By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

More than one year after the 2020 Artsakh War, the future of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations remains vague. Azerbaijan has put forward two demands: Armenia in written form should recognize Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and provide uncontrolled access to Azerbaijan to reach the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic via the Syunik province. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has launched the strategy of coercive diplomacy and military blackmail, refusing to free all remaining Armenian POWs and advancing into Armenian territory. The release of POWs is a clearly articulated agreement fixed in the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement. However, Azerbaijan argues that Armenians still languishing in Azerbaijani jails are POWs and are not covered by that statement. Baku successfully merged the POWs’ issue with maps of mine fields, thus forcing Armenia to accept the humans versus maps bargain. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 18.12.2021  |  External Relations
•  

Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Amid heightened tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, the issue of Georgia’s path to NATO membership is once again in the spotlight. While Tbilisi has made real progress in its military reform efforts, the major hurdle is political, not military, in nature and until the Alliance can achieve consensus, the future of Georgia’s relationship with NATO will remain uncertain. In March 2019, then-Georgian Defence Minister Levan Izoria heralded a new era in military reform: “In the past we trained our soldiers for external deployment, but the new emphasis is now on self-defence” — or rather territorial defence, a process that began to be addressed by U.S.-based military advisers in July 2016. READ MORE.

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 15.12.2021  |  External Relations
•  

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The current border tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are not the first and likely not the last. Given this, a successful border demarcation/delimitation process could be a crucial point in paving the way for a final peace agreement between the two adversaries. Therefore, the resumption of direct peace talks is the only rational option. Last month, shortly after the first anniversary of the 44-day Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, saw a new phase of violent hostilities, and the fighting was far from conventional. Deadly skirmishes occurred on the Azerbaijan–Armenia's international border, in a place named Giziltapa (Tsitserrnakar) near Syunik province. According to the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, the tensions flared up due to the Armenian Armed Forces' intensive artillery fires at the positions of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. In response, the Armenian Ministry of Defence accused the Azerbaijani side of provocation, violating international borders, and spreading disinformation regarding the skirmishes. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 15.12.2021  |  Security
•  

Policy Recommendations from the 21st workshop of RSSC SG/PfP Consortium

The Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group (RSSC SG) was proud to resume its activities in a face-to face format in Rome, 7-10 September 2021. On that occasion, the Study Group discussed and subsequently agreed on a number of policy recommendations. The second Karabakh war was the catalyst for massive changes in the South Caucasus. Certainly, the new territorial realities fit better the internationally recognized territories of both countries, but important challenges remain, making it important for the RSSC SG to meet to spur thinking on the way forward. The conflict was also an opportunity for other regional actors. Georgia deployed uncommon diplomacy and peace-making skills in the aftermath of the combat phase between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Georgia demonstrated its ability at being an effective bridge between the two belligerents, Russia established itself as the essential arbiter and guarantor of a fragile ceasefire, and of purveyor of security for new lines of demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey has not waited and sided with Azerbaijan in achieving and securing the new territorial realities. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 08.12.2021  |  Security
•  

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Regardless of the intentions of the US and the future trajectory of the new world order transformation, the democracy vs. authoritarianism vision puts small states located between Russia and Europe in a complicated situation.
As the "Unipolar Moment" started to fade away after the 2008 world financial crisis, political elites, the expert community, and academicians in the different capitals of the world launched discussions and debates about the future of the world order. There was no lack of catchy terms – post-American world, multi-polar world, no polar world, polycentric world, the rise of others – which all have one common feature; there will be many players active on the geopolitical chessboard of the globe, and the US will not be able to impose its vision on all of them. The US political establishment coined its term for the emerging world order – great power competition – which is the prevailing theme in all strategic level documents published by the Trump and Biden administrations. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 08.12.2021  |  External Relations
•  

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Russian resort town of Sochi was turned into the spotlight of South Caucasus geopolitics on November 26 as Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the much-anticipated trilateral meeting. The gathering was first announced by the Russian President’s Press-Secretary Dmitri Peskov to be held on November 8–12 to mark the first anniversary of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, which fixed the devastating defeat of Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war. Some Armenian media leaked news about the upcoming meeting even earlier, arguing that another document violating Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh’s vital national interests was in the works. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 02.12.2021  |  External Relations
•  

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last year proved that assessments according to which by taking some 8500 square km of territories in the 2020 Karabakh war, Azerbaijan will be satisfied and an era of peaceful development will be launched for Armenians, were highly exaggerated, and had little semblance to reality.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia has faced a new, harsh reality along its borders with Azerbaijan. Some in Armenia hoped that after taking back most of the territories which Baku lost during the first Karabakh war of 1992-1994, an era of regional peace would start in the South Caucasus, while Azerbaijan would agree to continue negotiations to fix the status of Nagorno Karabakh within its 1988 borders. Baku was quite quick to dampen such perceptions. Azerbaijan established an economic region of Karabakh in July 2021 and started to aggressively push forward the narrative that war had ended not only the conflict, but Nagorno Karabakh itself, and thus it was senseless to negotiate over the status of a non-existing entity. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 24.11.2021  |  Security
•  

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

“Co-opetition” was a term coined by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff to describe a paradoxical strategy of cooperation among competitors, enabling them to collectively achieve mutual gains. It’s a relatively new term in international relations and used occasionally in international trade. Nevertheless, I will be using co-opetition to explain the current status of Russian-Turkish relations.
In foreign policymaking and geopolitical self-perception, Russia and Turkey resemble each other in many ways. Throughout the course of events in the Middle East and South Caucasus, as the West failed to engage with regional developments to resolve conflicts, other regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Russia filled the political vacuum. Hence, the Turkish-Russian interaction in the Middle East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the military and political withdrawal of the US and the European Union’s absence from the region. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 24.11.2021  |  External Relations
•  

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies,

On November 10, 2021, the South Caucasus will mark the first anniversary of the tripartite Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan statement, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war. During the last year, the experts, representatives of civil society, and journalists hotly debated the outcomes of the war and the implications of the trilateral statement. Who benefited more from the war – Russia, Turkey, or Azerbaijan? Has the Karabakh conflict been solved or thrown into the dustbin of history, or will the region face new rounds of negotiations and the possible resumption of hostilities? What is the future of Armenia – Azerbaijan and Armenia – Turkey relations? There are no easy answers to all these questions. However, one thing is clear – a year after the 2020 Karabakh war, the South Caucasus is still in the midst of geopolitical transformation, with regional powers vying for influence. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 16.11.2021  |  External Relations
•  

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago, Iran has patiently and cautiously followed developments in the South Caucasus. Tehran’s main strategic objective has been to prevent US-Israeli penetration in the region, and it has viewed the Russian political and military presence in the region, particularly in Armenia, as a buffer zone against Western and even Turkish expansionist activities. When Turkey started to follow an independent foreign policy and came to terms with sharing power in the region with Russia, Iranian policymakers thought that Turkey—by cooperating with Russia—would reduce western influence in the region and give up its Pan-Turkic and neo-Ottoman claims. However, Iran was mistaken. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 09.11.2021  |  External Relations
•