By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Russian resort town of Sochi was turned into the spotlight of South Caucasus geopolitics on November 26 as Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the much-anticipated trilateral meeting. The gathering was first announced by the Russian President’s Press-Secretary Dmitri Peskov to be held on November 8–12 to mark the first anniversary of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, which fixed the devastating defeat of Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war. Some Armenian media leaked news about the upcoming meeting even earlier, arguing that another document violating Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh’s vital national interests was in the works. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 02.12.2021  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last year proved that assessments according to which by taking some 8500 square km of territories in the 2020 Karabakh war, Azerbaijan will be satisfied and an era of peaceful development will be launched for Armenians, were highly exaggerated, and had little semblance to reality.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia has faced a new, harsh reality along its borders with Azerbaijan. Some in Armenia hoped that after taking back most of the territories which Baku lost during the first Karabakh war of 1992-1994, an era of regional peace would start in the South Caucasus, while Azerbaijan would agree to continue negotiations to fix the status of Nagorno Karabakh within its 1988 borders. Baku was quite quick to dampen such perceptions. Azerbaijan established an economic region of Karabakh in July 2021 and started to aggressively push forward the narrative that war had ended not only the conflict, but Nagorno Karabakh itself, and thus it was senseless to negotiate over the status of a non-existing entity. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 24.11.2021  |  Security
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

“Co-opetition” was a term coined by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff to describe a paradoxical strategy of cooperation among competitors, enabling them to collectively achieve mutual gains. It’s a relatively new term in international relations and used occasionally in international trade. Nevertheless, I will be using co-opetition to explain the current status of Russian-Turkish relations.
In foreign policymaking and geopolitical self-perception, Russia and Turkey resemble each other in many ways. Throughout the course of events in the Middle East and South Caucasus, as the West failed to engage with regional developments to resolve conflicts, other regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Russia filled the political vacuum. Hence, the Turkish-Russian interaction in the Middle East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the military and political withdrawal of the US and the European Union’s absence from the region. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 24.11.2021  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies,

On November 10, 2021, the South Caucasus will mark the first anniversary of the tripartite Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan statement, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war. During the last year, the experts, representatives of civil society, and journalists hotly debated the outcomes of the war and the implications of the trilateral statement. Who benefited more from the war – Russia, Turkey, or Azerbaijan? Has the Karabakh conflict been solved or thrown into the dustbin of history, or will the region face new rounds of negotiations and the possible resumption of hostilities? What is the future of Armenia – Azerbaijan and Armenia – Turkey relations? There are no easy answers to all these questions. However, one thing is clear – a year after the 2020 Karabakh war, the South Caucasus is still in the midst of geopolitical transformation, with regional powers vying for influence. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 16.11.2021  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has patiently and cautiously followed developments in the South Caucasus. Tehran’s main strategic objective has been to prevent US-Israeli penetration in the region, and it has viewed the Russian political and military presence in the region, particularly in Armenia, as a buffer zone against Western and even Turkish expansionist activities. When Turkey started to follow an independent foreign policy and came to terms with sharing power in the region with Russia, Iranian policymakers thought that Turkey—by cooperating with Russia—would reduce western influence in the region and give up its Pan-Turkic and neo-Ottoman claims. However, Iran was mistaken. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 09.11.2021  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The "corridors war", currently being hotly debated among experts, pundits, and policy-making circles in the South Caucasus, is largely based on wishful thinking rather than hard facts. In reality the options are rather limited.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, the theme of competing corridors in the South Caucasus has established itself as one of the primary topics for discussion and debate among experts, pundits, and policymaking circles. Almost daily, Azerbaijan and Turkey speak about the necessity to open the so-called "Zangezur corridor," arguing that it will significantly boost the regional economy. According to Baku and Ankara, the opening of the corridor is envisaged under the terms of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, even though the document itself speaks about only one corridor – Lachin. Under the term “corridor”, Azerbaijan envisages an arrangement which will allow Azerbaijani vehicles and trains to cross the Armenia – Azerbaijan border, pass via the Syunik province of Armenia and then enter the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic (an Azerbaijani exclave), without any border, passport, and customs control implemented by the Armenian side. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 09.11.2021  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Whilst Georgia has long acted as an informal home for peace building initiatives between Armenia and Azerbaijan, its recent offer of its “good offices” shows a higher level of engagement.
Ever since the end of the first Karabakh war, Georgia has become a Mecca for meetings of Armenian and Azerbaijani experts, peacebuilders, and other civil society representatives. Buzz words such as Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy in the context of the Karabakh conflict settlement process could be heard very often in hotel conference halls and board rooms in Tbilisi, Bakuriani, Telavi, and other places. Given the apparent obstacles in bringing Azerbaijani experts to Armenia and Armenians to Azerbaijan, many saw Georgia as an ideal place for serious meetings and discussions and long Caucasian-style dinners. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 25.10.2021  |  External Relations
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By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (Ret.), D.Sc., Professor of Political Science of the RA, RF, USA (state studies-strategic security studies), Full Member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the RF

In the wake of the 44-day war in 2020, an unprecedented escalation of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders has been launched. This was done contrary to the principles and procedure for border delimitation and demarcation recommended by the OSCE Secretariat. The unparalleled pressure on the Armenian population from Karabakh was accompanied by subsequent attempts to undermine the settlement process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship. Among the arguments substantiating claims to include Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Baku authorities refer to the Azerbaijani-language toponymy, which allegedly has a long history. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 13.10.2021  |  Security
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By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

In the period immediately after the 44-day Karabakh war, Baku-Tehran relations remained on the level of pragmatic co-operation, until the new conservative political establishment ascended to power in Iran. Since then, Tehran’s rhetoric against Azerbaijan has shifted from that of “partnership” to open threats that explicitly neglect the partnership atmosphere. Relations between Baku and Tehran have always been unstable, particularly at the beginning of the 2000s. However, they rekindled when both countries became engaged in regional infrastructure and transit projects. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 13.10.2021  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

For 30 years, Iran has adopted a cautious approach to developments in the South Caucasus, wary of the risk of encirclement. Iran's current military drills on the border with Azerbaijan are meant to send a signal that Tehran has its red lines too.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has carefully followed the developments in the South Caucasus. The strategic goal of Iran was not to allow the region to be a launchpad for the US or Israeli-initiated anti-Iranian activities. Due to the constant US pressure, Iran could not significantly increase its influence in the South Caucasus and directly compete with the US. Meanwhile, the US and Israel were not the only sources of concern for Iran. Turkey's intentions to increase its influence in the South Caucasus through the establishment of the Turkey–Georgia–Azerbaijan strategic partnership was another source of concern. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 11.10.2021  |  External Relations
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