By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, diversification has probably been the most-used term in discussions about the future of Armenian foreign policy. It should be noted that Armenia has sought to pursue a diversified foreign policy since the early years of independence. In parallel with establishing a strategic alliance with Russia, Armenia has launched a pragmatic partnership with the EU and NATO. Armenia signed its first IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) with NATO in 2005. NATO was actively involved in the defence reforms in Armenia accelerated after 2008, including defence education and strategic defence review. Armenia joined the EU Eastern partnership initiative in 2009. It failed to conclude the Association Agreement with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Instead, it signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 2017, now serving as the solid base for Armenia–EU relations. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 26.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

In a nutshell, friendly relations between Georgia and Turkey are not a deterrent against potential Russian aggression against Georgia. Russia can always impose a blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coast by using its naval assets in Sevastopol, Crimea and Ochamchire in occupied Abkhazia, thereby effectively ‘strangling’ the nascent Georgian Coast Guard. However, despite being somewhat politically marginalised by the West, Turkey remains a crucial partner for Georgia.
Georgian–Turkish relations are in essence cordial but not equal. Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, is viewed as a junior partner in the relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For Georgia, Turkey represents an important partner in the volatile South Caucasus region. At the same time, enjoying friendly relations with Georgia as a transit country for oil, gas and cargo trains from Azerbaijan to Turkey, known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, is important for Turkey. Moreover, cargo transferred by road from Russia and Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey is a basic necessity. Bilateral relations are mainly focused on the economy and, occasionally, the Turkish military donates or sells military equipment to the Georgian Defence Forces (GDF). READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 19.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with one clear goal – to destroy it. It was a logical continuation of Azerbaijan’s decades-long policy, including the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and the blockade of the Lachin (Berdzor) corridor imposed in December 2022. After 24 hours of intensive fighting, the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic surrendered. A few days later, the large exodus of the Armenian population started, and by the end of September 2023, less than 100 Armenians were left in Nagorno Karabakh. On September 28, the president of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic signed a decree to dissolve the Republic by the end of 2023.
The reaction in Armenia to these events was somewhat surprising. The government made it clear that Armenia would not intervene to prevent the destruction of Nagorno Karabakh. Most Armenians went to social media, lamenting the lack of actions by Russia, the EU, and the US. Many were genuinely surprised that for Russia and the collective West, geopolitical or economic interests had more value than the fate of 100,000 Armenians who lived in Nagorno Karabakh for the last several millennia. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 19.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On 28 September, the separatist regime illegally created by Armenia in the territories of Azerbaijan in early 1990s, and which presented itself as the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, declared its dissolution by the end of 2023. Azerbaijan has quickly restored its sovereignty over the area that remained under the joint control of the separatists and Russia’s peacekeeping contingent following the 44-day war in 2020. This has been undoubtedly a major development not only for Azerbaijan but also for the entire South Caucasus. Many people both in the region and beyond agree that Baku and Yerevan are now much closer to a peace treaty as the crux of their decades-long conflict no longer exists.
It is important that the Armenian government shares this view and realizes the present opportunities for a real breakthrough. For instance, the speaker of the Armenian parliament Alen Simonian told Armenian public television on September 25 that “We are very close and have a historic opportunity to sign a peace agreement”. “Endless war is not beneficial for anyone”, he asserted. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 19.10.2023  |  Security
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 28, the leader of the separatist regime in Karabakh signed an order to dissolve all “state” agencies and organizations by the end of 2023. This was accompanied by a mass exodus of the Armenian population from the region. According to Armenian sources, more than 100,000 Armenians have left Karabakh as of October 1. The Yerevan office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said those fleeing Karabakh have not reported maltreatment. “Nobody has shared instances of being harassed,” said Kavita Belani, the UNHCR representative in Armenia at a recent news conference. It has also been reported that some Armenians have decided not to the leave the region. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 11.10.2023  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The lightning offensive of Azerbaijan against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic launched on September 19 has significantly changed the regional security architecture, which emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. Within 24 hours, Azerbaijan forced the unrecognized Republic to surrender, followed by the forced displacement of the entire Armenian population. As of early October 2023, around 102000 Armenians entered Armenia from Nagorno Karabakh, while, according to various estimates, from 15 to several hundred Armenians remained in the area. This new status quo raises many questions regarding the future of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the area, the prospects of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty, and the fate of Armenians from Karabakh, including such issues as the right of return and property compensation READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 11.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan's destruction by force of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) is seen by some as removing one of the key obstacles in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, that will resume in the next days in Granada, Spain. Others however see the elimination of the Karabakh factor as opening the way for Azerbaijan to make even more demands on Armenia. It is challenging to assess whether peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is within reach. However, one thing is clear: the second humiliation of Armenia within three years has already triggered significant backlash among Armenians. Many are still in shock, which is why Yerevan witnessed only small protests recently. However, many Armenians are fed up with permanent losses, and there is a growing feeling that Armenia, in the long–term perspective, should become stronger to reclaim its position in the region. In the current environment, any attack of Azerbaijan against Armenia, regardless of pretexts or reasons, will only strengthen this feeling among Armenians and will be a direct path to long-term instability and conflicts in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 04.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 20, Azerbaijan called for a ceasefire in the operation against armed detachments of the separatist regime in Karabakh. In a televised address to the nation, President Ilham Aliyev stated that Baku’s conditions were accepted by the separatist entity. He announced that the “representatives of the Armenian community living in Karabakh, who refused to meet our representatives several months ago, are ready to meet in the city of Yevlakh. Azerbaijan has disclosed that 192 servicemen were killed and more than 500 wounded during the 24-hour “anti-terrorist operation”. The Armenian side has reported at least 200 people killed and more than 400 wounded.
In preventing further escalation, the Armenian government chose not to militarily intervene in the clashes on September 19 and 20. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan characterized possible involvement as a threat to his country. He stated, “Armenia is not involved in military operations. I want to mention once again that Armenia does not have an army in Nagorno-Karabakh”. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 04.10.2023  |  Security
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By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched an “anti-terrorist operation” in the Karabakh region against armed separatist forces. The operation followed three years of largely unproductive peace talks between Armenian and Azerbaijan following the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The clashes ended in a ceasefire after only one day due to the separatist regime’s limited military-technical capacity in resisting the well-equipped Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Baku’s allies were quick to applaud the move. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during a joint news conference with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, declared, “It is a matter of pride that the operation was successfully completed in a short period of time, with utmost sensitivity to the rights of civilians”. Turkey has traditionally been a staunch ally of Azerbaijan, and the recent military operation to reclaim Karabakh plays into Ankara’s regional interests, especially regarding the future development and opening of the Zangezur Corridor. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 04.10.2023  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with only one goal: to finish with that republic. The Azerbaijani attack was not a surprise to anyone. At least since the beginning of 2023, Azerbaijan has stated clearly and loudly that Baku will not tolerate the status quo that emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and will do everything possible to destroy the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan was also clear that it would reach its goal quickly. Since the beginning of September 2023, as Azerbaijan started to concentrate troops along the line of contact, it was clear the military offensive would take place very soon. Armenia knew that Russia knew that, the EU and the US knew that, and Nagorno Karabakh authorities knew that. What were the positions of the sides regarding the upcoming offensive of Azerbaijan? READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 25.09.2023  |  Security
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