By Marat Terterov, PhD, Founder, and former Executive Director of the EGF

Small countries often find themselves having to make difficult choices when it comes to navigating optimal pathways for their national development. Their relations with larger powers, as well as competing relations between larger powers with an interest in specific regions where small countries are located, will invariably impact on their development. One of the regions of the world where the impact of larger powers on the development of smaller countries is highly evident is the South Caucasus, a region of the former-Soviet Union predominantly associated with the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These three relatively small yet important countries in a region of strategic importance have come a long way since they became independent nation states following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 13.07.2024  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On June 20, during a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken called upon the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments to conclude a peace agreement “without delay” (US State Department, June 20). He stressed Washington’s willingness to support the peace process “in any way useful to the parties.” During his recent trip to the South Caucasus in late June, US Deputy Secretary of State James O’Brien reiterated these messages to the respective governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The United States views peace between the two countries in a larger geopolitical perspective, characterizing it as vital to reducing wider regional dependency on Washington’s foes. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 13.07.2024  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As war in Ukraine rages and the confrontation between Russia and the West continues unabated, a growing number of experts are speaking of the beginning of Cold War 2.0, pitting the West against Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, the so-called “Axis of upheaval.” As with the original Cold War, the new one covers many areas of the globe, including Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East. The former Soviet Union remains the heart of this confrontation, and the South Caucasus is no exception. Strategically located between Russia, Turkey, and Iran, for the 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union the region was mainly the scene of competition between Russia and Turkey, with the first in the leading role. The last four years have brought significant changes in equilibrium. Azerbaijan transformed the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by defeating Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War with the direct military involvement of Turkey. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 13.07.2024  |  Security
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By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On June 11, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended a session of the BRICS group (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Moscow. While there, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. During the face-to-face meeting with Putin, Fidan discussed bilateral economic and political relations, focusing on the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East caused by the war in Gaza. Putin vowed to “fully support” Turkish membership in BRICS and build stronger ties to facilitate further economic cooperation. Fidan’s visit to Russia came shortly after he visited China, where he reiterated Ankara’s willingness to join BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These pronouncements have raised eyebrows in the West. US Ambassador to Türkiye Jeff Flake declared that Türkiye’s place is “in the West” and voiced his hope that Ankara would decide against joining the bloc. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 05.07.2024  |  External Relations
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By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

After the end of the Cold War, Turkish decision-makers adopted a “top-down” strategy that capitalized on the dramatic shift in international arms production. Turkey aimed to look eastward to cooperate with China and Russia as its threat perception changed. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey became a prominent Israeli arms purchaser. There were numerous factors behind this. First, Israeli weapons were a high-tech and credible alternative to NATO weapons. Second, unlike Europe and the U.S., Israeli arms purchases were not conditioned to Turkey’s domestic developments (democratization, human rights, minority rights…). Third, Israel and Turkey’s foreign policies overlapped in critical areas in the Middle East, aiming to contain Syrian and Iranian interests. Finally, deep relations with Israel were expected to be rewarded by pro-Israeli lobbying groups in the U.S. to counter the Armenian and Greek lobbies. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 28.06.2024  |  Security
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By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Following the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of Armenians, Azerbaijan has pursued a double-pronged strategy in negotiations with Armenia. Its first approach has been to undermine Western-led Brussels and Washington negotiation formats while showing an interest in resuming negotiations on the Moscow or regional platform. President Ilham Aliyev cancelled participation in the Granada summit of the European Policy Community in October and the scheduled tripartite meeting in Brussels facilitated by the European Council president, Charles Michel. In November, Azerbaijan rejected the United States’ offer to resume negotiations with foreign ministers in Washington. Baku explained its decision by claiming that the European Union, France, and the US have a pro-Armenian or anti-Azerbaijani stance. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has several times expressed its readiness to resume negotiations in Russia or on regional platforms. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 28.06.2024  |  External Relations
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By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Two agreements signed at the end of May advanced Azerbaijan’s efforts to establish itself as a key energy provider in Southeast Europe, going beyond its role as a producer of hydrocarbons to enter the electricity markets in the region as well. On May 29, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary signed a memorandum to create a joint venture as part of the implementation of the Black Sea Energy Caspian-Black Sea-Europe Green Energy Corridor project. The first agreement regarding the submarine cable was signed in 2022 and it is supposed to be fully operational in 2029. The Black Sea submarine cable will be 1,195 km long and is set to be an important pillar of the transition to green energy, with the plan to integrate it into the EU's internal electricity market. As an attempt to diversify energy supplies in response to Russia's war in Ukraine in February 2022, the Black Sea cable is of particular importance. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 21.06.2024  |  Energy
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

A long road has been passed since Armenia and Azerbaijan were fighting a violent war that erupted in the wake of the deadlock in the peace negotiations for around three decades. As President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan rightfully said, the chance for peace was eventually brought about by the war in 2020 that put an end to the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories. Having liberated its occupied territories, Azerbaijan immediately initiated a peace treaty with Armenia based on the fundamental principles of international relations, including mutual recognition of each other’s territorial integrity and non-use of force. It is a telling fact that Azerbaijan put forward this initiative in March 2022, when the Armenian separatist regime still had some control over the parts of the Karabakh region where Russia’s peacekeeping mission was temporarily deployed. This clearly manifested Baku’s intention to peacefully reintegrate the Armenian population in the Karabakh region and diplomatically resolve the remaining disputes with Armenia. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 21.06.2024  |  External Relations
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By Anahide PILIBOSSIAN, Vice President of Strategy and Development, APRI Armenia
Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Despite economic challenges and existing agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union, Armenia seeks closer alignment with the EU.
The recent statement of the Armenian Foreign Minister in the margins of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum denotes Armenia’s desire to join the European Union. This aspiration raises important questions on Armenia’s current position and options, which this article seeks to shed light on. At the same time, today’s complicated geopolitical environment highlights the need for the EU to formulate a strategic vision for the region. Between Pax Europa and Pax Russica, Armenia first went with the latter. However, following Yerevan’s defeat in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the military takeover of the region by Azerbaijan, despite the presence of the Russian peacekeepers, Armenia has now opted for the former. It stated its desire, backed by the EU, to join the Black Sea energy cable project (from which it has been excluded, reportedly as a result of pressures from Azerbaijan) and promote a regional infrastructure and connectivity project called the Crossroad of Peace, embracing, as European leaders did after World War II, the peace-building effects of economic regional integration projects. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 13.06.2024  |  External Relations
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By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On May 14, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar and Azerbaijani Minister of Economy Mikail Jabbarov signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of natural gas, including the export of Central Asian gas to Türkiye. Bayraktar told the media that by 2030, Türkiye is expected to receive increased gas supplies from Azerbaijan’s natural gas deposits and the Caspian Sea’s natural gas reserves, though he did not specify how much. Some of the gas flowing to Türkiye will transit onward to Europe. Bayraktar highlighted that a key aspect of the deal was arrangements for transporting Turkmen natural gas to Türkiye via Georgia and Azerbaijan. In recent years, traditionally isolated Turkmenistan has begun to seek more cooperation with outside partners, especially in the energy sector. The transit of Turkmen gas to Türkiye and onward to European markets would go a long way in removing ongoing reliance on Russian supplies. While Bayraktar did not disclose the planned transit route for the Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan or the amount of gas involved, several recent developments offer hints on how the two sides plan to carry out this project. READ MORE

• EGF Editor  |  Опубликовано на EGF: 07.06.2024  |  Energy
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