By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan has pursued a strategy based on coercive diplomacy and military blackmail in negotiations with Armenia. Azerbaijan seeks to force Armenia to accept its two primary demands – to accept that Nagorno-Karabakh as a territorial administrative unit does not exist anymore and to provide Azerbaijan with a corridor via Syunik to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. Military incursions into Armenia are one of the main tools used by Azerbaijan to push forward with its coercive strategy. As a result of multiple aggressive actions, Azerbaijan has occupied up to 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory. Russia and the CSTO provided muted reactions to Azerbaijani aggression, so Armenia decided to involve other international players to deter further attacks. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 26.01.2023  |  Security
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The end of 2022 marked another round of confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Karabakh region with the involvement of Russian peacekeeping forces. The standoff began in early December, when the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the separatist Karabakh region denied access to Azerbaijani officials from the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources and the state-owned mining company AzerGold CJSC from carrying out on-site inspections of the Gizilbulag gold deposits and the Demirli copper-molybdenum deposits to evaluate potential risks to the environment. While Azerbaijani state officials were deprived of free movement inside the separatist portion of Karabakh by the peacekeeping mission, it fuelled skepticism in Azerbaijani and Armenian societies regarding Russia’s role in the process. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 26.01.2023  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The defeat in the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war shocked Armenia and Armenians all around the world. It ruined many perceptions deeply entrenched in political elites, expert and academic communities, and broader society: including that the Armenian army was the strongest in the South Caucasus, that Russia would not allow Turkey's involvement in Azerbaijan's war against Armenia, and that the West would not allow authoritarian Azerbaijan and Turkey to attack democratic Armenia. All these assumptions were crushed within 44 days, leaving Armenia facing a much harsher geopolitical reality. Despite this terrible outcome, many in Armenia believed that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement would foment a new status quo. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 20.01.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only route connecting the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic with the outside world. The corridor is blocked by "eco–activists," who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor the copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno Karabakh. They argued that Nagorno Karabakh authorities did not meet international standards. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase – the resignation of the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor were among the new demands added. Anyone, who has at least a basic understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has followed the developments there since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, has no doubts that what has been going on in the Lachin corridor for almost a month is connected with geopolitics, rather than benign environmental concerns. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 11.01.2023  |  Security
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The recent war of words between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the developments of the last several weeks, have demonstrated that both sides are far from inking a peace deal, which was promised by the end of 2022. Although both states vowed to intensify joint efforts on the final peace treaty in October 2022 on the sidelines of the Prague summit, little has been done since. On the contrary, the failure to hold peace negotiations has been magnified by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s controversial statements regarding Moscow’s non-recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh, which have immensely increased the risks of renewed hostilities between Baku and Yerevan. Although Russia maintains the role of “key mediator” on the Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan now openly demonstrates its discontent over Moscow’s role in the peace process, particularly after the merely symbolic meeting in Sochi on October 3. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 11.01.2023  |  Security
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On December 12, under the pretext of environmentalism, dozens of Azerbaijani state-backed “eco-activists” blocked the only land corridor in the Stepanakert-Shushi section connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. As anticipated, the “environmental” slogans were soon politicized, and political demands were raised by enforcing a blockade. A humanitarian disaster was created for the 120,000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. The real question is why Azerbaijan went for such a provocation and at what risk? Hence, in this article, I will shed light on the current crisis based on my meetings with Azerbaijani experts (keeping their identities anonymous) on the sidelines of several international conferences and online interviews I have conducted to analyze the Azerbaijani perspective and highlight the threats, arguing that the current humanitarian crisis is much deeper than the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it is related with the “battle of corridors” and beyond. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 11.01.2023  |  External Relations
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By Vusal GULIYEV, Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center of Boğaziçi University

The Russo‑Ukrainian war has affected global container traffic flows more profoundly than any other recent crisis. A series of West‑led sanctions and export restrictions imposed on Moscow has forced logistics companies to avoid shipping consignments via Russia’s Northern Corridor. At the same time, the disruption of operations through the Trans‑Siberian transit line has opened up new avenues for wide‑ranging cooperation along the emerging Trans‑Eurasian transport and trade corridors. The current geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe gives an additional impetus to what countries like Türkiye officially call the Trans‑Caspian East‑West‑Middle Corridor Initiative as well as to a set of containerized rail freight transport networks that traverse Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Anatolia whilst circumventing Russian territory. This alternative multimodal cross‑regional path—widely known as the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)— could help ease current logistics woes and begin a new chapter in terms of interconnectivity across the Euro‑Asian transportation networks, as global freight flows struggle to pick up speed in the wake of heavy economic sanctions on Kremlin. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 11.01.2023  |  Markets
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The war in Ukraine brought Russia – West relations to the lowest point since the early Cold war years of the 1950s. Discussions about the emergence of Cold War 2.0 were prevalent among experts and the academic community well before February 24, 2022. The starting point was perhaps President Putin's famous 2007 Munich security conference speech. However, the current confusion in global geopolitics is quite different from the original Cold War. In the second part of the 20th century, the world was bipolar, as the US and Soviet Union were fighting each other. Many countries sought to avoid this confrontation through membership in the Non–aligned movement, but it never became a third pole. Now the situation is much more complicated. As the US and Russia are facing each other in a new rendition of a Cold War, the world is far from being bipolar. It may eventually end with a new bipolar system, but Russia will not be among the top two players. If bipolarity ever returns, the US and China will be the building blocks of that system. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 13.12.2022  |  External Relations
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By Vusal GULIYEV, Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center of Boğaziçi University

In light of Russia’s increasing isolation from global markets due to a series of Western-led sanctions, the development of functional, secure, and integrated freight railway networks between Europe and Asia, beyond the territory of the Russian Federation, has come to dominate the discourse over the past several months. The disruption of commercial operations through the northern rail lines catapulted the popularity of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), an overland network of road, rail lines, and maritime transport that traverses Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Middle East whilst circumventing Russian territory. Consequently, the current geopolitical circumstance in Eastern Europe has allowed the host economies of the TITR—i.e., Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Türkiye—to reinforce the development of mutual political and economic bonds in order to strategically and effectively operationalize a uniform policy toward the sustainable implementation of the TITR. In the wake of heavy economic sanctions on Moscow, the major transit countries located along this overland trade channel have taken concrete steps toward achieving the expansion of transcontinental transit opportunities and attracting more international cargo shipments by realizing the rapid commercialization of this multimodal cross-regional route. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 06.12.2022  |  Markets
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last three weeks have proved that Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from signing a peace agreement, at least by the end of 2022. There is a danger that Azerbaijan may interpret this as a failure of the peace process and use this as a "moral justification" to launch a new large-scale aggression. If this happens, it will push Armenia and Azerbaijan further back from any chance to reach an agreement and deepen the mutual mistrust.
In recent months Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process passed through several ups and downs. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression seemed to jeopardize the fragile achievements reached during the three Brussel summits held in April, May, and August 2022. However, immediately after the ceasefire reached on September 14, there was a new push toward reaching a peace agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in New York in late September and Geneva on October 2; Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan had a meeting with President Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington on September 27, 2022. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 06.12.2022  |  Security
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