By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On November 11, a summit of the leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) convened in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. This major gathering came amid the OTS’s re-emerging significance as a key regional organization and a critical platform for rapprochement between the Central Asia and Caucasus regions. The official Samarkand Declaration, which was signed as a final accord by the attendees, paves the way for a comprehensive partnership format among the OTS member states. The Samarkand meeting represented the major political gathering for the Turkic nations in 2022, and it will further facilitate dialogue and regional interconnectivity between the OTS member states—independent of Russian and Western influence. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The war in Ukraine brought Russia – West relations to the lowest point since the early Cold war years of the 1950s. Discussions about the emergence of Cold War 2.0 were prevalent among experts and the academic community well before February 24, 2022. The starting point was perhaps President Putin's famous 2007 Munich security conference speech. However, the current confusion in global geopolitics is quite different from the original Cold War. In the second part of the 20th century, the world was bipolar, as the US and Soviet Union were fighting each other. Many countries sought to avoid this confrontation through membership in the Non–aligned movement, but it never became a third pole. Now the situation is much more complicated. As the US and Russia are facing each other in a new rendition of a Cold War, the world is far from being bipolar. It may eventually end with a new bipolar system, but Russia will not be among the top two players. If bipolarity ever returns, the US and China will be the building blocks of that system. READ MORE

By Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s chairmanship in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has fallen on a dynamic period, fraught with various events and trends – the period of the «historical rift», when one era comes to an end and another begins – thus far unpredictable and unknown.
The modern system of international cooperation, based on the universal principles and norms, begins to falter. One of the main reasons for this is a deep crisis of trust at the global level, which, in turn, provokes a geopolitical confrontation and the risk of reviving the bloc thinking stereotypes. This process of mutual alienation complicates the return of the world economy to its former course of development and the restoration of global supply chains. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On October 25, 2022, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused the West of pressuring Armenia to cut its traditionally close ties with Moscow to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus. Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson of the Russian FM, also warned that the West is planting anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society. Zakharova’s statement came in response to an article published in Haygagan Jamanag (a newspaper belonging to Pashinyan’s family), accusing Moscow of trying to annex Armenia and create a union state with Russia. In response to Zakharova’s comments, Vigen Khachatryan, an MP from Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party, called on his government to “revise” relations with Russia as “Moscow is not a reliable ally”.
Russian newspapers and media outlets have also been accusing Armenia of signing a secret agreement with Azerbaijan in Washington. On October 10, 2022, the Russian Telegram Channel “Siloviki” posted the “Washington proposal,” an unconfirmed document that notes Azerbaijan’s nomination of a representative to work with an Armenian counterpart designated by the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh to “discuss the rights and securities… and provide confidence regarding the protection of the Armenian minority groups in Nagorno-Karabakh.” This means Armenia was going to recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and push the Russian peacekeepers from the region before 2025. These accusations were refuted by the US. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the South Caucasus becomes increasingly involved in the great power competition, and the US-Russia confrontation impacts regional geopolitics, Iran looks for additional ways to secure its national interests. Iran’s top foreign policy priority remains the Middle East, where Tehran seeks to consolidate its power and influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. However, Iran views the South Caucasus as a significant region where Tehran should continue its presence and prevent anti-Iranian developments.
Iran is concerned with growing Azerbaijan-Israel political, economic, and military cooperation. Israel was one of the biggest weapons suppliers to Azerbaijan before, during, and after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. According to several sources and reports, Israel’s security services actively use Azerbaijan territory for their anti-Iranian activities. Azerbaijan established control over the 130 km long Nagorno Karabakh-Iran border due to the 2020 war and opened two airports there – Fizuli and Zangelan – located very close to the Azerbaijan-Iran border. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Sweden and Finland have long followed a policy of military neutrality so as not to incur Russia’s wrath. However, the unprovoked Russian war against Ukraine has changed the attitude of these countries. Both Sweden and Finland announced their wish to join the North Atlantic Alliance in mid-May. Then, out of the blue, came obstruction from Turkey with the claim that both countries were financing terror and supporting Kurdish “terrorist” groups that Turkey has been trying to eliminate for the last 40 years or so. One of the major handicaps of the North Atlantic Treaty was and still is the omission of information about a NATO country blocking the participation of non-NATO states in NATO activities or the joining of new NATO members into the Alliance. Admission of new NATO members requires the unanimous consent of all members and the subsequent ratification of protocols by their respective parliaments. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

During my academic visit to New Delhi in February 2020, I met with Indian politicians and scholars and discussed opportunities for upgrading Armenian-Indian relations. While back then the idea of arms trade was still immature, I raised the issue of defence cooperation between the two countries. Through honest discussions about the Armenian cause, I came to a conclusion, which I summarized in a November 2020 article for the Armenian Weekly. Despite today’s tumultuous climate in Armenia, it’s reassuring to learn that this 2020 recommendation has materialized, and bilateral ties are taking military and strategic dimensions. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The first face to face meeting between Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and Turkish President, Recip Tayip Erdogan, took place in Prague on 6 October, on the margins of the summit of the European Political Community. Whilst in the summer there was hope of an early breakthrough in the Armenia-Turkey normalisation, decisions agreed by the special envoys of the two countries have not been implemented. May this latest meeting stimulate normalization, or further work in the process of building confidence and trust is required?
The first week of October 2022 was marked by intensive diplomacy around the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia threw the region back to the brink of a new large-scale war. It seemed that months-long Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations facilitated by the European Council President Charles Michel were fruitless. However, despite bleak predictions, a new wave of diplomatic activity was launched immediately after the ceasefire was reached on September 14. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

With the unprovoked military intervention in Ukraine, Russia has been isolated economically and politically due to the Western-imposed sanctions. But while the sanctions banned Russia from trading with the Western states, particularly in the energy field, some nations still prefer to maintain trade relations with Moscow. Countries like Iran, China and India are seeking to strengthen trade turnover by pushing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project for a better connection via a multimodal transport network that spans rail, road, and sea. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Tehran on July 19, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned against blocking the Armenian-Iranian border, stating, “If there is an effort to block the border between Iran and Armenia, the Islamic Republic will oppose it because this border has been a communication route for thousands of years.” After this warning, Turkish and Azerbaijani media started paying more attention to Iranian officials and launched a “war of words.” In response to media provocations and threats toward Armenia launched by Azerbaijan, Iran facilitated the appointment of a Consulate General in Syunik to redraw its “red lines” in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In the last 10 days, the most discussed issue amongst Armenian media, experts and political circles was the statement of Iran’s Supreme Leader during his meetings with the Russian and Turkish presidents held in Tehran. The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey gathered together to discuss the future of Syria in the Astana format amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine and complete rupture of Russia-West relations. Few could imagine that the Supreme Leader would mention Armenia and, in particular, the Armenia-Iran border during the summit. However, the Iranian message was clear: Iran will not tolerate the closure of the Armenia-Iran border. READ MORE

By Igor MATVEEV, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies, and RIAC expert, Moscow
Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine has sparked broad and intensive debates about future modalities of the relations between Russia and Iran in Syria. Western and Israeli analysts predict an essential growth of the political, military, and economic presence of Tehran due to Moscow’s attention switching from Syria to Ukraine. This, in turn, may shift the whole dynamics of the Russian-Iranian relations on the Syrian dossier. On the contrary, despite reports of minor pull-outs from Syria along with international media leaks about transfers of military sites to Iran and Hezbollah, Russian representatives consistently reject such forecasts, referring to a “routine rotation” but “absolutely not a withdrawal” of the Russian troops. Those speculations have intensified on the eve of the trilateral meeting of the Iranian, Russian, and Turkish leaders on Syria scheduled for July 19, 2022, in the Iranian capital. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

There should be realistic expectations of what can result from ongoing discussions on the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Given the current situation in the South Caucasus, the region is far away from peace, and no one should have hopes that Armenia – Turkey normalization will solve conflicts and bring an era of peace to the region. However, in the current situation, even a contribution to regional stability is too significant an opportunity to miss.
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly changed the geopolitics of the South Caucasus and triggered new processes. Turkey’s war involvement seemed to worsen further Armenia – Turkey relations. The Armenian government imposed a ban on imports from Turkey from January 2021 due to Turkey's open and evident promotion and support for the Azerbaijani war effort. However, after the early parliamentary elections in Armenia held in June 2021, Armenian officials started to speak about the necessity to normalize relations with Turkey. These discussions ended with the assignment of a special representatives to start negotiations, and the first meeting took place on January 14, 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The election of Joe Biden as president in November 2020 raised hopes among the international community that the United States will restore the nuclear deal signed in 2015. Many architects of the deal returned to positions in the White House and State Department. The other signatories of the deal, including the three EU states, China and Russia, were ready to contribute to the restoration of the deal. Conventional wisdom said that Iran should be interested in restoring the deal, too. The economic downturn triggered by the re-imposition of the US sanctions created significant challenges for the Iranian government. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, discussions have been underway about the impact of the war on the evolving global order. The transformation of the world order is a very complicated and multi-layered process, and history tells us that it takes decades and is often accompanied by bloody conflicts between great powers. In the last decade, there were several prevailing predictions of the world order – a new bipolar world dominated by the US and China, a multipolar world with several equal players such as the US, China, Russia, India and the EU, and a nonpolar world characterized by constant conflicts and instability. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Tensions between Turkey and Iran were recently rekindled by the latter constructing a dam over transboundary waterways, namely the Aras, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers. Iran is accusing Turkey of intentionally triggering a regional drought and water shortage –– both of which have impacted Iran brutally. Ankara says Iran’s claims are a diversion.

A new round of disagreements between Iran and Turkey began when Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian criticized Turkey’s dam projects on the Aras and Tigris rivers –– the main transboundary waterways in the region –– citing the threats to water flow in the area and environmental damage to regional states in his speech before Iran’s Parliament on May 10. Abdollahian said he has called on “his Turkish counterpart at least three times over the past months to pay serious attention to the construction of dams on the Aras River.” READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

As the “frozen conflict” with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) persists, the Ukrainian crisis poses a different challenge for Azerbaijan. “Neutrality” appears to be the watchword as Baku seeks to preserve its ties with both Moscow and Kyiv. While Baku is concerned about the developing situation, it potentially stands to benefit from the trouble with its gas exports to Europe. Given Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Russia after the war on Nagorno-Karabakh and its friendly relations with Ukraine (not to mention its significant gas reserves), some may think that Baku is in a prime position to benefit from the looming energy crisis presented by the region’s unrest. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia–Turkey normalization process was officially launched on January 14, 2022 when special representatives – the Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Ruben Rubinyan and Ambassador Serdar Kılıç – met in Moscow. The groundwork for this meeting began in mid-2021, when the Armenian government proposed the idea of peace in the South Caucasus and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia’s catastrophic defeat in the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to put aside one of the main obstacles to launching the Armenia–Turkey normalization process. The 2008-2009 “football diplomacy” failed mainly due to Turkey’s precondition to Armenia to return “occupied lands” to Azerbaijan. By signing the November 10, 2020 statement, the Armenian government accepted the loss of seven regions outside the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR), as well as 30-percent of territories of NKAR itself. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Coming to power after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Lukashenko had ruled Belarus in a highly autocratic fashion for almost three decades, while seeking to navigate his country within Moscow’s sphere of influence. However, the aging leader’s arbitrary rule began to teeter and he faced a major challenge in the election of 2020. When skewed and rigged election results were announced, hundreds of thousands of voters of Belarus peacefully protested their strong objections.
The West echoed moral support to the mass of citizens voicing democratic demands on the streets, but provided little material assistance. Somewhat optimistically and naively, the West trusted that the unarmed people would peacefully prevail over the coercive might of the internal and external dictators in Minsk and Moscow. Putin, by contrast, sensing a vulnerable and weakened regime, provided his fellow authoritarian colleague with external assistance to forcefully crush the peaceful demonstrators. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On January 19, 2022, Iranian President Dr. Ibrahim Raisi travelled to Moscow and met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in an effort to improve bilateral ties between both countries. The leaders discussed regional and international issues, among them the negotiations around Iran’s nuclear program and regional cooperation in Eurasia. However, contrary to expectations and some statements before the meeting, the visit, for now, has failed to achieve a major advance in addressing the Iranian expectations, mostly related to the signing of a strategic agreement like the one between China and Iran a year ago. Nevertheless, the visit pushed the negotiations between both sides to a higher level and facilitated Iran’s economic integration in Russian-Chinese Eurasian architecture. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

At the recent face-to-face meetings of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Sochi and Brussels at the end of 2021, the two leaders agreed to restore the Soviet-era Yeraskh- Julfa- Meghri- Horadiz railway connection between the two countries, which has not been in operation for three decades. However, the major expectations regarding the border delimitation/demarcation process and opening of Nakhchivan corridor remained unresolved. The last round of negotiations in Sochi was arranged in the light of deadly border skirmishes which left 13 soldiers killed on each side. While both leaders "agreed to take tangible steps for further de-escalation in the border area" the agreement on the railway connection between Baku and Yerevan was again reaffirmed during the Brussels meeting hosted by European Council President Charles Michel on December 14. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Neither Russia nor China are interested in complete decoupling from the West, and both would like to maintain cooperative relations with the EU while fighting back against US pressure. In this context a Russia – China alliance against the 'Collective West" and the establishment of a new “iron curtain” completely separating them from Europe is possibly the worst outcome for Beijing and Moscow.
The end of the "unipolar moment" and the painful process of the emergence of the new world order ushered in a stand-off between Russia and the West around the transformation of the post-cold war European security architecture. On the surface, Russia and the West are arguing about the future of the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine, but the fate of Kyiv is only the tip of the iceberg. The real fight is about the future of European security architecture in a multi-polar, more unstable, and conflict-prone global order. READ MORE

Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Amid heightened tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, the issue of Georgia’s path to NATO membership is once again in the spotlight. While Tbilisi has made real progress in its military reform efforts, the major hurdle is political, not military, in nature and until the Alliance can achieve consensus, the future of Georgia’s relationship with NATO will remain uncertain. In March 2019, then-Georgian Defence Minister Levan Izoria heralded a new era in military reform: “In the past we trained our soldiers for external deployment, but the new emphasis is now on self-defence” — or rather territorial defence, a process that began to be addressed by U.S.-based military advisers in July 2016. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 14, 2022, the special representatives of Armenia and Turkey met in Moscow to launch the normalization process between the two countries. The recent turmoil in Kazakhstan and intensive Russia – US, Russia – NATO negotiations on the future of the European security architecture have cast some shadow on the meeting, as the attention of the international media and expert and academic community was focused on more significant issues. Meanwhile, the meeting in Moscow was a remarkable event at the regional level. Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, fully aligned itself with Azerbaijan, and imposed an economic blockade on Armenia, seeking to force Yerevan to give up Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

2023 will be a crucial elections year in Turkey, and there is no certainty that president Erdogan and his AK Party can maintain their hold on power. The stakes are high and political turmoil will have implications way beyond Turkey itself.

The latest Russia-US and Russia-NATO tensions have entirely shifted the attention of the media and the expert community to Ukraine. Tens, if not hundreds, of papers and policy briefs are published daily, seeking to understand what Russia wants in Ukraine and whether Russia and the West will come to a diplomatic solution and avoid war. As a NATO member and Black Sea littoral state Turkey has a significant role in these calculations. What will be Turkey's reaction if war breaks out in or around Ukraine, and how will the war impact Russia - Turkey relations in other regions – the Middle East, South Caucasus, Balkans, and North Africa? READ MORE