By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

There is broad consensus in the region and in the international community on the need to restore communications in the South Caucasus and on the possibility of finding mutually accepted solutions for this to be achieved. However the constant focus on the routes passing via the Syunik region and connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan has made the whole process of restoration of communications a bone of contention for both sides. The restoration of communications may still play a positive role in the establishment of good neighbourly relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, by creating conditions from which both societies can benefit. However, if the sides continue this tit-for-tat discussion around the "Zangezur corridor," blaming each other for violating previous agreements, the restoration of communications issue will only deepen the mistrust between them, he adds. Starting instead with a railway connection between Armenia and Nakhijevan via Yersakh on the other hand, requires only a further 1 km of railroad to be constructed, and will serve as a significant confidence-building measure between Armenia and Azerbaijan and will make it easier for Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree on the modalities for the restoration of other routes. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In recent months, Iran has engaged in active foreign policy in the South Caucasus to push its geo-economic interests forward. Meanwhile, Western-led economic sanctions have pushed Russia to realize the significance of the North-South trade route. Iran defused and refreshed its relations with Azerbaijan and by engaging with Armenia it decreased Baku’s political pressure on Yerevan. The following analysis will highlight the recent events and the role Armenia and Azerbaijan play in Iran’s regional trade and economic interests. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Russian-Turkish relations are in large part based on the personal chemistry, affinity, and trust between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put these personal ties to the test. While President Erdoğan also maintains a close working relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Turkish-Ukrainian military ties are strong, it has become clear that Erdoğan is not willing to sacrifice relations with Putin for Zelenskyy’s sake. Moreover, Erdoğan’s efforts to mediate between the two leaders have been either rebuffed or ignored by Putin. As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, where things go from here is far from certain, but it is worth considering the range of possibilities. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia–Turkey normalization process was officially launched on January 14, 2022 when special representatives – the Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Ruben Rubinyan and Ambassador Serdar Kılıç – met in Moscow. The groundwork for this meeting began in mid-2021, when the Armenian government proposed the idea of peace in the South Caucasus and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia’s catastrophic defeat in the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to put aside one of the main obstacles to launching the Armenia–Turkey normalization process. The 2008-2009 “football diplomacy” failed mainly due to Turkey’s precondition to Armenia to return “occupied lands” to Azerbaijan. By signing the November 10, 2020 statement, the Armenian government accepted the loss of seven regions outside the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR), as well as 30-percent of territories of NKAR itself. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

A remarkable event occurred on March 11 in Baku when Azerbaijan and Iran, after a period of turbulence in their bilateral relations, signed a new document establishing new transport and electricity supply links connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan via Iranian territory. The Minister of Urban Development of Iran, Rustam Ghasemi, signed the document from the Iranian side. The fact that Rustem Ghasemi had previously paid frequent visits to Azerbaijan to discuss potential economic cooperation with Azerbaijan indicate persistent Iranian attempts to gain at least a minimal political foothold. The signing of a major cooperation document between Baku and Tehran so soon following the heated border tensions in October 2021, surprised some observers. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Neither friend nor foe, Turkey and Russia have backed opposing sides in several regional conflicts, yet managed to avoid direct confrontation. Now the Ukraine crisis poses a serious challenge.
The war in Ukraine has become the latest test for Turkey’s regional ambitions in confronting those of Russia, in what has clearly become a “cooperative rivalry.” This is where both sides, despite their opposite views on various regional conflicts ranging from Libya to Syria to the South Caucasus, have worked to manage these conflicts without directly challenging one another.
The current crisis has raised Turkey’s concerns of being in the firing line of Russia’s hegemonic ambitions. It is important to note that Turkey and Russia are not allies, but bitter ‘frenemies.’ Despite having robust commercial, energy, diplomatic and military ties, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned back in 2016 that NATO has to act and increase its presence in the Black Sea. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially recognized the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, two self-proclaimed states controlled by pro-Russian groups in Donbas, Eastern Ukraine. The next day, Russia’s Federation Council unanimously authorized the use of military force, and Russian soldiers entered both territories. On February 24, President Putin announced a “special military operation” to “demilitarize and de-nazify” Ukraine. Minutes later, missiles struck the military infrastructure across Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv. Russia’s actions received widespread international condemnation, as many Western countries imposed new sanctions, aiming to trigger a financial crisis in Russia. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

If Russia successfully resists the unprecedented pressure from the West and remains one of the main poles in the emerging multipolar world, its interests lie in balancing Turkish influence in its neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. It does not imply that Russia and Turkey will stop their economic cooperation. It simply means that Russia will seek to prevent Turkish dominance over the South Caucasus.
The Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine launched on February 24, 2022, has shaken global geopolitics and geoeconomics. It completely ruined Russia – West relations and resulted in unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including cutting several Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, dubbed by economists as a "financial nuclear option". NATO member countries, including the US, UK, Germany, and several east European states, supply Ukraine with various lethal weapons while rejecting Ukraine's plea for imposing a no-fly zone, as the Russian President indicated that the Kremlin would perceive that move as a declaration of war. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Divide and conquer is a well-known historic aphorism for ambitious imperial states. Divide and control is a corollary. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Moscow’s geo-political and foreign policy has opted on a number of occasions to initiate or accentuate the splitting away of small fragments from somewhat weak newly independent states. In so doing, Moscow could more effectively re-assert some control over its historic ‘near abroad’ and re-extend its sphere of influence over parts of the former Soviet Union. Amongst the examples are: Transnistria splintering from Moldova in 1991, South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia in the early 1990s, and Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukraine in 2014. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and agreements with these two entities on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. On February 22, President Putin stated that Russia recognized these states within territories envisaged by their constitutions, which cover entire territories of former Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of Ukraine, while the de facto Republics control only 30 percent of the oblasts' territories. On early morning February 24, President Putin declared the launch of special military operation in Ukraine. He stated that Russian goal is the demilitarization of Ukraine and added that Russia has no intention to occupy Ukrainian territories. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Economic cooperation in the South Caucasus may bring lasting stability if vital interests are taken into account.
Regional economic cooperation in the South Caucasus has always been the focus of international organizations and external powers as a tangible way to stabilize the region and pave the way for conflict settlement. After the end of the first Karabakh war in 1994, in close cooperation with Turkey and under strong US support, Azerbaijan launched several regional infrastructure projects—oil and gas pipelines and railways connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey via Georgia. Azerbaijan and Turkey excluded Armenia from these projects and imposed an economic blockade, viewing this exclusion as a tool to force Armenia to give up Nagorno Karabakh. READ MORE

Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Amid heightened tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, the issue of Georgia’s path to NATO membership is once again in the spotlight. While Tbilisi has made real progress in its military reform efforts, the major hurdle is political, not military, in nature and until the Alliance can achieve consensus, the future of Georgia’s relationship with NATO will remain uncertain. In March 2019, then-Georgian Defence Minister Levan Izoria heralded a new era in military reform: “In the past we trained our soldiers for external deployment, but the new emphasis is now on self-defence” — or rather territorial defence, a process that began to be addressed by U.S.-based military advisers in July 2016. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In February 2021, I wrote an article “Turkey’s Pivot in Central Asia: A Calculated Risk?” and asked to what extent can Turkey push its pan-Turkic aspirations in Central Asia? If Turkey’s economic and energy relations in Central Asia continue to deepen, will it inevitably increase engagement on security issues as a means to protect them? Will Russia and China tolerate a NATO member exerting its influence near their traditional zones of influence? The developments in Kazakhstan clearly provided answers to these questions.
Long seen as the pole of stability in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has faced its most serious political crisis to date. What began as a reaction to a spike in fuel prices in the western oil-producing regions spread across the country with unprecedented calls for reform, before escalating into violence in the country’s biggest city, Almaty. The protest movement in Kazakhstan quickly escalated and turned violent as protesters seized and set alight government buildings. After failing to quell the unrest, President Kassym- Jomart Tokayev launched a “counter-terror” operation to regain control of the situation and appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for military assistance. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

2023 will be a crucial elections year in Turkey, and there is no certainty that president Erdogan and his AK Party can maintain their hold on power. The stakes are high and political turmoil will have implications way beyond Turkey itself.

The latest Russia-US and Russia-NATO tensions have entirely shifted the attention of the media and the expert community to Ukraine. Tens, if not hundreds, of papers and policy briefs are published daily, seeking to understand what Russia wants in Ukraine and whether Russia and the West will come to a diplomatic solution and avoid war. As a NATO member and Black Sea littoral state Turkey has a significant role in these calculations. What will be Turkey's reaction if war breaks out in or around Ukraine, and how will the war impact Russia - Turkey relations in other regions – the Middle East, South Caucasus, Balkans, and North Africa? READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

We need time to understand better what happened in Kazakhstan, and why". Whilst sending CSTO troops to Kazakhstan was clearly President Putin's decision to support President Tokayev in the internal fight between Kazakh local elites, the deployment has implications also for other countries participating in the mission, including Armenia.

The beginning of 2022 surprised many. While experts and pundits were busy discussing the possible outcome of the Russia – US and Russia - NATO negotiations, scheduled for early January, and seeking to predict if large-scale hostilities would break out in Ukraine, Kazakhstan imploded. This vast country with less than 20 million population, with huge reserves of oil, uranium, and other minerals and a significant geographical location connecting China with Russia and Europe, seemed to be an island of stability in the vast landmass of Eurasia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev had ruled the country since its independence, and while he stepped down in 2019, he maintained his influence and control from the position of Chairman of the Security Council. The second President of Kazakhstan, Kassym - Jomart Tokayev, a professional diplomat who started his career in the Soviet Union, seemed to be an excellent choice for Nazarbayev, enabling him to organize a smooth power transition, keep the stability of the country, and his primordial leading position. READ MORE

By Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is on the eve of an important political event - the presidential elections in the country. This major political event was launched at the meeting of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which took place on July 23, 2021. Today, the election campaign is in full swing, and it is taking place in a new political atmosphere. All processes are conducted openly, transparently and in accordance with the national electoral legislation and the time frames specified therein. All five parties that have nominated their candidates are actively promoting their program ideas and platforms. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

“Co-opetition” was a term coined by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff to describe a paradoxical strategy of cooperation among competitors, enabling them to collectively achieve mutual gains. It’s a relatively new term in international relations and used occasionally in international trade. Nevertheless, I will be using co-opetition to explain the current status of Russian-Turkish relations.
In foreign policymaking and geopolitical self-perception, Russia and Turkey resemble each other in many ways. Throughout the course of events in the Middle East and South Caucasus, as the West failed to engage with regional developments to resolve conflicts, other regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Russia filled the political vacuum. Hence, the Turkish-Russian interaction in the Middle East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the military and political withdrawal of the US and the European Union’s absence from the region. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Russian resort town of Sochi was turned into the spotlight of South Caucasus geopolitics on November 26 as Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the much-anticipated trilateral meeting. The gathering was first announced by the Russian President’s Press-Secretary Dmitri Peskov to be held on November 8–12 to mark the first anniversary of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, which fixed the devastating defeat of Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war. Some Armenian media leaked news about the upcoming meeting even earlier, arguing that another document violating Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh’s vital national interests was in the works. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Whilst Georgia has long acted as an informal home for peace building initiatives between Armenia and Azerbaijan, its recent offer of its “good offices” shows a higher level of engagement.
Ever since the end of the first Karabakh war, Georgia has become a Mecca for meetings of Armenian and Azerbaijani experts, peacebuilders, and other civil society representatives. Buzz words such as Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy in the context of the Karabakh conflict settlement process could be heard very often in hotel conference halls and board rooms in Tbilisi, Bakuriani, Telavi, and other places. Given the apparent obstacles in bringing Azerbaijani experts to Armenia and Armenians to Azerbaijan, many saw Georgia as an ideal place for serious meetings and discussions and long Caucasian-style dinners. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Like other regional powers, Russia has taken major steps to advance its geopolitical interests in the Levant. With the goals of expanding its influence and control the vast energy resources in the region. Although it only has a naval military base in Tartus (Syria) and no borders on the Mediterranean Sea, Russia has managed to exert its influence around nearby countries, including Lebanon. The perception of Lebanon as part of its Syrian stake encourages Moscow to strive to capitalize on its influence in the region after intervening in the Syrian conflict. In the last few years, Russia started playing a larger role in Lebanon following the growing civil unrest in Syria and the defeat of ISIS. READ MORE

By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (ret), Professor of RA, RF, USA (strategic security studies), Lazarev Club Board Member

On the eve of the 30th anniversary of Ukraine, on August 23, 2021, at the initiative of President of Ukraine Zelensky, the Crimean Platform summit was held with the participation of 46 states and international organizations. The establishment of the platform with the goal of its long-term functioning was announced as one of the main events in the framework of the celebration of the 30th anniversary of independence of Ukraine. According to the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky, the launch of the platform will introduce the problem of "de-occupation of the Crimea" into the international agenda on a regular political and diplomatic basis. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on September 19 that Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had requested a meeting, via a message transmitted by the Georgian prime minister. Erdogan said that “Armenia should take positive steps” if it wishes for such a meeting. Erdogan is alluding to the opening of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which he believes is a political issue that will be resolved soon, as will Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. The corridor refers to a ground transportation link that would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan through Armenia’s southern Syunik region. If we try to translate Erdogan’s diplomatic language, the Turkish president clearly states that he is ready to accept Armenian leadership’s proposal for dialogue if Armenia continues to fulfil Turkey’s demands. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The possible normalisation of Armenia–Turkey relations have always been in the spotlight of the South Caucasus geopolitics. Turkey recognised Armenian independence back in 1991 but refused to establish diplomatic relations, and in April 1993 closed its border with Armenia in response to the advance of Armenian forces in the first Karabakh war. Since then, Turkey has put forward several preconditions for normalising relations with Armenia: the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Karabakh, the end to the Armenian genocide international recognition campaign, and the official recognition of Armenia–Turkey borders by independent Armenia. At the same time, Armenia–Turkey relations were a part of the broader regional geopolitics. Russia struggled to regain its influence in the South Caucasus while the US viewed the emerging Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership as a critical tool to counter Russian efforts. READ MORE

By Ryszard Czarnecki, Member of European Parliament

Uzbek Presidential elections are scheduled to be held on October 24, 2021. These will be the sixth Presidential elections that will take place in the independent country. In the previous Presidential elections held in 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev emerged as the winner. Mirziyoyev is all set to run for a second term as the long ruling Liberal Democratic party will nominate him again.
Uzbekistan’s Central Electoral Commission has invited observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Narzulla Oblomurodov, leader of Ecological Party of Uzbekistan; Bahrom Abduhalimov, head of Adolat Social Democratic Party, and Alisher Kadirov, chair of Democrat Party of Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival), are the other leaders who have been nominated to run for the President. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly impacted the regional dynamics in the South Caucasus. Experts and pundits have not come yet to a unified approach regarding the reasons and implications of the war. However, many agree that the primary beneficiaries of the war were Russia and Turkey. Kremlin has reached perhaps its main goal in Karabakh – to put Russian boots on the ground, while it has also significantly increased its military presence in Armenia. Turkey has cemented its presence in Azerbaijan as now a large part of Azerbaijani society believes that without Turkey’s overt support and involvement, Baku could not win the war. Turkey also is a part of the Joint Monitoring Centre operating in the Aghdam region of Azerbaijan, though Turkey hoped to have more military involvement in the post-war Karabakh. READ MORE