moscow. Putin, by contrast, sensing a vulnerable and weakened regime, provided his fellow authoritarian colleague with external assistance to forcefully crush the peaceful demonstrators. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

If Russia successfully resists the unprecedented pressure from the West and remains one of the main poles in the emerging multipolar world, its interests lie in balancing Turkish influence in its neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. It does not imply that Russia and Turkey will stop their economic cooperation. It simply means that Russia will seek to prevent Turkish dominance over the South Caucasus.
The Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine launched on February 24, 2022, has shaken global geopolitics and geoeconomics. It completely ruined Russia – West relations and resulted in unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including cutting several Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, dubbed by economists as a "financial nuclear option". NATO member countries, including the US, UK, Germany, and several east European states, supply Ukraine with various lethal weapons while rejecting Ukraine's plea for imposing a no-fly zone, as the Russian President indicated that the Kremlin would perceive that move as a declaration of war. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Divide and conquer is a well-known historic aphorism for ambitious imperial states. Divide and control is a corollary. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Moscow’s geo-political and foreign policy has opted on a number of occasions to initiate or accentuate the splitting away of small fragments from somewhat weak newly independent states. In so doing, Moscow could more effectively re-assert some control over its historic ‘near abroad’ and re-extend its sphere of influence over parts of the former Soviet Union. Amongst the examples are: Transnistria splintering from Moldova in 1991, South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia in the early 1990s, and Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukraine in 2014. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On January 19, 2022, Iranian President Dr. Ibrahim Raisi travelled to Moscow and met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in an effort to improve bilateral ties between both countries. The leaders discussed regional and international issues, among them the negotiations around Iran’s nuclear program and regional cooperation in Eurasia. However, contrary to expectations and some statements before the meeting, the visit, for now, has failed to achieve a major advance in addressing the Iranian expectations, mostly related to the signing of a strategic agreement like the one between China and Iran a year ago. Nevertheless, the visit pushed the negotiations between both sides to a higher level and facilitated Iran’s economic integration in Russian-Chinese Eurasian architecture. READ MORE

Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Amid heightened tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, the issue of Georgia’s path to NATO membership is once again in the spotlight. While Tbilisi has made real progress in its military reform efforts, the major hurdle is political, not military, in nature and until the Alliance can achieve consensus, the future of Georgia’s relationship with NATO will remain uncertain. In March 2019, then-Georgian Defence Minister Levan Izoria heralded a new era in military reform: “In the past we trained our soldiers for external deployment, but the new emphasis is now on self-defence” — or rather territorial defence, a process that began to be addressed by U.S.-based military advisers in July 2016. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 14, 2022, the special representatives of Armenia and Turkey met in Moscow to launch the normalization process between the two countries. The recent turmoil in Kazakhstan and intensive Russia – US, Russia – NATO negotiations on the future of the European security architecture have cast some shadow on the meeting, as the attention of the international media and expert and academic community was focused on more significant issues. Meanwhile, the meeting in Moscow was a remarkable event at the regional level. Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, fully aligned itself with Azerbaijan, and imposed an economic blockade on Armenia, seeking to force Yerevan to give up Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

2023 will be a crucial elections year in Turkey, and there is no certainty that president Erdogan and his AK Party can maintain their hold on power. The stakes are high and political turmoil will have implications way beyond Turkey itself.

The latest Russia-US and Russia-NATO tensions have entirely shifted the attention of the media and the expert community to Ukraine. Tens, if not hundreds, of papers and policy briefs are published daily, seeking to understand what Russia wants in Ukraine and whether Russia and the West will come to a diplomatic solution and avoid war. As a NATO member and Black Sea littoral state Turkey has a significant role in these calculations. What will be Turkey's reaction if war breaks out in or around Ukraine, and how will the war impact Russia - Turkey relations in other regions – the Middle East, South Caucasus, Balkans, and North Africa? READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

We need time to understand better what happened in Kazakhstan, and why". Whilst sending CSTO troops to Kazakhstan was clearly President Putin's decision to support President Tokayev in the internal fight between Kazakh local elites, the deployment has implications also for other countries participating in the mission, including Armenia.

The beginning of 2022 surprised many. While experts and pundits were busy discussing the possible outcome of the Russia – US and Russia - NATO negotiations, scheduled for early January, and seeking to predict if large-scale hostilities would break out in Ukraine, Kazakhstan imploded. This vast country with less than 20 million population, with huge reserves of oil, uranium, and other minerals and a significant geographical location connecting China with Russia and Europe, seemed to be an island of stability in the vast landmass of Eurasia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev had ruled the country since its independence, and while he stepped down in 2019, he maintained his influence and control from the position of Chairman of the Security Council. The second President of Kazakhstan, Kassym - Jomart Tokayev, a professional diplomat who started his career in the Soviet Union, seemed to be an excellent choice for Nazarbayev, enabling him to organize a smooth power transition, keep the stability of the country, and his primordial leading position. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

More than one year after the 2020 Artsakh War, the future of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations remains vague. Azerbaijan has put forward two demands: Armenia in written form should recognize Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and provide uncontrolled access to Azerbaijan to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic via the Syunik province. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has launched the strategy of coercive diplomacy and military blackmail, refusing to free all remaining Armenian POWs and advancing into Armenian territory. The release of POWs is a clearly articulated agreement fixed in the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement. However, Azerbaijan argues that Armenians still languishing in Azerbaijani jails are POWs and are not covered by that statement. Baku successfully merged the POWs’ issue with maps of mine fields, thus forcing Armenia to accept the humans versus maps bargain. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

“Co-opetition” was a term coined by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff to describe a paradoxical strategy of cooperation among competitors, enabling them to collectively achieve mutual gains. It’s a relatively new term in international relations and used occasionally in international trade. Nevertheless, I will be using co-opetition to explain the current status of Russian-Turkish relations.
In foreign policymaking and geopolitical self-perception, Russia and Turkey resemble each other in many ways. Throughout the course of events in the Middle East and South Caucasus, as the West failed to engage with regional developments to resolve conflicts, other regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Russia filled the political vacuum. Hence, the Turkish-Russian interaction in the Middle East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the military and political withdrawal of the US and the European Union’s absence from the region. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies,

On November 10, 2021, the South Caucasus will mark the first anniversary of the tripartite Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan statement, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war. During the last year, the experts, representatives of civil society, and journalists hotly debated the outcomes of the war and the implications of the trilateral statement. Who benefited more from the war – Russia, Turkey, or Azerbaijan? Has the Karabakh conflict been solved or thrown into the dustbin of history, or will the region face new rounds of negotiations and the possible resumption of hostilities? What is the future of Armenia – Azerbaijan and Armenia – Turkey relations? There are no easy answers to all these questions. However, one thing is clear – a year after the 2020 Karabakh war, the South Caucasus is still in the midst of geopolitical transformation, with regional powers vying for influence. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The "corridors war", currently being hotly debated among experts, pundits, and policy-making circles in the South Caucasus, is largely based on wishful thinking rather than hard facts. In reality the options are rather limited.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, the theme of competing corridors in the South Caucasus has established itself as one of the primary topics for discussion and debate among experts, pundits, and policymaking circles. Almost daily, Azerbaijan and Turkey speak about the necessity to open the so-called "Zangezur corridor," arguing that it will significantly boost the regional economy. According to Baku and Ankara, the opening of the corridor is envisaged under the terms of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, even though the document itself speaks about only one corridor – Lachin. Under the term “corridor”, Azerbaijan envisages an arrangement which will allow Azerbaijani vehicles and trains to cross the Armenia – Azerbaijan border, pass via the Syunik province of Armenia and then enter the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic (an Azerbaijani exclave), without any border, passport, and customs control implemented by the Armenian side. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Whilst Georgia has long acted as an informal home for peace building initiatives between Armenia and Azerbaijan, its recent offer of its “good offices” shows a higher level of engagement.
Ever since the end of the first Karabakh war, Georgia has become a Mecca for meetings of Armenian and Azerbaijani experts, peacebuilders, and other civil society representatives. Buzz words such as Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy in the context of the Karabakh conflict settlement process could be heard very often in hotel conference halls and board rooms in Tbilisi, Bakuriani, Telavi, and other places. Given the apparent obstacles in bringing Azerbaijani experts to Armenia and Armenians to Azerbaijan, many saw Georgia as an ideal place for serious meetings and discussions and long Caucasian-style dinners. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Like other regional powers, Russia has taken major steps to advance its geopolitical interests in the Levant. With the goals of expanding its influence and control the vast energy resources in the region. Although it only has a naval military base in Tartus (Syria) and no borders on the Mediterranean Sea, Russia has managed to exert its influence around nearby countries, including Lebanon. The perception of Lebanon as part of its Syrian stake encourages Moscow to strive to capitalize on its influence in the region after intervening in the Syrian conflict. In the last few years, Russia started playing a larger role in Lebanon following the growing civil unrest in Syria and the defeat of ISIS. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

For 30 years, Iran has adopted a cautious approach to developments in the South Caucasus, wary of the risk of encirclement. Iran's current military drills on the border with Azerbaijan are meant to send a signal that Tehran has its red lines too.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has carefully followed the developments in the South Caucasus. The strategic goal of Iran was not to allow the region to be a launchpad for the US or Israeli-initiated anti-Iranian activities. Due to the constant US pressure, Iran could not significantly increase its influence in the South Caucasus and directly compete with the US. Meanwhile, the US and Israel were not the only sources of concern for Iran. Turkey's intentions to increase its influence in the South Caucasus through the establishment of the Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership was another source of concern. READ MORE

By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (ret), Professor of RA, RF, USA (strategic security studies), Lazarev Club Board Member

On the eve of the 30th anniversary of Ukraine, on August 23, 2021, at the initiative of President of Ukraine Zelensky, the Crimean Platform summit was held with the participation of 46 states and international organizations. The establishment of the platform with the goal of its long-term functioning was announced as one of the main events in the framework of the celebration of the 30th anniversary of independence of Ukraine. According to the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky, the launch of the platform will introduce the problem of "de-occupation of the Crimea" into the international agenda on a regular political and diplomatic basis. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia is celebrating the 30th anniversary of its independence but whilst it has all the attributes of a modern state a lot of its institutions are hollow. There is much that can be done, and if it acts reasonably, Armenia can celebrate its 50th anniversary of independence in twenty years’ time in a much more positive atmosphere.
On 21 September 2021, Armenia celebrates the 30th anniversary of its independence. For a nation with at least 3500 years of history, this may not seem a very impressive record. However, since 1045 AD Armenia has never witnessed such a long period of independent statehood in the Armenian highland. Armenia enjoyed a brief period of independence in May 1918 - December 1920, after the collapse of the Russian Empire. However, these two and half years were marked by instability, conflicts, widespread famine, and poverty.READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The possible normalisation of Armenia–Turkey relations have always been in the spotlight of the South Caucasus geopolitics. Turkey recognised Armenian independence back in 1991 but refused to establish diplomatic relations, and in April 1993 closed its border with Armenia in response to the advance of Armenian forces in the first Karabakh war. Since then, Turkey has put forward several preconditions for normalising relations with Armenia: the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Karabakh, the end to the Armenian genocide international recognition campaign, and the official recognition of Armenia–Turkey borders by independent Armenia. At the same time, Armenia–Turkey relations were a part of the broader regional geopolitics. Russia struggled to regain its influence in the South Caucasus while the US viewed the emerging Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership as a critical tool to counter Russian efforts. READ MORE

By Ryszard Czarnecki, Member of European Parliament

Uzbek Presidential elections are scheduled to be held on October 24, 2021. These will be the sixth Presidential elections that will take place in the independent country. In the previous Presidential elections held in 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev emerged as the winner. Mirziyoyev is all set to run for a second term as the long ruling Liberal Democratic party will nominate him again.
Uzbekistan’s Central Electoral Commission has invited observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Narzulla Oblomurodov, leader of Ecological Party of Uzbekistan; Bahrom Abduhalimov, head of Adolat Social Democratic Party, and Alisher Kadirov, chair of Democrat Party of Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival), are the other leaders who have been nominated to run for the President. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly impacted the regional dynamics in the South Caucasus. Experts and pundits have not come yet to a unified approach regarding the reasons and implications of the war. However, many agree that the primary beneficiaries of the war were Russia and Turkey. Kremlin has reached perhaps its main goal in Karabakh – to put Russian boots on the ground, while it has also significantly increased its military presence in Armenia. Turkey has cemented its presence in Azerbaijan as now a large part of Azerbaijani society believes that without Turkey’s overt support and involvement, Baku could not win the war. Turkey also is a part of the Joint Monitoring Centre operating in the Aghdam region of Azerbaijan, though Turkey hoped to have more military involvement in the post-war Karabakh. READ MORE

Hayk Kotanjian, Lieutenant General (ret), Professor of RA, RF, USA (strategic security studies), Lazarev Club Board Member

The strategic emphasis of the 4th session of the Lazarev Club has been imperatively demanded by the need to find and pursue new ways to prevent the loss of the Armenian national statehood. The end-product of those efforts should be built upon the coincidence of the strategic interests of security and sustainable development of our two fraternal peoples and allied states - Russia and Armenia. The existential importance of brainstorming on the problem of life and death of the state, as well as its innovative development, was exacerbated by the challenge of the upcoming formation of new authorities following the results of the early parliamentary elections. READ MORE

By Lilit Galstyan, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Political Studies, Yerevan

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have ushered in hopes of humanity's happy and harmonious future. The ideas such as "End of history" became very popular both within academic circles and with policymakers. There was a widespread belief that the entire planet would live under liberal democracy, and inter-state conflicts will become bad memories from history. However, the beginning of the XXI century crushed these hopes. Russia - West relations started to deteriorate after the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, while the 2014 Crimean crisis brought bilateral relations to the lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the astonishing Chinese economic growth and the emergence of the multi-million middle class did not bring about political changes in China. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The EU has thrown Armenia an economic lifeline, but Yerevan has a stark choice ahead: either to use its economic resources to modernise its military and ensure that the Armenian population left in Karabakh is protected, or to create conditions for the Armenians in Karabakh to gradually settle in Armenia.
The EU has always perceived the South Caucasus as a neighbouring area between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The South Caucasus was never part of the EU's vital interests, but the Europeans were not indifferent to the region's fate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with South Caucasus Republics, and later included the region into the European Neighbourhood policy. The next phase in EU-South Caucasus relations was the launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative and the inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into the program. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Russia – Turkey relations are probably among the most discussed topics of Eurasian geopolitics. Experts and pundits are frantically searching for the correct terms to describe them – cooperation/competition, the marriage of convenience, and frenemies – all these words are used in endless efforts to grasp reality beneath the surface of high-level meetings and smiley handshakes of the leaders. The two countries interact in different regions – Middle East, Northern Africa, Black Sea basin, Central Asia, Western Balkans, and South Caucasus. In all these areas, they have overlapping and colliding interests, which have created a complex web of relationships. READ MORE