By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s March 18 visit to Voskepar and Kiranc villages in the Tavush region, discussions and debates have been underway in Armenia on the situation along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border in that region. The visit took place after the statement of the office of Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, demanding the immediate return of “four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages’” located in Tavush along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border to Azerbaijan which were in principle covered in the demarcation and delimitation negotiations. During his meetings with villagers, the Armenian prime minister stated that “the process of delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan was entering the practical stage.” Despite acknowledging that there were no agreements on maps and principles of the process and that Azerbaijan would not leave the Armenian territories currently under its control, the prime minister argued for withdrawing from those villages to avoid a new war. After these meetings, some representatives of the Armenian leadership, including the speaker of the National Assembly, started to state that those territories were not part of Armenia and should be returned to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 05.04.2024  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan was a watershed moment in the conflict. Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory by force, defying decades-long widespread perception among OSCE Co-chair countries and other actors that the conflict had no military solution. Many expected that the demise of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would pave the way for the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement, thus bringing long-awaited stability to the region. However, it appeared that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was only one part of the bigger puzzle of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. After September 2023, Azerbaijan brought back the narrative of a corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, despite the fact that there was no Lachin corridor anymore connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh and started to highlight the necessity to change the Armenian constitution and other laws READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 27.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

In the shifting landscape of global energy dynamics and geopolitical uncertainties, the relationship between Azerbaijan and the European Union (EU) has emerged as a beacon of mutually beneficial and strategic partnership. The relationship between the two sides is multilayered and is of wider geostrategic importance. While the EU, among others, is a major partner for Azerbaijan constituting about 65 percent of its total foreign trade, Azerbaijan is a critical country for the EU in the Europe-Asia connectivity, and as an energy supplier. The cooperation in the field of energy is particularly of great importance for both sides and has gained momentum against the backdrop of regional geopolitical upheavals and efforts to pursue green transition.
The two sides have forged a strategic partnership in the field of energy that is pivotal for both sides economic prosperity and energy security. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, called Azerbaijan a “reliable partner” of the EU, when she signed the deal on the strategic partnership with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, on July 18, 2022. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 27.03.2024  |  Energy
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia and Turkey started a new phase of normalization at the end of 2021, appointing special representatives to draw up recommendations. From the beginning, Turkey stated that the process should be carried out without any preconditions. However, in the last two years Ankara has put forward various preconditions and failed to take steps agreed upon during negotiations.
Armenia–Turkey relations have always been a significant factor impacting regional geopolitics in the South Caucasus. In the period between the first and the second Nagorno-Karabakh wars, many viewed the normalization of Armenia–Turkey relations as having the power to help settle the conflict. Another significant factor influencing the process was the West’s perception that Armenia–Turkey normalization might enable Armenia to reduce its dependence on Russia, as “without fear of Turkey, Armenia will need Russia less. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 20.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On January 28, 2024, masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul, killing one person. Shortly afterward, the Islamic State, through its official Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility. Turkish police detained 47 people, most Central Asian nationals. The incident shed light on the growing presence in Turkey of a Central Asian offshoot of the Islamic State group known as ISIS-K for Khorasan, once a large portion of the Persian Empire now divided among Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states. The January 28 assault was the group’s first successful attack in Turkey since January 1, 2017, when jihadists invaded an Istanbul nightclub, killing 39 people and wounding nearly 80.
Since then, Turkish security forces have launched mass counter-operations against ISIS suspects in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The operations appear to have deterred deadly terrorist attacks in large urban and border areas and to have depleted the militants’ financial resources. With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K suspended overseas activities to focus more on Afghanistan and try to undermine the Taliban, which resumed control over the country after the Americans left. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 20.03.2024  |  Security
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Amid increasing tensions between Russia and Armenia, and Azerbaijan’s growing pressure on Armenia to annex new border villages, the first week of March was characterized by intensive official Armenian- Iranian meetings. What is the nature of these meetings? Is there any coincidence with the timing? And what can Iran do to defuse tensions between Yerevan and Moscow?
On March 6, 2024, a delegation headed by Armenia’s Defence Minister Suren Papikyan visited Iran and met with Iranian officials. In Papikyan’s meeting with his Iranian counterpart Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, the Iranian minister reaffirmed his country’s position supporting Armenia’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty over its entire territory and opposing a change in internationally recognized borders in the region. He also expressed support for direct negotiations between Yerevan and Baku that aim “to bring peace and security to the region.” However, Ashtiani warned that the pursuit of security from outside the region would backfire and create instability, adding “The architecture of regional security must be formed in the region itself, otherwise it will become a battlefield for major powers.” READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 20.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

Following the recent presidential elections, Azerbaijan turned its focus to the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and its role in connecting the Turkic world, indicating that Baku does not intend to align with the West or Russia. The expansion of defence cooperation within the OTS signifies a pivotal shift in regional dynamics, with member states increasingly prioritizing mutual security and strategic alignment as well as shaping a common foreign policy agenda. The integration of Turkish defence industry companies in other member states’ defence infrastructure underscores the benefits of OTS cooperation and how the organization is emerging as a formidable force in Eurasia.
On February 14, during his inauguration speech at parliament, the re-elected President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, outlined the country’s foreign policy priorities within the framework of regional integration projects (See EDM, February 22). He designated the Organization of the Turkic States (OTS) as the primary focus for his new term, dismissing alternative organizations without explicitly naming them (Azertag, February 14). “This is the main international organization for us because it is our family. We have no other family. Our family is the Turkic world”, he stated about the OTS. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 12.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The South Caucasus will be the epicentre of any political or economic friction between Russia and the Middle East. The region, located along the International North-South Transport Corridor, is the most feasible gateway to connect Russia to the Middle East. Russia’s increasing economic and political interaction and involvement in the Middle East will further enhance its dependency on Azerbaijan, due to its bridging location, and Turkey, its partner in addressing upheavals in the Arab region. These two factors may push Russia to pressure Armenia to agree on the implementation of article nine of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement on unblocking economic and transport communications in the region and deploying Russian border guards to control the transit road connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. By doing so, Russia assumes it would increase its leverage on the main actors in the region that will use the transit route connecting Europe to China. The main actor within this context is Turkey, which aims to use the shortest route (compared to the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route) to trade with the Central Asian republics and beyond. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 12.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

This AIES Focus discusses the four major foreign actors in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan within the time frame of the last 12 to 18 months. While Russia and Turkey are active and directly involved, China and India are implicitly but not explicitly involved in the conflict. As a result, the author tries to present and highlight the divergent and convergent perspectives of the foreign actors in the conflict. One of the major focal points of the conflict relates to what the Azerbaijani call the Zangezur corridor, and the Armenians perceive as a bone of contention. What is perhaps not least important to emphasise is that for Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, the corridor has a crucial role in the transportation link between Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Turkic States. As for Armenia and Iran, its neighbouring country, the establishment of such a corridor is perceived as an existential threat. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 05.03.2024  |  External Relations
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region.
Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 05.03.2024  |  Security
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