By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

Following the recent presidential elections, Azerbaijan turned its focus to the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and its role in connecting the Turkic world, indicating that Baku does not intend to align with the West or Russia. The expansion of defence cooperation within the OTS signifies a pivotal shift in regional dynamics, with member states increasingly prioritizing mutual security and strategic alignment as well as shaping a common foreign policy agenda. The integration of Turkish defence industry companies in other member states’ defence infrastructure underscores the benefits of OTS cooperation and how the organization is emerging as a formidable force in Eurasia.
On February 14, during his inauguration speech at parliament, the re-elected President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, outlined the country’s foreign policy priorities within the framework of regional integration projects (See EDM, February 22). He designated the Organization of the Turkic States (OTS) as the primary focus for his new term, dismissing alternative organizations without explicitly naming them (Azertag, February 14). “This is the main international organization for us because it is our family. We have no other family. Our family is the Turkic world”, he stated about the OTS. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 12.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The South Caucasus will be the epicentre of any political or economic friction between Russia and the Middle East. The region, located along the International North-South Transport Corridor, is the most feasible gateway to connect Russia to the Middle East. Russia’s increasing economic and political interaction and involvement in the Middle East will further enhance its dependency on Azerbaijan, due to its bridging location, and Turkey, its partner in addressing upheavals in the Arab region. These two factors may push Russia to pressure Armenia to agree on the implementation of article nine of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement on unblocking economic and transport communications in the region and deploying Russian border guards to control the transit road connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. By doing so, Russia assumes it would increase its leverage on the main actors in the region that will use the transit route connecting Europe to China. The main actor within this context is Turkey, which aims to use the shortest route (compared to the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route) to trade with the Central Asian republics and beyond. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 12.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

This AIES Focus discusses the four major foreign actors in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan within the time frame of the last 12 to 18 months. While Russia and Turkey are active and directly involved, China and India are implicitly but not explicitly involved in the conflict. As a result, the author tries to present and highlight the divergent and convergent perspectives of the foreign actors in the conflict. One of the major focal points of the conflict relates to what the Azerbaijani call the Zangezur corridor, and the Armenians perceive as a bone of contention. What is perhaps not least important to emphasise is that for Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, the corridor has a crucial role in the transportation link between Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Turkic States. As for Armenia and Iran, its neighbouring country, the establishment of such a corridor is perceived as an existential threat. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 05.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region.
Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 05.03.2024  |  Security
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

Over the past two years, since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policies have drawn varying interpretations from experts and political observers. The delicate balancing act pursued by Baku between competing global powers while safeguarding the country’s national interests and restoring its territorial integrity has appeared as an intriguing case for the studies of international relations. Amidst the evolving dynamics of regional geopolitics, Azerbaijan’s recent engagements with Western counterparts underscore its unwavering commitment to maintaining robust relations with the West. Despite the complexities of navigating relations with neighbouring powers, Azerbaijan remains steadfast in its pursuit of multilateral or, as better known in the Azerbaijani discourse, balanced approach in foreign policy.
Many experts are still debating how the Azerbaijani government succeeded to dismantle the separatist regime in Karabakh without provoking a clash with Russia, widely known to be the major protector of this regime. In November 2023, during an international conference in a European city attended by the author of this article, Armenian experts critiqued the collaboration between Azerbaijan and the Western powers (i.e., the EU and United States) in September 2023 to dismantle to the separatist regime, aiming to diminish Russia's influence in the South Caucasus. Interestingly, some of these experts now suggest that Baku has aligned with Moscow to penalize Armenia’s pro-Western government. This situation underscores the complexity of Azerbaijan's foreign policy, often susceptible to misinterpretation. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 24.02.2024  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Ever since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, every meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders has been portrayed as raising significant expectations of some breakthrough. In 2021, all looked to Russia, where Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev met twice in January and November. Starting from 2022, the geography of hope for a breakthrough moved to Brussels, where Pashinyan and Aliyev met in April, May, and August. Even the large-scale Azerbaijani incursion into Armenia in September 2022, less than two weeks after the August 31 trilateral summit in Brussels, did not appear to diminish the hopes that every meeting may bring Armenia and Azerbaijan closer to peace. In late September 2022, experts and policy officials started to speak about possibly signing a peace deal by the end of 2022. Even the absence of a peace agreement and the start of the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in December 2022 did not shake the belief in some magic after each Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation encounter. In the first half of 2023, the center of gravity of expectations shifted towards Washington DC as Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held two rounds of negotiations in May and June. Even the disregard by Azerbaijan towards the measures of International Court of Justice on the blockade, the establishment of block post on the Lachin corridor in April, and the complete cut of Nagorno–Karabakh from the world in June 2023 somehow did not significantly decrease the hopes that Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations would bring results soon. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 24.02.2024  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since 2020, the South Caucasus has entered an active era of turbulence. The primary reason was the Azerbaijani decision to use military force to “solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” Azerbaijan started the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, launched incursions into Armenia proper in May, November 2021, and September 2022, and imposed a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022. The culmination of this strategy was the September 2023 military attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of around 105,000 Armenians and the dissolution of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
Even after the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan continues its policy of threats and pressure towards Armenia with an ever-changing shopping list of demands. Baku supports the concept of so-called “Western Azerbaijan” at the highest level. It expects an extraterritorial corridor from Armenia. It states that it will not pull away its troops from occupied Armenian territories, rejects Armenia’s offer to sign a non-aggression pact and continues to demand changes in the Armenian constitution and other laws. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 17.02.2024  |  External Relations
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By Marat Terterov, PhD, Founder, and former Executive Director of the EGF

The folly of predicting Russia’s future
When undertaking the task of seeking to forecast a ‘likely scenario’ for tomorrow’s Russia, one has to start with a caveat – predicting Russia’s future and what fate awaits the country in light of its continued military excursion in Ukraine is like trying to find a needle in a haystack. In other words, it is almost impossible to predict future political developments in Russia with any real certainty. This includes any efforts to predict whether Russia will continue to remain the arch belligerent in Ukraine, or whether it will be prepared to make concessions, or to forecast what impact either (or other) of these developments in the current conflict in Ukraine will have on the Russian regime of Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 06.02.2024  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of Armenians, there were some hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan received everything it could dream of just a few years ago.
After September 2023, Azerbaijan controlled the entire Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government accepted that reality with no intention to challenge it, while the international community did nothing tangible to punish Azerbaijan or create conditions to bring Armenians back. President Ilham Aliyev proved to everyone that he was not a “golden boy” who became president just because he was the son of a prominent leader – Heydar Aliyev – and lacked basic governance skills. He succeeded where his father failed, taking control over Nagorno Karabakh and raising Azerbaijani flags in Shushi and Stepanakert. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 06.02.2024  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

2023 ended with positive notes for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, but the new year has so far failed to maintain the momentum. Despite a successful prisoner exchange, and Armenia’s endorsement of Azerbaijan’s COP29 candidacy, recent statements from the respective governments have presented a mixed picture. While the Azerbaijani side has not indicated any setbacks in the ongoing talks yet, the Armenian government has criticized the recent statements by the Azerbaijani leader as unconstructive for the peace process.
Complicating matters further, disagreements have intensified regarding the possible regulations along the Zangezur corridor. The latest developments highlight a disparity in the visions of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for this corridor. Unfortunately, these developments suggest that the obstacles in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty talks may be more fundamental, potentially leading to indefinite delays in the process. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 06.02.2024  |  Security
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