By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

Armenia and Azerbaijan remain at an impasse in their ongoing peace process, facing the conditions of withdrawing international lawsuits and agreeing on a ban against third-party military forces along their border. Armenia’s constitutional claims over Karabakh and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group remain sensitive topics. Azerbaijan insists on amending Armenia’s constitution to eliminate future territorial disputes, while Armenia faces legal and political hurdles in making such changes. Disagreements over reopening transportation links further hinder the peace process. Azerbaijan demands an “unimpeded” land passage to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia’s Meghri region, while Armenia insists on controlled transit. This unresolved dispute continues to block progress toward a final agreement. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, ISPI Senior Associate Research Fellow


Armenia signed an agreement to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in May 2014 after halting the process of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union. Many observers noted that Armenia’s then-President Serzh Sargsyan reversed his foreign policy following a meeting with Russia’s president in September 2013 in a U-turn. This decision paved the way for Armenia’s EAEU membership and halted the negotiation of an agreement that would have included, inter alia, a free-trade agreement with the EU. The reversal was likely made under Russian pressure and was influenced by geopolitical and geo-economic considerations. Armenia, supporting the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in its conflict with Azerbaijan, saw its alliance with Russia as a crucial deterrent against hostile neighbours, including Azerbaijan, which had significantly increased its military spending. READ MORE

By Daria ISACHENKO, PhD, Associate Researcher, SWP Berlin/ CATS
Franziska SMOLNIK, PhD, Senior Fellow, SWP Berlin

Turkey is a NATO ally, an EU membership candidate, and a confident geopolitical actor. The latter aspect is uppermost in Berlin’s assessment of Ankara’s policy in the South Caucasus, where Turkey’s growing influence is recognised. If they are to make the most of the potential for cooperation, Ankara, and Berlin each need to acknowledge the other’s foreign policy framework and find ways to reconcile Turkey’s autonomous line with Germany’s EU-oriented and often normative approach.
The current state of Turkish foreign policy towards the South Caucasus rather resembles the situation in the Balkans, where “Ankara pursues a parallel, as opposed to an adversarial, strategy to that of the West”. Given that the South Caucasus does not involve sensitive issues such as those that characterise Ankara’s and Berlin’s bilateral relations, nor flashpoints in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean where their positions clearly diverge, it should theoretically be possible for Ankara and Berlin to start exploring areas of cooperation. If that is to happen, a middle ground will need to be found between Turkey’s autonomous action and Germany’s EU-embedded approach. Moreover, Berlin – and Brussels – will have to determine more clearly how to reconcile normative and geopolitical interests. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Policy Advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations and Head of Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group

Azerbaijan’s strategic location in the South Caucasus, economic potential, and historical ties with Turkic states underscore its regional significance. Positioned as a vital energy corridor, it fosters economic diversification, infrastructure development, and diplomatic engagement with Central Asia. Azerbaijan plays a key role in regional connectivity, humanitarian initiatives, and multilateral cooperation within the Organization of Turkic States, shaping geopolitical dynamics.
Situated at the nexus of Europe and Asia, Azerbaijan’s proximity to significant energy producers and consumers has established it as a vital transit corridor for energy resources. This strategic positioning has not only reinforced Azerbaijan’s centrality in regional energy security but also facilitated avenues for collaboration and partnerships with neighbouring states. In addition to its prominence in the energy sector, Azerbaijan has pursued economic diversification, fostering expertise in fields such as advanced technology, transportation, and tourism. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On December 25, Azerbaijan ended 2024 in nationwide sorrow and resentment following the crash of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243 near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The Embraer 190 aircraft, carrying 67 passengers from Baku to Grozny, Chechnya, attempted an emergency landing but tragically crashed. Among those aboard were Azerbaijani, Russian, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz nationals. While 29 people survived, 38, including two pilots and a flight attendant, lost their lives. Initial reports attributed the crash to a collision with a flock of birds, but this theory was soon refuted when parts of the aircraft were found to bear shrapnel marks. The following day, Azerbaijani officials revealed that the crash was caused by a Russian surface-to-air missile, which exploded near the aircraft mid-flight, with shrapnel injuring passengers and crew. This incident has strained Azerbaijan-Russia relations, as Moscow refused to accept responsibility for the tragedy. READ MORE

By Tabib HUSEYNOV, independent policy analyst and researcher

This article explores Azerbaijan’s evolving and increasingly more assertive foreign policy doctrine, which began to take shape following its victory over Armenia in the 2020 Second Karabakh War and was further solidified after its 2023 blitzkrieg operation, which dismantled institutionalized separatism within its territory. Conceptualized through the framework of strategic autonomy, this new doctrine is firmly anchored in realist and neorealist schools of thought, emphasizing pragmatic, interest-driven relationships with major regional and global powers while avoiding geopolitical entanglements. The paper argues that Azerbaijan’s quest for strategic autonomy is both a response to external pressures and a means to assert agency within the broader Eurasian security landscape. It also describes Azerbaijan as a “geopolitical interconnector”, capable of punching above its weight in contributing to international security, owing to its strategic location and diplomatic outreach across opposing blocs. The paper enriches scholarly discussions on strategic autonomy with a practical case study, offering a novel analytical framework to understand Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and its potential impact on regional and global geopolitics. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Head of Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group and Policy Expert at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center

The strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR) has grown in recent years, paralleling geopolitical and economic developments on both global and regional scales. Against the backdrop of global logistics markets adapting to new conditions, the development of this multifaceted transport route, which encompasses transit states in Central Eurasia such as Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Georgia, has become a priority for many nations and multinational corporations. Following prolonged delays in traditional transport and logistics corridors caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trans-Caspian Corridor began to gain prominence in global freight transport. Its importance was further highlighted after the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war, creating new long-term opportunities for the sustained development of this multimodal trans-regional route. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies


Currently, the situation is intriguing. Both sides claim substantial progress in peace talks. At the December 5 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Ministerial Council, Armenia’s foreign minister announced that the preamble to the peace agreement text and 15 out of its 17 articles had been finalized. The Armenian prime minister later stated that 90% of the text was agreed. However, according to the Azerbaijani state-affiliated think tank AIR Center, at least three contentious issues remain unresolved: the presence of the European Union (EU) mission in Armenia, constitutional and legal changes in Armenia, and the withdrawal of Armenia’s legal cases against Azerbaijan in international courts. Baku has also proposed two other preconditions to any peace agreement. These include dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group and establishing a “Zangezur corridor” free of Armenian control. READ MORE

Bakhram Sotiboldiev,
Head of the Department of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

In today's rapidly changing world, Uzbekistan confidently positions itself as one of the key players on the international stage. The country’s foreign policy, reinvigorated with the election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as President in 2016, demonstrates impressive results, transforming the republic into a significant center for regional and global diplomacy. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On October 3, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan hosted a high-level event in collaboration with the European Union, the Central Asian countries located along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (also known as the Middle Corridor), the South Caucasus states, and Türkiye, as well as the major international financial institutions. The event resulted in the establishment of a Coordination Platform for the Middle Corridor. According to the European Union, the Coordination Platform will focus on promoting the transit corridor and implementing priority infrastructure projects while coordinating investments in the South Caucasus and Türkiye. The European Union announced plans to launch a regional transport program in 2025 to support infrastructure development and provide technical assistance for improving standards, digitalization, and interoperability across the region. The Middle Corridor is an essential route that will allow Central Asia to better access Europe without having to go through sanctioned Russia, but it still faces numerous economic, logistical, and political roadblocks in its development. READ MORE

Samariddin Sattorov,
Chief Researcher of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

In recent years, geopolitical tensions have been increasing in different regions of the world, and interethnic conflicts and contradictions on religious grounds continue to worsen.
In the context of such instability, maintaining an open and constructive dialogue between different religious and cultural groups is becoming vital. Strengthening religious tolerance helps to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding, respect and generosity in society, which in turn alleviates tensions and prevents the escalation of conflicts. READ MORE

Export is a key driver of the economy, enabling the development of production, the creation of new jobs, and the growth of GDP. For this reason, every state seeks to support enterprises aiming to expand their exports to international markets. This article explores the comprehensive measures of direct support for exporters in Uzbekistan.
Export support in Uzbekistan is carried out systematically, strictly adhering to the goal set in the Uzbekistan 2030 Strategy — increasing the share of the private sector in exports to 60%.
Here are some indicative figures: from 2017 to 2023, Uzbekistan’s total exports reached $120 billion. In 2023 alone, export volumes amounted to $24 billion, marking a 64% increase compared to 2017.
READ MORE

By Tabib Huseynov, independent policy analyst and researcher

In a move that has left many in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and beyond scratching their heads, the Armenian Constitutional Court adopted on September 26 a landmark ruling No. 1749, greenlighting the border delimitation process with Azerbaijan. The text of the ruling (henceforth referred to as Ruling 1749 or simply, the ruling) was published three days later over the weekend, which invites questions about whether this delay was intended to minimize scrutiny as the initial news cycle on the decision faded and public attention shifted elsewhere. Some Armenian commentators hailed the ruling, claiming it invalidates Baku's criticism that Armenia's Constitution harbours territorial claims against Azerbaijan. On October 4, Armenian foreign ministry spokesperson Ani Badalyan echoed this argument, claiming the ruling proves Armenia’s Constitution contains no territorial claims. READ MORE

Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections were held in Georgia. Long before election day, they were called the most crucial Georgian elections since the 2003 Rose Revolution. Opposition parties presented the election as a choice between Russia and Europe, while the ruling Georgian Dream Party described it as a choice between peace and war. In both cases, geopolitics played a significant role.
The opposition accused the Georgian Dream of steering Georgia away from European integration. At the same time, the government claimed that the opposition sought to open a second front against Russia, transforming Georgia into another Ukraine. Georgian Dream even displayed posters on Tbilisi streets contrasting images of a peaceful Tbilisi with war-ravaged Ukrainian cities. Recent actions by the Georgian government, including the passage of a law on transparency of foreign influence and an anti-LGBT propaganda law, have strained Georgia’s relations with the West. The European Union halted the accession process and cancelled funding from the European Peace Facility, while the United States imposed sanctions on several Georgian officials. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On August 18–19, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a two-day visit to Azerbaijan. This marked the first state visit by a Russian president to the South Caucasian republic and only the second visit in the bilateral relationship since former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev’s trip to Moscow in 2002. Contrary to expectations from local observers, the visit did not yield any significant agreements or binding political and economic arrangements. A few announcements were made regarding future joint initiatives, including cooperation on food security, labour inspections, the establishment of a Russian-Azerbaijani university, and the joint production of oil tankers. An agreement was also reached to expand the partnership between Russia’s public joint-stock company (PJSC) Gazprom and the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) . Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller revealed that the two sides agreed to broaden their “multifaceted strategic partnership,” particularly concerning the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) project. He also mentioned the planned signing of a comprehensive scientific and technical cooperation program in September. While few details were disclosed, this marked their first public reference to the INSTC project, about which little is currently known. Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan demonstrates how Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the region, which could lead to neighbouring states, such as Iran and Armenia, feeling threatened. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On June 11, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended a session of the BRICS group (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Moscow. While there, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. During the face-to-face meeting with Putin, Fidan discussed bilateral economic and political relations, focusing on the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East caused by the war in Gaza. Putin vowed to “fully support” Turkish membership in BRICS and build stronger ties to facilitate further economic cooperation. Fidan’s visit to Russia came shortly after he visited China, where he reiterated Ankara’s willingness to join BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These pronouncements have raised eyebrows in the West. US Ambassador to Türkiye Jeff Flake declared that Türkiye’s place is “in the West” and voiced his hope that Ankara would decide against joining the bloc. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On August 7, 2024, Elchin Amirbayov, President Ilham Aliyev’s senior envoy for special assignments, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that Baku had agreed to withdraw the issue of the “Zangezur Corridor” from Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations and “refer it to a later stage.” This statement put Russia in a difficult position, as it had aimed to control the transit routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, according to the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement signed by the heads of state of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. As such, Russia attempted to revive the issue but met Iranian opposition. This article will highlight U.S. involvement in containing Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, Russia’s objective behind bringing back the corridor issue and Tehran’s harsh stance against Moscow. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The relationship between Armenia and Turkiye has a significant influence on the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus. The Turkish blockade of Armenia and refusal to establish diplomatic relations, coupled with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, have restricted Armenia’s ability to pursue a more flexible foreign policy, effectively binding it to an alliance with Russia. Normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye would allow Yerevan to explore foreign and defence policy alternatives beyond its reliance on Russia. The United States has persistently advocated for Armenia–Turkiye normalization, viewing this as an essential step in untangling the post-1994 status quo in the South Caucasus, which is marked by Russian dominance through its military and economic presence in Armenia. Washington has actively engaged in many efforts, including track 1, track 1.5, and track 2 diplomacy, with initiatives such as the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission and the 2008–2009 “football diplomacy” serving as notable examples. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On July 11 and 12, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev paid a state visit to Pakistan to bolster bilateral ties with Islamabad. The visit came less than two weeks after Aliyev’s meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for their first-ever trilateral summit. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit on July 3 in Astana and was a significant milestone in elevating their tripartite cooperation from parliamentary and ministerial levels to state leadership. Both Aliyev’s visit to Islamabad and the trilateral summit of Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Türkiye highlight the three countries’ commitment to expanding their trilateral trade and transit cooperation, as well as better integrating their military capabilities and defence production. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Recently, Azerbaijan–Pakistan ties have grown significantly through economic and military-technical cooperation. Pakistan threw its full support behind Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, supplying weapons and providing training for Azerbaijani special forces. When Azerbaijan claimed victory in November 2020, the streets of Baku were full of Pakistani flags. Relations grew closer still after 2020, with intensive negotiations to buy Pakistani-made military jets and supply Azerbaijani gas to Pakistan. They discussed a series of joint projects worth $2 billion, setting up a bilateral committee to develop the projects. Most importantly, President Aliyev expressed his full support for Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, claiming that international law and justice are on the side of Pakistan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Following the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of Armenians, Azerbaijan has pursued a double-pronged strategy in negotiations with Armenia. Its first approach has been to undermine Western-led Brussels and Washington negotiation formats while showing an interest in resuming negotiations on the Moscow or regional platform. President Ilham Aliyev cancelled participation in the Granada summit of the European Policy Community in October and the scheduled tripartite meeting in Brussels facilitated by the European Council president, Charles Michel. In November, Azerbaijan rejected the United States’ offer to resume negotiations with foreign ministers in Washington. Baku explained its decision by claiming that the European Union, France, and the US have a pro-Armenian or anti-Azerbaijani stance. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has several times expressed its readiness to resume negotiations in Russia or on regional platforms. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

A long road has been passed since Armenia and Azerbaijan were fighting a violent war that erupted in the wake of the deadlock in the peace negotiations for around three decades. As President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan rightfully said, the chance for peace was eventually brought about by the war in 2020 that put an end to the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories. Having liberated its occupied territories, Azerbaijan immediately initiated a peace treaty with Armenia based on the fundamental principles of international relations, including mutual recognition of each other’s territorial integrity and non-use of force. It is a telling fact that Azerbaijan put forward this initiative in March 2022, when the Armenian separatist regime still had some control over the parts of the Karabakh region where Russia’s peacekeeping mission was temporarily deployed. This clearly manifested Baku’s intention to peacefully reintegrate the Armenian population in the Karabakh region and diplomatically resolve the remaining disputes with Armenia. READ MORE

By Anahide PILIBOSSIAN, Vice President of Strategy and Development, APRI Armenia
Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Despite economic challenges and existing agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union, Armenia seeks closer alignment with the EU.
The recent statement of the Armenian Foreign Minister in the margins of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum denotes Armenia’s desire to join the European Union. This aspiration raises important questions on Armenia’s current position and options, which this article seeks to shed light on. At the same time, today’s complicated geopolitical environment highlights the need for the EU to formulate a strategic vision for the region. Between Pax Europa and Pax Russica, Armenia first went with the latter. However, following Yerevan’s defeat in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the military takeover of the region by Azerbaijan, despite the presence of the Russian peacekeepers, Armenia has now opted for the former. It stated its desire, backed by the EU, to join the Black Sea energy cable project (from which it has been excluded, reportedly as a result of pressures from Azerbaijan) and promote a regional infrastructure and connectivity project called the Crossroad of Peace, embracing, as European leaders did after World War II, the peace-building effects of economic regional integration projects. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia is still absorbing the implications of the protests that overwhelmed Yerevan on May 9. On April 19, 2024, the Armenian and Azerbaijani border delimitation and demarcation commissions signed the protocol on the delimitation and demarcation process in the Tavush region of Armenia. That agreement granted Azerbaijan control over a patch of territory along that border that had been officially part of Soviet Azerbaijan but controlled by Armenia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The movement “Tavush for the Motherland” started with the closure of the Armenia-Georgia interstate highway near the village of Kirants in the Tavush region, one of the villages that was going to be affected by the process. Later, it transformed into a march towards Yerevan. Protestors led by Tavush Archbishop Bagrat reached Yerevan on May 9, 2024, and at a rally asked for Prime Minister Pashinyan's resignation. The rally was followed by several rallies in Yerevan in the last two weeks, sometimes accompanied by clashes with police. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On May 10 and 11, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, respectively, met for another round of bilateral peace negotiations in Almaty, Kazakhstan. It was the second meeting this year between the two sides after meeting in Berlin on February 28 and 29. The Almaty talks came after the initiation of the delimitation process on the Armenian-Azerbaijani interstate border, with the return of four non-enclave villages to Azerbaijan in April (see EDM, April 17, 23, May 14). The act was celebrated by some as the first instance in the post-Soviet era of a peaceful resolution in the long-standing territorial disputes between the two countries (Azertag.az, April 19; State.gov, April 28). The two parties hope to build on this progress and foster a constructive atmosphere during the talks in Almaty. These developments point to progress in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, demonstrating both sides’ willingness to pursue improved relations. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On April 17, 2024, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, at a meeting with the residents of Kirants village in the Tavush region, said that for the past 30 years, the residents have lived “in the conditions of lawlessness, and the time has come to put an end to this, to establish a rule of law” in the region. The PM added: “Our idea is for you not to say Azerbaijan is 50 meters away, but to say, wow, it is good that Azerbaijan is 50 meters away. We will trade there. We will build the economy there. Maybe we will build another checkpoint. Cars will come and go and pay the Republic of Armenia.” He later continued: “Now you can say to me: Do you 100-percent guarantee that you will do this? I will answer, I don’t guarantee 100-percent, but I know that by taking step by step, we will reach 90-percent or even more.” Azerbaijan insists that there are four bordering villages near Armenia’s Tavush and Azerbaijan’s Qazax region that must be ceded to Azerbaijan. Baku argues that these villages were taken by Armenian forces in the early 1990s.” READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On March 27, 2024, a high-level group named “Friends of Armenia Network” headed by the former Danish Prime Minister and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen published a white paper aiming to “galvanize support for democratic Armenia and promote peace in South Caucasus.” The title of the paper is “Deepening EU-Armenia Relations: More Europe in Armenia; More Armenia in Europe,” and the authors include former prime ministers, European parliamentarians and diplomats.
“Armenia is pivoting to the West,” the paper argues, and the EU has a strategic and value-based interest in supporting this pivot. To succeed, both Yerevan and Brussels need to make a “substantial, long-term strategic commitment in terms of resources, security cooperation, trade relations, and political engagement.” To make this pivot “irreversible,” the EU must grant Armenia “EU candidate status,” which would match Yerevan’s strategic orientation, back up its geopolitical commitments and minimize the impact of Moscow’s reaction to Yerevan by increasing the latter’s resilience. READ MORE

Dear participants of the forum!
Ladies and gentlemen!
At the outset, let me sincerely welcome you at the third Tashkent International Investment Forum.

I would like to note with pleasure that within the framework of this format, which is becoming a great annual tradition, new and reliable partners from all continents of the world are gathering in our country. Over the past three years, this Forum has provided a broad platform for enhancing collaboration, discussing pressing issues, and generating fruitful ideas and solutions to tackle the most urgent challenges. READ MORE

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev will pay a state visit to Tajikistan on April 18-19 at the invitation of President Emomali Rahmon.

As close neighbors whose peoples are historically and culturally inseparable from each other, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have brought their relations to the level of strategic partnership and alliance.
The close and constructive political dialog established between the leaders of the two countries, supported by regular bilateral and multilateral meetings, plays a huge role in the development of mutually beneficial and fruitful cooperation. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

From March 17 to 19, Jens Stoltenberg, secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), embarked on his first tour of the South Caucasus, visiting Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (NATO, March 19). During this tour, he engaged with each country’s political leadership. In Azerbaijan, he also met with the defence and foreign ministers. Stoltenberg’s visit occurred amid deteriorating relations between Russia and Armenia, an ongoing stalemate in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, and political uncertainty in Georgia before parliamentary elections in October 2024. Each one of these situations points toward the possibility of renewed confrontation and prolonged instability in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan was a watershed moment in the conflict. Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory by force, defying decades-long widespread perception among OSCE Co-chair countries and other actors that the conflict had no military solution. Many expected that the demise of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would pave the way for the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement, thus bringing long-awaited stability to the region. However, it appeared that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was only one part of the bigger puzzle of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. After September 2023, Azerbaijan brought back the narrative of a corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, despite the fact that there was no Lachin corridor anymore connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh and started to highlight the necessity to change the Armenian constitution and other laws READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The South Caucasus will be the epicentre of any political or economic friction between Russia and the Middle East. The region, located along the International North-South Transport Corridor, is the most feasible gateway to connect Russia to the Middle East. Russia’s increasing economic and political interaction and involvement in the Middle East will further enhance its dependency on Azerbaijan, due to its bridging location, and Turkey, its partner in addressing upheavals in the Arab region. These two factors may push Russia to pressure Armenia to agree on the implementation of article nine of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement on unblocking economic and transport communications in the region and deploying Russian border guards to control the transit road connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. By doing so, Russia assumes it would increase its leverage on the main actors in the region that will use the transit route connecting Europe to China. The main actor within this context is Turkey, which aims to use the shortest route (compared to the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route) to trade with the Central Asian republics and beyond. READ MORE

In the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan, a country known for its dazzling architecture and rich history, is emerging as a promising eco-tourism destination.

Eco-tourism in Uzbekistan presents an opportunity to explore the country’s natural beauty while contributing to its sustainable development. As more travelers seek out eco-friendly travel options, Uzbekistan stands as a testament to the power of eco-tourism to transform not just the landscape, but also the lives of the people who call it home. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On January 10, 2024, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev gave a 2.5-hour interview with local TV channels. In his interview, Aliyev not only repeated false remarks and justified the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians of Artsakh but also threatened Armenia. When it comes to delimiting and demarcating the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, he rejected the old Soviet maps proposed by Armenia, arguing, “In the 20th century, the lands of Azerbaijan were given to Armenia in parts. One day after the establishment of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic in 1918, the ancient Azerbaijani city of Erevan was handed over to Armenia. After the Sovietization in April 1920, in November, the Soviet government took the bigger part of Western Zangezur from Azerbaijan and handed it over to Armenia. By May 1969, Azerbaijani lands were given to Armenia in parts, and from an area of about 100,000 square kilometres, it dropped to 86,600 square kilometres.” READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of Armenians, there were some hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan received everything it could dream of just a few years ago.
After September 2023, Azerbaijan controlled the entire Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government accepted that reality with no intention to challenge it, while the international community did nothing tangible to punish Azerbaijan or create conditions to bring Armenians back. President Ilham Aliyev proved to everyone that he was not a “golden boy” who became president just because he was the son of a prominent leader – Heydar Aliyev – and lacked basic governance skills. He succeeded where his father failed, taking control over Nagorno Karabakh and raising Azerbaijani flags in Shushi and Stepanakert. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In just one month, the world will mark the second anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian war. During this period, assessments on the course and possible outcomes of the war underwent significant changes several times. At the end of February 2022, almost everyone was sure that the war would end very quickly with Russia’s victory, bringing a change of government in Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced by a pro-Russian figure. Already in September 2022, after successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, expectations changed dramatically. This time, many were sure of Russia’s imminent defeat. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Amid the escalating Gaza war, a striking absence marks the regional conflict landscape: the non-involvement of the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ including Iran and its proxies. Nearly six weeks into the war, these forces have consistently communicated their decision to remain on the sidelines. This inaction comes into sharp focus against the backdrop of Iran’s strategy to leverage non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas in its proxy warfare. While Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, clarified their stance in a much-anticipated speech a month into the conflict, the impact of this abstention is profound. Israel, grappling with internal divisions and security vulnerabilities heightened by Hamas’s attacks, finds itself in a precarious position not seen in decades. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched an “anti-terrorist operation” in the Karabakh region against armed separatist forces. The operation followed three years of largely unproductive peace talks between Armenian and Azerbaijan following the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The clashes ended in a ceasefire after only one day due to the separatist regime’s limited military-technical capacity in resisting the well-equipped Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Baku’s allies were quick to applaud the move. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during a joint news conference with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, declared, “It is a matter of pride that the operation was successfully completed in a short period of time, with utmost sensitivity to the rights of civilians”. Turkey has traditionally been a staunch ally of Azerbaijan, and the recent military operation to reclaim Karabakh plays into Ankara’s regional interests, especially regarding the future development and opening of the Zangezur Corridor. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

EU-Azerbaijan relations are important for both sides, and the Brussels format of the Armenia-Azerbaijani peace talks, are likewise important to reach negotiated solutions over the remaining unresolved questions between Baku and Yerevan. The reactivation of the Brussels format and the revitalization of the constructive role of the EU in the South Caucasus should happen sooner rather than later. A balanced approach by the EU and its leading member states vis-à-vis the countries of the region is of utmost necessity towards this end.
On 25 October, Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, announced that the scheduled meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with the mediation of the European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels [known as the Brussels format of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks] had been postponed due to scheduling problems. Previously, another EU-brokered summit between these two leaders from the South Caucasus, originally planned to take place on the sidelines of the European Political Community gathering on 5 October, was cancelled by the Azerbaijani side. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On July 9, Turkey freed the commanders of the well-known Ukrainian Azov regiment after months of hosting them as a part of a deal with Russia. The fighters surrendered to Russian forces after weeks of brutal siege and resistance at the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol, even after the rest of the city had fallen following Russia’s devastating and relentless assaults. Ankara’s surprise move came during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s first official visit to Turkey since the Russian invasion in February 2022 to meet his counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and discuss the possibilities of deepening their strategic partnership. Amid rhetoric on expanding the two countries’ cooperation in defense and security, Erdogan also declared, “Ukraine deserves to be a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] member”. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 kilometre model of ship network, rail and road project, was initiated in 2000 by Russia, Iran and India to facilitate trade between India, Russia and Europe. Azerbaijan, Armenia and other countries joined the initiative in 2005. This transport corridor aims to reduce the delivery time of cargo from India to Russia and Northern Europe to the Persian Gulf and beyond. Compared to the sea route via the Suez Canal, this route’s distance shrinks by more than half, which brings the term and cost of transportation down. If the present delivery time on this route is over six weeks, it is expected to decrease to three weeks through this corridor.
In my March 2021 analysis “Armenia and India’s Vision of ‘North-South Corridor’: A Strategy or a ‘Pipe Dream?’” I warned that Armenia’s inability to play an active transit role between Russia/Europe and Iran/India will isolate the republic from regional trade. Between 2005-2018, Armenia did little to finalize the north-south strategic highway connecting its northern border to the southern border, mainly due to public corruption and carelessness. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe.
Energy has long been the core element of Azerbaijan's pragmatic foreign policy, and recently it gained more impetus as European nations sought additional energy suppliers to replace Russian fossil fuel exports. Although the EU’s leading member countries are able to compensate for energy shortages by using energy reserves, employing alternative energy sources and importing additional gas volumes from alternative suppliers, the less developed Balkan states are struggling to adapt to the energy deficit. Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On a diplomatic level, Turkey tried to launch “Astana style” diplomatic measures to address Nagorno-Karabakh. However, given the fact that the conflict was taking place in the post-Soviet space, Russia failed to see much incentive in engaging in a bilateral track with Turkey in the form of a new “Astana style” process where Turkey and Russia were going to be equal partners, addressing a conflict in Russia’s “backyard”.
The year 2022 witnessed intensified dialogues between top Syrian and Turkish officials. These kicked off with an August meeting in Damascus between Ali Mamlouk, the Head of the National Security Bureau of the Ba’ath Party and a Special Security Advisor to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Hakan Fidan, the Head of Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT). They concluded with a tripartite December meeting in Moscow, where Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu hosted his Syrian and Turkish colleagues Ali Mahmoud Abbas and Hulusi Akar (remarkably, Ali Mamlouk and Hakan Fidan were also present). Those meetings prompted world media and political experts to speculate about an “unthinkable” Syrian-Turkish rapprochement becoming “thinkable”. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On December 12, under the pretext of environmentalism, dozens of Azerbaijani state-backed “eco-activists” blocked the only land corridor in the Stepanakert-Shushi section connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. As anticipated, the “environmental” slogans were soon politicized, and political demands were raised by enforcing a blockade. A humanitarian disaster was created for the 120,000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. The real question is why Azerbaijan went for such a provocation and at what risk? Hence, in this article, I will shed light on the current crisis based on my meetings with Azerbaijani experts (keeping their identities anonymous) on the sidelines of several international conferences and online interviews I have conducted to analyze the Azerbaijani perspective and highlight the threats, arguing that the current humanitarian crisis is much deeper than the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it is related with the “battle of corridors” and beyond. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The devastating earthquakes of 7.8 and 7.5 magnitudes struck southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. As of February 12, the death toll passed 30,000, while the number of wounded reached almost 100,000. More than 12,000 buildings were destroyed, and large-scale rescue operations are underway. Besides the immense human tragedy, the earthquake will have domestic and foreign policy implications for Turkey. The country faces crucial presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for May 14. After the earthquake, discussions started about possibly postponing the elections, given the scale of destruction.
Turkey’s authorities have declared a three-month emergency in provinces affected by the earthquake. Many wonder about the possibility of pursuing an election campaign in the current circumstances. According to Turkey’s constitution, elections should occur by June 18, 2023. Only the start of a war gives authorities a legal option to postpone elections for one year. However, some experts argue that the government may apply to the Constitutional court asking for a one-year postponement claiming that the current emergency equals the launch of military activities. READ MORE