By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan has pursued a strategy based on coercive diplomacy and military blackmail in negotiations with Armenia. Azerbaijan seeks to force Armenia to accept its two primary demands – to accept that Nagorno-Karabakh as a territorial administrative unit does not exist anymore and to provide Azerbaijan with a corridor via Syunik to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. Military incursions into Armenia are one of the main tools used by Azerbaijan to push forward with its coercive strategy. As a result of multiple aggressive actions, Azerbaijan has occupied up to 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory. Russia and the CSTO provided muted reactions to Azerbaijani aggression, so Armenia decided to involve other international players to deter further attacks. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The recent war of words between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the developments of the last several weeks, have demonstrated that both sides are far from inking a peace deal, which was promised by the end of 2022. Although both states vowed to intensify joint efforts on the final peace treaty in October 2022 on the sidelines of the Prague summit, little has been done since. On the contrary, the failure to hold peace negotiations has been magnified by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s controversial statements regarding Moscow’s non-recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh, which have immensely increased the risks of renewed hostilities between Baku and Yerevan. Although Russia maintains the role of “key mediator” on the Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan now openly demonstrates its discontent over Moscow’s role in the peace process, particularly after the merely symbolic meeting in Sochi on October 3. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Despite the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine and the continuing reassurances coming from NATO that Georgia’s interests are being taken into consideration, Georgia’s NATO accession process has come to an impasse. Instead of reaching a national consensus and keeping society united, the population remains divided and polarised. The only progress that can be highlighted is the forthcoming manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles and the establishment of a Cyber Security Command.

Difficult Realities
Notwithstanding the deceptive external calm vis-à-vis ongoing skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran’s military exercises on the border with Azerbaijan, and Turkey’s ongoing operations against the PKK in Syria, Georgia remains vulnerable to any potential conflict with Russia. What is more, Georgia has no allies or partners that will come to its rescue in case of military conflict with Russia. Georgia is in a ‘grey area’ with respect to Russia, and will therefore need to rely on its own strengths and resourcefulness. READ MORE

An open letter signed by people from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and other countries

We, a group of people who stand for peace, from the post-Soviet space and its neighbourhood exhausted by never-ending wars and growing imperialist rivalry on our territories, are full of rage as we have observed Azerbaijan’s recent large-scale attack on Armenia. This, coupled with Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine and the renewed military clashes in border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, raises heavy concerns regarding possible future escalations not only in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict but all other conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
The recent attack on Armenia has costed hundreds of lives within two days from both sides of the conflict, caused serious destruction to civil infrastructure in Armenia, displaced thousands, and further widened the gap between the countries and their people. We raise our persistent voices against the continuing warfare. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only route connecting the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic with the outside world. The corridor is blocked by "eco–activists," who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor the copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno Karabakh. They argued that Nagorno Karabakh authorities did not meet international standards. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase – the resignation of the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor were among the new demands added. Anyone, who has at least a basic understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has followed the developments there since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, has no doubts that what has been going on in the Lachin corridor for almost a month is connected with geopolitics, rather than benign environmental concerns. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, I participated in multiple international and regional workshops and conferences in Europe and Russia and met with many European, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Iranian and Russian experts and politicians. These opportunities and encounters made me realize that we as Armenians must adapt to a new reality, revise our strategy (if we have one) and try to confront the dangers with the resources that we have. The possibility of a new war with Azerbaijan is very high, but proactive diplomacy and deterrence can postpone a major military clash.
I also realized a change in attitude in many Azerbaijani experts. Of course, we cannot generalize, but from their perspective, Azerbaijanis still firmly believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has been resolved, which the West and Russia do not agree on. They do not have enough leverage to force their will on Baku, as Azerbaijan is playing its energy card very well for now. Azerbaijanis have come to realize that if they enforce their will over Nagorno-Karabakh and engage in ethnic cleansing, there will be international backlash. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last three weeks have proved that Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from signing a peace agreement, at least by the end of 2022. There is a danger that Azerbaijan may interpret this as a failure of the peace process and use this as a "moral justification" to launch a new large-scale aggression. If this happens, it will push Armenia and Azerbaijan further back from any chance to reach an agreement and deepen the mutual mistrust.
In recent months Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process passed through several ups and downs. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression seemed to jeopardize the fragile achievements reached during the three Brussel summits held in April, May, and August 2022. However, immediately after the ceasefire reached on September 14, there was a new push toward reaching a peace agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in New York in late September and Geneva on October 2; Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan had a meeting with President Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington on September 27, 2022. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, the liberation of Kherson has already been assessed as a great military and an important political and psychological victory for Ukraine. Now it is possible to analyze what new opportunities this gives to the Ukrainian army and how things will develop. At the same time, the Russian forces launched a massive offensive in the Donetsk region, and are carrying out more intensive missile attacks against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine, as a result of which, first of all, the civilian population of the country is harmed and the victims are increasing more and more. With all of the above, the Russians want to somehow cover up the Kherson disaster. At the same time, it is worth noting the fact that the Russian army is insufficiently equipped and not ready for the winter war. This is the main reason why the Russians are asking for negotiations. According to them, depending on the situation on the front, the events may develop in two scenarios - the parties take the so-called winter break, or the armed forces of Ukraine develop an offensive to the south - first in the direction of Melitopol and Mariupol, and then in the direction of Crimea. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to sideline the US and France, who with Russia had for decades co-chaired the OSCE Minsk Group, from involvement in any post-war conflict settlement arrangements. It established instead a Russian monopoly in mediating future arrangements in the region. Neither Washington nor France was involved in preparing the November 10 statement, while the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh fomented the role of Russia as the only security provider for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed another trilateral statement on January 11, 2021, focused on restoring communications. The leaders' November 26, 2021, summit aimed to promote a border delimitation and demarcation process. In late 2021, the West started taking small steps to re-insert itself in the negotiation process, with the President of the European Council organizing the first Aliyev – Pashinyan summit in Brussels. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 12, 2022, the White House published President Biden’s first national security strategy. The document outlines the US’ primary goals for domestic and foreign policy and its future vision for the world. US national security strategies have been published every four years since the early 2000s, laying out the incumbent administration’s policy goals and strategic priorities. The 2002 and 2006 national security strategies were focused on the war on terror and democracy promotion. The Obama administration, while emphasizing democracy promotion, started to refocus the US’ attention on the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, due to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the February 2015 national security strategy included harsh rhetoric toward Russia. In December 2017, President Donald Trump focused his national security strategy on great power competition and US rivalry with China READ MORE

By Ahmad ALILI, Director, Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre, Baku
Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies, Yerevan

On 31 August 2022, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, meeting in Brussels under the auspices of European Council president Charles Michel, agreed to authorise their foreign ministers to start immediate negotiations on a peace treaty. Instead, in less than two weeks, the two sides found themselves negotiating yet another ceasefire.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are slowly emerging from a long period of conflict. Over three and a half decades, tens of thousands died in fighting; hundreds of thousands of people were displaced; tens of thousands of landmines and other unexploded ordnance contaminated huge tracts of territory, and war and enmity became the standard narrative with both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The 1st Karabakh War in the early 1990s resulted in massive loss of territory by Azerbaijan; the 2nd Karabakh War in autumn 2020 changed the reality on the ground for the second time, nearly, but not completely, restoring the status quo ante. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Last week’s aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenia should be viewed from a regional lens, as the conflict imposes a new geopolitical reality not only on Armenia, but also Iran and the wider South Caucasus.

On September 10, 2022, the Defence Minister of Azerbaijan instructed his army to maintain combat readiness to “suppress any Armenian provocations.” Not surprisingly, three days later, Baku launched a full-scale aggression on Armenia’s eastern border, concentrating on Jermuk and using special forces, Israeli and Turkish-made drones and artillery strikes against military and civilian targets. Consequently, Azerbaijan occupied strategic positions near the border, exerting pressure on Armenia’s narrow southern region. The aim of this military operation was to enter Jermuk and force the authorities of Yerevan into another “capitulation.” READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since April 2021, Iran and other signatories of the 2015 nuclear deal (commonly known as JCPoA) have been engaged in active negotiations to restore it. President Biden’s administration declared its intention to move forward in that direction almost immediately after coming to power in January 2021. Many representatives of the Obama administration, who were personally involved in the negotiations from 2013 to 2015, received new positions in the Biden administration, and their desire to restore what they achieved in 2015 was quite understandable. Besides personal motives, the two and half years of the “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran launched by President Trump did not bring any tangible results. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Almost every war, short or long, ends at the negotiation table. There are exceptions to this rule, like World War II, which ended with the capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan. However, the capitulation of one side is an unlikely scenario for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan suffered significant defeat during the first Karabakh war in the early 1990s but did not sign the capitulation. Armenia faced almost the same fate in 2020, and while Azerbaijan and some experts in Armenia argue that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement was a capitulation for Armenia, there was no formal capitulation. Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been negotiating to reach a long-lasting solution. Russia, and since mid-2021, the EU have acted as primary mediators, organizing several high-level summits and hectic behind-the-scenes actions to facilitate the process. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The “Great Game” was a political and diplomatic confrontation that existed for most of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century between the British Empire and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and Central Asia, aiming to control trade routes in India. Almost a century later, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “Game” returned, and a fierce competition arose between the Russians and the Americans and their Western allies to control the oil and gas fields and pipelines in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In recent months, some positive momentum was registered in Armenia-Azerbaijan talks. The sides established national commissions on border delimitation and demarcation, and after a six-months break, the trilateral Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan commission on restoration of communication resumed its work. According to Russian sources, later confirmed by the Armenian deputy prime minister, the sides achieved significant progress in the negotiations, almost reaching an agreement on the route of the highway, which will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan via the Syunik region of Armenia, as well as on modalities of border and customs control. The agreement to open the Armenia-Turkey land border for the crossing of third country citizens and launch direct air cargo trade between the two countries, achieved during the July 1 meeting of Armenia and Turkey representatives, seemed to add a more positive environment in the South Caucasus geopolitics. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Amid mounting domestic unrest and ongoing diplomatic standoffs with regional states, Iran has devoted a significant and increasing amount of national resources toward upgrading its national drone program. On May 17, the Iranian government officially inaugurated its first overseas drone factory in Dushanbe, Tajikistan; the facility manufactures the indigenous Ababil-2, a multipurpose drone model with reconnaissance, combat, and suicide capabilities. The Ababil-2 boasts a maximum range of 200 kilometres and can sustain roughly 90 minutes of flight time. The new drone factory will help Iran to improve relations with Tajikistan after a period of lingering diplomatic tension, and General Mohammad Bagheri described its inauguration as a turning point in bilateral military cooperation between the two countries. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In late May 2022, Armenia and Azerbaijan established national commissions for border delimitation and demarcation. The two countries are close to signing a deal on the restoration of communications and will soon launch negotiations on elaborating a bilateral agreement. Currently, experts and societies wonder what these developments mean for the future of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Discussions are underway, and different ideas have been put forward. Some Azerbaijani experts started to circulate the possibility of autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh, hinting that Azerbaijan may change its post-2020 war rhetoric, denying the existence of Nagorno Karabakh and claiming that the issue of status was thrown into the dustbin of history. There is a lack of details on what this autonomy could be. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 has substantially changed the security situation around the Black Sea. The three NATO member states Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have pursued a very different and distinct policy with regard to Russia. Bulgaria, as will be further presented, remains dependent on Russian gas and oil. Despite the recent Russian decision to halt gas exports to Bulgaria over the country’s refusal to pay for supplies in roubles, Bulgaria did not buckle under pressure. Romania maintains a watchful eye after the Russian military operations along the Black Sea coast, in general, and the city of Odessa, in particular. Turkey maintains balanced relations with Russia and Ukraine. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia and Azerbaijan come closer to launching bilateral negotiations over the normalisation of relations, many issues wait for a solution. Currently, the hottest debates are underway regarding the future status of Nagorno Karabakh and the legal modalities of the transit for Armenian and Azerbaijani goods passing each other territories. The war in Ukraine and the complete collapse of Russia – West relations added geopolitical components to the equilibrium. Do we have EU – Russia competition over the mediation process? Are there any disagreements between Brussels and Moscow on promoting lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus? All these issues are worthy of being discussed and debated. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On May 12, the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia held another meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on the side-lines of the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States Ministerial summit, and with the participation of the Russian foreign minister. Although Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan characterized the meeting as another “productive interaction” between the warring parties, little progress has been made in the peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan since the 6 April meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Brussels. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On May 22, 2022, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev met in Brussels. The meeting was facilitated by the President of the European Council Charles Michel. For many observers, the May 22 trilateral meeting created a feeling of déjà vu. The same leaders were in Brussels less than two months ago. On April 6, 2022, Michel organized another meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders with the same sequence and results. Michel met separately with two leaders, then they held hours-long trilateral discussions, and late in the night, he published a statement summarizing the results. On April 6, participants discussed the same issues as on May 22 – the restoration of communications, the start of the border delimitation and demarcation process, and the launch of negotiations to sign a bilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan treaty. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The issue of the status of Nagorno Karabakh cannot be avoided in future discussions on an Armenia-Azerbaijan bilateral peace treaty. One solution is to agree to some transitional arrangement.
The April 6 Brussels meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations new momentum. The sides agreed to establish a border delimitation and demarcation commission and take steps to launch negotiations over the signature of a bilateral peace treaty. These issues were also agreed upon in principle back in November 2021, when two leaders had a meeting in Sochi facilitated by Russian President Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

There is no doubt that the ongoing Russian military action against Ukraine profoundly affects the rest of the Black Sea littoral states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Turkey. The tense standoff of recent weeks placed each of them in a difficult position between apprehension and, particularly with Turkey, a kind of peacemaker or rather mediator, which Russia now ignores completely.
Romanian Defence Minister, Vasile Dincu, said in January 2022 that “Russia, at the moment, is not a direct threat to Romania, but it is [rather] a threat to security in the [Black Sea] area”. The author disagrees with the minister’s statement since the Russian military, which is stationed on the occupied Crimean peninsula - not much more than 100 km from the Danube Delta – is a direct threat to Romania, even though Russian officials will blame the other side for posing a threat to Russia. Furthermore, the region’s three NATO member countries, namely Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, have until today been unable to create and implement a comprehensive Black Sea security strategy together with NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine to counter the challenges posed by Russia. The latter, however, successfully implemented its divide and rule policy in the region. READ MORE.

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in September of 2020 opened a new page in the modern history of the post-Soviet region and explicitly changed the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus. With Baku regaining control over large swathes of territories, Turkey has obtained a greater role in the region, acting as a guarantor of the ceasefire regime between Azerbaijan-Armenia alongside Russia, whereas Iran’s diminished position has gotten less attention. Indeed, in the post-war period, Tehran saw a steep decline in its regional influence in the Southern Caucasus, losing its direct land route to Armenia and facing the growing influence of Russia, Israel, and Turkey. Prior to the conflict, Iran had long pursued a balanced foreign policy in the region, developing a partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively. However, Turkey’s close relations with Azerbaijan since the 1990s prevented Iran from establishing powerful leverage over this country, unlike landlocked Armenia, which has relied on Iran as one of the main economic partners. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

While the world continues to follow the war in Ukraine and the growing tensions in relations between Russia and the West, Armenia and Azerbaijan are ready to launch negotiations to sign a peace treaty. All external powers involved in the region’s geopolitics – Russia, the US, the EU, Turkey, and Iran – support this process. Armenia and Azerbaijan will soon launch three separate, though interconnected, processes: the start of the work of the bilateral border delimitation and demarcation commission, the restoration of communications infrastructure, and the launch of negotiations on a peace treaty. These issues are discussed on two parallel platforms – Armenia-Azerbaijan-EU and Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia. Both Russia and the EU support the start of work on all three tracks. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Moscow and Beijing are likely to discover that their initial joy over the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may be premature. Afghanistan under the Taliban remains divided, insecure and uncertain about its current and future path. Without stability and security, neither Beijing nor Moscow will provide economic assistance while the international community will continue to shun Afghanistan.
Russia’s Presidential Envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, noted that “The Taliban were easier to negotiate with than the old “puppet government” of the exiled President Ashraf Ghani.” The latter was seen by, and from Moscow, as a puppet of the West and contacts that Russia maintained with Hamid Karzai’s successor were either downgraded or revised. At the same time, contacts between Russia and the Taliban only increased. With the West’s departure, Moscow is seizing up the opportunity indirectly to recognise the authority of the Taliban, which it officially designated as a terrorist organisation back in 2003 though without burning its bridges with the militant group. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As large-scale hostilities continue in Ukraine, politicians, geopolitical experts and international media outlets seek to assess the outcomes and implications of the conflict. When Russia launched its “special military operation” on February 24, the widespread assumption was that Russia planned a blitzkrieg to take major Ukrainian cities within days or maximum weeks. The narrative changed as the first week of hostilities passed with no significant Russian successes. Experts and commentators started to claim that the Russian plan failed due to miscalculations and stiff resistance of the Ukrainians. According to these assessments, Russian President Vladimir Putin was misinformed by his advisors and generals, who promised him that many Ukrainians would meet Russian troops with flowers and that the “special military operation” would be an “easy evening walk.” According to this narrative, facing a different reality, at the beginning of March 2022, Putin started to look for ways out of the mess hastily and end the war. READ MORE

Policy Recommendations from the 21st workshop of RSSC SG/PfP Consortium

The Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group (RSSC SG) was proud to resume its activities in a face-to face format in Rome, 7-10 September 2021. On that occasion, the Study Group discussed and subsequently agreed on a number of policy recommendations. The second Karabakh war was the catalyst for massive changes in the South Caucasus. Certainly, the new territorial realities fit better the internationally recognized territories of both countries, but important challenges remain, making it important for the RSSC SG to meet to spur thinking on the way forward. The conflict was also an opportunity for other regional actors. Georgia deployed uncommon diplomacy and peace-making skills in the aftermath of the combat phase between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Georgia demonstrated its ability at being an effective bridge between the two belligerents, Russia established itself as the essential arbiter and guarantor of a fragile ceasefire, and of purveyor of security for new lines of demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey has not waited and sided with Azerbaijan in achieving and securing the new territorial realities. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 22, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made an paid official trip visit to Moscow to discuss and sign a new declaration on allied cooperation with Russia. The visit came just a day after President Putin's infamous decision to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk Peoples' Republic in Eastern Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s “unexpected” decision deteriorated relations with Ukraine, even more and was followed by the new round of economic sanctions imposed by the U.S and the EU.
President Aliyev's visit to Moscow triggered debates in Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively, on whether the main text of the declaration was pre-negotiated between the two leaders, or prepared amid the escalation around Ukraine. READ MORE

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Without a doubt, Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin is the greatest factor in the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine. Yet paradoxically, Putin is perhaps the best hope for peace in the South Caucasus, at least as far as Azerbaijan and Armenia are concerned. The Georgian situation is, however, another matter. But one should take one step at a time in this exceptionally dangerous and conflict-prone region.
The recent 2020 Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia was, in effect, a continuation of the bitter 1990s ethno-religious territorial war over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) that emerged between the two newly independent states in the midst of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The 1990s conflict produced thousands of casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced civilian ethnic minority refugees. It was a humanitarian catastrophe for families on both sides of the border. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Since its emergence in the 1980s, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has been a significant source of concern to the state of Turkey. With the escalation of conflict between the Turkish state and the ethnic Kurdish community in the 1990s, the level of violence explicitly increased, and the civilian death toll rose to its highest point. Though the PKK could not ensure absolute authority in large, predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast, it gradually shifted to a new strategy —urban violence— to undermine the Turkish state's authority in Kurdish regions.
According to theories of violent resistance, violence is the only practical and productive tool of mass mobilisation of ethnic insurgencies against political systems. In the case of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, many scholars argue that Turkey's policy of ethnic nationalism has had a decisive role in shaping Kurdish ethnic nationalism throughout these years. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The current border tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are not the first and likely not the last. Given this, a successful border demarcation/delimitation process could be a crucial point in paving the way for a final peace agreement between the two adversaries. Therefore, the resumption of direct peace talks is the only rational option. Last month, shortly after the first anniversary of the 44-day Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, saw a new phase of violent hostilities, and the fighting was far from conventional. Deadly skirmishes occurred on the Azerbaijan–Armenia's international border, in a place named Giziltapa (Tsitserrnakar) near Syunik province. According to the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, the tensions flared up due to the Armenian Armed Forces' intensive artillery fires at the positions of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. In response, the Armenian Ministry of Defence accused the Azerbaijani side of provocation, violating international borders, and spreading disinformation regarding the skirmishes. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In the past few years, Turkey has been gradually increasing its influence in Ukraine through trade and military cooperation amid escalating tensions between Moscow and Kyiv, challenging Moscow’s standing in the Black Sea region. The strategic cooperation between Ankara and Kyiv is not limited to political statements, but rather encompasses other important fields, such as the economy, security and defence industries. Moreover, relations between the two countries gained further impetus with Russia’s unification of Crimea in 2014 and reached their peak during the administration of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who assumed office in 2019. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

In the period immediately after the 44-day Karabakh war, Baku-Tehran relations remained on the level of pragmatic co-operation, until the new conservative political establishment ascended to power in Iran. Since then, Tehran’s rhetoric against Azerbaijan has shifted from that of “partnership” to open threats that explicitly neglect the partnership atmosphere. Relations between Baku and Tehran have always been unstable, particularly at the beginning of the 2000s. However, they rekindled when both countries became engaged in regional infrastructure and transit projects. READ MORE

By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (Ret.), D.Sc., Professor of Political Science of the RA, RF, USA (state studies-strategic security studies), Full Member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the RF

In the wake of the 44-day war in 2020, an unprecedented escalation of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders has been launched. This was done contrary to the principles and procedure for border delimitation and demarcation recommended by the OSCE Secretariat. The unparalleled pressure on the Armenian population from Karabakh was accompanied by subsequent attempts to undermine the settlement process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship. Among the arguments substantiating claims to include Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Baku authorities refer to the Azerbaijani-language toponymy, which allegedly has a long history. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last year proved that assessments according to which by taking some 8500 square km of territories in the 2020 Karabakh war, Azerbaijan will be satisfied and an era of peaceful development will be launched for Armenians, were highly exaggerated, and had little semblance to reality.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia has faced a new, harsh reality along its borders with Azerbaijan. Some in Armenia hoped that after taking back most of the territories which Baku lost during the first Karabakh war of 1992-1994, an era of regional peace would start in the South Caucasus, while Azerbaijan would agree to continue negotiations to fix the status of Nagorno Karabakh within its 1988 borders. Baku was quite quick to dampen such perceptions. Azerbaijan established an economic region of Karabakh in July 2021 and started to aggressively push forward the narrative that war had ended not only the conflict, but Nagorno Karabakh itself, and thus it was senseless to negotiate over the status of a non-existing entity. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies
Todd Fabacher, Co-Founder, Distrikt Foundation, Gyumri

Countries, just like people, will experience the five stages of grief after a significant loss. 2020 was a challenging year for all nations. COVID – 19 pandemic and economic downturn have negatively impacted almost everyone. It was an exceptionally difficult year for Armenia because, besides the pandemic, defeat in the war launched by Azerbaijan against the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh) Republic in autumn 2020 resulted in significant material and human losses. In the first half of 2021, Armenia grasped domestic political instability, triggering an early parliamentary election in June 2021. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Back in July, Rich Outzen published a policy paper “Deals, Drones and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection” in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy highlighting the new strategy of the Turkish Armed Forces, the development of the arms industry and how Ankara is deploying hard power in the region. According to Outzen, the integration of drones, electronic warfare, manoeuvre and precision strike employed by Turkey across technologies and domains (manned/unmanned and ground/air/naval) have been characterized as a new phase of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). An RMA is a hypothesis in military theory about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for radical military reform. An RMA occurs when new tactics, technologies and operational concepts enable dramatic increases in ineffectiveness to provide early innovators a marked advantage and force others to adopt the same methods. READ MORE

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Despite signing the November 9, 2020 ceasefire, Azerbaijan and Armenia have not been able to agree on an actual firm ceasefire. There are too many border incursions and military incidents, despite the existence of decades-old soviet boundaries between republics that were firmly regulated in the former Soviet Union. Peacekeepers are too few and not located in enough areas to address all of the border incidents. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The bilateral Israeli-Greek military and defence industry cooperation was not created in a vacuum, but is a by-product of the steadily deteriorating Israeli-Turkish relations which include two important events: the famous World Economic Forum incident in Davos on January 29th, 2009 and the Mavi Marmara incident on May 31st, 2010. The Davos incident was further aggravated by the Mavi Marmara incident, which left ten Turkish citizens dead after clashing with Israeli commandos as the latter boarded the ship which was trying to break the Gaza blockade. Moreover, the military component of Israeli-Turkish relations, which used to be the backbone of the relations, is still missing and is unlikely to reappear in the near future. READ MORE.

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Just when you think the war is over, it actually is not. Multi-generational families are haunted by the dead. There are too many displaced persons, multitudes of refugee children uprooted from schools and homes, and continued mistreatment of POWs. The major economic dislocations and massive war debts are part of the ongoing and mounting negative tally. The competing legal terms national self-determination vs territorial integrity are brandished about in fervent ideological battles that further entrench the hardened positions of two combatant sides. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

A joint initiative of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, known as the ‘Bucharest Nine', was launched in November 2015 and laid a foundation for foreign and security policy meetings and discussions. As the next step, the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 accelerated military-to-military cooperation. As a result, the initiative brought Romanian troops to Poland and Polish troops to Romania on a rotational basis in March 2017. In addition, their pivotal positions in the east and in the south of NATO’s reach have further increased their cooperation in a variety of defence and security programmes. READ MORE.

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Azerbaijani military incursion into Armenian territory may have significant geopolitical implications. The muted reaction of the CSTO and Russia triggered another wave of anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia.
On 12 May 2021, news coming from the Syunik region shocked Armenian society. Several hundred Azerbaijani soldiers had crossed the Armenian border and penetrated up to 3.5 km into Armenian territory near the "Black Lake". The Armenian government did not confirm this immediately, however, late in the evening on the same day, Armenia’s Security Council convened in an extraordinary session, and the prime minister declared that Azerbaijani Armed forces had entered Armenian territory. READ MORE

By Nika Chitadze, PhD, Director, Center for International Studies, International Black Sea University, Tbilisi

The melting of the Arctic ice cap in combination with developments elsewhere concerning future of energy and military security are creating scenarios that range from low level friction to potential conflict between the Arctic littoral states. Much attention has been devoted to maritime boundary disputes involving the Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US. In addition to this, the emerging interest of non-Arctic states in shipping, polar research and non-living resources exploitation also adds uncertain elements to the Arctic geopolitical development. READ MORE

By Eduard Abrahamyan, Wider Black Sea & Central Asia regional security analyst

The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan held four-hour-long consultations in Paris, on January 16, under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group. The joint statement to come out of the meeting included telling language. In particular, the two sides acknowledged the need for “concrete measures to prepare the populations for peace”. READ MORE